[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78FN5ANETMSPMEFACSJ7JMC":3,"skill-same:01M78FN5ANETMSPMEFACSJ7JMC":47},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":29,"ownerBlogUrl":30,"ownerDescription":31,"updatedAt":32,"install":33,"resources":46},"01M78FN5ANETMSPMEFACSJ7JMC","solid-wac",null,"Use when implementing or auditing Solid server WAC authorization, ACL creation and inheritance, auxiliary-resource escalation, method-to-mode mapping, 401 versus 403 challenges, WAC-Allow, or defensive typed ACL parsing with @solid\u002Fobject and @rdfjs\u002Fwrapper.","jeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk","jeswr","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F63333554?v=4","01M78F8AE112CQ0KHFC3R0Z8SJ","Jesse Wright","01M78F8AERJX4YWDA1S4BMF74V",2,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsolid-wac\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: solid-wac\ndescription: Use when implementing or auditing Solid server WAC authorization, ACL creation and inheritance, auxiliary-resource escalation, method-to-mode mapping, 401 versus 403 challenges, WAC-Allow, or defensive typed ACL parsing with @solid\u002Fobject and @rdfjs\u002Fwrapper.\n---\n\n## Quick reference\n\nResolve the own ACL first, otherwise the nearest ancestor ACL; no ACL means deny all.\nGate every ACL creation\u002Fmodification path on Control, including POST minting and PATCH create.\nWrite implies Append; Control does not grant resource-body access. Preserve fail-closed parsing, inheritance, and store errors.\nReturn 401 for unauthenticated denial and 403 for authenticated denial; WAC-Allow advertises modes only on successful GET\u002FHEAD.\n\n\u003C!-- AUTHORED-BY Codex GPT-6.1-Sol -->\n\nImplementation paths, ADR numbers, server-specific defaults, and commands below refer to\nthe original `prod-solid-server` implementation, outside this SDK checkout. They document\nthat server's patterns, rather than files or dependencies to install in this workspace.\n\n# Solid WAC (Web Access Control)\n\nAuthorization for a Solid\u002FLDP server. Grounded in `src\u002Fauthz\u002F{types,mode,wac,acl,wacAllow,public}.ts`\nand ADR-0004. WAC is **fail-closed** and **RDF-driven**: `.acl` documents are user-controlled RDF parsed\nthrough **`@solid\u002Fobject`** typed wrappers. 🔒 = security-critical.\n\n## When to use\n\nImplementing\u002Fauditing WAC authorization; parsing or authoring `.acl` documents; reasoning about ACL\ninheritance and resource→ACL resolution; 401 vs 403; building the `WAC-Allow` header.\n\n## The four modes — one mapper is the authority\n\n`read` (GET\u002FHEAD\u002FOPTIONS), `write` (PUT\u002FPATCH\u002FDELETE), `append` (POST to a container), `control` (any op\non a `.acl`). `modeForOperation(method, target)` is the **single** place that derives a mode from a\nmethod — never infer a mode from an HTTP verb anywhere else.\n\n```ts\nif (isAclResource(target)) return \"control\";\nswitch (method) {\n  case \"GET\": case \"HEAD\": case \"OPTIONS\": return \"read\";\n  case \"POST\": return isContainer(target) ? \"append\" : \"write\";\n  default: return \"write\";            \u002F\u002F PUT, PATCH, DELETE\n}\n```\n\n**Mode implication is exactly two rules:** `write` subsumes `append`; **`control` does NOT grant\nread\u002Fwrite of the resource *body*** (only of its `.acl`). Assume nothing else.\n\n## 🔒 `.acl` creation must be Control-gated on EVERY write verb (auxiliary-mint escalation)\n\n\"`control` for an `.acl`\" must be enforced wherever a request can **create or modify** an `.acl`, not\njust where the request *target* is an `.acl`. The classic bypass (found live in two independent Solid\nservers, 2026-06; CTH + two code-review passes missed it): a verb that authorizes only container\n`acl:Append`\u002F`acl:Write` and then **mints\u002Fwrites a child whose name is `\u003Cx>.acl`** lets an Append-only\nagent install the own-ACL of a private sibling `\u003Cx>` and grant itself `control` — full read + ACL\nownership. Two concrete vectors:\n\n- **POST + `Slug: secret.acl`** — POST authorizes `append` on the *container*, but the slug sanitiser\n  keeps `.