[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78C3AFB8Y33VNN47DAB0QKJ":3,"skill-same:01M78C3AFB8Y33VNN47DAB0QKJ":45},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":25,"commitSha":26,"skillDirectory":27,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":29,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":30,"install":31,"resources":44},"01M78C3AFB8Y33VNN47DAB0QKJ","security-review",null,"Portable security review for a feature, endpoint, or change before it ships. Orchestrates the existing OWASP review (@security-boss) and secrets scan (security_secrets validator), then adds the pass they miss — an explicit business-logic-flaw walkthrough (IDOR, race\u002FTOCTOU, state-machine bypass, privilege escalation, price\u002Fquantity tampering). Advisory and non-mutating — produces a findings report; real findings are filed as tasks. Use when a change touching money, access control, or multi-step state is about to ship, or when the auth looks fine but the flow could be abused. NOT FOR SAST or dependency-CVE scanning (consumer CI owns those).","rynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow","rynhardt81","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F52700299?v=4","01M78BZMY2RF5TVDY59XT67ZB6","RjvR","01M78BZMYQ2AJGBHKAT0M1Q2ZB",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsecurity-review\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: security-review\ndescription: Portable security review for a feature, endpoint, or change before it ships. Orchestrates the existing OWASP review (@security-boss) and secrets scan (security_secrets validator), then adds the pass they miss — an explicit business-logic-flaw walkthrough (IDOR, race\u002FTOCTOU, state-machine bypass, privilege escalation, price\u002Fquantity tampering). Advisory and non-mutating — produces a findings report; real findings are filed as tasks. Use when a change touching money, access control, or multi-step state is about to ship, or when the auth looks fine but the flow could be abused. NOT FOR SAST or dependency-CVE scanning (consumer CI owns those).\nallowed-tools: Read, Glob, Grep, Bash, Write, TodoWrite, Task\n---\n\n# security-review Workflow\n\nReviews a feature or change for security flaws before it ships — including the business-logic flaws generic OWASP red-flags miss. Input is the change (a diff, a feature's files, or a task ID); output is a findings report, with real findings filed as tasks. Mutates nothing — findings become tasks, never a hard gate.\n\n## Index\n\n| File or section | Read when… |\n|---|---|\n| What it orchestrates | Knowing which existing pieces (`@security-boss`, secrets validator) own which pass |\n| When to use (incl. when not to) | Deciding whether the change has a surface worth reviewing |\n| Invocation | Choosing scope (diff, task, `--files`, `--output`) |\n| Steps 1–3 | Scoping the surface, running OWASP + secrets, the business-logic walkthrough |\n| Step 4: Report and file findings | Writing the report and filing findings as tasks or intents |\n| `_shared\u002Ftask-triage.md` | Step 4 — security findings are a hard floor: blocker-or-next, never deferred by default |\n| Anti-criteria for this skill | Checking the run stayed advisory and self-contained |\n\n## What it orchestrates\n\nThis skill **orchestrates** Forge's existing security pieces and adds the one missing pass. It does **not** re-implement OWASP or secret detection — those already exist:\n\n- **OWASP Top 10 review** → `@security-boss` (injection, broken auth, broken access control, XSS, SSRF, etc.). It already carries the authn-vs-authz distinction and access-control red-flags.\n- **Secrets scan** → the `security_secrets.py` validator (hardcoded keys\u002Ftokens, `.env` writes), with patterns from `hooks\u002Fconfig\u002Fsecret-patterns.yaml`.\n\nWhat neither covers — and what this skill adds — is **business-logic flaws**: vulnerabilities where every individual call is \"authenticated and well-formed,\" but the *sequence* or *values* break an invariant. A generic OWASP red-flag list provably doesn't force this; it takes a deliberate walkthrough. The skill self-contains that walkthrough so it runs on a bare clone with no PAI\u002Fexternal plugins.\n\n## When to use\n\n- **Before shipping a feature that touches money, access, or state** — checkout, balance, role changes, multi-step workflows.\n- **At `\u002Fnew-feature` security review** and in the `\u002Fcreate-pr` Step 3.7 pre-flight for any security-relevant change.\n- When a reviewer says \"the auth looks fine\" but the *flow* could be abused.