[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78H2R5QP62XPD3TXSRDASS0":3,"skill-same:01M78H2R5QP62XPD3TXSRDASS0":52},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":32,"commitSha":33,"skillDirectory":34,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":35,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":36,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":37,"install":38,"resources":51},"01M78H2R5QP62XPD3TXSRDASS0","bloodhound-bhce",null,"Operate BloodHound Community Edition v9.2.2 via Decepticon's bhce_* tools — health check, Cypher passthrough, SharpHound ZIP ingest. Replaces the in-house ingest + ESC* post-process pipeline per ADR-0005.","dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","dnzengou","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F7807581?v=4","01M75KKJA3F5ZP7CA10MB2AEXC","01M78GP0FED2V1CDPB1N6G0CTH",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fbloodhound-bhce\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: bloodhound-bhce\ndescription: Operate BloodHound Community Edition v9.2.2 via Decepticon's bhce_* tools — health check, Cypher passthrough, SharpHound ZIP ingest. Replaces the in-house ingest + ESC* post-process pipeline per ADR-0005.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: active-directory\n  when_to_use: \"bloodhound bhce attack path adcs esc dcsync sharphound ingest cypher ad enumeration domain compromise\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1078.002\n    - T1558.003\n    - T1649\n    - T1003.006\n  upstream_url: https:\u002F\u002Fbloodhound.specterops.io\u002F\n---\n\n# BloodHound CE via Decepticon's `bhce_*` Tools\n\nDecepticon ships a sidecar BloodHound Community Edition v9.2.2 stack\n(see `docs\u002Fadr\u002F0005-bloodhound-via-bhce-rest-client.md`).  Three\n`@tool` wrappers expose it to the agent:\n\n| tool | what it does |\n|---|---|\n| `bhce_status` | Confirm BHCE is healthy and our HMAC token authenticates.  Always call this first when an AD task starts. |\n| `bhce_cypher` | Run any Cypher query against BHCE's graph.  Mutations are off by default. |\n| `bhce_ingest_zip` | Push a SharpHound `.zip` into BHCE — 3-step `file-upload` flow + polling until BHCE finishes parse + ESC* analysis. |\n\nUse these instead of the legacy `bh_ingest_zip` \u002F `dcsync_check` \u002F\n`delegation_audit` \u002F `gpo_audit` \u002F `adcs_audit` family — those are\nthe in-house port and are being retired per ADR-0005.\n\n## Why we use BHCE rather than our own ingest\n\nBHCE's `PostProcessedRelationships` Go pipeline emits every edge a\nred-team operator expects: `ADCSESC1-13`, `GoldenCert`, `DCSync`,\n`TrustedForNTAuth`, `IssuedSignedBy`, `CoerceAndRelayNTLMTo*`,\n`HasSIDHistory`, `HasTrustKeys`, `SyncLAPSPassword`, …  The list is in\n`graphschema\u002Fad\u002Fad.go::PostProcessedRelationships()` in the BHCE\nsource.  We deliberately do **not** re-implement these in our\ncodebase; the agent leans on BHCE's analyzer instead.\n\nThe Decepticon KGStore still owns web, cloud, and smart-contract\nfindings, and stays canonical for cross-domain chain planning.\nBHCE is the AD layer.\n\n## End-to-end loop the agent should follow\n\n1. **Health check** — `bhce_status()`.  Verify `version.data.server_version` matches the deployed v9.2.2 and `self.data.principal_name` is non-empty.  If the diagnostic mentions `BHCE_URL` \u002F `BHCE_TOKEN_*`, the sidecar is offline or the token has been revoked — stop and report.\n\n2. **Ingest** — for every SharpHound collection drop:\n   ```\n   bhce_ingest_zip(path=\"\u002Fabs\u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002F20260605_lab.zip\")\n   ```\n   Expected result envelope: `{job_id, terminal_status, last_payload, elapsed_seconds}`.  `terminal_status` must be one of\n   `Complete`, `PartiallyComplete`, `Failed`, `Cancelled`.  Anything else\n   (an `error` field, missing terminal_status) means BHCE never closed\n   the job — surface the error to the operator rather than continuing\n   with stale data.\n\n3. **Walk the graph** with `bhce_cypher`.  