`, so the minted child is `\u003Cc>\u002Fsecret.acl`. Guard the **child-name chokepoint**: reject (409)\n  a POST whose minted name resolves to an `.acl` (case-insensitive, trailing-slash-tolerant — a strict\n  superset of the resolver's exact-lowercase `aclFor`). Covers `Slug` AND any auto-generated name.\n- **PATCH-create \u002F PATCH-modify of an `.acl`** — if `patch()` derives its mode from the patch *content*\n  (`append` for an insert-only patch) instead of going through `modeForOperation`, an Append-only agent\n  can `PATCH \u002Fc\u002Fsecret.acl` with an INSERT-only body granting itself control. Route an `.acl` target to\n  `control` in the PATCH path for BOTH the create branch and the modify branch (don't over-gate ordinary\n  resources — `control` only when `isAclResource(target)`, else the patch-derived mode).\n\nRule of thumb: enumerate **every** path that writes\u002Fcreates a resource (PUT create+overwrite, POST mint,\nPATCH create+modify, DELETE, any container\u002Fancestor auto-create) and confirm each routes an `.acl` target\nto `control`. Mode-mapper centrality (above) only helps if every verb actually consults it on create —\nPATCH-create and POST-mint are the two that historically don't. `.meta`\u002Fother auxiliaries: gate uniformly\nacross all verbs ONLY if they are access-load-bearing (consulted by the resolver); a non-load-bearing\nsuffix needs no guard (guarding it only in POST is an inconsistency, not a fix).\n\n## 🔒 ACL resolution walk (own → ancestor → fail-closed)\n\n1. **Own ACL** (`\u002Fx.acl`): if present, only its `acl:accessTo` rules for `x` apply — ancestors are **not**\n   consulted.\n2. **Else** walk ancestors **child→root**, stop at the **first** with an ACL; its `acl:default` rules\n   apply. Inheritance is **monolithic, not a union** — the nearest ACL fully governs; a distant one is\n   ignored.\n3. **No ACL anywhere up to and including the storage root → deny all.** A missing ACL means \"unmanaged\n   by WAC\", not \"no rules\" — fail-closed.\n\nFor a `.acl` resource itself, resolve the ACL of the **protected resource it governs** (strip `.acl`).\nTreat the legacy `acl:defaultForNew` exactly like `acl:default`.\n\n## 🔒 Rule matching + agentGroup fail-closed\n\nA rule matches when: `acl:agent` lists the exact WebID IRI (case-sensitive); or `acl:agentClass\nfoaf:Agent` (public, includes anonymous); or `acl:agentClass acl:AuthenticatedAgent` (any *authenticated*\nWebID). **`acl:agentGroup` never matches in v1** (group resolution is a follow-up) — a present group rule\ngrants no one. Do **not** add a \"log and allow\" fallback; fail-closed means a misconfigured group rule is\ninert, never an attack vector. A rule can list **multiple** `acl:accessTo`\u002F`acl:default` targets —\niterate **every** object, not just the wrapper's first.\n\n## 🔒 House rule: parse\u002Fauthor ACL via typed wrappers, defensively\n\nParse `.acl` through `@solid\u002Fobject`'s `AclResource`\u002F`Authorization` wrappers (over `@rdfjs\u002Fwrapper`) —\n**never** hand-iterate raw quads or string-match Turtle, and never hand-build triples to author one (the\n[solid-rdf](..\u002Fsolid-rdf\u002FSKILL.md) discipline). When reading `acl:mode`, **match quads directly and skip any non-`NamedNode`\nobject** — malformed user literals must be ignored, not crash authorization with a 500.\n\n```ts\nfor (const q of rule.dataset.match(subject, factory.namedNode(ACL_MODE))) {\n  if (q.object.termType !