[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78FD8TRFME38YFDSJXBBDJX":3,"skill-same:01M78FD8TRFME38YFDSJXBBDJX":203},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":29,"ownerBlogUrl":30,"ownerDescription":31,"updatedAt":32,"install":33,"resources":46},"01M78FD8TRFME38YFDSJXBBDJX","pod-auth",null,"Use when integrating @jeswr\u002Fpod-auth login, multi-account managers, bounded auth.fetch, restore, React sessions, Node agents, CSS self-registration or Client Identifier Documents, or migrating deprecated suite client authentication.","jeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk","jeswr","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F63333554?v=4","01M78F8AE112CQ0KHFC3R0Z8SJ","Jesse Wright","01M78F8AERJX4YWDA1S4BMF74V",2,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fpod-auth\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: pod-auth\ndescription: Use when integrating @jeswr\u002Fpod-auth login, multi-account managers, bounded auth.fetch, restore, React sessions, Node agents, CSS self-registration or Client Identifier Documents, or migrating deprecated suite client authentication.\n---\n\u003C!-- AUTHORED-BY Codex GPT-6 -->\n\u003C!-- AUTHORED-BY Codex GPT-6.1-Sol -->\n\n# Work with `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth`\n\nUse this package for new suite client authentication. It owns session policy over the imported\n`@jeswr\u002Freactive-authentication` protocol engine. It supersedes the current-integration guidance in\n[`skills\u002Fsolid-reactive-authentication`](..\u002F..\u002Fskills\u002Fsolid-reactive-authentication\u002FSKILL.md), which\nroutes existing integrations to the current packages and historical references.\nRead [README.md](.\u002FREADME.md) and `src\u002Ftypes.ts` for the implemented API; do not infer APIs from the\npublished 0.1.x package or copy its providers into applications. This workspace package remains\nprivate and experimental pending conformance.\n\n`@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Fnode` also exports `createNodeOidcClient` for server-side brokers (mcp-oauth's\npod sessions). It delegates split server authorization to reactive-authentication. Its sensitive\nstate and original private JWK envelope belong only in an encrypted server vault with callback consume,\nrefresh CAS and durable retirement. Signing keys are imported non-extractable; browser key storage is unchanged.\n\n## Quick reference\n\n| Entry point | Use |\n| --- | --- |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth` | `createPodAuth`, credential-bounded fetch, UI hooks and session lifecycle |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Freact` | Optional `PodAuthProvider` \u002F `usePodAuth` lifecycle mirror |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Faccounts` | `createAccountManager`, independent account sessions, local switching and restore |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Fnode` | `forClientCredentials` and `forCid` agent factories; `createNodeOidcClient` and `storageDescriptionRoots` (LWS realm checks) for server brokers |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Ftesting` | Node-only mock OP, mock LWS AS and memory store |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Fdirectory` | Provider metadata, WebID\u002Fprovider address resolution and recent providers |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Fregistration` | CSS v7 self-registration, previews, progress and typed partial failures |\n\n```ts\nimport { createPodAuth, type PodAuthOptions } from '@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth';\n\n\u002F\u002F Supply application UI that returns the complete callback URL and honors cancellation.\ndeclare const ui: PodAuthOptions['ui'];\n\nconst auth = createPodAuth({\n  clientId: 'https:\u002F\u002Fsuite.example\u002F.well-known\u002Fsolid-client-id.jsonld',\n  redirectUri: 'https:\u002F\u002Fsuite.example\u002Fauth\u002Fcallback.html',\n  boundary: { roots: ['https:\u002F\u002Fpod.example\u002Falice\u002F'] },\n  ui,\n});\n\nawait auth.restore();\nawait auth.login({ webId: 'https:\u002F\u002Fid.example\u002Falice#me' });\nconst response = await auth.fetch('https:\u002F\u002Fpod.example\u002Falice\u002Fprivate');\nconst identity = await auth.identity();\n```\n\nFor a cancel button, pass `auth.login(hint, { signal })`. Aborting aborts `ui.getCode` and the\nattempt's requests; the call rejects once the attempt has wound down. Stored sessions stay unless a\ngrant had already arrived, which pod-auth then discards with a full `logout()`. Don't call `logout()`\nyourself to cancel, since it purges every stored session.\n\nPass `auth.fetch` to [storage-client](..\u002Fstorage-client\u002FSKILL.md),\n[storage-capabilities](..\u002Fstorage-capabilities\u002FSKILL.md) and\n[pod-notifications](..\u002Fpod-notifications\u002FSKILL.md). Read the\n[LWS differences](..\u002F..\u002Fskills\u002Flws-vs-solid\u002FSKILL.md) for storage and grant semantics.\n\nConstruct one core per application session. `ui.getCode` must return the complete callback URL,\nincluding `state`, `code` and `iss`, honor cancellation and own popup\u002Fredirect cleanup. Choose among\nadvertised issuers explicitly; omitting the chooser for multiple issuers throws `AmbiguousIssuerError`.\nSame-hint concurrent login is single-flight; different hints reject while login is pending. Log out\nbefore switching accounts on the same core, or use the account manager below. `identity()` reads claims only; it never refreshes, contacts an issuer or\nreturns credentials. Public profile reads are not proof of authentication.\n\nUse the pure `.\u002Fdirectory` entry point for shared sign-in address handling. `KNOWN_PROVIDERS` is deeply\nfrozen; `providersFromConfig` returns copies from comma-separated HTTPS URLs or a fallback directory.\n`classifyLoginInput` checks URL shape without network; `resolveLoginTarget` tries both interpretations\nusing only the supplied pristine public fetch, honors abort, and caps responses at 1 MiB. It throws\n`InvalidLoginAddressError` (a `TypeError`) for invalid URLs or `NotALoginAddressError` for failed probes.