[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78GQHSFDMEXAN04AT16TEE1":3,"skill-same:01M78GQHSFDMEXAN04AT16TEE1":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":28,"commitSha":29,"skillDirectory":30,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":32,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M78GQHSFDMEXAN04AT16TEE1","aatmf-t06-training-poisoning",null,"AATMF T6 — Training & Feedback Poisoning. Data poisoning, RLHF reward hacks, fine-tune-time exfil, embedding poisoning.","dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","dnzengou","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F7807581?v=4","01M75KKJA3F5ZP7CA10MB2AEXC","01M78GP0FED2V1CDPB1N6G0CTH",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fllm-redteam\u002Ft06-training-poisoning\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: aatmf-t06-training-poisoning\ndescription: AATMF T6 — Training & Feedback Poisoning. Data poisoning, RLHF reward hacks, fine-tune-time exfil, embedding poisoning.\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"training data poisoning rlhf reward hack fine-tune embedding poisoning\"\n  mitre_attack: T1565\n  subdomain: ai-security\n  aatmf_tactic: T6\n---\n\n# T6 — Training & Feedback Poisoning\n\nAttacks on the training pipeline rather than inference. High-effort,\nhigh-impact — requires attacker to influence training-data pipeline or\nRLHF feedback loop.\n\n## Techniques\n\n### T6.001 — Pre-training data poisoning\nInject malicious data into a public crawl that targets will scrape:\n- Wikipedia\u002FStackOverflow edits w\u002F misleading code patterns\n- Github repos w\u002F subtle backdoors that get indexed\n- \"Trigger phrases\" that activate backdoor behavior\n\nScope: targets foundation models. Out of scope for most red-team\nengagements; relevant for AI-supply-chain audits.\n\n### T6.002 — Fine-tune data injection\nSome platforms allow user-supplied fine-tune data:\n- Submit poisoned dataset\n- Backdoor activates on specific trigger\n- Survives subsequent SFT\u002FRLHF\n\nTest: provide a small fine-tune sample w\u002F a trigger → check if the\ndeployed fine-tuned model responds to it.\n\n### T6.003 — RLHF reward hacking\nWhere users vote on responses (thumbs up\u002Fdown feeding back to training):\n- Brigade upvote attacker-preferred unsafe responses\n- Brigade downvote safe responses\n- Model drifts toward attacker-preferred outputs over time\n\nDetection: longitudinal monitoring of policy-compliance rate.\n\n### T6.004 — Embedding poisoning\nWhere RAG store updates from user inputs (e.g. customer-support bot\nthat \"learns\" from conversations):\n- Submit content w\u002F adversarial embeddings (engineered to be retrieved\n  for unrelated queries)\n- Resulting RAG retrieval injects attacker content into other users'\n  responses\n\nThis is RAG-store T12 territory but the *poison-via-training-loop*\nangle places it here.\n\n## Probe pattern\n\nT6 attacks are *infrastructure-level* — promptfoo doesn't test them\ndirectly. The right probe:\n- Audit the training-data ingest pipeline (is user content used in fine-tunes?)\n- Audit RLHF feedback paths (who can vote? rate limits?)\n- Audit RAG-update paths (who can add documents? approval?)\n\nIf any of these accepts unmoderated user content → T6 is a live risk.\n\n## Detection signals\n\n- Model behavior shifts over time without explicit retraining\n- Specific user IDs \u002F brigades correlate w\u002F shifts\n- Test fixtures (canary phrases) trigger non-default responses\n\n## Severity\n\n| Outcome | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| Live foundation-model poisoning | Critical (rare — usually responsibly disclosed to provider) |\n| Fine-tune backdoor in customer deployment | Critical 9.0 |\n| RAG embedding poisoning at scale | Critical 9.0 |\n| RLHF brigade drifting policy | High 8.0 (slow + reversible) |\n\n## Defender\n\n- NEVER use unmoderated user content in fine-tunes or RLHF\n- Diff-testing: every fine-tune evaluated against safety regression suite\n- Canary phrases in eval suite to detect drift\n- RAG-update review queue + approval flow\n- Per-user rate limits on feedback signals\n- Anomaly detection on feedback patterns (brigade signatures)\n\n## Cross-references\n- T12 (RAG manipulation) — adjacent class, attack on retrieval not training\n- T13 (supply chain) — model artifact integrity\n","# T6 — Training & Feedback Poisoning\n\nAttacks on the training pipeline rather than inference. High-effort,\nhigh-impact — requires attacker to influence training-data pipeline or\nRLHF feedback loop.