[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M77X90YXVN5N66ZPMAHQWGFS":3,"skill-same:01M77X90YXVN5N66ZPMAHQWGFS":56},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":29,"ownerBlogUrl":30,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":31,"install":32,"resources":45},"01M77X90YXVN5N66ZPMAHQWGFS","who-owns-this-domain",null,"Establish who registered and who operates a domain using WHOIS, RDAP and DNS. Use when running a whois lookup, querying RDAP, digging A, AAAA, MX, NS, TXT, SOA or CAA records, reading SPF includes, DKIM selectors or DMARC rua addresses, finding the registrar, registrant or nameservers, doing reverse DNS, PTR, ASN or netblock lookups, or hunting historical WHOIS and passive DNS. Applies to phishing and brand-abuse takedown, domain-dispute and UDRP evidence, vendor verification before payment, and infrastructure attribution. Reference at useosint.com\u002Fskills\u002Fwho-owns-this-domain.","Reihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent","Reihantt6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F219822095?v=4","01M77KK94PV8B7C2D9XWXNS8DJ","Mohamad Reihan tegar prasetya","01M77KK958QFMTHYXGXFV7KZ79",2,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fwho-owns-this-domain\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\ndescription: \"Establish who registered and who operates a domain using WHOIS, RDAP and DNS. Use when running a whois lookup, querying RDAP, digging A, AAAA, MX, NS, TXT, SOA or CAA records, reading SPF includes, DKIM selectors or DMARC rua addresses, finding the registrar, registrant or nameservers, doing reverse DNS, PTR, ASN or netblock lookups, or hunting historical WHOIS and passive DNS. Applies to phishing and brand-abuse takedown, domain-dispute and UDRP evidence, vendor verification before payment, and infrastructure attribution. Reference at useosint.com\u002Fskills\u002Fwho-owns-this-domain.\"\n---\n# Who owns this domain\n\nRegistration data tells you who bought the name; DNS tells you who runs the\nservice. They are frequently different parties, and conflating them is the\nmistake that wrecks attribution. Everything here is passive except where flagged\n— but note that `dig` aimed at the target's own nameservers lands in the\ntarget's query logs, so resolve through a public recursive resolver or passive\nDNS when you care about being quiet.\n\n## Which source first\n\n| You hold | Reach for | Why |\n|---|---|---|\n| A domain, nothing else | RDAP, then registrar WHOIS | Structured, gives dates + registrar + status in one hit |\n| Redacted WHOIS | Historical WHOIS + passive DNS | Redaction is not retroactive across archives |\n| A domain you suspect is one of many | Nameserver pair + MX + reverse WHOIS | Infrastructure reuse outlives contact privacy |\n| An IP | IP RDAP at the RIR, then ASN lookup | Tells you the netblock holder, not the site owner |\n| A ccTLD | The registry's own WHOIS\u002Fweb service | ccTLDs ignore gTLD policy; coverage swings wildly |\n| A brand-new domain | Creation date + registrar + NS | Age plus a bulk-friendly registrar is the phishing tell |\n\n## WHOIS versus RDAP\n\nWHOIS is a plaintext protocol on TCP\u002F43 with no schema. Every registry emits a\ndifferent field layout, clients follow registry-to-registrar referrals\ninconsistently, and rate limiting is silent — you get truncation or a block, not\nan error you can parse.\n\nRDAP is the same registration data over HTTPS as JSON, with real HTTP semantics:\n404 for no such object, 429 when you are throttled, and per-object endpoints for\ndomains, nameservers, entities, IPs, and AS numbers. Query it through the\nbootstrap redirector or the registry directly:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Frdap.org\u002Fdomain\u002Fexample.com | jq .\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Frdap.org\u002Fip\u002F203.0.113.10 | jq '.name, .handle, .country'\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Frdap.org\u002Fautnum\u002F64500 | jq '.name, .entities'\n```\n\nRead these fields:\n\n- `events` — `registration`, `expiration`, `last changed`, `transfer`. A\n  `transfer` event long after registration means the current registrar's\n  records start there; anything older lives only in historical WHOIS.