\n\n```ts\nimport type { PodAuth } from '@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth';\nimport { resolveLoginTarget } from '@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Fdirectory';\n\ndeclare const auth: PodAuth;\ndeclare const address: string; \u002F\u002F What the user typed.\ndeclare const publicFetch: typeof fetch; \u002F\u002F A pristine, credential-free fetch.\n\nconst target = await resolveLoginTarget(address, { fetch: publicFetch });\nconst hint = target.kind === 'webid'\n  ? { webId: target.webId }\n  : { issuer: target.issuer };\nawait auth.login(hint);\n```\n\n`createRecentProvidersStore(storage)` keeps at most five public HTTPS issuers, deduped and most recent\nfirst; storage failures are harmless. Providers use monograms by default; host-supplied `label` and\n`iconUrl` are opt-in. Re-verify default provider and sign-up addresses live before release.\n\n## Preserve the credential boundary\n\n- Use the unbound `auth.fetch` throughout the SDK. Preserve global fetch; never call `registerGlobally`.\n  Construct auth after installing the intended pristine transport in tests. Protocol discovery,\n  registration, token and refresh HTTP must never recurse through a credential-attaching wrapper.\n- Keep the engine's `verifyWebId: true`: before storing a Solid session or reporting its identity,\n  it requires the returned WebID's profile to list the issuer as `solid:oidcIssuer`, compared with\n  `sameIssuer`, through the non-reactive protocol transport. An unlisted issuer throws the engine's\n  `IssuerNotAuthorizedError` (`webId`, `issuer`), re-exported unchanged by pod-auth and propagated from\n  `login()`. Profile fetch and parse failures keep their existing errors. Issuer-only login reads the\n  profile once; WebID hints retain discovery and claim-equality checks. Do not duplicate the engine check.\n- Credentials attach only within configured static roots or authenticated WebID-profile storage roots.\n  `boundary.automatic: false` selects static-only behavior. `boundary.eligible` restricts both kinds.\n  `boundary.storageEndpoints` names exact (or trailing-`\u002F` prefix) paths on each verified storage's\n  origin, for server APIs outside the pod folder; they share that storage's grant and stay out of\n  `Identity.storages`. Use it only for endpoints of the server that hosts the storage.\n- `auth.fetch` buffers bodies for replay after a 401; bodies over `maxReplayBodyBytes` (default\n  16 MiB) reject after being read. A `Blob`\u002F`File` body is replayed as it is and never buffered,\n  so upload files as a `File` instead of raising the limit. Node agents\n  (`forClientCredentials`, `forCid`) keep the default.\n  Do not trust an origin merely because it hosts the issuer\u002FWebID or returned a 401. Excluded or\n  public resources must not prompt; unverified 401s remain 401s.\n- Automatic roots load on login\u002Frestore from `pim:storage` assertions naming the exact authenticated\n  WebID, optionally through its linked LWS\u002FSolid description. Call login\u002Frestore first when there are\n  no static roots. Identities without WebIDs, including CID agents, need configured storage roots.\n  Never use `AutomaticCredentialBoundary` to authorize response-asserted roots: a target's type Link,\n  storage Link\u002Fdescription, ancestor HEADs, challenge realm\u002FAS or redirect destination is not a grant.\n- Apply the boundary's explicit AS-origin policy to UMA and both LWS discovery forms, including CID\n  composition. Exchange endpoints must also use granted origins and reject redirects. LWS audiences\n  must stay inside an existing grant, directly or through a description rooted within it; metadata\n  can only narrow authority. Refuse before sending claim\u002Fsubject tokens to untrusted endpoints.\n- Keep authenticated fetch's manual redirects and per-hop credential checks. Clear automatic roots\n  on logout\u002Fsession supersession, fence pending identity discovery, and reload profile roots on restore.\n- Keep provider composition in `src\u002Fproviders.ts`, ordered Solid-OIDC, UMA, then LWS. Share the Solid\n  session and its fence with UMA and the LWS OIDC source. Keep protocol logic in the engine, including\n  PKCE S256, state\u002Fnonce, DPoP binding, nonce retry limits and verified RFC 9728 \u002F legacy LWS discovery.\n- Require HTTPS for the production client ID. `{ dynamicRegistration: true }` is limited to a loopback\n  callback outside production. `allowInsecureLoopback` permits only explicit development HTTP and is\n  checked on every protocol hop. Browser callback origins must match the application origin.\n- Native applications may explicitly set `nativeRedirect: true` with a private-use scheme callback\n  such as `org.jeswr.suite:\u002Foauth\u002Fcallback`. This mode requires a lowercase reverse-domain scheme\n  (suite-native's grammar); reserved schemes, authority (including empty `\u002F\u002F`), credentials, relative\n  paths, queries, fragments and URL normalization are rejected. HTTP(S) callbacks are rejected in\n  native mode; omitting the opt-in retains the browser policy. Supply an HTTPS Client ID Document\n  URL with `application_type: native` and the exact redirect registered; dynamic registration and\n  `allowInsecureLoopback: true` are forbidden. Only the scheme callback skips the WebView-origin\n  check (`capacitor:\u002F\u002Flocalhost` or `https:\u002F\u002Flocalhost` may host the app). `ui.getCode` still returns\n  the complete callback URL with `code`, `state` and `iss`, and owns native cancellation\u002Fcleanup.\n  The scheme URI stays in OAuth authorization\u002Ftoken parameters and the configuration namespace,\n  never in a resource Request, boundary root or storage context. Without known roots, login uses\n  `\u002F.well-known\u002Fpod-auth\u002Fnative-bootstrap` on the Client ID Document's HTTPS origin for its synthetic\n  upgrade\u002Fcontext; that URL is never fetched or implicitly trusted. Verified storage roots alone\n  gain resource access, and the first inherits the bootstrap session as in browser login.