[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M782SQB63CPAK9DVT7Q8THXM":3,"skill-same:01M782SQB63CPAK9DVT7Q8THXM":47},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":29,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":31,"updatedAt":32,"install":33,"resources":46},"01M782SQB63CPAK9DVT7Q8THXM","agent-owasp-compliance",null,"Check any AI agent codebase against the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) Top 10 risks.\nUse this skill when:\n- Evaluating an agent system's security posture before production deployment\n- Running a compliance check against OWASP ASI 2026 standards\n- Mapping existing security controls to the 10 agentic risks\n- Generating a compliance report for security review or audit\n- Comparing agent framework security features against the standard\n- Any request like \"is my agent OWASP compliant?\", \"check ASI compliance\", or \"agentic security audit\"","Lord1Egypt\u002Fawesome-skill-forge","Lord1Egypt","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F99746359?v=4","01M7592YDNT0XK9WJ0T2MQVPDN","Mohamed Mounir Ali AL Keshita","01M75GRFNHC8VZNWEB8DKDE433",3,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FLord1Egypt\u002Fawesome-skill-forge\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fcommunity\u002Fskills_sh\u002Fs\u002Fskills-sh_github_awesome-copilot_agent-owasp-compliance\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: agent-owasp-compliance\ndescription: |\n  Check any AI agent codebase against the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) Top 10 risks.\n  Use this skill when:\n  - Evaluating an agent system's security posture before production deployment\n  - Running a compliance check against OWASP ASI 2026 standards\n  - Mapping existing security controls to the 10 agentic risks\n  - Generating a compliance report for security review or audit\n  - Comparing agent framework security features against the standard\n  - Any request like \"is my agent OWASP compliant?\", \"check ASI compliance\", or \"agentic security audit\"\n---\n\n# Agent OWASP ASI Compliance Check\n\nEvaluate AI agent systems against the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) Top 10 — the industry standard for agent security posture.\n\n## Overview\n\nThe OWASP ASI Top 10 defines the critical security risks specific to autonomous AI agents — not LLMs, not chatbots, but agents that call tools, access systems, and act on behalf of users. This skill checks whether your agent implementation addresses each risk.\n\n```\nCodebase → Scan for each ASI control:\n  ASI-01: Prompt Injection Protection\n  ASI-02: Tool Use Governance\n  ASI-03: Agency Boundaries\n  ASI-04: Escalation Controls\n  ASI-05: Trust Boundary Enforcement\n  ASI-06: Logging & Audit\n  ASI-07: Identity Management\n  ASI-08: Policy Integrity\n  ASI-09: Supply Chain Verification\n  ASI-10: Behavioral Monitoring\n→ Generate Compliance Report (X\u002F10 covered)\n```\n\n## The 10 Risks\n\n| Risk | Name | What to Look For |\n|------|------|-----------------|\n| ASI-01 | Prompt Injection | Input validation before tool calls, not just LLM output filtering |\n| ASI-02 | Insecure Tool Use | Tool allowlists, argument validation, no raw shell execution |\n| ASI-03 | Excessive Agency | Capability boundaries, scope limits, principle of least privilege |\n| ASI-04 | Unauthorized Escalation | Privilege checks before sensitive operations, no self-promotion |\n| ASI-05 | Trust Boundary Violation | Trust verification between agents, signed credentials, no blind trust |\n| ASI-06 | Insufficient Logging | Structured audit trail for all tool calls, tamper-evident logs |\n| ASI-07 | Insecure Identity | Cryptographic agent identity, not just string names |\n| ASI-08 | Policy Bypass | Deterministic policy enforcement, no LLM-based permission checks |\n| ASI-09 | Supply Chain Integrity | Signed plugins\u002Ftools, integrity verification, dependency auditing |\n| ASI-10 | Behavioral Anomaly | Drift detection, circuit breakers, kill switch capability |\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-01: Prompt Injection Protection\n\nLook for input validation that runs **before** tool execution, not after LLM generation.\n\n```python\nimport re\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\ndef check_asi_01(project_path: str) -> dict:\n    \"\"\"ASI-01: Is user input validated before reaching tool execution?