\n- `entities[].roles` — `registrant`, `technical`, `abuse`, `registrar`. The\n  registrar entity carries its IANA ID in `publicIds`.\n- `status` — EPP codes. `clientTransferProhibited` is routine. `clientHold`\n  means the registrar pulled the domain from DNS (nonpayment or an abuse\n  complaint). `serverHold` means the registry did — usually legal or\n  law-enforcement action. `redemptionPeriod` and `pendingDelete` mean it is\n  expiring and about to become available.\n- `nameservers` and `secureDNS` — operator fingerprint plus DNSSEC posture.\n\nSome servers also return a machine-readable list of which fields were redacted,\nwhich is more useful than guessing from `REDACTED FOR PRIVACY` strings.\n\nFor `.com` and `.net` the registry is thin: it returns only registrar, dates,\nstatus, and nameservers. The contact block, such as it is, comes from the\nregistrar's own server. Query both when they disagree — the registry is\nauthoritative on dates and transfers, the registrar on contacts.\n\n## What redaction actually removes\n\nUnder current gTLD registration-data policy, registrant name, street, phone and\nemail are usually stripped and replaced with a forwarding address or a web form.\nWhat survives and still pivots hard: registrar of record and its IANA ID, the\nreseller field when present, creation\u002Fupdate\u002Fexpiry\u002Ftransfer dates, nameservers,\nDNSSEC status, EPP status codes, registrant state\u002Fprovince and country (many\nregistrars keep these), registrant organization (some keep it for legal entities,\non the argument that a company name is not personal data), and the registrar\nabuse contact, which is never redacted and is the correct route for reports.\n\nDistinguish the **registrar of record** (the ICANN-accredited party, e.g. Tucows,\nPDR, Namecheap) from the **reseller** that actually sold the domain, and both\nfrom a **privacy service**, which appears in the registrant field under its own\ncorporate name and jurisdiction. The privacy service's identity is itself a lead:\nit tells you which registrar ecosystem you are in and where a disclosure request\nwould have to go.\n\n## The DNS pass\n\n```bash\ndig +short example.com A; dig +short example.com NS\ndig example.com MX +noall +answer\ndig example.com SOA +noall +answer          # RNAME mailbox, serial often YYYYMMDDnn\ndig example.com TXT +short                  # SPF and verification tokens\ndig _dmarc.example.com TXT +short\ndig google._domainkey.example.com TXT +short\ndig example.com CAA +short\ndig -x 203.0.113.10 +short\n```\n\nDo not build a workflow on `ANY` — most authoritative servers now answer it with\na minimal or synthetic response instead of the full record set.\n\nEvery record type leaks something different: the interpretation table is in\n[reference\u002Fdns-record-types.md](reference\u002Fdns-record-types.md) and the mapping\nfrom SPF include hosts, DKIM selectors and TXT tokens to named vendors is in\n[reference\u002Fvendor-fingerprints.md](reference\u002Fvendor-fingerprints.md). The short\nversion: TXT is a public inventory of the org's SaaS estate, MX names the mail\nsecurity vendor, DMARC `rua` names their DMARC-reporting vendor, and CAA names\nthe CA they standardized on.\n\n## IP, ASN, and what shared hosting costs you\n\n```bash\nwhois -h whois.cymru.com \" -v 203.0.113.10\"        # ASN, prefix, country, AS name\nwhois -h whois.radb.net -- '-i origin AS64500'     # prefixes routed by that AS\n```\n\nThe RIR record gives the netblock holder. If that is a hosting provider or cloud\nregion you have learned nothing about ownership — a shared IP couples a domain to\nthousands of unrelated tenants, so \"same IP\" is worthless as attribution\nevidence. It becomes evidence when the RIR record shows a reassignment or\nsub-allocation to a named customer, or when the block is small and the org name\nis the target's.\n\nPTRs are set by whoever controls the IP, not the domain owner. Clouds generate\nthem mechanically from the address, which tells you only the platform.