\n- Fence login, refresh, restore, persistence and logout against stale work after each awaited boundary.\n  Do not expose identity until credentials and refresh rotation are durable.\n\n## Session lifecycle\n\n`createAccountManager(options)` from `.\u002Faccounts` owns one fresh core per account. Its synchronous\n`accounts()` \u002F `active()` snapshots contain public Identity values only. `add(hint?, { signal }?)`\nuses a fresh session scope, DPoP key and boundary; failed\u002Fcancelled adds preserve existing state.\nDuplicate WebIDs replace only their old scope and retain ordering. `switchTo(webId)` persists\nthe active WebID without network\u002Fnavigation; `fetch` resolves the current active core at call time,\nwhile `fetchFor(webId)` stays bound to that account. Unknown WebIDs throw `UnknownAccountError`.\n\n`remove(webId)` uses `logout({ scope: 'session' })` on a core with a public `sessionScope`; never\nuse an unscoped core's all-sessions logout to remove one account. Each scope isolates credentials,\nkeys, restore locks and logout fences; metadata\u002Fcapability caches may be shared by storage ID.\n`restoreAll()` verifies each remembered pointer through its core's locked refresh\u002Fkey validation,\nisolates failures, and chooses the persisted active account or first restored. The pointer list is\nnot credential authority. `on('change', handler)` observes manager changes; `on('expired', webId => …)`\nidentifies the expired account. `authFor(webId)` exposes the real core; null supplies the anonymous\nadapter. `dispose()` cancels work\u002Freleases cores without removing persisted credentials.\nMatch remembered pointers by WebID **and scope**, including stale removal and restore. Check durable\npresence before cached credentials leave the core; missing pointers count as expiry for established\ndurable sessions. Fence asynchronous expiry checks against current identity and lifecycle generations.\nTrack every owned core through pending add, retirement and restore. Disposal closes their listeners\nand cancels revocation deadlines immediately, preserving remembered credentials.\nExpiry supersedes the scope's generation and stays latched until explicit login establishes a session;\nfetch and restore cannot revive cached authority. Check manager lifetime after remembered-list reads\nand before constructing cores, and forward its signal into OIDC `restore({ signal })`.\n\nUse suite-sdk's `AccountsProvider` \u002F `useAccounts` for React consumers to follow the active core\nthrough the existing PodAuthProvider. One account is simply a manager with one account; no\nsingle-session fallback is needed. Existing PodAuthProvider integrations remain supported.\n\n`restore()` reads a last-active pointer and redeems the refresh token under a Web Lock. Node's keyed\nFIFO fallback coordinates only the current realm, not workers\u002Fprocesses; browsers without Web Locks\nfail closed. Restore permits one `prompt=none` attempt through `ui.getCode` only after definitive\n`invalid_grant`, never interactive fallback or an iframe. Initial interactive login requests consent.\nConcurrent `restore()` calls share one attempt; `restore({ signal })` cancels only that caller's wait,\nthe shared attempt stops when every cancellable waiter has left, and a cancelled restore publishes no\nidentity and emits no `restore` event.\n\nPersist only refresh records beside the matching non-extractable ES256 private key and exportable\npublic key, scoped by issuer\u002FWebID\u002Factual client ID and DPoP public key inside an application namespace.\nIndependent grants retain separate credentials and refresh locks even for the same account; refresh\nrotation updates only its matching grant. Superseded grants stay discoverable for logout across reloads.\nDiscard unloadable, extractable, mismatched or non-ES256 keys before redemption.\nAccess\u002FID tokens and registrations remain\nin memory. Preserve credentials\u002Fpointers on transient network\u002Fdiscovery\u002Frefresh failures; propagate\nstorage errors. Retain the verbatim ported `decideSilentRestore` decision and tests with attribution.\n\n`remembered()` reads only public last-active metadata and currently returns zero or one records. It\ndoes not load credentials or contact the network. `logout()` revokes when advertised, purges stored\nsessions\u002Fkeys and the pointer across reloads, fences in-flight work, and emits `logout` even on failure.\nAwait cleanup; errors reject after cleanup attempts and notification. Clear application capability\ncaches on `logout`. Local logout does not sign out the OP browser session.\n\n`on('login' | 'restore' | 'logout' | 'expired' | 'challenge', handler)` returns an idempotent\nunsubscribe function. Events carry identity snapshots and timestamps; observers cannot interrupt auth.\nReact consumers mount one `PodAuthProvider` with `auth` or `config` and read `usePodAuth()`. Restore\nonce across StrictMode replay, mirror core lifecycle events, fence late restore results against newer\nevents, and remove subscriptions on unmount. Keep action\u002Ffetch handles stable and React optional.\nUse identity presence for authentication; agent identities may have no WebID.\n\n## Node agents\n\n`forClientCredentials` establishes a DPoP service session; `forCid` resolves an existing LWS CID and\nsigns its self-issued subject JWT. Both require non-empty explicit static boundary roots and keep\ncredentials in memory. They establish identity before returning. Client credentials report their\nconfigured client identifier as subject; never infer a WebID from an opaque token.\n\nCID mode, also available through core `lws.subject.cid`, requires a caller-owned non-extractable\nES256 private key. Resolve without credentials\u002Fredirects, authorize the exact same-document\n`JsonWebKey` authentication method and controller, and prove the supplied key matches before exposing\nidentity or releasing credentials. Missing, unresolved, unauthorized or mismatched keys fail closed;\nnever generate a key implicitly or fall back to OIDC. The caller owns provisioning and retention.