Some battle-tested starting\n   queries (BHCE node labels — `User`, `Computer`, `Group`, `Domain`,\n   `GPO`, `OU`, `CertTemplate`, `EnterpriseCA`, `RootCA`, `AIACA`,\n   `NTAuthStore`, `IssuancePolicy`):\n\n   - **All Domain Admins** (sanity check that ingest landed):\n     ```cypher\n     MATCH (g:Group)\n     WHERE g.objectid ENDS WITH '-512'\n     MATCH (n)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g)\n     RETURN n.name, labels(n)\n     ```\n\n   - **Shortest path from a foothold to a Tier-Zero asset**:\n     ```cypher\n     MATCH p = shortestPath(\n       (n {objectid: $foothold_sid})-[*1..15]->(t {system_tags: 'admin_tier_0'})\n     )\n     RETURN p\n     ```\n\n   - **ADCS escalation paths** (BHCE post-processes ESC* edges, so the\n     agent never has to derive them):\n     ```cypher\n     MATCH p = (u {objectid: $foothold_sid})\n                 -[:MemberOf|ADCSESC1|ADCSESC3|ADCSESC4|ADCSESC6a|ADCSESC6b|\n                   ADCSESC9a|ADCSESC9b|ADCSESC10a|ADCSESC10b|ADCSESC13|\n                   Enroll|AutoEnroll|GenericAll*1..10]->\n               (t:Domain)\n     RETURN p LIMIT 10\n     ```\n\n   - **GoldenCert opportunities** (CA + NTAuthStore + Domain triangle):\n     ```cypher\n     MATCH (ca:EnterpriseCA)-[:TrustedForNTAuth]->(:NTAuthStore)\n     MATCH (ca)-[:GoldenCert]->(d:Domain)\n     RETURN ca.name, d.name\n     ```\n\n   - **DCSync candidates**:\n     ```cypher\n     MATCH (n)-[:DCSync]->(d:Domain)\n     RETURN n.name, labels(n), d.name\n     ```\n\n4. **Cross-domain plays** — when an AD path terminates and the chain\n   needs to cross into the Decepticon KGStore (web exploitation, cloud\n   pivots, smart-contract findings), hand the BHCE finding off to the\n   chain planner.  Do not try to write web\u002Fcloud nodes into BHCE; BHCE\n   is AD-only.\n\n## Common failure modes\n\n- **`bhce_status` returns a `BHCE_URL` diagnostic** — the sidecar\n  isn't running (`docker compose up -d bhce-neo4j bhce`) or the\n  agent's environment is missing `BHCE_TOKEN_ID` \u002F `BHCE_TOKEN_KEY`.\n- **`bhce_cypher` returns 401 `signature digest mismatch`** — clock\n  skew.  BHCE enforces ±1 hour (`cmd\u002Fapi\u002Fsrc\u002Fapi\u002Fauth.go:276-296`).\n  Check the container time before opening a wider investigation.\n- **`bhce_ingest_zip` reports `terminal_status: Failed`** — the ZIP\n  is corrupt or BHCE rejected an unknown JSON schema version\n  (`meta.version`).  Look in `last_payload` for the BHCE-side reason.\n- **An expected ADCS edge is missing after ingest** — BHCE only\n  derives ESC* \u002F GoldenCert \u002F DCSync at analysis time, which runs\n  after ingest closes.  Wait for `terminal_status` (the tool already\n  polls until terminal) rather than re-running cypher in a busy loop.\n\n## Where authoritative information lives\n\n- **BHCE source code**: `github.com\u002FSpecterOps\u002FBloodHound` (current\n  release v9.2.2, 2026-06-01).  This is the single source of truth\n  for every edge, post-process algorithm, and Cypher passthrough\n  guard.  When the upstream changes the schema, the agent's queries\n  here have to follow.\n- **Official BHCE REST API spec**: shipped at\n  `packages\u002Fgo\u002Fopenapi\u002Fsrc\u002Fopenapi.yaml` in the BHCE repo, also\n  reachable at runtime via `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv2\u002Fspec` on the sidecar.\n- **SpecterOps documentation site**:\n  https:\u002F\u002Fbloodhound.specterops.io — official methodology, AD \u002F Azure\n  \u002F ADCS guides, and the canonical attack-path query library.\n  Consult it directly for novel attack patterns; we deliberately\n  avoid vendoring it here so the agent always reads the latest.\n- **ADR**: `docs\u002Fadr\u002F0005-bloodhound-via-bhce-rest-client.md` — why\n  the agent talks to a sidecar BHCE instead of using the in-house\n  port that PRs #560..#578 built.\n","# BloodHound CE via Decepticon's `bhce_*` Tools\n\nDecepticon ships a sidecar BloodHound Community Edition v9.2.2 stack\n(see `docs\u002Fadr\u002F0005-bloodhound-via-bhce-rest-client.md`).  Three\n`@tool` wrappers expose it to the agent:\n\n| tool | what it does |\n|---|---|\n| `bhce_status` | Confirm BHCE is healthy and our HMAC token authenticates.  