== \"NamedNode\") continue;       \u002F\u002F defensive: skip malformed\n  const mode = MODE_FROM_IRI[q.object.value]; if (mode) granted.add(mode);\n}\n```\n\n## 🔒 Reading ACLs fail-closed on transient errors\n\n`Store.getData(acl)` throwing `NotFoundError` = ACL missing → continue inheritance (OK). **Any other\nerror** (transient store failure, parse error) must **propagate and fail authorization** — never treat it\nas \"no ACL\", which would fail-open.\n\n## 401 vs 403 + WWW-Authenticate\n\nUnauthenticated (`credentials.webId === undefined`) and denied → **401** with a `WWW-Authenticate`\nchallenge (`Bearer scope=\"webid\", DPoP scope=\"webid\"`) — \"authenticate and retry\". Authenticated but\nlacking the mode → **403** — \"a valid token won't help here\". The distinction is semantic; reversing it\nbreaks client auth flows.\n\n## WAC-Allow header\n\nOn a successful **GET\u002FHEAD only** (never on mutations or errors), advertise effective modes:\n`user=\"…\",public=\"…\"` — what the authenticated requester vs an anonymous requester may do, both from the\nsame effective ACL. Canonical order `read write append control`; emit empty groups too (`user=\"\",public=\"\"`).\n\n## Gotchas\n\n- [ ] `modeForOperation()` is the **only** method→mode inference in the codebase.\n- [ ] No ACL anywhere → deny all (fail-closed); missing ACL ≠ \"no rules\".\n- [ ] Nearest ACL fully governs (monolithic); ancestors walked child→root, stop at first.\n- [ ] `acl:agentGroup` never matches in v1 — no silent allow.\n- [ ] `appliesToResource` iterates **all** `acl:accessTo`\u002F`acl:default` objects.\n- [ ] `write` subsumes `append`; `control` ≠ read\u002Fwrite of the body.\n- [ ] Parse `.acl` via `@solid\u002Fobject`; skip non-`NamedNode` `acl:mode` objects (don't 500).\n- [ ] `NotFoundError` → inherit; any other store error → fail authorization.\n- [ ] 401 (unauthenticated) vs 403 (insufficient) — check `credentials.webId` explicitly.\n- [ ] `WAC-Allow` only on GET\u002FHEAD; it advertises, never grants.\n\n## See also\n\n- Code: `src\u002Fauthz\u002F{mode,wac,acl,wacAllow}.ts`, `test\u002Funit\u002Fauthz\u002Fwac.test.ts`; ADR-0004.\n  Related: [solid-rdf](..\u002Fsolid-rdf\u002FSKILL.md) (ACL parsing\u002Fserialisation), [solid-auth](..\u002Fsolid-auth\u002FSKILL.md) (the `credentials` it consumes),\n  [solid-conformance](..\u002Fsolid-conformance\u002FSKILL.md) (the WAC test suite).\n- Specs \u002F libs (Context7): `@solid\u002Fobject`, `@rdfjs\u002Fwrapper`, W3C Web Access Control, Solid Protocol\n  (WAC + `WAC-Allow`), W3C LDP.\n","## Quick reference\n\nResolve the own ACL first, otherwise the nearest ancestor ACL; no ACL means deny all.\nGate every ACL creation\u002Fmodification path on Control, including POST minting and PATCH create.\nWrite implies Append; Control does not grant resource-body access. Preserve fail-closed parsing, inheritance, and store errors.\nReturn 401 for unauthenticated denial and 403 for authenticated denial; WAC-Allow advertises modes only on successful GET\u002FHEAD.\n\n\u003C!-- AUTHORED-BY Codex GPT-6.1-Sol -->\n\nImplementation paths, ADR numbers, server-specific defaults, and commands below refer to\nthe original `prod-solid-server` implementation, outside this SDK checkout. They document\nthat server's patterns, rather than files or dependencies to install in this workspace.\n\n# Solid WAC (Web Access Control)\n\nAuthorization for a Solid\u002FLDP server. Grounded in `src\u002Fauthz\u002F{types,mode,wac,acl,wacAllow,public}.ts`\nand ADR-0004. WAC is **fail-closed** and **RDF-driven**: `.acl` documents are user-controlled RDF parsed\nthrough **`@solid\u002Fobject`** typed wrappers. 🔒 = security-critical.\n\n## When to use\n\nImplementing\u002Fauditing WAC authorization; parsing or authoring `.acl` documents; reasoning about ACL\ninheritance and resource→ACL resolution; 401 vs 403; building the `WAC-Allow` header.