\n\n## Techniques\n\n### T6.001 — Pre-training data poisoning\nInject malicious data into a public crawl that targets will scrape:\n- Wikipedia\u002FStackOverflow edits w\u002F misleading code patterns\n- Github repos w\u002F subtle backdoors that get indexed\n- \"Trigger phrases\" that activate backdoor behavior\n\nScope: targets foundation models. Out of scope for most red-team\nengagements; relevant for AI-supply-chain audits.\n\n### T6.002 — Fine-tune data injection\nSome platforms allow user-supplied fine-tune data:\n- Submit poisoned dataset\n- Backdoor activates on specific trigger\n- Survives subsequent SFT\u002FRLHF\n\nTest: provide a small fine-tune sample w\u002F a trigger → check if the\ndeployed fine-tuned model responds to it.\n\n### T6.003 — RLHF reward hacking\nWhere users vote on responses (thumbs up\u002Fdown feeding back to training):\n- Brigade upvote attacker-preferred unsafe responses\n- Brigade downvote safe responses\n- Model drifts toward attacker-preferred outputs over time\n\nDetection: longitudinal monitoring of policy-compliance rate.\n\n### T6.004 — Embedding poisoning\nWhere RAG store updates from user inputs (e.g. customer-support bot\nthat \"learns\" from conversations):\n- Submit content w\u002F adversarial embeddings (engineered to be retrieved\n  for unrelated queries)\n- Resulting RAG retrieval injects attacker content into other users'\n  responses\n\nThis is RAG-store T12 territory but the *poison-via-training-loop*\nangle places it here.\n\n## Probe pattern\n\nT6 attacks are *infrastructure-level* — promptfoo doesn't test them\ndirectly. The right probe:\n- Audit the training-data ingest pipeline (is user content used in fine-tunes?)\n- Audit RLHF feedback paths (who can vote? rate limits?)\n- Audit RAG-update paths (who can add documents? approval?)\n\nIf any of these accepts unmoderated user content → T6 is a live risk.\n\n## Detection signals\n\n- Model behavior shifts over time without explicit retraining\n- Specific user IDs \u002F brigades correlate w\u002F shifts\n- Test fixtures (canary phrases) trigger non-default responses\n\n## Severity\n\n| Outcome | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| Live foundation-model poisoning | Critical (rare — usually responsibly disclosed to provider) |\n| Fine-tune backdoor in customer deployment | Critical 9.0 |\n| RAG embedding poisoning at scale | Critical 9.0 |\n| RLHF brigade drifting policy | High 8.0 (slow + reversible) |\n\n## Defender\n\n- NEVER use unmoderated user content in fine-tunes or RLHF\n- Diff-testing: every fine-tune evaluated against safety regression suite\n- Canary phrases in eval suite to detect drift\n- RAG-update review queue + approval flow\n- Per-user rate limits on feedback signals\n- Anomaly detection on feedback patterns (brigade signatures)\n\n## Cross-references\n- T12 (RAG manipulation) — adjacent class, attack on retrieval not training\n- T13 (supply chain) — model artifact integrity\n",{"name":5,"metadata":23,"description":7},{"subdomain":24,"when_to_use":25,"aatmf_tactic":26,"mitre_attack":27},"ai-security","training data poisoning rlhf reward hack fine-tune embedding poisoning","T6","T1565","main","376de63e2b186eeb9856476ae89186e62b1d3fbe","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fllm-redteam\u002Ft06-training-poisoning","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou","2026-11-09 16:34:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill aatmf-t06-training-poisoning",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill aatmf-t06-training-poisoning",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill aatmf-t06-training-poisoning","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fllm-redteam\u002Ft06-training-poisoning\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,56,63,70,77,84],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAX15GZR5Q5S7RMPWFX43","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JARXE0ZER8P81SFD024YP","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JANJNH8VMR0CK1Y6AM74G","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAFCYR2BAJF7KH0ZCXREA","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAAQ5T08FR9MY5SFNRWBM","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA6799JQZE0M9B21HRMGY","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]