\n\n## Client Identifier Document\n\nRun `node scripts\u002Fclient-id.mjs \u003Cconfig.json> \u003Cpublic-directory>` from the workspace root. Use the\n[README config recipe](.\u002FREADME.md#generate-the-suite-client-identifier-document): required HTTPS\n`origin`, `name`, non-empty same-origin `redirectUris`, and `fedapp.sectors`; optional `logo`,\n`fedapp.access`, `consumes`, `produces` and `declaresShape`. The generator embeds the federation\npackage's canonical mappings, fixes public-client scope\u002Fauth\u002FDPoP metadata and fails on unknown or\nunsafe config. Redirects remain exact; production generation has no HTTP exception or environment\nfallback. HTTP federation IRIs identify terms, not HTTP transport endpoints.\n\nServe `\u003Cpublic-directory>\u002F.well-known\u002Fsolid-client-id.jsonld` at exactly the generated `client_id`,\nwith `application\u002Fld+json`; include all permitted popup and full-page callbacks and keep the file fixed\nper Vercel deploy. Hosting\u002Froute\u002Fheader wiring belongs to the consuming app. This OAuth Client\nIdentifier Document does not provision the LWS agent CID's authentication key or replace `forCid`'s\ndocument-resolution checks.\n\n## Migrate the deprecated client packages\n\n| Deprecated package | Current direction |\n| --- | --- |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fsolid-dpop` | Suite sessions use pod-auth; agent grants use `pod-auth\u002Fnode`; proof internals stay in the protocol engine |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fsolid-openid-client` | Move session ownership to pod-auth; use core UI hooks for user authorization and `\u002Fnode` for agent factories |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fsolid-session-restore` | Use core `restore()`, `remembered()` and `logout()`; persistence is owned by pod-auth |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fsolid-auth-core` | Replace `createSolidAuth` with `createPodAuth`, and `\u002Freact` with `PodAuthProvider` \u002F `usePodAuth` |\n\nThese are migration directions, not drop-in export aliases. In particular `\u002Fnode` exports the two agent\nfactories, not the old `OidcSession`\u002F`createSolidOidcClient` API or proof helpers. Do not publish legacy\ncredentials into `Identity` or reproduce provider logic to preserve an old signature. Leave deprecated\ncode, exports and mirror pins available for existing consumers; migrate apps in their own tasks.\n`auth-solid`, server verifiers and `solid-webauthn-reauth` are outside these four deprecations.\n\n## Validate changes\n\nBefore changing authentication policy, read SDK core ADR-001 D4 and ADR-004 in\n`solid-suite-planning\u002Fspecs\u002Fsdk-core\u002F`, alongside the repository's `AGENTS.md`.\nThis package is security-critical: preserve 100% coverage thresholds and add behavioral\u002Fadversarial\ntests for changes. Use `.\u002Ftesting` over the real engine for boundary exclusions, callback and hint\nvalidation, cancellation, provider routing, cross-account\u002Fstale-operation fences, key rejection,\nrotation, storage failures and logout\u002Frestore races. Never log tokens, authorization codes or keys.\n\nBuild reactive-authentication before pod-auth, then run `lint`, `build`, `typecheck`, `test` and the\nroot gate. Generator regressions live in `test\u002Fclient-id.test.mjs` under `pnpm run test:root`, with\noffline OIDC schema\u002FJSON-LD checks. Keep development tool versions aligned with root; pnpm 10.4.1\nwith `ignore-scripts` requires local tool declarations for filtered scripts.\n\n## CSS self-registration\n\nRead README's `.\u002Fregistration` contract and `src\u002Fregistration.ts` before changing this surface.\n`createRegistration({ accountApi, podHost?, podAuth, fetch?, allowInsecureLoopback? })` uses the\nexisting auth core, never another session. Null disables availability. Keep `methods` password-only.\nPublic index controls are account.create\u002Fpassword.login; scoped password.create\u002Faccount.pod\u002Faccount.webId\nexist only after account creation. Follow only these controls, same-origin HTTPS, no URL credentials,\nqueries\u002Ffragments, cookies or redirects. Reuse guarded-fetch's refusal and bounded document reads.\nCapture a pristine protocol transport; never send account requests through PodAuth.fetch.\n\nKeep local username validation before any network, and HEAD's exact 404 available \u002F 2xx taken \u002F\n401,403 unknown \u002F error split. Never report 401\u002F403 as taken: CSS denies missing children too.\nA 400 from password enrollment is `username-taken` (duplicate derived login ID), never\n`weak-password`; that code is only for the local pre-network policy check. Keep the order\naccount → password → pod: CSS 7 rejects pod creation on an account without a login method.\nThe username-only password ID is `\u003Cusername>@registration.invalid`; expose it as public loginId,\nnever pretend it is a recovery email. Do not retain passwords\u002Faccount tokens or raw error causes.\nSnapshot inputs before awaits. Report account\u002Fpassword\u002Fpod\u002Fwebid\u002Fprofile\u002Fsign-in with frozen prior\nprogress, and preserve confirmed results in every typed RegistrationError. Whole-flow retries are\nnot idempotent; never hide partial creation or retain credential-bearing recovery state.\n\nCSS links a freshly created WebID automatically. Verify the link; POST the advertised WebID control\nonly when absent. Request linkStorage on pod creation. For the protected profile, establish OIDC with\nthe existing auth.login, require the exact new WebID\u002Fissuer, then write only its profile through\nauth.fetch. Build names with wrapper\u002Fn3, preserving server assertions; the final login returns the\nestablished Identity. Keep passwords\u002Faccount tokens outside OIDC\u002FUI hooks and persistent storage.\n\nKeep new-file thresholds at 100% and exercise the real protocol engine as well as fake account APIs.