\n\n**Do NOT use it** as a SAST engine or dependency-CVE scanner — those are the consumer project's CI\u002Fruntime job (Semgrep, CodeQL, `npm audit`), not this portable framework's. This skill is review *judgment*, not tooling. Skip it too for pure secrets scanning with no logic surface (the `security_secrets.py` validator already fires on writes), and for a change with no money\u002Faccess\u002Fstate surface — a normal `@security-boss` review suffices.\n\n## Invocation\n\n```\n\u002Fsecurity-review                      # review the current diff (git diff)\n\u002Fsecurity-review T###                 # review the change for a task\n\u002Fsecurity-review --files \u003Cglob>       # review specific files\n\u002Fsecurity-review --output PATH        # custom report path (default: memories\u002Fsecurity-review-{date}.md)\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 1: Scope the surface\n\nIdentify what's under review (diff, feature files, or a task's scope). Read `docs\u002Fcode-map.md` if present to locate the relevant surfaces (auth handlers, input parsers, money\u002Fstate mutations, external-call sites). Note which surfaces touch **money, access control, or multi-step state** — those are where business-logic flaws live.\n\n## Step 2: OWASP + secrets (orchestrate existing)\n\n- Invoke `@security-boss` (via the Task tool) for the OWASP Top 10 review of the scoped surface. Do not restate the OWASP list here — `@security-boss` owns it.\n- Confirm the secrets scan is clean (the `security_secrets.py` validator fires on writes; for a review pass, grep the diff for the same pattern classes — hardcoded keys, tokens, `.env` content).\n\n## Step 3: Business-logic-flaw walkthrough (the missing pass)\n\nFor each money\u002Faccess\u002Fstate surface, walk these explicitly — each is a flaw where the individual request is valid but the *logic* is exploitable:\n\n- **IDOR \u002F object-level:** can a user act on another user's object by changing an ID? (`\u002Forders\u002F{id}` returning any order.)\n- **Race \u002F TOCTOU:** can two concurrent requests both pass a check that should only pass once? (double-spend, coupon reuse, balance going negative.)\n- **State-machine \u002F workflow bypass:** can a step be skipped or replayed out of order? (reaching \"shipped\" without \"paid\"; re-submitting a one-time action.)\n- **Privilege escalation:** horizontal (peer's data) or vertical (higher role's capability) — by manipulating a role\u002Ftenant\u002Fflag the server trusts without re-checking.\n- **Price \u002F quantity tampering:** is an amount, price, discount, or quantity taken from the client and trusted? (negative quantity, client-set price, stacked discounts.)\n- **Invariant breaks:** what business rule must *always* hold (balance ≥ 0, one vote per user, total = sum of line items) — and can a sequence of valid calls violate it?\n\nFor each surface, record: the invariant, the abuse it could allow, and whether the code enforces it **server-side on every relevant operation** (not just the happy path, not client-trusted).\n\n## Step 4: Report and file findings\n\nWrite the findings to `memories\u002Fsecurity-review-{date}.md` (or `--output`). For each real finding: severity, the surface, the abuse, and the fix direction. **File genuine findings as tasks** via the `@security-boss` convention (`forge task add` with severity in `--category`) — so they enter the work queue rather than evaporate. Security findings are a **hard floor** under `skills\u002F_shared\u002Ftask-triage.md` — blocker-or-next, never deferred to the backlog epic by default. A finding wider than a bounded patch — an architectural gap or the same flaw repeated across a surface — is written as `\u002Fintent \"\u003Cproblem>\"` with this report as evidence, then promoted once accepted; the task queue holds fixes, not redesigns. Print a one-paragraph summary and stop. **Advisory only** — never blocks a ship; the findings are the deliverable.\n\n## Anti-criteria for this skill\n\n- **Anti:** Does NOT re-implement the OWASP Top 10 inline — it invokes `@security-boss`, which owns that list.\n- **Anti:** Does NOT block a ship — advisory only; findings become tasks, not gates (informational-hooks doctrine).\n- **Anti:** Does NOT ship SAST\u002FCVE tooling — review judgment only; scanning tools are the consumer's CI job.\n- **Anti:** Does NOT depend on a PAI\u002Fexternal plugin — the business-logic walkthrough is self-contained, bare-clone runnable.