[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78H528SSYA9FANT93SF8QYS":3,"skill-same:01M78H528SSYA9FANT93SF8QYS":46},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":26,"commitSha":27,"skillDirectory":28,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":29,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":31,"install":32,"resources":45},"01M78H528SSYA9FANT93SF8QYS","idor",null,"Hunt Insecure Direct Object Reference (CWE-639) — missing authorization checks on object IDs. Covers horizontal vs vertical privilege escalation, UUID vs integer guessing, and GraphQL introspection-driven IDOR discovery.","dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","dnzengou","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F7807581?v=4","01M75KKJA3F5ZP7CA10MB2AEXC","01M78GP0FED2V1CDPB1N6G0CTH",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fanalyst\u002Fidor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: idor\ndescription: Hunt Insecure Direct Object Reference (CWE-639) — missing authorization checks on object IDs. Covers horizontal vs vertical privilege escalation, UUID vs integer guessing, and GraphQL introspection-driven IDOR discovery.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: web-exploitation\n  when_to_use: \"idor insecure direct object reference cwe-639 authorization horizontal vertical privilege escalation uuid integer graphql introspection\"\n---\n\n# IDOR Hunting Playbook\n\nIDOR is the #1 source of bug bounty payouts because it's simple,\nubiquitous, and scanners can't find it (authorization is business\nlogic). Every endpoint that takes an object ID is a candidate.\n\n## 1. Sources\n\n- URL path segments: `\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F123\u002Finvoices\u002F456`\n- Query string: `?user_id=123`\n- JSON body fields: `{\"orderId\": 123}`\n- Headers used as auth scope: `X-Tenant-ID`, `X-Customer-Id`\n- JWT claims that downstream handlers *trust*: `sub`, `tenant`, `role`\n- WebSocket subscription filters\n- GraphQL arguments (`user(id: 123)`)\n\n## 2. Audit workflow\n\n### Step 1 — enumerate object-handling endpoints\n```bash\n# REST\ngrep -rE '@(Get|Post|Put|Delete|Patch)Mapping.*\\{[a-zA-Z]+Id\\}' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc   # Spring\ngrep -rE 'router\\.(get|post|put|delete)\\([^)]*:id' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc                # Express\ngrep -rE '@app\\.route\\([^)]*\u003C[a-z]+:' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc                             # Flask\ngrep -rE 'resources?\\s+:[a-z]+' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc                                   # Rails\n\n# GraphQL\ngrep -rE 'type Query|type Mutation' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\ngrep -rE '\\w+\\(id: ID' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\n```\n\n### Step 2 — for each endpoint, answer three questions\n1. **Does it check who the caller is?** (auth middleware \u002F decorator)\n2. **Does it check whether the object belongs to the caller?**\n   (ownership check \u002F tenant filter in the query)\n3. **Does it check whether the caller's role permits the action?**\n   (RBAC \u002F policy engine)\n\nA \"no\" to question 2 = horizontal IDOR (read\u002Fwrite other users' data).\nA \"no\" to question 3 = vertical IDOR (regular user → admin action).\n\n### Step 3 — ownership-check grep patterns\n```bash\n# Django: should have .filter(user=request.user) on the queryset\ngrep -rE 'Model\\.objects\\.get\\(pk=' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc | grep -v 'user=request\\.user'\n\n# Rails: should have current_user.posts.find(params[:id])\ngrep -rE 'Post\\.find\\(params\\[:id\\]\\)' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\n\n# Spring: should have @PreAuthorize(\"#id == principal.id\")\ngrep -rE 'findById\\(id\\)' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc | xargs -I{} grep -L '@PreAuthorize\\|@PostAuthorize'\n```\n\n## 3. High-yield patterns\n\n### GraphQL IDOR via introspection\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fgraphql \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ __schema { types { name fields { name args { name type { name } } } } } }\"}'\n```\nAny query field that takes an `id` arg and lacks a custom directive\n(`@auth(requires: OWNER)`) is a candidate. Mutations are even higher\nvalue — they often forget ownership checks.\n\n### JWT claim trust\nIf the handler pulls `user_id` from `request.user.id` but also accepts\na `user_id` query param as override for \"admin features\", check whether\nthe override path enforces the admin claim. Frequently broken.\n\n### Mass assignment via hidden fields\n```python\nUser.objects.create(**request.POST.dict())\n# allows POST'ing is_staff=true\n```\n\n## 4. PoC workflow\n\nTwo-account diff:\n1. Create account A, note `sessionA` cookie and `objectA` ID.\n2. Create account B, note `sessionB` cookie and `objectB` ID.\n3. `curl -b sessionA \u002Fapi\u002Fobjects\u002F\u003CobjectB>` — should 403.\n4. If it returns 200 with objectB data → confirmed IDOR.\n\nFor vertical escalation:\n1. Normal user cookie `sessionU`.