AGENT SKILL

security-review

Portable security review for a feature, endpoint, or change before it ships. Orchestrates the existing OWASP review (@security-boss) and secrets scan (security_secrets validator), then adds the pass they miss — an explicit business-logic-flaw walkthrough (IDOR, race/TOCTOU, state-machine bypass, privilege escalation, price/quantity tampering). Advisory and non-mutating — produces a findings report; real findings are filed as tasks. Use when a change touching money, access control, or multi-step state is about to ship, or when the auth looks fine but the flow could be abused. NOT FOR SAST or dependency-CVE scanning (consumer CI owns those).

License 许可
MIT
最近更新
2026-10-23
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01 前言 Front Matter

name
security-review
description
Portable security review for a feature, endpoint, or change before it ships. Orchestrates the existing OWASP review (@security-boss) and secrets scan (security_secrets validator), then adds the pass they miss — an explicit business-logic-flaw walkthrough (IDOR, race/TOCTOU, state-machine bypass, privilege escalation, price/quantity tampering). Advisory and non-mutating — produces a findings report; real findings are filed as tasks. Use when a change touching money, access control, or multi-step state is about to ship, or when the auth looks fine but the flow could be abused. NOT FOR SAST or dependency-CVE scanning (consumer CI owns those).
allowed-tools
Read, Glob, Grep, Bash, Write, TodoWrite, Task

03 SKILL.md 正文

security-review Workflow

Reviews a feature or change for security flaws before it ships — including the business-logic flaws generic OWASP red-flags miss. Input is the change (a diff, a feature's files, or a task ID); output is a findings report, with real findings filed as tasks. Mutates nothing — findings become tasks, never a hard gate.

Index

File or section Read when…
What it orchestrates Knowing which existing pieces (@security-boss, secrets validator) own which pass
When to use (incl. when not to) Deciding whether the change has a surface worth reviewing
Invocation Choosing scope (diff, task, --files, --output)
Steps 1–3 Scoping the surface, running OWASP + secrets, the business-logic walkthrough
Step 4: Report and file findings Writing the report and filing findings as tasks or intents
_shared/task-triage.md Step 4 — security findings are a hard floor: blocker-or-next, never deferred by default
Anti-criteria for this skill Checking the run stayed advisory and self-contained

What it orchestrates

This skill orchestrates Forge's existing security pieces and adds the one missing pass. It does not re-implement OWASP or secret detection — those already exist:

  • OWASP Top 10 review → @security-boss (injection, broken auth, broken access control, XSS, SSRF, etc.). It already carries the authn-vs-authz distinction and access-control red-flags.
  • Secrets scan → the security_secrets.py validator (hardcoded keys/tokens, .env writes), with patterns from hooks/config/secret-patterns.yaml.

What neither covers — and what this skill adds — is business-logic flaws: vulnerabilities where every individual call is "authenticated and well-formed," but the sequence or values break an invariant. A generic OWASP red-flag list provably doesn't force this; it takes a deliberate walkthrough. The skill self-contains that walkthrough so it runs on a bare clone with no PAI/external plugins.

When to use

  • Before shipping a feature that touches money, access, or state — checkout, balance, role changes, multi-step workflows.
  • At /new-feature security review and in the /create-pr Step 3.7 pre-flight for any security-relevant change.
  • When a reviewer says "the auth looks fine" but the flow could be abused.

Do NOT use it as a SAST engine or dependency-CVE scanner — those are the consumer project's CI/runtime job (Semgrep, CodeQL, npm audit), not this portable framework's. This skill is review judgment, not tooling. Skip it too for pure secrets scanning with no logic surface (the security_secrets.py validator already fires on writes), and for a change with no money/access/state surface — a normal @security-boss review suffices.

Invocation

/security-review                      # review the current diff (git diff)
/security-review T###                 # review the change for a task
/security-review --files <glob>       # review specific files
/security-review --output PATH        # custom report path (default: memories/security-review-{date}.md)

Step 1: Scope the surface

Identify what's under review (diff, feature files, or a task's scope). Read docs/code-map.md if present to locate the relevant surfaces (auth handlers, input parsers, money/state mutations, external-call sites). Note which surfaces touch money, access control, or multi-step state — those are where business-logic flaws live.

Step 2: OWASP + secrets (orchestrate existing)

  • Invoke @security-boss (via the Task tool) for the OWASP Top 10 review of the scoped surface. Do not restate the OWASP list here — @security-boss owns it.
  • Confirm the secrets scan is clean (the security_secrets.py validator fires on writes; for a review pass, grep the diff for the same pattern classes — hardcoded keys, tokens, .env content).

Step 3: Business-logic-flaw walkthrough (the missing pass)

For each money/access/state surface, walk these explicitly — each is a flaw where the individual request is valid but the logic is exploitable:

  • IDOR / object-level: can a user act on another user's object by changing an ID? (/orders/{id} returning any order.)
  • Race / TOCTOU: can two concurrent requests both pass a check that should only pass once? (double-spend, coupon reuse, balance going negative.)
  • State-machine / workflow bypass: can a step be skipped or replayed out of order? (reaching "shipped" without "paid"; re-submitting a one-time action.)
  • Privilege escalation: horizontal (peer's data) or vertical (higher role's capability) — by manipulating a role/tenant/flag the server trusts without re-checking.
  • Price / quantity tampering: is an amount, price, discount, or quantity taken from the client and trusted? (negative quantity, client-set price, stacked discounts.)
  • Invariant breaks: what business rule must always hold (balance ≥ 0, one vote per user, total = sum of line items) — and can a sequence of valid calls violate it?

For each surface, record: the invariant, the abuse it could allow, and whether the code enforces it server-side on every relevant operation (not just the happy path, not client-trusted).

Step 4: Report and file findings

Write the findings to memories/security-review-{date}.md (or --output). For each real finding: severity, the surface, the abuse, and the fix direction. File genuine findings as tasks via the @security-boss convention (forge task add with severity in --category) — so they enter the work queue rather than evaporate. Security findings are a hard floor under skills/_shared/task-triage.md — blocker-or-next, never deferred to the backlog epic by default. A finding wider than a bounded patch — an architectural gap or the same flaw repeated across a surface — is written as /intent "<problem>" with this report as evidence, then promoted once accepted; the task queue holds fixes, not redesigns. Print a one-paragraph summary and stop. Advisory only — never blocks a ship; the findings are the deliverable.

Anti-criteria for this skill

  • Anti: Does NOT re-implement the OWASP Top 10 inline — it invokes @security-boss, which owns that list.
  • Anti: Does NOT block a ship — advisory only; findings become tasks, not gates (informational-hooks doctrine).
  • Anti: Does NOT ship SAST/CVE tooling — review judgment only; scanning tools are the consumer's CI job.
  • Anti: Does NOT depend on a PAI/external plugin — the business-logic walkthrough is self-contained, bare-clone runnable.

See also

  • agents/security-boss.md — the OWASP + authn/authz reviewer this skill orchestrates
  • hooks/validators/agents/security_secrets.py + hooks/config/secret-patterns.yaml — the secrets scan + its (now live) pattern config
  • rules/security.md — the authn-vs-authz distinction + when to invoke @security-boss
  • /audit-rules / /vet-idea — sibling advisory, non-mutating, report-only skills this mirrors

Project-specific overrides: if SKILL.local.md exists in this directory, read it — it is consumer-owned, survives framework refresh, and wins on conflict. A sidecar that relaxes a gate defined above must state how to prove the gate is wrong in that case. Doctrine: rules/framework-vs-project-root.md.

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