\"\"\"\n    positive_patterns = [\n        \"input_validation\", \"validate_input\", \"sanitize\",\n        \"classify_intent\", \"prompt_injection\", \"threat_detect\",\n        \"PolicyEvaluator\", \"PolicyEngine\", \"check_content\",\n    ]\n    negative_patterns = [\n        r\"eval\\(\", r\"exec\\(\", r\"subprocess\\.run\\(.*shell=True\",\n        r\"os\\.system\\(\",\n    ]\n\n    # Scan Python files for signals\n    root = Path(project_path)\n    positive_matches = []\n    negative_matches = []\n\n    for py_file in root.rglob(\"*.py\"):\n        content = py_file.read_text(errors=\"ignore\")\n        for pattern in positive_patterns:\n            if pattern in content:\n                positive_matches.append(f\"{py_file.name}: {pattern}\")\n        for pattern in negative_patterns:\n            if re.search(pattern, content):\n                negative_matches.append(f\"{py_file.name}: {pattern}\")\n\n    positive_found = len(positive_matches) > 0\n    negative_found = len(negative_matches) > 0\n\n    return {\n        \"risk\": \"ASI-01\",\n        \"name\": \"Prompt Injection\",\n        \"status\": \"pass\" if positive_found and not negative_found else \"fail\",\n        \"controls_found\": positive_matches,\n        \"vulnerabilities\": negative_matches,\n        \"recommendation\": \"Add input validation before tool execution, not just output filtering\"\n    }\n```\n\n**What passing looks like:**\n```python\n# GOOD: Validate before tool execution\nresult = policy_engine.evaluate(user_input)\nif result.action == \"deny\":\n    return \"Request blocked by policy\"\ntool_result = await execute_tool(validated_input)\n```\n\n**What failing looks like:**\n```python\n# BAD: User input goes directly to tool\ntool_result = await execute_tool(user_input)  # No validation\n```\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-02: Insecure Tool Use\n\nVerify tools have allowlists, argument validation, and no unrestricted execution.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Tool registration with explicit allowlists (not open-ended)\n- Argument validation before tool execution\n- No `subprocess.run(shell=True)` with user-controlled input\n- No `eval()` or `exec()` on agent-generated code without sandbox\n\n**Passing example:**\n```python\nALLOWED_TOOLS = {\"search\", \"read_file\", \"create_ticket\"}\n\ndef execute_tool(name: str, args: dict):\n    if name not in ALLOWED_TOOLS:\n        raise PermissionError(f\"Tool '{name}' not in allowlist\")\n    # validate args...\n    return tools[name](**validated_args)\n```\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-03: Excessive Agency\n\nVerify agent capabilities are bounded — not open-ended.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Explicit capability lists or execution rings\n- Scope limits on what the agent can access\n- Principle of least privilege applied to tool access\n\n**Failing:** Agent has access to all tools by default.\n**Passing:** Agent capabilities defined as a fixed allowlist, unknown tools denied.\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-04: Unauthorized Escalation\n\nVerify agents cannot promote their own privileges.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Privilege level checks before sensitive operations\n- No self-promotion patterns (agent changing its own trust score or role)\n- Escalation requires external attestation (human or SRE witness)\n\n**Failing:** Agent can modify its own configuration or permissions.\n**Passing:** Privilege changes require out-of-band approval (e.g., Ring 0 requires SRE attestation).\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-05: Trust Boundary Violation\n\nIn multi-agent systems, verify that agents verify each other's identity before accepting instructions.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Agent identity verification (DIDs, signed tokens, API keys)\n- Trust score checks before accepting delegated tasks\n- No blind trust of inter-agent messages\n- Delegation narrowing (child scope \u003C= parent scope)\n\n**Passing example:**\n```python\ndef accept_task(sender_id: str, task: dict):\n    trust = trust_registry.get_trust(sender_id)\n    if not trust.meets_threshold(0.7):\n        raise PermissionError(f\"Agent {sender_id} trust too low: {trust.current()}\")\n    if not verify_signature(task, sender_id):\n        raise SecurityError(\"Task signature verification failed\")\n    return process_task(task)\n```\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-06: Insufficient Logging\n\nVerify all agent actions produce structured, tamper-evident audit entries.