\n\n## The four modes — one mapper is the authority\n\n`read` (GET\u002FHEAD\u002FOPTIONS), `write` (PUT\u002FPATCH\u002FDELETE), `append` (POST to a container), `control` (any op\non a `.acl`). `modeForOperation(method, target)` is the **single** place that derives a mode from a\nmethod — never infer a mode from an HTTP verb anywhere else.\n\n```ts\nif (isAclResource(target)) return \"control\";\nswitch (method) {\n  case \"GET\": case \"HEAD\": case \"OPTIONS\": return \"read\";\n  case \"POST\": return isContainer(target) ? \"append\" : \"write\";\n  default: return \"write\";            \u002F\u002F PUT, PATCH, DELETE\n}\n```\n\n**Mode implication is exactly two rules:** `write` subsumes `append`; **`control` does NOT grant\nread\u002Fwrite of the resource *body*** (only of its `.acl`). Assume nothing else.\n\n## 🔒 `.acl` creation must be Control-gated on EVERY write verb (auxiliary-mint escalation)\n\n\"`control` for an `.acl`\" must be enforced wherever a request can **create or modify** an `.acl`, not\njust where the request *target* is an `.acl`. The classic bypass (found live in two independent Solid\nservers, 2026-06; CTH + two code-review passes missed it): a verb that authorizes only container\n`acl:Append`\u002F`acl:Write` and then **mints\u002Fwrites a child whose name is `\u003Cx>.acl`** lets an Append-only\nagent install the own-ACL of a private sibling `\u003Cx>` and grant itself `control` — full read + ACL\nownership. Two concrete vectors:\n\n- **POST + `Slug: secret.acl`** — POST authorizes `append` on the *container*, but the slug sanitiser\n  keeps `.`, so the minted child is `\u003Cc>\u002Fsecret.acl`. Guard the **child-name chokepoint**: reject (409)\n  a POST whose minted name resolves to an `.acl` (case-insensitive, trailing-slash-tolerant — a strict\n  superset of the resolver's exact-lowercase `aclFor`). Covers `Slug` AND any auto-generated name.\n- **PATCH-create \u002F PATCH-modify of an `.acl`** — if `patch()` derives its mode from the patch *content*\n  (`append` for an insert-only patch) instead of going through `modeForOperation`, an Append-only agent\n  can `PATCH \u002Fc\u002Fsecret.acl` with an INSERT-only body granting itself control. Route an `.acl` target to\n  `control` in the PATCH path for BOTH the create branch and the modify branch (don't over-gate ordinary\n  resources — `control` only when `isAclResource(target)`, else the patch-derived mode).\n\nRule of thumb: enumerate **every** path that writes\u002Fcreates a resource (PUT create+overwrite, POST mint,\nPATCH create+modify, DELETE, any container\u002Fancestor auto-create) and confirm each routes an `.acl` target\nto `control`. Mode-mapper centrality (above) only helps if every verb actually consults it on create —\nPATCH-create and POST-mint are the two that historically don't. `.meta`\u002Fother auxiliaries: gate uniformly\nacross all verbs ONLY if they are access-load-bearing (consulted by the resolver); a non-load-bearing\nsuffix needs no guard (guarding it only in POST is an inconsistency, not a fix).\n\n## 🔒 ACL resolution walk (own → ancestor → fail-closed)\n\n1. **Own ACL** (`\u002Fx.acl`): if present, only its `acl:accessTo` rules for `x` apply — ancestors are **not**\n   consulted.\n2. **Else** walk ancestors **child→root**, stop at the **first** with an ACL; its `acl:default` rules\n   apply. Inheritance is **monolithic, not a union** — the nearest ACL fully governs; a distant one is\n   ignored.\n3. **No ACL anywhere up to and including the storage root → deny all.** A missing ACL means \"unmanaged\n   by WAC\", not \"no rules\" — fail-closed.\n\nFor a `.acl` resource itself, resolve the ACL of the **protected resource it governs** (strip `.acl`).