\n`tools\u002Fstorage-conformance\u002Fintegration\u002Fregistration.test.ts` is the real CSS 7.2.0 lane; run with\n`pnpm --filter @jeswr\u002Fstorage-conformance run test:registration` after dependency-first builds.\nNo socket\u002FCI skip switches: integration lives separately from the offline gate per ADR-009.\n","\u003C!-- AUTHORED-BY Codex GPT-6 -->\n\u003C!-- AUTHORED-BY Codex GPT-6.1-Sol -->\n\n# Work with `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth`\n\nUse this package for new suite client authentication. It owns session policy over the imported\n`@jeswr\u002Freactive-authentication` protocol engine. It supersedes the current-integration guidance in\n[`skills\u002Fsolid-reactive-authentication`](..\u002F..\u002Fskills\u002Fsolid-reactive-authentication\u002FSKILL.md), which\nroutes existing integrations to the current packages and historical references.\nRead [README.md](.\u002FREADME.md) and `src\u002Ftypes.ts` for the implemented API; do not infer APIs from the\npublished 0.1.x package or copy its providers into applications. This workspace package remains\nprivate and experimental pending conformance.\n\n`@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Fnode` also exports `createNodeOidcClient` for server-side brokers (mcp-oauth's\npod sessions). It delegates split server authorization to reactive-authentication. Its sensitive\nstate and original private JWK envelope belong only in an encrypted server vault with callback consume,\nrefresh CAS and durable retirement. Signing keys are imported non-extractable; browser key storage is unchanged.\n\n## Quick reference\n\n| Entry point | Use |\n| --- | --- |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth` | `createPodAuth`, credential-bounded fetch, UI hooks and session lifecycle |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Freact` | Optional `PodAuthProvider` \u002F `usePodAuth` lifecycle mirror |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Faccounts` | `createAccountManager`, independent account sessions, local switching and restore |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Fnode` | `forClientCredentials` and `forCid` agent factories; `createNodeOidcClient` and `storageDescriptionRoots` (LWS realm checks) for server brokers |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Ftesting` | Node-only mock OP, mock LWS AS and memory store |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Fdirectory` | Provider metadata, WebID\u002Fprovider address resolution and recent providers |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Fregistration` | CSS v7 self-registration, previews, progress and typed partial failures |\n\n```ts\nimport { createPodAuth, type PodAuthOptions } from '@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth';\n\n\u002F\u002F Supply application UI that returns the complete callback URL and honors cancellation.\ndeclare const ui: PodAuthOptions['ui'];\n\nconst auth = createPodAuth({\n  clientId: 'https:\u002F\u002Fsuite.example\u002F.well-known\u002Fsolid-client-id.jsonld',\n  redirectUri: 'https:\u002F\u002Fsuite.example\u002Fauth\u002Fcallback.html',\n  boundary: { roots: ['https:\u002F\u002Fpod.example\u002Falice\u002F'] },\n  ui,\n});\n\nawait auth.restore();\nawait auth.login({ webId: 'https:\u002F\u002Fid.example\u002Falice#me' });\nconst response = await auth.fetch('https:\u002F\u002Fpod.example\u002Falice\u002Fprivate');\nconst identity = await auth.identity();\n```\n\nFor a cancel button, pass `auth.login(hint, { signal })`. Aborting aborts `ui.getCode` and the\nattempt's requests; the call rejects once the attempt has wound down. Stored sessions stay unless a\ngrant had already arrived, which pod-auth then discards with a full `logout()`. Don't call `logout()`\nyourself to cancel, since it purges every stored session.\n\nPass `auth.fetch` to [storage-client](..\u002Fstorage-client\u002FSKILL.md),\n[storage-capabilities](..\u002Fstorage-capabilities\u002FSKILL.md) and\n[pod-notifications](..\u002Fpod-notifications\u002FSKILL.md). Read the\n[LWS differences](..\u002F..\u002Fskills\u002Flws-vs-solid\u002FSKILL.md) for storage and grant semantics.\n\nConstruct one core per application session. `ui.getCode` must return the complete callback URL,\nincluding `state`, `code` and `iss`, honor cancellation and own popup\u002Fredirect cleanup. Choose among\nadvertised issuers explicitly; omitting the chooser for multiple issuers throws `AmbiguousIssuerError`.\nSame-hint concurrent login is single-flight; different hints reject while login is pending. Log out\nbefore switching accounts on the same core, or use the account manager below. `identity()` reads claims only; it never refreshes, contacts an issuer or\nreturns credentials. Public profile reads are not proof of authentication.\n\nUse the pure `.\u002Fdirectory` entry point for shared sign-in address handling. `KNOWN_PROVIDERS` is deeply\nfrozen; `providersFromConfig` returns copies from comma-separated HTTPS URLs or a fallback directory.\n`classifyLoginInput` checks URL shape without network; `resolveLoginTarget` tries both interpretations\nusing only the supplied pristine public fetch, honors abort, and caps responses at 1 MiB. It throws\n`InvalidLoginAddressError` (a `TypeError`) for invalid URLs or `NotALoginAddressError` for failed probes.\n\n```ts\nimport type { PodAuth } from '@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth';\nimport { resolveLoginTarget } from '@jeswr\u002Fpod-auth\u002Fdirectory';\n\ndeclare const auth: PodAuth;\ndeclare const address: string; \u002F\u002F What the user typed.\ndeclare const publicFetch: typeof fetch; \u002F\u002F A pristine, credential-free fetch.\n\nconst target = await resolveLoginTarget(address, { fetch: publicFetch });\nconst hint = target.kind === 'webid'\n  ? { webId: target.webId }\n  : { issuer: target.issuer };\nawait auth.login(hint);\n```\n\n`createRecentProvidersStore(storage)` keeps at most five public HTTPS issuers, deduped and most recent\nfirst; storage failures are harmless. Providers use monograms by default; host-supplied `label` and\n`iconUrl` are opt-in. Re-verify default provider and sign-up addresses live before release.