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Structured logging for every tool call (not just print statements)\n- Audit entries include: timestamp, agent ID, tool name, args, result, policy decision\n- Append-only or hash-chained log format\n- Logs stored separately from agent-writable directories\n\n**Failing:** Agent actions logged via `print()` or not logged at all.\n**Passing:** Structured JSONL audit trail with chain hashes, exported to secure storage.\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-07: Insecure Identity\n\nVerify agents have cryptographic identity, not just string names.\n\n**Failing indicators:**\n- Agent identified by `agent_name = \"my-agent\"` (string only)\n- No authentication between agents\n- Shared credentials across agents\n\n**Passing indicators:**\n- DID-based identity (`did:web:`, `did:key:`)\n- Ed25519 or similar cryptographic signing\n- Per-agent credentials with rotation\n- Identity bound to specific capabilities\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-08: Policy Bypass\n\nVerify policy enforcement is deterministic — not LLM-based.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Policy evaluation uses deterministic logic (YAML rules, code predicates)\n- No LLM calls in the enforcement path\n- Policy checks cannot be skipped or overridden by the agent\n- Fail-closed behavior (if policy check errors, action is denied)\n\n**Failing:** Agent decides its own permissions via prompt (\"Am I allowed to...?\").\n**Passing:** PolicyEvaluator.evaluate() returns allow\u002Fdeny in \u003C0.1ms, no LLM involved.\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-09: Supply Chain Integrity\n\nVerify agent plugins and tools have integrity verification.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- `INTEGRITY.json` or manifest files with SHA-256 hashes\n- Signature verification on plugin installation\n- Dependency pinning (no `@latest`, `>=` without upper bound)\n- SBOM generation\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-10: Behavioral Anomaly\n\nVerify the system can detect and respond to agent behavioral drift.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Circuit breakers that trip on repeated failures\n- Trust score decay over time (temporal decay)\n- Kill switch or emergency stop capability\n- Anomaly detection on tool call patterns (frequency, targets, timing)\n\n**Failing:** No mechanism to stop a misbehaving agent automatically.\n**Passing:** Circuit breaker trips after N failures, trust decays without activity, kill switch available.\n\n---\n\n## Compliance Report Format\n\n```markdown\n# OWASP ASI Compliance Report\nGenerated: 2026-04-01\nProject: my-agent-system\n\n## Summary: 7\u002F10 Controls Covered\n\n| Risk | Status | Finding |\n|------|--------|---------|\n| ASI-01 Prompt Injection | PASS | PolicyEngine validates input before tool calls |\n| ASI-02 Insecure Tool Use | PASS | Tool allowlist enforced in governance.py |\n| ASI-03 Excessive Agency | PASS | Execution rings limit capabilities |\n| ASI-04 Unauthorized Escalation | PASS | Ring promotion requires attestation |\n| ASI-05 Trust Boundary | FAIL | No identity verification between agents |\n| ASI-06 Insufficient Logging | PASS | AuditChain with SHA-256 chain hashes |\n| ASI-07 Insecure Identity | FAIL | Agents use string names, no crypto identity |\n| ASI-08 Policy Bypass | PASS | Deterministic PolicyEvaluator, no LLM in path |\n| ASI-09 Supply Chain | FAIL | No integrity manifests or plugin signing |\n| ASI-10 Behavioral Anomaly | PASS | Circuit breakers and trust decay active |\n\n## Critical Gaps\n- ASI-05: Add agent identity verification using DIDs or signed tokens\n- ASI-07: Replace string agent names with cryptographic identity\n- ASI-09: Generate INTEGRITY.json manifests for all plugins\n\n## Recommendation\nInstall agent-governance-toolkit for reference implementations of all 10 controls:\npip install agent-governance-toolkit\n```\n\n---\n\n## Quick Assessment Questions\n\nUse these to rapidly assess an agent system:\n\n1. **Does user input pass through validation before reaching any tool?** (ASI-01)\n2. **Is there an explicit list of what tools the agent can call?** (ASI-02)\n3. **Can the agent do anything, or are its capabilities bounded?** (ASI-03)\n4. **Can the agent promote its own privileges?** (ASI-04)\n5. **Do agents verify each other's identity before accepting tasks?** (ASI-05)\n6. **Is every tool call logged with enough detail to replay it?** (ASI-06)\n7. **Does each agent have a unique cryptographic identity?