Always call this first when an AD task starts. |\n| `bhce_cypher` | Run any Cypher query against BHCE's graph.  Mutations are off by default. |\n| `bhce_ingest_zip` | Push a SharpHound `.zip` into BHCE — 3-step `file-upload` flow + polling until BHCE finishes parse + ESC* analysis. |\n\nUse these instead of the legacy `bh_ingest_zip` \u002F `dcsync_check` \u002F\n`delegation_audit` \u002F `gpo_audit` \u002F `adcs_audit` family — those are\nthe in-house port and are being retired per ADR-0005.\n\n## Why we use BHCE rather than our own ingest\n\nBHCE's `PostProcessedRelationships` Go pipeline emits every edge a\nred-team operator expects: `ADCSESC1-13`, `GoldenCert`, `DCSync`,\n`TrustedForNTAuth`, `IssuedSignedBy`, `CoerceAndRelayNTLMTo*`,\n`HasSIDHistory`, `HasTrustKeys`, `SyncLAPSPassword`, …  The list is in\n`graphschema\u002Fad\u002Fad.go::PostProcessedRelationships()` in the BHCE\nsource.  We deliberately do **not** re-implement these in our\ncodebase; the agent leans on BHCE's analyzer instead.\n\nThe Decepticon KGStore still owns web, cloud, and smart-contract\nfindings, and stays canonical for cross-domain chain planning.\nBHCE is the AD layer.\n\n## End-to-end loop the agent should follow\n\n1. **Health check** — `bhce_status()`.  Verify `version.data.server_version` matches the deployed v9.2.2 and `self.data.principal_name` is non-empty.  If the diagnostic mentions `BHCE_URL` \u002F `BHCE_TOKEN_*`, the sidecar is offline or the token has been revoked — stop and report.\n\n2. **Ingest** — for every SharpHound collection drop:\n   ```\n   bhce_ingest_zip(path=\"\u002Fabs\u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002F20260605_lab.zip\")\n   ```\n   Expected result envelope: `{job_id, terminal_status, last_payload, elapsed_seconds}`.  `terminal_status` must be one of\n   `Complete`, `PartiallyComplete`, `Failed`, `Cancelled`.  Anything else\n   (an `error` field, missing terminal_status) means BHCE never closed\n   the job — surface the error to the operator rather than continuing\n   with stale data.\n\n3. **Walk the graph** with `bhce_cypher`.  Some battle-tested starting\n   queries (BHCE node labels — `User`, `Computer`, `Group`, `Domain`,\n   `GPO`, `OU`, `CertTemplate`, `EnterpriseCA`, `RootCA`, `AIACA`,\n   `NTAuthStore`, `IssuancePolicy`):\n\n   - **All Domain Admins** (sanity check that ingest landed):\n     ```cypher\n     MATCH (g:Group)\n     WHERE g.objectid ENDS WITH '-512'\n     MATCH (n)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g)\n     RETURN n.name, labels(n)\n     ```\n\n   - **Shortest path from a foothold to a Tier-Zero asset**:\n     ```cypher\n     MATCH p = shortestPath(\n       (n {objectid: $foothold_sid})-[*1..15]->(t {system_tags: 'admin_tier_0'})\n     )\n     RETURN p\n     ```\n\n   - **ADCS escalation paths** (BHCE post-processes ESC* edges, so the\n     agent never has to derive them):\n     ```cypher\n     MATCH p = (u {objectid: $foothold_sid})\n                 -[:MemberOf|ADCSESC1|ADCSESC3|ADCSESC4|ADCSESC6a|ADCSESC6b|\n                   ADCSESC9a|ADCSESC9b|ADCSESC10a|ADCSESC10b|ADCSESC13|\n                   Enroll|AutoEnroll|GenericAll*1..10]->\n               (t:Domain)\n     RETURN p LIMIT 10\n     ```\n\n   - **GoldenCert opportunities** (CA + NTAuthStore + Domain triangle):\n     ```cypher\n     MATCH (ca:EnterpriseCA)-[:TrustedForNTAuth]->(:NTAuthStore)\n     MATCH (ca)-[:GoldenCert]->(d:Domain)\n     RETURN ca.name, d.name\n     ```\n\n   - **DCSync candidates**:\n     ```cypher\n     MATCH (n)-[:DCSync]->(d:Domain)\n     RETURN n.name, labels(n), d.name\n     ```\n\n4. **Cross-domain plays** — when an AD path terminates and the chain\n   needs to cross into the Decepticon KGStore (web exploitation, cloud\n   pivots, smart-contract findings), hand the BHCE finding off to the\n   chain planner.  Do not try to write web\u002Fcloud nodes into BHCE; BHCE\n   is AD-only.\n\n## Common failure modes\n\n- **`bhce_status` returns a `BHCE_URL` diagnostic** — the sidecar\n  isn't running (`docker compose up -d bhce-neo4j bhce`) or the\n  agent's environment is missing `BHCE_TOKEN_ID` \u002F `BHCE_TOKEN_KEY`.