\nTreat the legacy `acl:defaultForNew` exactly like `acl:default`.\n\n## 🔒 Rule matching + agentGroup fail-closed\n\nA rule matches when: `acl:agent` lists the exact WebID IRI (case-sensitive); or `acl:agentClass\nfoaf:Agent` (public, includes anonymous); or `acl:agentClass acl:AuthenticatedAgent` (any *authenticated*\nWebID). **`acl:agentGroup` never matches in v1** (group resolution is a follow-up) — a present group rule\ngrants no one. Do **not** add a \"log and allow\" fallback; fail-closed means a misconfigured group rule is\ninert, never an attack vector. A rule can list **multiple** `acl:accessTo`\u002F`acl:default` targets —\niterate **every** object, not just the wrapper's first.\n\n## 🔒 House rule: parse\u002Fauthor ACL via typed wrappers, defensively\n\nParse `.acl` through `@solid\u002Fobject`'s `AclResource`\u002F`Authorization` wrappers (over `@rdfjs\u002Fwrapper`) —\n**never** hand-iterate raw quads or string-match Turtle, and never hand-build triples to author one (the\n[solid-rdf](..\u002Fsolid-rdf\u002FSKILL.md) discipline). When reading `acl:mode`, **match quads directly and skip any non-`NamedNode`\nobject** — malformed user literals must be ignored, not crash authorization with a 500.\n\n```ts\nfor (const q of rule.dataset.match(subject, factory.namedNode(ACL_MODE))) {\n  if (q.object.termType !== \"NamedNode\") continue;       \u002F\u002F defensive: skip malformed\n  const mode = MODE_FROM_IRI[q.object.value]; if (mode) granted.add(mode);\n}\n```\n\n## 🔒 Reading ACLs fail-closed on transient errors\n\n`Store.getData(acl)` throwing `NotFoundError` = ACL missing → continue inheritance (OK). **Any other\nerror** (transient store failure, parse error) must **propagate and fail authorization** — never treat it\nas \"no ACL\", which would fail-open.\n\n## 401 vs 403 + WWW-Authenticate\n\nUnauthenticated (`credentials.webId === undefined`) and denied → **401** with a `WWW-Authenticate`\nchallenge (`Bearer scope=\"webid\", DPoP scope=\"webid\"`) — \"authenticate and retry\". Authenticated but\nlacking the mode → **403** — \"a valid token won't help here\". The distinction is semantic; reversing it\nbreaks client auth flows.\n\n## WAC-Allow header\n\nOn a successful **GET\u002FHEAD only** (never on mutations or errors), advertise effective modes:\n`user=\"…\",public=\"…\"` — what the authenticated requester vs an anonymous requester may do, both from the\nsame effective ACL. Canonical order `read write append control`; emit empty groups too (`user=\"\",public=\"\"`).\n\n## Gotchas\n\n- [ ] `modeForOperation()` is the **only** method→mode inference in the codebase.\n- [ ] No ACL anywhere → deny all (fail-closed); missing ACL ≠ \"no rules\".\n- [ ] Nearest ACL fully governs (monolithic); ancestors walked child→root, stop at first.\n- [ ] `acl:agentGroup` never matches in v1 — no silent allow.\n- [ ] `appliesToResource` iterates **all** `acl:accessTo`\u002F`acl:default` objects.\n- [ ] `write` subsumes `append`; `control` ≠ read\u002Fwrite of the body.\n- [ ] Parse `.acl` via `@solid\u002Fobject`; skip non-`NamedNode` `acl:mode` objects (don't 500).\n- [ ] `NotFoundError` → inherit; any other store error → fail authorization.\n- [ ] 401 (unauthenticated) vs 403 (insufficient) — check `credentials.webId` explicitly.\n- [ ] `WAC-Allow` only on GET\u002FHEAD; it advertises, never grants.\n\n## See also\n\n- Code: `src\u002Fauthz\u002F{mode,wac,acl,wacAllow}.ts`, `test\u002Funit\u002Fauthz\u002Fwac.test.ts`; ADR-0004.\n  Related: [solid-rdf](..\u002Fsolid-rdf\u002FSKILL.md) (ACL parsing\u002Fserialisation), [solid-auth](..\u002Fsolid-auth\u002FSKILL.md) (the `credentials` it consumes),\n  [solid-conformance](..\u002Fsolid-conformance\u002FSKILL.md) (the WAC test suite).\n- Specs \u002F libs (Context7): `@solid\u002Fobject`, `@rdfjs\u002Fwrapper`, W3C Web Access Control, Solid Protocol\n  (WAC + `WAC-Allow`), W3C LDP.