** (ASI-07)\n8. **Is policy enforcement deterministic (not LLM-based)?** (ASI-08)\n9. **Are plugins\u002Ftools integrity-verified before use?** (ASI-09)\n10. **Is there a circuit breaker or kill switch?** (ASI-10)\n\nIf you answer \"no\" to any of these, that's a gap to address.\n\n---\n\n## Related Resources\n\n- [OWASP Agentic AI Threats](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-project-agentic-ai-threats\u002F)\n- [Agent Governance Toolkit](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmicrosoft\u002Fagent-governance-toolkit) — Reference implementation covering 10\u002F10 ASI controls\n- [agent-governance skill](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Ftree\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fagent-governance) — Governance patterns for agent systems\n","# Agent OWASP ASI Compliance Check\n\nEvaluate AI agent systems against the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) Top 10 — the industry standard for agent security posture.\n\n## Overview\n\nThe OWASP ASI Top 10 defines the critical security risks specific to autonomous AI agents — not LLMs, not chatbots, but agents that call tools, access systems, and act on behalf of users. This skill checks whether your agent implementation addresses each risk.\n\n```\nCodebase → Scan for each ASI control:\n  ASI-01: Prompt Injection Protection\n  ASI-02: Tool Use Governance\n  ASI-03: Agency Boundaries\n  ASI-04: Escalation Controls\n  ASI-05: Trust Boundary Enforcement\n  ASI-06: Logging & Audit\n  ASI-07: Identity Management\n  ASI-08: Policy Integrity\n  ASI-09: Supply Chain Verification\n  ASI-10: Behavioral Monitoring\n→ Generate Compliance Report (X\u002F10 covered)\n```\n\n## The 10 Risks\n\n| Risk | Name | What to Look For |\n|------|------|-----------------|\n| ASI-01 | Prompt Injection | Input validation before tool calls, not just LLM output filtering |\n| ASI-02 | Insecure Tool Use | Tool allowlists, argument validation, no raw shell execution |\n| ASI-03 | Excessive Agency | Capability boundaries, scope limits, principle of least privilege |\n| ASI-04 | Unauthorized Escalation | Privilege checks before sensitive operations, no self-promotion |\n| ASI-05 | Trust Boundary Violation | Trust verification between agents, signed credentials, no blind trust |\n| ASI-06 | Insufficient Logging | Structured audit trail for all tool calls, tamper-evident logs |\n| ASI-07 | Insecure Identity | Cryptographic agent identity, not just string names |\n| ASI-08 | Policy Bypass | Deterministic policy enforcement, no LLM-based permission checks |\n| ASI-09 | Supply Chain Integrity | Signed plugins\u002Ftools, integrity verification, dependency auditing |\n| ASI-10 | Behavioral Anomaly | Drift detection, circuit breakers, kill switch capability |\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-01: Prompt Injection Protection\n\nLook for input validation that runs **before** tool execution, not after LLM generation.\n\n```python\nimport re\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\ndef check_asi_01(project_path: str) -> dict:\n    \"\"\"ASI-01: Is user input validated before reaching tool execution?\"\"\"\n    positive_patterns = [\n        \"input_validation\", \"validate_input\", \"sanitize\",\n        \"classify_intent\", \"prompt_injection\", \"threat_detect\",\n        \"PolicyEvaluator\", \"PolicyEngine\", \"check_content\",\n    ]\n    negative_patterns = [\n        r\"eval\\(\", r\"exec\\(\", r\"subprocess\\.run\\(.*shell=True\",\n        r\"os\\.system\\(\",\n    ]\n\n    # Scan Python files for signals\n    root = Path(project_path)\n    positive_matches = []\n    negative_matches = []\n\n    for py_file in root.rglob(\"*.py\"):\n        content = py_file.read_text(errors=\"ignore\")\n        for pattern in positive_patterns:\n            if pattern in content:\n                positive_matches.append(f\"{py_file.name}: {pattern}\")\n        for pattern in negative_patterns:\n            if re.search(pattern, content):\n                negative_matches.append(f\"{py_file.name}: {pattern}\")\n\n    positive_found = len(positive_matches) > 0\n    negative_found = len(negative_matches) > 0\n\n    return {\n        \"risk\": \"ASI-01\",\n        \"name\": \"Prompt Injection\",\n        \"status\": \"pass\" if positive_found and not negative_found else \"fail\",\n        \"controls_found\": positive_matches,\n        \"vulnerabilities\": negative_matches,\n        \"recommendation\": \"Add input validation before tool execution, not just output filtering\"\n    }\n```\n\n**What passing looks like:**\n```python\n# GOOD: Validate before tool execution\nresult = policy_engine.evaluate(user_input)\nif result.action == \"deny\":\n    return \"Request blocked by policy\"\ntool_result = await execute_tool(validated_input)\n```\n\n**What failing looks like:**\n```python\n# BAD: User input goes directly to tool\ntool_result = await execute_tool(user_input)  # No validation\n```\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-02: Insecure Tool Use\n\nVerify tools have allowlists, argument validation, and no unrestricted execution.