\n- **`bhce_cypher` returns 401 `signature digest mismatch`** — clock\n  skew.  BHCE enforces ±1 hour (`cmd\u002Fapi\u002Fsrc\u002Fapi\u002Fauth.go:276-296`).\n  Check the container time before opening a wider investigation.\n- **`bhce_ingest_zip` reports `terminal_status: Failed`** — the ZIP\n  is corrupt or BHCE rejected an unknown JSON schema version\n  (`meta.version`).  Look in `last_payload` for the BHCE-side reason.\n- **An expected ADCS edge is missing after ingest** — BHCE only\n  derives ESC* \u002F GoldenCert \u002F DCSync at analysis time, which runs\n  after ingest closes.  Wait for `terminal_status` (the tool already\n  polls until terminal) rather than re-running cypher in a busy loop.\n\n## Where authoritative information lives\n\n- **BHCE source code**: `github.com\u002FSpecterOps\u002FBloodHound` (current\n  release v9.2.2, 2026-06-01).  This is the single source of truth\n  for every edge, post-process algorithm, and Cypher passthrough\n  guard.  When the upstream changes the schema, the agent's queries\n  here have to follow.\n- **Official BHCE REST API spec**: shipped at\n  `packages\u002Fgo\u002Fopenapi\u002Fsrc\u002Fopenapi.yaml` in the BHCE repo, also\n  reachable at runtime via `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv2\u002Fspec` on the sidecar.\n- **SpecterOps documentation site**:\n  https:\u002F\u002Fbloodhound.specterops.io — official methodology, AD \u002F Azure\n  \u002F ADCS guides, and the canonical attack-path query library.\n  Consult it directly for novel attack patterns; we deliberately\n  avoid vendoring it here so the agent always reads the latest.\n- **ADR**: `docs\u002Fadr\u002F0005-bloodhound-via-bhce-rest-client.md` — why\n  the agent talks to a sidecar BHCE instead of using the in-house\n  port that PRs #560..#578 built.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":23,"description":7},{"subdomain":24,"when_to_use":25,"mitre_attack":26,"upstream_url":31},"active-directory","bloodhound bhce attack path adcs esc dcsync sharphound ingest cypher ad enumeration domain compromise",[27,28,29,30],"T1078.002","T1558.003","T1649","T1003.006","https:\u002F\u002Fbloodhound.specterops.io\u002F","main","376de63e2b186eeb9856476ae89186e62b1d3fbe","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fbloodhound-bhce","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou","2026-11-09 16:34:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":39,"prompt":49,"zipAvailable":50},[40,43,46],{"tool":41,"command":42},"npx","npx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill bloodhound-bhce",{"tool":44,"command":45},"bunx","bunx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill bloodhound-bhce",{"tool":47,"command":48},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill bloodhound-bhce","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fbloodhound-bhce\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[53,60,67,74,81,88],{"skillNo":54,"name":55,"nameZh":6,"description":56,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":57,"categories":58,"keywords":59,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAX15GZR5Q5S7RMPWFX43","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JARXE0ZER8P81SFD024YP","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":71,"categories":72,"keywords":73,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JANJNH8VMR0CK1Y6AM74G","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":75,"name":76,"nameZh":6,"description":77,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":78,"categories":79,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAFCYR2BAJF7KH0ZCXREA","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAAQ5T08FR9MY5SFNRWBM","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":91,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":92,"categories":93,"keywords":94,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA6799JQZE0M9B21HRMGY","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]