\n\n## Preserve the credential boundary\n\n- Use the unbound `auth.fetch` throughout the SDK. Preserve global fetch; never call `registerGlobally`.\n  Construct auth after installing the intended pristine transport in tests. Protocol discovery,\n  registration, token and refresh HTTP must never recurse through a credential-attaching wrapper.\n- Keep the engine's `verifyWebId: true`: before storing a Solid session or reporting its identity,\n  it requires the returned WebID's profile to list the issuer as `solid:oidcIssuer`, compared with\n  `sameIssuer`, through the non-reactive protocol transport. An unlisted issuer throws the engine's\n  `IssuerNotAuthorizedError` (`webId`, `issuer`), re-exported unchanged by pod-auth and propagated from\n  `login()`. Profile fetch and parse failures keep their existing errors. Issuer-only login reads the\n  profile once; WebID hints retain discovery and claim-equality checks. Do not duplicate the engine check.\n- Credentials attach only within configured static roots or authenticated WebID-profile storage roots.\n  `boundary.automatic: false` selects static-only behavior. `boundary.eligible` restricts both kinds.\n  `boundary.storageEndpoints` names exact (or trailing-`\u002F` prefix) paths on each verified storage's\n  origin, for server APIs outside the pod folder; they share that storage's grant and stay out of\n  `Identity.storages`. Use it only for endpoints of the server that hosts the storage.\n- `auth.fetch` buffers bodies for replay after a 401; bodies over `maxReplayBodyBytes` (default\n  16 MiB) reject after being read. A `Blob`\u002F`File` body is replayed as it is and never buffered,\n  so upload files as a `File` instead of raising the limit. Node agents\n  (`forClientCredentials`, `forCid`) keep the default.\n  Do not trust an origin merely because it hosts the issuer\u002FWebID or returned a 401. Excluded or\n  public resources must not prompt; unverified 401s remain 401s.\n- Automatic roots load on login\u002Frestore from `pim:storage` assertions naming the exact authenticated\n  WebID, optionally through its linked LWS\u002FSolid description. Call login\u002Frestore first when there are\n  no static roots. Identities without WebIDs, including CID agents, need configured storage roots.\n  Never use `AutomaticCredentialBoundary` to authorize response-asserted roots: a target's type Link,\n  storage Link\u002Fdescription, ancestor HEADs, challenge realm\u002FAS or redirect destination is not a grant.\n- Apply the boundary's explicit AS-origin policy to UMA and both LWS discovery forms, including CID\n  composition. Exchange endpoints must also use granted origins and reject redirects. LWS audiences\n  must stay inside an existing grant, directly or through a description rooted within it; metadata\n  can only narrow authority. Refuse before sending claim\u002Fsubject tokens to untrusted endpoints.\n- Keep authenticated fetch's manual redirects and per-hop credential checks. Clear automatic roots\n  on logout\u002Fsession supersession, fence pending identity discovery, and reload profile roots on restore.\n- Keep provider composition in `src\u002Fproviders.ts`, ordered Solid-OIDC, UMA, then LWS. Share the Solid\n  session and its fence with UMA and the LWS OIDC source. Keep protocol logic in the engine, including\n  PKCE S256, state\u002Fnonce, DPoP binding, nonce retry limits and verified RFC 9728 \u002F legacy LWS discovery.\n- Require HTTPS for the production client ID. `{ dynamicRegistration: true }` is limited to a loopback\n  callback outside production. `allowInsecureLoopback` permits only explicit development HTTP and is\n  checked on every protocol hop. Browser callback origins must match the application origin.\n- Native applications may explicitly set `nativeRedirect: true` with a private-use scheme callback\n  such as `org.jeswr.suite:\u002Foauth\u002Fcallback`. This mode requires a lowercase reverse-domain scheme\n  (suite-native's grammar); reserved schemes, authority (including empty `\u002F\u002F`), credentials, relative\n  paths, queries, fragments and URL normalization are rejected. HTTP(S) callbacks are rejected in\n  native mode; omitting the opt-in retains the browser policy. Supply an HTTPS Client ID Document\n  URL with `application_type: native` and the exact redirect registered; dynamic registration and\n  `allowInsecureLoopback: true` are forbidden. Only the scheme callback skips the WebView-origin\n  check (`capacitor:\u002F\u002Flocalhost` or `https:\u002F\u002Flocalhost` may host the app). `ui.getCode` still returns\n  the complete callback URL with `code`, `state` and `iss`, and owns native cancellation\u002Fcleanup.\n  The scheme URI stays in OAuth authorization\u002Ftoken parameters and the configuration namespace,\n  never in a resource Request, boundary root or storage context. Without known roots, login uses\n  `\u002F.well-known\u002Fpod-auth\u002Fnative-bootstrap` on the Client ID Document's HTTPS origin for its synthetic\n  upgrade\u002Fcontext; that URL is never fetched or implicitly trusted. Verified storage roots alone\n  gain resource access, and the first inherits the bootstrap session as in browser login.\n- Fence login, refresh, restore, persistence and logout against stale work after each awaited boundary.\n  Do not expose identity until credentials and refresh rotation are durable.\n\n## Session lifecycle\n\n`createAccountManager(options)` from `.\u002Faccounts` owns one fresh core per account. Its synchronous\n`accounts()` \u002F `active()` snapshots contain public Identity values only. `add(hint?, { signal }?)`\nuses a fresh session scope, DPoP key and boundary; failed\u002Fcancelled adds preserve existing state.\nDuplicate WebIDs replace only their old scope and retain ordering. `switchTo(webId)` persists\nthe active WebID without network\u002Fnavigation; `fetch` resolves the current active core at call time,\nwhile `fetchFor(webId)` stays bound to that account. Unknown WebIDs throw `UnknownAccountError`.