\n2. Call admin endpoint: `curl -b sessionU -X POST \u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\u002F\u003Cvictim>\u002Frole -d '{\"role\":\"admin\"}'`.\n3. Watch the response code + subsequent `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F\u003Cvictim>`.\n\n## 5. UUID vs integer\n\nSequential integer IDs make IDOR trivial. UUIDv4 makes it harder *but*:\n- UUIDs leak in logs, emails, public URLs, support tickets\n- Many apps use UUIDv1 (time-based) which is partially predictable\n- Enumeration through a listing endpoint still works\n- Some APIs accept both UUID and numeric ID (dual primary key)\n\nAlways test UUID endpoints — the \"it's a UUID so it's safe\" assumption\nis one of the richest hunting grounds.\n\n## 6. Success signals\n\n- HTTP 200 where you expected 403\u002F404\n- Response body contains PII\u002Fdata belonging to the other account\n- Role field changed on victim account\n- Subsequent admin action now permitted for low-priv session\n\nNegative control: same request with your own account's ID. Should\nreturn 200 with identical shape. Anything that returns 404 for your own\naccount but 200 for someone else's is a confirmation signal.\n\n## 7. Default CVSS\n\n| Variant                              | Vector                                        | Score |\n|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-------|\n| Horizontal read (other user PII)     | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:N           | 6.5   |\n| Horizontal write (modify other user) | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:N           | 8.1   |\n| Vertical escalation to admin         | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H           | 9.9   |\n| Unauth → any user profile            | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:N           | 7.5   |\n\n## 8. Chain promotion\n\nIDOR is a classic chain *starter*:\n- IDOR → other user's password reset token → account takeover\n- IDOR → admin role grant → every other admin-only vuln unlocked\n- IDOR → internal API key → SSRF pivots\n\nWeight 0.5 for authenticated IDOR, 0.3 for unauth.\n","# IDOR Hunting Playbook\n\nIDOR is the #1 source of bug bounty payouts because it's simple,\nubiquitous, and scanners can't find it (authorization is business\nlogic). Every endpoint that takes an object ID is a candidate.\n\n## 1. Sources\n\n- URL path segments: `\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F123\u002Finvoices\u002F456`\n- Query string: `?user_id=123`\n- JSON body fields: `{\"orderId\": 123}`\n- Headers used as auth scope: `X-Tenant-ID`, `X-Customer-Id`\n- JWT claims that downstream handlers *trust*: `sub`, `tenant`, `role`\n- WebSocket subscription filters\n- GraphQL arguments (`user(id: 123)`)\n\n## 2. Audit workflow\n\n### Step 1 — enumerate object-handling endpoints\n```bash\n# REST\ngrep -rE '@(Get|Post|Put|Delete|Patch)Mapping.*\\{[a-zA-Z]+Id\\}' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc   # Spring\ngrep -rE 'router\\.(get|post|put|delete)\\([^)]*:id' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc                # Express\ngrep -rE '@app\\.route\\([^)]*\u003C[a-z]+:' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc                             # Flask\ngrep -rE 'resources?\\s+:[a-z]+' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc                                   # Rails\n\n# GraphQL\ngrep -rE 'type Query|type Mutation' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\ngrep -rE '\\w+\\(id: ID' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\n```\n\n### Step 2 — for each endpoint, answer three questions\n1. **Does it check who the caller is?** (auth middleware \u002F decorator)\n2. **Does it check whether the object belongs to the caller?**\n   (ownership check \u002F tenant filter in the query)\n3. **Does it check whether the caller's role permits the action?**\n   (RBAC \u002F policy engine)\n\nA \"no\" to question 2 = horizontal IDOR (read\u002Fwrite other users' data).\nA \"no\" to question 3 = vertical IDOR (regular user → admin action).\n\n### Step 3 — ownership-check grep patterns\n```bash\n# Django: should have .filter(user=request.user) on the queryset\ngrep -rE 'Model\\.objects\\.get\\(pk=' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc | grep -v 'user=request\\.user'\n\n# Rails: should have current_user.posts.find(params[:id])\ngrep -rE 'Post\\.find\\(params\\[:id\\]\\)' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\n\n# Spring: should have @PreAuthorize(\"#id == principal.id\")\ngrep -rE 'findById\\(id\\)' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc | xargs -I{} grep -L '@PreAuthorize\\|@PostAuthorize'\n```\n\n## 3. High-yield patterns\n\n### GraphQL IDOR via introspection\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fgraphql \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ __schema { types { name fields { name args { name type { name } } } } } }\"}'\n```\nAny query field that takes an `id` arg and lacks a custom directive\n(`@auth(requires: OWNER)`) is a candidate. Mutations are even higher\nvalue — they often forget ownership checks.