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Tool registration with explicit allowlists (not open-ended)\n- Argument validation before tool execution\n- No `subprocess.run(shell=True)` with user-controlled input\n- No `eval()` or `exec()` on agent-generated code without sandbox\n\n**Passing example:**\n```python\nALLOWED_TOOLS = {\"search\", \"read_file\", \"create_ticket\"}\n\ndef execute_tool(name: str, args: dict):\n    if name not in ALLOWED_TOOLS:\n        raise PermissionError(f\"Tool '{name}' not in allowlist\")\n    # validate args...\n    return tools[name](**validated_args)\n```\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-03: Excessive Agency\n\nVerify agent capabilities are bounded — not open-ended.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Explicit capability lists or execution rings\n- Scope limits on what the agent can access\n- Principle of least privilege applied to tool access\n\n**Failing:** Agent has access to all tools by default.\n**Passing:** Agent capabilities defined as a fixed allowlist, unknown tools denied.\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-04: Unauthorized Escalation\n\nVerify agents cannot promote their own privileges.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Privilege level checks before sensitive operations\n- No self-promotion patterns (agent changing its own trust score or role)\n- Escalation requires external attestation (human or SRE witness)\n\n**Failing:** Agent can modify its own configuration or permissions.\n**Passing:** Privilege changes require out-of-band approval (e.g., Ring 0 requires SRE attestation).\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-05: Trust Boundary Violation\n\nIn multi-agent systems, verify that agents verify each other's identity before accepting instructions.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Agent identity verification (DIDs, signed tokens, API keys)\n- Trust score checks before accepting delegated tasks\n- No blind trust of inter-agent messages\n- Delegation narrowing (child scope \u003C= parent scope)\n\n**Passing example:**\n```python\ndef accept_task(sender_id: str, task: dict):\n    trust = trust_registry.get_trust(sender_id)\n    if not trust.meets_threshold(0.7):\n        raise PermissionError(f\"Agent {sender_id} trust too low: {trust.current()}\")\n    if not verify_signature(task, sender_id):\n        raise SecurityError(\"Task signature verification failed\")\n    return process_task(task)\n```\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-06: Insufficient Logging\n\nVerify all agent actions produce structured, tamper-evident audit entries.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Structured logging for every tool call (not just print statements)\n- Audit entries include: timestamp, agent ID, tool name, args, result, policy decision\n- Append-only or hash-chained log format\n- Logs stored separately from agent-writable directories\n\n**Failing:** Agent actions logged via `print()` or not logged at all.\n**Passing:** Structured JSONL audit trail with chain hashes, exported to secure storage.\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-07: Insecure Identity\n\nVerify agents have cryptographic identity, not just string names.\n\n**Failing indicators:**\n- Agent identified by `agent_name = \"my-agent\"` (string only)\n- No authentication between agents\n- Shared credentials across agents\n\n**Passing indicators:**\n- DID-based identity (`did:web:`, `did:key:`)\n- Ed25519 or similar cryptographic signing\n- Per-agent credentials with rotation\n- Identity bound to specific capabilities\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-08: Policy Bypass\n\nVerify policy enforcement is deterministic — not LLM-based.