\nColocation and enterprise blocks often carry customer names, and walking the PTRs\nof a \u002F24 around a known host can hand you the org's whole rack.\n\n## Historical WHOIS and passive DNS\n\nThis is where the real pivots are. Redaction started at a point in time, so\ndatabases that captured records before it still hold names, emails and phone\nnumbers; passive DNS keeps every observed answer, so you get IPs and hostnames\nthe zone no longer serves. Ask three questions: what did the registrant field say\nbefore it went private, what other domains share that registrant email or name\n(reverse WHOIS), and what IPs has this name resolved to over time. DomainTools,\nSecurityTrails, WhoisXML, Validin, Silent Push and VirusTotal's domain reports\ncarry some mix of the two — most gate the useful depth behind a paid key.\n\n## Zone transfers and zone walking\n\n`dig AXFR example.com @ns1.example.com` asks a nameserver for the whole zone. It\nis an interactive TCP request to target-controlled infrastructure, it is logged,\nand it is out of scope for passive work — only inside an authorized engagement,\nand expect a refusal. A zone signed with NSEC rather than NSEC3 can likewise be\nwalked to enumerate every name, and NSEC3 hashes can be cracked offline; both\nneed direct queries to the authoritative servers. Treat both as active and use\n`find-hidden-subdomains` when you need to stay passive.\n\n## Where this goes wrong\n\n- **Registrant is a placeholder.** Bulk registrars, resellers, privacy services\n  and corporate registrars all write their own details into contact fields. A\n  matching registrant string across domains can mean one owner or one reseller.\n- **Dates lie about age.** Expired-and-reregistered domains reset their creation\n  date at the registry, so a long archive history plus a recent creation date\n  means the name changed hands through a drop.\n- **Cached and cloaked DNS.** Answers are TTL-scoped snapshots, and providers\n  serve different records by geography, by resolver, and via split-horizon views\n  you will never see. One resolver is one vantage point.\n- **SPF and TXT records rot.** Present in SPF means \"was configured\", not \"in use\n  now\"; verification tokens are almost never cleaned up at all.\n- **MX and NS are outsourced.** They identify the vendor. They become an\n  ownership signal only when the specific assigned nameserver pair or mail tenant\n  label recurs across domains.\n- **Parked domains** show registrar DNS and a marketplace IP. No owner\n  infrastructure to find. **Squatters** copy the target's SPF and MX wholesale to\n  look legitimate, so mirrored records are not a relationship.\n\n## Confidence grading\n\n- **Confirmed** — the registry or RIR states it directly and it is not a contact\n  field: creation date, registrar, EPP status, nameservers, netblock holder.\n  Or: an unredacted registrant corroborated by a second independent source (a\n  corporate filing, a historical snapshot, an archived page).\n- **Probable** — a distinctive shared fingerprint across domains: the same\n  assigned nameserver pair, the same mail tenant label, the same DKIM key, the\n  same CAA `accounturi`, the same unusual TXT token. Same operator, probably\n  same owner.\n- **Unconfirmed** — shared IP on shared hosting, shared registrar, shared public\n  DNS provider, or a registrant string that could be a reseller. Also anything\n  from a historical database you have not seen the raw record for.\n\nAlways record the lookup timestamp and which server answered. A WHOIS record\nwithout a retrieval time is not evidence.\n\n## Worked example\n\nTarget: `northwind-logistics.example`, referred by a fraud team.\n\nRDAP: created eleven months ago, registrar Namecheap, registrant redacted but\ncountry `PA`, status `clientTransferProhibited`, nameservers a Cloudflare pair\n(`dana`, `rex`). Young, cheap, proxied, origin hidden.\n\nDNS: no MX at all, which kills the \"they invoice from this domain\" theory\noutright. TXT holds one `google-site-verification` token and an SPF record whose\nonly include is a transactional-email vendor. DMARC is `p=none` with no `rua`, so\nthere is no reporting vendor to pivot to. Dead end on the mail side.