\n\n### JWT claim trust\nIf the handler pulls `user_id` from `request.user.id` but also accepts\na `user_id` query param as override for \"admin features\", check whether\nthe override path enforces the admin claim. Frequently broken.\n\n### Mass assignment via hidden fields\n```python\nUser.objects.create(**request.POST.dict())\n# allows POST'ing is_staff=true\n```\n\n## 4. PoC workflow\n\nTwo-account diff:\n1. Create account A, note `sessionA` cookie and `objectA` ID.\n2. Create account B, note `sessionB` cookie and `objectB` ID.\n3. `curl -b sessionA \u002Fapi\u002Fobjects\u002F\u003CobjectB>` — should 403.\n4. If it returns 200 with objectB data → confirmed IDOR.\n\nFor vertical escalation:\n1. Normal user cookie `sessionU`.\n2. Call admin endpoint: `curl -b sessionU -X POST \u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\u002F\u003Cvictim>\u002Frole -d '{\"role\":\"admin\"}'`.\n3. Watch the response code + subsequent `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F\u003Cvictim>`.\n\n## 5. UUID vs integer\n\nSequential integer IDs make IDOR trivial. UUIDv4 makes it harder *but*:\n- UUIDs leak in logs, emails, public URLs, support tickets\n- Many apps use UUIDv1 (time-based) which is partially predictable\n- Enumeration through a listing endpoint still works\n- Some APIs accept both UUID and numeric ID (dual primary key)\n\nAlways test UUID endpoints — the \"it's a UUID so it's safe\" assumption\nis one of the richest hunting grounds.\n\n## 6. Success signals\n\n- HTTP 200 where you expected 403\u002F404\n- Response body contains PII\u002Fdata belonging to the other account\n- Role field changed on victim account\n- Subsequent admin action now permitted for low-priv session\n\nNegative control: same request with your own account's ID. Should\nreturn 200 with identical shape. Anything that returns 404 for your own\naccount but 200 for someone else's is a confirmation signal.\n\n## 7. Default CVSS\n\n| Variant                              | Vector                                        | Score |\n|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-------|\n| Horizontal read (other user PII)     | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:N           | 6.5   |\n| Horizontal write (modify other user) | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:N           | 8.1   |\n| Vertical escalation to admin         | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H           | 9.9   |\n| Unauth → any user profile            | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:N           | 7.5   |\n\n## 8. Chain promotion\n\nIDOR is a classic chain *starter*:\n- IDOR → other user's password reset token → account takeover\n- IDOR → admin role grant → every other admin-only vuln unlocked\n- IDOR → internal API key → SSRF pivots\n\nWeight 0.5 for authenticated IDOR, 0.3 for unauth.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":23,"description":7},{"subdomain":24,"when_to_use":25},"web-exploitation","idor insecure direct object reference cwe-639 authorization horizontal vertical privilege escalation uuid integer graphql introspection","main","376de63e2b186eeb9856476ae89186e62b1d3fbe","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fanalyst\u002Fidor","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou","2026-11-09 16:34:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":33,"prompt":43,"zipAvailable":44},[34,37,40],{"tool":35,"command":36},"npx","npx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill idor",{"tool":38,"command":39},"bunx","bunx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill idor",{"tool":41,"command":42},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill idor","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fanalyst\u002Fidor\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[47,54,61,68,75,82],{"skillNo":48,"name":49,"nameZh":6,"description":50,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":51,"categories":52,"keywords":53,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAX15GZR5Q5S7RMPWFX43","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":55,"name":56,"nameZh":6,"description":57,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":58,"categories":59,"keywords":60,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JARXE0ZER8P81SFD024YP","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":62,"name":63,"nameZh":6,"description":64,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":65,"categories":66,"keywords":67,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JANJNH8VMR0CK1Y6AM74G","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":69,"name":70,"nameZh":6,"description":71,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":72,"categories":73,"keywords":74,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAFCYR2BAJF7KH0ZCXREA","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":76,"name":77,"nameZh":6,"description":78,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":79,"categories":80,"keywords":81,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAAQ5T08FR9MY5SFNRWBM","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":86,"categories":87,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA6799JQZE0M9B21HRMGY","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]