\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","5482abfe2666cc12f835fe360e8fad1f1e1dea8c","skills\u002Fsolid-wac",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr","jeswr.org\u002F#me","@solid Lead @theodi | PhD Candidate @OxfordHCC\r\n\r\n","2026-11-15 05:20:24",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":34,"prompt":44,"zipAvailable":45},[35,38,41],{"tool":36,"command":37},"npx","npx skills add jeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk --skill solid-wac",{"tool":39,"command":40},"bunx","bunx skills add jeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk --skill solid-wac",{"tool":42,"command":43},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add jeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk --skill solid-wac","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsolid-wac\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[48,55,62,69,76,83],{"skillNo":49,"name":50,"nameZh":6,"description":51,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":52,"categories":53,"keywords":54,"publishedAt":19},"01M78FNRF6EV6SKPEYRZ6JTTQ3","storage-conformance","Work on @jeswr\u002Fstorage-conformance, the shared storage conformance suite package in the Solid SDK workspace.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftools\u002Fstorage-conformance\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":56,"name":57,"nameZh":6,"description":58,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":59,"categories":60,"keywords":61,"publishedAt":19},"01M78FNMS7HQGD9EE43WAFEW6A","fetch-rdf-engine-tests","Maintain fetch-rdf's real Node WASM parser integration tests without introducing a reverse engine dependency in fetch-rdf.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftools\u002Ffetch-rdf-engine-tests\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":63,"name":64,"nameZh":6,"description":65,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":66,"categories":67,"keywords":68,"publishedAt":19},"01M78FNK5M6ASAR3909JT6BZV1","alpha","Use when checking fixtures, including folded YAML descriptions.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftest\u002Ffixtures\u002Fcheck-skills\u002Fvalid\u002Fskills\u002Falpha\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":70,"name":71,"nameZh":6,"description":72,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":73,"categories":74,"keywords":75,"publishedAt":19},"01M78FNGATR8F4N09HWSFVWBAF","widget","Use when testing package skills: YAML quoting works.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftest\u002Ffixtures\u002Fcheck-skills\u002Fvalid\u002Fpackages\u002Fwidget\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":77,"name":78,"nameZh":6,"description":79,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":80,"categories":81,"keywords":82,"publishedAt":19},"01M78FN9M05GCHYTK848SSMN9R","web-seo","Use when improving technical and entity SEO for a modern personal, portfolio, documentation, or marketing site, including crawlable HTML, canonical metadata, sitemap and robots, Person\u002FProfilePage JSON-LD, Core Web Vitals, and honest ranking expectations.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fweb-seo\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":84,"name":85,"nameZh":6,"description":86,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":19},"01M78FN2286ASSW8GM4W3KW6TJ","solid-type-index","Use when discovering or registering Solid data by RDF class, reading publicTypeIndex or privateTypeIndex links, creating missing Type Index documents, or implementing TypeRegistration wrappers and bounded pod search.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsolid-type-index\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]