\n\nHistorical WHOIS is the break: a snapshot from two months after registration,\npre-privacy-service, carries a Gmail address and a name. Reverse WHOIS on that\naddress returns six more domains, four sharing the same `dana`\u002F`rex` pair — and\nCloudflare assigns that pair per account, so this is one operator, not chance.\n\nGrade: registrant identity **probable** (one snapshot, corroborated by the\nnameserver cluster, not yet by a filing). Seven-domain cluster **confirmed** as\none operator.\n\n## Pivots\n\n| New selector | Goes to |\n|---|---|\n| Subdomains, siblings on shared certs | `find-hidden-subdomains` |\n| IPs, netblocks, ASNs | `find-exposed-servers` |\n| Registrant email, mail vendor, forwarding address | `what-an-email-reveals` |\n| Registrant org, privacy-service jurisdiction | `who-really-owns-it`, `x-ray-a-company` |\n| Registrant phone from a pre-redaction snapshot | `whose-number-is-this` |\n| Historical content at recovered IPs and hostnames | `read-deleted-pages` |\n| Indexed files on discovered hostnames | `google-like-a-spy` |\n| A cluster of domains, IPs and registrants to lay out | `graph-the-network` |\n\n## Legal and ToS notes\n\nBulk WHOIS access is contractually restricted: registries and registrars forbid\nusing it for marketing or for building redistributable databases, and enforce\nwith rate limits and blocks. RDAP supports differentiated access, where a vetted\nauthenticated requester sees more than an anonymous one — that vetting exists\nprecisely so personal data cannot be bulk-collected anonymously. Pre-redaction\nregistrant data pulled from a historical database is still personal data under\nGDPR: you need a lawful basis, and the minimization rules in\n[..\u002F..\u002FETHICS.md](..\u002F..\u002FETHICS.md) apply. AXFR without written authorization can\nconstitute unauthorized access.\n","# Who owns this domain\n\nRegistration data tells you who bought the name; DNS tells you who runs the\nservice. They are frequently different parties, and conflating them is the\nmistake that wrecks attribution. Everything here is passive except where flagged\n— but note that `dig` aimed at the target's own nameservers lands in the\ntarget's query logs, so resolve through a public recursive resolver or passive\nDNS when you care about being quiet.\n\n## Which source first\n\n| You hold | Reach for | Why |\n|---|---|---|\n| A domain, nothing else | RDAP, then registrar WHOIS | Structured, gives dates + registrar + status in one hit |\n| Redacted WHOIS | Historical WHOIS + passive DNS | Redaction is not retroactive across archives |\n| A domain you suspect is one of many | Nameserver pair + MX + reverse WHOIS | Infrastructure reuse outlives contact privacy |\n| An IP | IP RDAP at the RIR, then ASN lookup | Tells you the netblock holder, not the site owner |\n| A ccTLD | The registry's own WHOIS\u002Fweb service | ccTLDs ignore gTLD policy; coverage swings wildly |\n| A brand-new domain | Creation date + registrar + NS | Age plus a bulk-friendly registrar is the phishing tell |\n\n## WHOIS versus RDAP\n\nWHOIS is a plaintext protocol on TCP\u002F43 with no schema. Every registry emits a\ndifferent field layout, clients follow registry-to-registrar referrals\ninconsistently, and rate limiting is silent — you get truncation or a block, not\nan error you can parse.\n\nRDAP is the same registration data over HTTPS as JSON, with real HTTP semantics:\n404 for no such object, 429 when you are throttled, and per-object endpoints for\ndomains, nameservers, entities, IPs, and AS numbers. Query it through the\nbootstrap redirector or the registry directly:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Frdap.org\u002Fdomain\u002Fexample.com | jq .\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Frdap.org\u002Fip\u002F203.0.113.10 | jq '.name, .handle, .country'\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Frdap.org\u002Fautnum\u002F64500 | jq '.name, .entities'\n```\n\nRead these fields:\n\n- `events` — `registration`, `expiration`, `last changed`, `transfer`. A\n  `transfer` event long after registration means the current registrar's\n  records start there; anything older lives only in historical WHOIS.