\n\n`remove(webId)` uses `logout({ scope: 'session' })` on a core with a public `sessionScope`; never\nuse an unscoped core's all-sessions logout to remove one account. Each scope isolates credentials,\nkeys, restore locks and logout fences; metadata\u002Fcapability caches may be shared by storage ID.\n`restoreAll()` verifies each remembered pointer through its core's locked refresh\u002Fkey validation,\nisolates failures, and chooses the persisted active account or first restored. The pointer list is\nnot credential authority. `on('change', handler)` observes manager changes; `on('expired', webId => …)`\nidentifies the expired account. `authFor(webId)` exposes the real core; null supplies the anonymous\nadapter. `dispose()` cancels work\u002Freleases cores without removing persisted credentials.\nMatch remembered pointers by WebID **and scope**, including stale removal and restore. Check durable\npresence before cached credentials leave the core; missing pointers count as expiry for established\ndurable sessions. Fence asynchronous expiry checks against current identity and lifecycle generations.\nTrack every owned core through pending add, retirement and restore. Disposal closes their listeners\nand cancels revocation deadlines immediately, preserving remembered credentials.\nExpiry supersedes the scope's generation and stays latched until explicit login establishes a session;\nfetch and restore cannot revive cached authority. Check manager lifetime after remembered-list reads\nand before constructing cores, and forward its signal into OIDC `restore({ signal })`.\n\nUse suite-sdk's `AccountsProvider` \u002F `useAccounts` for React consumers to follow the active core\nthrough the existing PodAuthProvider. One account is simply a manager with one account; no\nsingle-session fallback is needed. Existing PodAuthProvider integrations remain supported.\n\n`restore()` reads a last-active pointer and redeems the refresh token under a Web Lock. Node's keyed\nFIFO fallback coordinates only the current realm, not workers\u002Fprocesses; browsers without Web Locks\nfail closed. Restore permits one `prompt=none` attempt through `ui.getCode` only after definitive\n`invalid_grant`, never interactive fallback or an iframe. Initial interactive login requests consent.\nConcurrent `restore()` calls share one attempt; `restore({ signal })` cancels only that caller's wait,\nthe shared attempt stops when every cancellable waiter has left, and a cancelled restore publishes no\nidentity and emits no `restore` event.\n\nPersist only refresh records beside the matching non-extractable ES256 private key and exportable\npublic key, scoped by issuer\u002FWebID\u002Factual client ID and DPoP public key inside an application namespace.\nIndependent grants retain separate credentials and refresh locks even for the same account; refresh\nrotation updates only its matching grant. Superseded grants stay discoverable for logout across reloads.\nDiscard unloadable, extractable, mismatched or non-ES256 keys before redemption.\nAccess\u002FID tokens and registrations remain\nin memory. Preserve credentials\u002Fpointers on transient network\u002Fdiscovery\u002Frefresh failures; propagate\nstorage errors. Retain the verbatim ported `decideSilentRestore` decision and tests with attribution.\n\n`remembered()` reads only public last-active metadata and currently returns zero or one records. It\ndoes not load credentials or contact the network. `logout()` revokes when advertised, purges stored\nsessions\u002Fkeys and the pointer across reloads, fences in-flight work, and emits `logout` even on failure.\nAwait cleanup; errors reject after cleanup attempts and notification. Clear application capability\ncaches on `logout`. Local logout does not sign out the OP browser session.\n\n`on('login' | 'restore' | 'logout' | 'expired' | 'challenge', handler)` returns an idempotent\nunsubscribe function. Events carry identity snapshots and timestamps; observers cannot interrupt auth.\nReact consumers mount one `PodAuthProvider` with `auth` or `config` and read `usePodAuth()`. Restore\nonce across StrictMode replay, mirror core lifecycle events, fence late restore results against newer\nevents, and remove subscriptions on unmount. Keep action\u002Ffetch handles stable and React optional.\nUse identity presence for authentication; agent identities may have no WebID.\n\n## Node agents\n\n`forClientCredentials` establishes a DPoP service session; `forCid` resolves an existing LWS CID and\nsigns its self-issued subject JWT. Both require non-empty explicit static boundary roots and keep\ncredentials in memory. They establish identity before returning. Client credentials report their\nconfigured client identifier as subject; never infer a WebID from an opaque token.\n\nCID mode, also available through core `lws.subject.cid`, requires a caller-owned non-extractable\nES256 private key. Resolve without credentials\u002Fredirects, authorize the exact same-document\n`JsonWebKey` authentication method and controller, and prove the supplied key matches before exposing\nidentity or releasing credentials. Missing, unresolved, unauthorized or mismatched keys fail closed;\nnever generate a key implicitly or fall back to OIDC. The caller owns provisioning and retention.\n\n## Client Identifier Document\n\nRun `node scripts\u002Fclient-id.mjs \u003Cconfig.json> \u003Cpublic-directory>` from the workspace root. Use the\n[README config recipe](.\u002FREADME.md#generate-the-suite-client-identifier-document): required HTTPS\n`origin`, `name`, non-empty same-origin `redirectUris`, and `fedapp.sectors`; optional `logo`,\n`fedapp.access`, `consumes`, `produces` and `declaresShape`. The generator embeds the federation\npackage's canonical mappings, fixes public-client scope\u002Fauth\u002FDPoP metadata and fails on unknown or\nunsafe config. Redirects remain exact; production generation has no HTTP exception or environment\nfallback. HTTP federation IRIs identify terms, not HTTP transport endpoints.