\n\n## See also\n\n- `agents\u002Fsecurity-boss.md` — the OWASP + authn\u002Fauthz reviewer this skill orchestrates\n- `hooks\u002Fvalidators\u002Fagents\u002Fsecurity_secrets.py` + `hooks\u002Fconfig\u002Fsecret-patterns.yaml` — the secrets scan + its (now live) pattern config\n- `rules\u002Fsecurity.md` — the authn-vs-authz distinction + when to invoke `@security-boss`\n- `\u002Faudit-rules` \u002F `\u002Fvet-idea` — sibling advisory, non-mutating, report-only skills this mirrors\n\n---\n\n**Project-specific overrides:** if `SKILL.local.md` exists in this directory, read it — it is consumer-owned, survives framework refresh, and **wins on conflict**. A sidecar that relaxes a gate defined above must state how to prove the gate is wrong in that case. Doctrine: `rules\u002Fframework-vs-project-root.md`.\n","# security-review Workflow\n\nReviews a feature or change for security flaws before it ships — including the business-logic flaws generic OWASP red-flags miss. Input is the change (a diff, a feature's files, or a task ID); output is a findings report, with real findings filed as tasks. Mutates nothing — findings become tasks, never a hard gate.\n\n## Index\n\n| File or section | Read when… |\n|---|---|\n| What it orchestrates | Knowing which existing pieces (`@security-boss`, secrets validator) own which pass |\n| When to use (incl. when not to) | Deciding whether the change has a surface worth reviewing |\n| Invocation | Choosing scope (diff, task, `--files`, `--output`) |\n| Steps 1–3 | Scoping the surface, running OWASP + secrets, the business-logic walkthrough |\n| Step 4: Report and file findings | Writing the report and filing findings as tasks or intents |\n| `_shared\u002Ftask-triage.md` | Step 4 — security findings are a hard floor: blocker-or-next, never deferred by default |\n| Anti-criteria for this skill | Checking the run stayed advisory and self-contained |\n\n## What it orchestrates\n\nThis skill **orchestrates** Forge's existing security pieces and adds the one missing pass. It does **not** re-implement OWASP or secret detection — those already exist:\n\n- **OWASP Top 10 review** → `@security-boss` (injection, broken auth, broken access control, XSS, SSRF, etc.). It already carries the authn-vs-authz distinction and access-control red-flags.\n- **Secrets scan** → the `security_secrets.py` validator (hardcoded keys\u002Ftokens, `.env` writes), with patterns from `hooks\u002Fconfig\u002Fsecret-patterns.yaml`.\n\nWhat neither covers — and what this skill adds — is **business-logic flaws**: vulnerabilities where every individual call is \"authenticated and well-formed,\" but the *sequence* or *values* break an invariant. A generic OWASP red-flag list provably doesn't force this; it takes a deliberate walkthrough. The skill self-contains that walkthrough so it runs on a bare clone with no PAI\u002Fexternal plugins.\n\n## When to use\n\n- **Before shipping a feature that touches money, access, or state** — checkout, balance, role changes, multi-step workflows.\n- **At `\u002Fnew-feature` security review** and in the `\u002Fcreate-pr` Step 3.7 pre-flight for any security-relevant change.\n- When a reviewer says \"the auth looks fine\" but the *flow* could be abused.\n\n**Do NOT use it** as a SAST engine or dependency-CVE scanner — those are the consumer project's CI\u002Fruntime job (Semgrep, CodeQL, `npm audit`), not this portable framework's. This skill is review *judgment*, not tooling. Skip it too for pure secrets scanning with no logic surface (the `security_secrets.py` validator already fires on writes), and for a change with no money\u002Faccess\u002Fstate surface — a normal `@security-boss` review suffices.\n\n## Invocation\n\n```\n\u002Fsecurity-review                      # review the current diff (git diff)\n\u002Fsecurity-review T###                 # review the change for a task\n\u002Fsecurity-review --files \u003Cglob>       # review specific files\n\u002Fsecurity-review --output PATH        # custom report path (default: memories\u002Fsecurity-review-{date}.md)\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 1: Scope the surface\n\nIdentify what's under review (diff, feature files, or a task's scope). Read `docs\u002Fcode-map.md` if present to locate the relevant surfaces (auth handlers, input parsers, money\u002Fstate mutations, external-call sites). Note which surfaces touch **money, access control, or multi-step state** — those are where business-logic flaws live.\n\n## Step 2: OWASP + secrets (orchestrate existing)\n\n- Invoke `@security-boss` (via the Task tool) for the OWASP Top 10 review of the scoped surface. Do not restate the OWASP list here — `@security-boss` owns it.