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Policy evaluation uses deterministic logic (YAML rules, code predicates)\n- No LLM calls in the enforcement path\n- Policy checks cannot be skipped or overridden by the agent\n- Fail-closed behavior (if policy check errors, action is denied)\n\n**Failing:** Agent decides its own permissions via prompt (\"Am I allowed to...?\").\n**Passing:** PolicyEvaluator.evaluate() returns allow\u002Fdeny in \u003C0.1ms, no LLM involved.\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-09: Supply Chain Integrity\n\nVerify agent plugins and tools have integrity verification.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- `INTEGRITY.json` or manifest files with SHA-256 hashes\n- Signature verification on plugin installation\n- Dependency pinning (no `@latest`, `>=` without upper bound)\n- SBOM generation\n\n---\n\n## Check ASI-10: Behavioral Anomaly\n\nVerify the system can detect and respond to agent behavioral drift.\n\n**What to search for:**\n- Circuit breakers that trip on repeated failures\n- Trust score decay over time (temporal decay)\n- Kill switch or emergency stop capability\n- Anomaly detection on tool call patterns (frequency, targets, timing)\n\n**Failing:** No mechanism to stop a misbehaving agent automatically.\n**Passing:** Circuit breaker trips after N failures, trust decays without activity, kill switch available.\n\n---\n\n## Compliance Report Format\n\n```markdown\n# OWASP ASI Compliance Report\nGenerated: 2026-04-01\nProject: my-agent-system\n\n## Summary: 7\u002F10 Controls Covered\n\n| Risk | Status | Finding |\n|------|--------|---------|\n| ASI-01 Prompt Injection | PASS | PolicyEngine validates input before tool calls |\n| ASI-02 Insecure Tool Use | PASS | Tool allowlist enforced in governance.py |\n| ASI-03 Excessive Agency | PASS | Execution rings limit capabilities |\n| ASI-04 Unauthorized Escalation | PASS | Ring promotion requires attestation |\n| ASI-05 Trust Boundary | FAIL | No identity verification between agents |\n| ASI-06 Insufficient Logging | PASS | AuditChain with SHA-256 chain hashes |\n| ASI-07 Insecure Identity | FAIL | Agents use string names, no crypto identity |\n| ASI-08 Policy Bypass | PASS | Deterministic PolicyEvaluator, no LLM in path |\n| ASI-09 Supply Chain | FAIL | No integrity manifests or plugin signing |\n| ASI-10 Behavioral Anomaly | PASS | Circuit breakers and trust decay active |\n\n## Critical Gaps\n- ASI-05: Add agent identity verification using DIDs or signed tokens\n- ASI-07: Replace string agent names with cryptographic identity\n- ASI-09: Generate INTEGRITY.json manifests for all plugins\n\n## Recommendation\nInstall agent-governance-toolkit for reference implementations of all 10 controls:\npip install agent-governance-toolkit\n```\n\n---\n\n## Quick Assessment Questions\n\nUse these to rapidly assess an agent system:\n\n1. **Does user input pass through validation before reaching any tool?** (ASI-01)\n2. **Is there an explicit list of what tools the agent can call?** (ASI-02)\n3. **Can the agent do anything, or are its capabilities bounded?** (ASI-03)\n4. **Can the agent promote its own privileges?** (ASI-04)\n5. **Do agents verify each other's identity before accepting tasks?** (ASI-05)\n6. **Is every tool call logged with enough detail to replay it?** (ASI-06)\n7. **Does each agent have a unique cryptographic identity?** (ASI-07)\n8. **Is policy enforcement deterministic (not LLM-based)?** (ASI-08)\n9. **Are plugins\u002Ftools integrity-verified before use?** (ASI-09)\n10. **Is there a circuit breaker or kill switch?** (ASI-10)\n\nIf you answer \"no\" to any of these, that's a gap to address.\n\n---\n\n## Related Resources\n\n- [OWASP Agentic AI Threats](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-project-agentic-ai-threats\u002F)\n- [Agent Governance Toolkit](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmicrosoft\u002Fagent-governance-toolkit) — Reference implementation covering 10\u002F10 ASI controls\n- [agent-governance skill](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Ftree\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fagent-governance) — Governance patterns for agent systems\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"master","4aa004da461d820f4ea5499e58eb8d196cf99016","community\u002Fskills_sh\u002Fs\u002Fskills-sh_github_awesome-copilot_agent-owasp-compliance",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FLord1Egypt\u002Fawesome-skill-forge","https:\u002F\u002Fskill-explorer-rho.vercel.app","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FLord1Egypt","Unbreakable. Unstoppable. 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