\n\nServe `\u003Cpublic-directory>\u002F.well-known\u002Fsolid-client-id.jsonld` at exactly the generated `client_id`,\nwith `application\u002Fld+json`; include all permitted popup and full-page callbacks and keep the file fixed\nper Vercel deploy. Hosting\u002Froute\u002Fheader wiring belongs to the consuming app. This OAuth Client\nIdentifier Document does not provision the LWS agent CID's authentication key or replace `forCid`'s\ndocument-resolution checks.\n\n## Migrate the deprecated client packages\n\n| Deprecated package | Current direction |\n| --- | --- |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fsolid-dpop` | Suite sessions use pod-auth; agent grants use `pod-auth\u002Fnode`; proof internals stay in the protocol engine |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fsolid-openid-client` | Move session ownership to pod-auth; use core UI hooks for user authorization and `\u002Fnode` for agent factories |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fsolid-session-restore` | Use core `restore()`, `remembered()` and `logout()`; persistence is owned by pod-auth |\n| `@jeswr\u002Fsolid-auth-core` | Replace `createSolidAuth` with `createPodAuth`, and `\u002Freact` with `PodAuthProvider` \u002F `usePodAuth` |\n\nThese are migration directions, not drop-in export aliases. In particular `\u002Fnode` exports the two agent\nfactories, not the old `OidcSession`\u002F`createSolidOidcClient` API or proof helpers. Do not publish legacy\ncredentials into `Identity` or reproduce provider logic to preserve an old signature. Leave deprecated\ncode, exports and mirror pins available for existing consumers; migrate apps in their own tasks.\n`auth-solid`, server verifiers and `solid-webauthn-reauth` are outside these four deprecations.\n\n## Validate changes\n\nBefore changing authentication policy, read SDK core ADR-001 D4 and ADR-004 in\n`solid-suite-planning\u002Fspecs\u002Fsdk-core\u002F`, alongside the repository's `AGENTS.md`.\nThis package is security-critical: preserve 100% coverage thresholds and add behavioral\u002Fadversarial\ntests for changes. Use `.\u002Ftesting` over the real engine for boundary exclusions, callback and hint\nvalidation, cancellation, provider routing, cross-account\u002Fstale-operation fences, key rejection,\nrotation, storage failures and logout\u002Frestore races. Never log tokens, authorization codes or keys.\n\nBuild reactive-authentication before pod-auth, then run `lint`, `build`, `typecheck`, `test` and the\nroot gate. Generator regressions live in `test\u002Fclient-id.test.mjs` under `pnpm run test:root`, with\noffline OIDC schema\u002FJSON-LD checks. Keep development tool versions aligned with root; pnpm 10.4.1\nwith `ignore-scripts` requires local tool declarations for filtered scripts.\n\n## CSS self-registration\n\nRead README's `.\u002Fregistration` contract and `src\u002Fregistration.ts` before changing this surface.\n`createRegistration({ accountApi, podHost?, podAuth, fetch?, allowInsecureLoopback? })` uses the\nexisting auth core, never another session. Null disables availability. Keep `methods` password-only.\nPublic index controls are account.create\u002Fpassword.login; scoped password.create\u002Faccount.pod\u002Faccount.webId\nexist only after account creation. Follow only these controls, same-origin HTTPS, no URL credentials,\nqueries\u002Ffragments, cookies or redirects. Reuse guarded-fetch's refusal and bounded document reads.\nCapture a pristine protocol transport; never send account requests through PodAuth.fetch.\n\nKeep local username validation before any network, and HEAD's exact 404 available \u002F 2xx taken \u002F\n401,403 unknown \u002F error split. Never report 401\u002F403 as taken: CSS denies missing children too.\nA 400 from password enrollment is `username-taken` (duplicate derived login ID), never\n`weak-password`; that code is only for the local pre-network policy check. Keep the order\naccount → password → pod: CSS 7 rejects pod creation on an account without a login method.\nThe username-only password ID is `\u003Cusername>@registration.invalid`; expose it as public loginId,\nnever pretend it is a recovery email. Do not retain passwords\u002Faccount tokens or raw error causes.\nSnapshot inputs before awaits. Report account\u002Fpassword\u002Fpod\u002Fwebid\u002Fprofile\u002Fsign-in with frozen prior\nprogress, and preserve confirmed results in every typed RegistrationError. Whole-flow retries are\nnot idempotent; never hide partial creation or retain credential-bearing recovery state.\n\nCSS links a freshly created WebID automatically. Verify the link; POST the advertised WebID control\nonly when absent. Request linkStorage on pod creation. For the protected profile, establish OIDC with\nthe existing auth.login, require the exact new WebID\u002Fissuer, then write only its profile through\nauth.fetch. Build names with wrapper\u002Fn3, preserving server assertions; the final login returns the\nestablished Identity. Keep passwords\u002Faccount tokens outside OIDC\u002FUI hooks and persistent storage.\n\nKeep new-file thresholds at 100% and exercise the real protocol engine as well as fake account APIs.\n`tools\u002Fstorage-conformance\u002Fintegration\u002Fregistration.test.ts` is the real CSS 7.2.0 lane; run with\n`pnpm --filter @jeswr\u002Fstorage-conformance run test:registration` after dependency-first builds.\nNo socket\u002FCI skip switches: integration lives separately from the offline gate per ADR-009.\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","5482abfe2666cc12f835fe360e8fad1f1e1dea8c","packages\u002Fpod-auth",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjeswr","jeswr.org\u002F#me","@solid Lead @theodi | PhD Candidate @OxfordHCC\r\n\r\n","2026-11-15 05:20:24",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":34,"prompt":44,"zipAvailable":45},[35,38,41],{"tool":36,"command":37},"npx","npx skills add jeswr\u002Fsolid-sdk --skill 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