\n- `entities[].roles` — `registrant`, `technical`, `abuse`, `registrar`. The\n  registrar entity carries its IANA ID in `publicIds`.\n- `status` — EPP codes. `clientTransferProhibited` is routine. `clientHold`\n  means the registrar pulled the domain from DNS (nonpayment or an abuse\n  complaint). `serverHold` means the registry did — usually legal or\n  law-enforcement action. `redemptionPeriod` and `pendingDelete` mean it is\n  expiring and about to become available.\n- `nameservers` and `secureDNS` — operator fingerprint plus DNSSEC posture.\n\nSome servers also return a machine-readable list of which fields were redacted,\nwhich is more useful than guessing from `REDACTED FOR PRIVACY` strings.\n\nFor `.com` and `.net` the registry is thin: it returns only registrar, dates,\nstatus, and nameservers. The contact block, such as it is, comes from the\nregistrar's own server. Query both when they disagree — the registry is\nauthoritative on dates and transfers, the registrar on contacts.\n\n## What redaction actually removes\n\nUnder current gTLD registration-data policy, registrant name, street, phone and\nemail are usually stripped and replaced with a forwarding address or a web form.\nWhat survives and still pivots hard: registrar of record and its IANA ID, the\nreseller field when present, creation\u002Fupdate\u002Fexpiry\u002Ftransfer dates, nameservers,\nDNSSEC status, EPP status codes, registrant state\u002Fprovince and country (many\nregistrars keep these), registrant organization (some keep it for legal entities,\non the argument that a company name is not personal data), and the registrar\nabuse contact, which is never redacted and is the correct route for reports.\n\nDistinguish the **registrar of record** (the ICANN-accredited party, e.g. Tucows,\nPDR, Namecheap) from the **reseller** that actually sold the domain, and both\nfrom a **privacy service**, which appears in the registrant field under its own\ncorporate name and jurisdiction. The privacy service's identity is itself a lead:\nit tells you which registrar ecosystem you are in and where a disclosure request\nwould have to go.\n\n## The DNS pass\n\n```bash\ndig +short example.com A; dig +short example.com NS\ndig example.com MX +noall +answer\ndig example.com SOA +noall +answer          # RNAME mailbox, serial often YYYYMMDDnn\ndig example.com TXT +short                  # SPF and verification tokens\ndig _dmarc.example.com TXT +short\ndig google._domainkey.example.com TXT +short\ndig example.com CAA +short\ndig -x 203.0.113.10 +short\n```\n\nDo not build a workflow on `ANY` — most authoritative servers now answer it with\na minimal or synthetic response instead of the full record set.\n\nEvery record type leaks something different: the interpretation table is in\n[reference\u002Fdns-record-types.md](reference\u002Fdns-record-types.md) and the mapping\nfrom SPF include hosts, DKIM selectors and TXT tokens to named vendors is in\n[reference\u002Fvendor-fingerprints.md](reference\u002Fvendor-fingerprints.md). The short\nversion: TXT is a public inventory of the org's SaaS estate, MX names the mail\nsecurity vendor, DMARC `rua` names their DMARC-reporting vendor, and CAA names\nthe CA they standardized on.\n\n## IP, ASN, and what shared hosting costs you\n\n```bash\nwhois -h whois.cymru.com \" -v 203.0.113.10\"        # ASN, prefix, country, AS name\nwhois -h whois.radb.net -- '-i origin AS64500'     # prefixes routed by that AS\n```\n\nThe RIR record gives the netblock holder. If that is a hosting provider or cloud\nregion you have learned nothing about ownership — a shared IP couples a domain to\nthousands of unrelated tenants, so \"same IP\" is worthless as attribution\nevidence. It becomes evidence when the RIR record shows a reassignment or\nsub-allocation to a named customer, or when the block is small and the org name\nis the target's.\n\nPTRs are set by whoever controls the IP, not the domain owner. Clouds generate\nthem mechanically from the address, which tells you only the platform.