\n- Confirm the secrets scan is clean (the `security_secrets.py` validator fires on writes; for a review pass, grep the diff for the same pattern classes — hardcoded keys, tokens, `.env` content).\n\n## Step 3: Business-logic-flaw walkthrough (the missing pass)\n\nFor each money\u002Faccess\u002Fstate surface, walk these explicitly — each is a flaw where the individual request is valid but the *logic* is exploitable:\n\n- **IDOR \u002F object-level:** can a user act on another user's object by changing an ID? (`\u002Forders\u002F{id}` returning any order.)\n- **Race \u002F TOCTOU:** can two concurrent requests both pass a check that should only pass once? (double-spend, coupon reuse, balance going negative.)\n- **State-machine \u002F workflow bypass:** can a step be skipped or replayed out of order? (reaching \"shipped\" without \"paid\"; re-submitting a one-time action.)\n- **Privilege escalation:** horizontal (peer's data) or vertical (higher role's capability) — by manipulating a role\u002Ftenant\u002Fflag the server trusts without re-checking.\n- **Price \u002F quantity tampering:** is an amount, price, discount, or quantity taken from the client and trusted? (negative quantity, client-set price, stacked discounts.)\n- **Invariant breaks:** what business rule must *always* hold (balance ≥ 0, one vote per user, total = sum of line items) — and can a sequence of valid calls violate it?\n\nFor each surface, record: the invariant, the abuse it could allow, and whether the code enforces it **server-side on every relevant operation** (not just the happy path, not client-trusted).\n\n## Step 4: Report and file findings\n\nWrite the findings to `memories\u002Fsecurity-review-{date}.md` (or `--output`). For each real finding: severity, the surface, the abuse, and the fix direction. **File genuine findings as tasks** via the `@security-boss` convention (`forge task add` with severity in `--category`) — so they enter the work queue rather than evaporate. Security findings are a **hard floor** under `skills\u002F_shared\u002Ftask-triage.md` — blocker-or-next, never deferred to the backlog epic by default. A finding wider than a bounded patch — an architectural gap or the same flaw repeated across a surface — is written as `\u002Fintent \"\u003Cproblem>\"` with this report as evidence, then promoted once accepted; the task queue holds fixes, not redesigns. Print a one-paragraph summary and stop. **Advisory only** — never blocks a ship; the findings are the deliverable.\n\n## Anti-criteria for this skill\n\n- **Anti:** Does NOT re-implement the OWASP Top 10 inline — it invokes `@security-boss`, which owns that list.\n- **Anti:** Does NOT block a ship — advisory only; findings become tasks, not gates (informational-hooks doctrine).\n- **Anti:** Does NOT ship SAST\u002FCVE tooling — review judgment only; scanning tools are the consumer's CI job.\n- **Anti:** Does NOT depend on a PAI\u002Fexternal plugin — the business-logic walkthrough is self-contained, bare-clone runnable.\n\n## See also\n\n- `agents\u002Fsecurity-boss.md` — the OWASP + authn\u002Fauthz reviewer this skill orchestrates\n- `hooks\u002Fvalidators\u002Fagents\u002Fsecurity_secrets.py` + `hooks\u002Fconfig\u002Fsecret-patterns.yaml` — the secrets scan + its (now live) pattern config\n- `rules\u002Fsecurity.md` — the authn-vs-authz distinction + when to invoke `@security-boss`\n- `\u002Faudit-rules` \u002F `\u002Fvet-idea` — sibling advisory, non-mutating, report-only skills this mirrors\n\n---\n\n**Project-specific overrides:** if `SKILL.local.md` exists in this directory, read it — it is consumer-owned, survives framework refresh, and **wins on conflict**. A sidecar that relaxes a gate defined above must state how to prove the gate is wrong in that case. Doctrine: `rules\u002Fframework-vs-project-root.md`.\n",{"name":5,"description":7,"allowed-tools":24},"Read, Glob, Grep, Bash, Write, TodoWrite, Task","main","51a4b0dd2ff140f5a7ccf57daaa79defe2489745","skills\u002Fsecurity-review","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frynhardt81","2026-10-23 13:56:45",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":32,"prompt":42,"zipAvailable":43},[33,36,39],{"tool":34,"command":35},"npx","npx skills add rynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow --skill security-review",{"tool":37,"command":38},"bunx","bunx skills add rynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow --skill security-review",{"tool":40,"command":41},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add rynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow --skill security-review","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsecurity-review\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[46,53,60,67,74,81],{"skillNo":47,"name":48,"nameZh":6,"description":49,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":50,"categories":51,"keywords":52,"publishedAt":19},"01M78C3X48Y2TPS649BRYJZWT3","wizard","Generates an interactive bash wizard that walks a human through steps only they can perform — opens each URL, says what to click and copy, captures values (hidden entry for secrets), writes .env and GitHub secrets, confirms before irreversible actions. Use when provisioning infrastructure, setting up credentials or CI secrets, walking an unfamiliar third-party dashboard, or running a one-off migration or cutover. Don't invoke this for steps the agent can perform itself.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwizard\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":54,"name":55,"nameZh":6,"description":56,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":57,"categories":58,"keywords":59,"publishedAt":19},"01M78C3RJ1F82TBBK398FR824Q","vet-idea","Vets an idea, decision, or plan BEFORE it is built. Runs a single model through five fixed adversarial advisor roles, a peer-review pass, and a chairman synthesis that emits a halt-capable GO \u002F NO-GO \u002F RECONSIDER verdict. Advisory and non-mutating — outputs a report, never writes task state. Use when an idea, feature, or costly hard-to-reverse decision is of uncertain worth and the question is whether to build it at all. NOT FOR settled work (bug fixes, approved features) or for shaping how to build it (the ISA Interview workflow).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvet-idea\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":19},"01M78C3JXH3ABXMDK2ZESXYM3R","triage-incident","Production incident triage — from \"something is broken for users\" to fixed, verified, and learned-from. Pulls the error signal (Sentry\u002Flogs\u002Fuser report), reproduces before touching code, routes the fix through \u002Ffix-bug's prod fast path, and closes with a postmortem entry. Use when something is broken for users in production — an outage, data corruption, a Sentry spike, or a crash-rate alert. NOT FOR bugs found in development (use \u002Ffix-bug directly) or CI failures (use \u002Fdiagnose-ci).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriage-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":71,"categories":72,"keywords":73,"publishedAt":19},"01M78C3F8RA1PSYSV5KR6FYYDW","setup-review-bot","Configures a repo's AI code reviewers — the post-PR mention bot and the pre-push local reviewer — and writes the AGENTS.md the reviewers read. Interviews the user for what the reviewer should weight, then sets git config forge.reviewBot \u002F forge.localReview and populates AGENTS.md at the project root. Use when a repo has no reviewer configured, when review findings are consistently off-target, or when onboarding a new project.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsetup-review-bot\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":75,"name":76,"nameZh":6,"description":77,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":78,"categories":79,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":19},"01M78C36APGXG6WFF3DFEPPQMZ","run-epic","Autonomously drains every open task in a single epic. Pulls ready tasks via the forge CLI, executes the work in-context using the matching discipline (fix-bug \u002F new-feature \u002F refactor), files newly-discovered work as follow-up tasks without stopping to ask, opens a PR per completed task via \u002Fcreate-pr, and repeats until the epic has zero ready\u002Fin-progress\u002Fpending tasks. Use when the user says `\u002Frun-epic E##`, \"run epic autonomously\", \"finish all remaining tasks for epic X\", or \"drive epic X to completion\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Frun-epic\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":19},"01M78C337YT1PPY5PTKCX7C4WP","remember","Saves and retrieves project knowledge that persists across sessions — bug patterns, technical decisions, key facts, and code patterns. Use whenever the user wants to record a lesson learned, save a debugging insight, document a technical choice, note a convention, or search past memories.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frynhardt81\u002FforgeFlow\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fremember\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]