bloodhound-bhce
Operate BloodHound Community Edition v9.2.2 via Decepticon's bhce_* tools — health check, Cypher passthrough, SharpHound ZIP ingest. Replaces the in-house ingest + ESC* post-process pipeline per ADR-0005.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-09
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- bloodhound-bhce
- metadata
- { "subdomain": "active-directory", "when_to_use": "bloodhound bhce attack path adcs esc dcsync sharphound ingest cypher ad enumeration domain compromise", "mitre_attack": [ "T1078.002", "T1558.003", "T1649", "T1003.006" ], "upstream_url": "https://bloodhound.specterops.io/" }
- description
- Operate BloodHound Community Edition v9.2.2 via Decepticon's bhce_* tools — health check, Cypher passthrough, SharpHound ZIP ingest. Replaces the in-house ingest + ESC* post-process pipeline per ADR-0005.
03 SKILL.md 正文
BloodHound CE via Decepticon's bhce_* Tools
Decepticon ships a sidecar BloodHound Community Edition v9.2.2 stack
(see docs/adr/0005-bloodhound-via-bhce-rest-client.md). Three
@tool wrappers expose it to the agent:
| tool | what it does |
|---|---|
bhce_status |
Confirm BHCE is healthy and our HMAC token authenticates. Always call this first when an AD task starts. |
bhce_cypher |
Run any Cypher query against BHCE's graph. Mutations are off by default. |
bhce_ingest_zip |
Push a SharpHound .zip into BHCE — 3-step file-upload flow + polling until BHCE finishes parse + ESC* analysis. |
Use these instead of the legacy bh_ingest_zip / dcsync_check /
delegation_audit / gpo_audit / adcs_audit family — those are
the in-house port and are being retired per ADR-0005.
Why we use BHCE rather than our own ingest
BHCE's PostProcessedRelationships Go pipeline emits every edge a
red-team operator expects: ADCSESC1-13, GoldenCert, DCSync,
TrustedForNTAuth, IssuedSignedBy, CoerceAndRelayNTLMTo*,
HasSIDHistory, HasTrustKeys, SyncLAPSPassword, … The list is in
graphschema/ad/ad.go::PostProcessedRelationships() in the BHCE
source. We deliberately do not re-implement these in our
codebase; the agent leans on BHCE's analyzer instead.
The Decepticon KGStore still owns web, cloud, and smart-contract findings, and stays canonical for cross-domain chain planning. BHCE is the AD layer.
End-to-end loop the agent should follow
-
Health check —
bhce_status(). Verifyversion.data.server_versionmatches the deployed v9.2.2 andself.data.principal_nameis non-empty. If the diagnostic mentionsBHCE_URL/BHCE_TOKEN_*, the sidecar is offline or the token has been revoked — stop and report. -
Ingest — for every SharpHound collection drop:
bhce_ingest_zip(path="/abs/path/to/20260605_lab.zip")Expected result envelope:
{job_id, terminal_status, last_payload, elapsed_seconds}.terminal_statusmust be one ofComplete,PartiallyComplete,Failed,Cancelled. Anything else (anerrorfield, missing terminal_status) means BHCE never closed the job — surface the error to the operator rather than continuing with stale data. -
Walk the graph with
bhce_cypher. Some battle-tested starting queries (BHCE node labels —User,Computer,Group,Domain,GPO,OU,CertTemplate,EnterpriseCA,RootCA,AIACA,NTAuthStore,IssuancePolicy):-
All Domain Admins (sanity check that ingest landed):
MATCH (g:Group) WHERE g.objectid ENDS WITH '-512' MATCH (n)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g) RETURN n.name, labels(n) -
Shortest path from a foothold to a Tier-Zero asset:
MATCH p = shortestPath( (n {objectid: $foothold_sid})-[*1..15]->(t {system_tags: 'admin_tier_0'}) ) RETURN p -
ADCS escalation paths (BHCE post-processes ESC* edges, so the agent never has to derive them):
MATCH p = (u {objectid: $foothold_sid}) -[:MemberOf|ADCSESC1|ADCSESC3|ADCSESC4|ADCSESC6a|ADCSESC6b| ADCSESC9a|ADCSESC9b|ADCSESC10a|ADCSESC10b|ADCSESC13| Enroll|AutoEnroll|GenericAll*1..10]-> (t:Domain) RETURN p LIMIT 10 -
GoldenCert opportunities (CA + NTAuthStore + Domain triangle):
MATCH (ca:EnterpriseCA)-[:TrustedForNTAuth]->(:NTAuthStore) MATCH (ca)-[:GoldenCert]->(d:Domain) RETURN ca.name, d.name -
DCSync candidates:
MATCH (n)-[:DCSync]->(d:Domain) RETURN n.name, labels(n), d.name
-
-
Cross-domain plays — when an AD path terminates and the chain needs to cross into the Decepticon KGStore (web exploitation, cloud pivots, smart-contract findings), hand the BHCE finding off to the chain planner. Do not try to write web/cloud nodes into BHCE; BHCE is AD-only.
Common failure modes
bhce_statusreturns aBHCE_URLdiagnostic — the sidecar isn't running (docker compose up -d bhce-neo4j bhce) or the agent's environment is missingBHCE_TOKEN_ID/BHCE_TOKEN_KEY.bhce_cypherreturns 401signature digest mismatch— clock skew. BHCE enforces ±1 hour (cmd/api/src/api/auth.go:276-296). Check the container time before opening a wider investigation.bhce_ingest_zipreportsterminal_status: Failed— the ZIP is corrupt or BHCE rejected an unknown JSON schema version (meta.version). Look inlast_payloadfor the BHCE-side reason.- An expected ADCS edge is missing after ingest — BHCE only
derives ESC* / GoldenCert / DCSync at analysis time, which runs
after ingest closes. Wait for
terminal_status(the tool already polls until terminal) rather than re-running cypher in a busy loop.
Where authoritative information lives
- BHCE source code:
github.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound(current release v9.2.2, 2026-06-01). This is the single source of truth for every edge, post-process algorithm, and Cypher passthrough guard. When the upstream changes the schema, the agent's queries here have to follow. - Official BHCE REST API spec: shipped at
packages/go/openapi/src/openapi.yamlin the BHCE repo, also reachable at runtime viaGET /api/v2/specon the sidecar. - SpecterOps documentation site: https://bloodhound.specterops.io — official methodology, AD / Azure / ADCS guides, and the canonical attack-path query library. Consult it directly for novel attack patterns; we deliberately avoid vendoring it here so the agent always reads the latest.
- ADR:
docs/adr/0005-bloodhound-via-bhce-rest-client.md— why the agent talks to a sidecar BHCE instead of using the in-house port that PRs #560..#578 built.
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