\nColocation and enterprise blocks often carry customer names, and walking the PTRs\nof a \u002F24 around a known host can hand you the org's whole rack.\n\n## Historical WHOIS and passive DNS\n\nThis is where the real pivots are. Redaction started at a point in time, so\ndatabases that captured records before it still hold names, emails and phone\nnumbers; passive DNS keeps every observed answer, so you get IPs and hostnames\nthe zone no longer serves. Ask three questions: what did the registrant field say\nbefore it went private, what other domains share that registrant email or name\n(reverse WHOIS), and what IPs has this name resolved to over time. DomainTools,\nSecurityTrails, WhoisXML, Validin, Silent Push and VirusTotal's domain reports\ncarry some mix of the two — most gate the useful depth behind a paid key.\n\n## Zone transfers and zone walking\n\n`dig AXFR example.com @ns1.example.com` asks a nameserver for the whole zone. It\nis an interactive TCP request to target-controlled infrastructure, it is logged,\nand it is out of scope for passive work — only inside an authorized engagement,\nand expect a refusal. A zone signed with NSEC rather than NSEC3 can likewise be\nwalked to enumerate every name, and NSEC3 hashes can be cracked offline; both\nneed direct queries to the authoritative servers. Treat both as active and use\n`find-hidden-subdomains` when you need to stay passive.\n\n## Where this goes wrong\n\n- **Registrant is a placeholder.** Bulk registrars, resellers, privacy services\n  and corporate registrars all write their own details into contact fields. A\n  matching registrant string across domains can mean one owner or one reseller.\n- **Dates lie about age.** Expired-and-reregistered domains reset their creation\n  date at the registry, so a long archive history plus a recent creation date\n  means the name changed hands through a drop.\n- **Cached and cloaked DNS.** Answers are TTL-scoped snapshots, and providers\n  serve different records by geography, by resolver, and via split-horizon views\n  you will never see. One resolver is one vantage point.\n- **SPF and TXT records rot.** Present in SPF means \"was configured\", not \"in use\n  now\"; verification tokens are almost never cleaned up at all.\n- **MX and NS are outsourced.** They identify the vendor. They become an\n  ownership signal only when the specific assigned nameserver pair or mail tenant\n  label recurs across domains.\n- **Parked domains** show registrar DNS and a marketplace IP. No owner\n  infrastructure to find. **Squatters** copy the target's SPF and MX wholesale to\n  look legitimate, so mirrored records are not a relationship.\n\n## Confidence grading\n\n- **Confirmed** — the registry or RIR states it directly and it is not a contact\n  field: creation date, registrar, EPP status, nameservers, netblock holder.\n  Or: an unredacted registrant corroborated by a second independent source (a\n  corporate filing, a historical snapshot, an archived page).\n- **Probable** — a distinctive shared fingerprint across domains: the same\n  assigned nameserver pair, the same mail tenant label, the same DKIM key, the\n  same CAA `accounturi`, the same unusual TXT token. Same operator, probably\n  same owner.\n- **Unconfirmed** — shared IP on shared hosting, shared registrar, shared public\n  DNS provider, or a registrant string that could be a reseller. Also anything\n  from a historical database you have not seen the raw record for.\n\nAlways record the lookup timestamp and which server answered. A WHOIS record\nwithout a retrieval time is not evidence.\n\n## Worked example\n\nTarget: `northwind-logistics.example`, referred by a fraud team.\n\nRDAP: created eleven months ago, registrar Namecheap, registrant redacted but\ncountry `PA`, status `clientTransferProhibited`, nameservers a Cloudflare pair\n(`dana`, `rex`). Young, cheap, proxied, origin hidden.\n\nDNS: no MX at all, which kills the \"they invoice from this domain\" theory\noutright. TXT holds one `google-site-verification` token and an SPF record whose\nonly include is a transactional-email vendor. DMARC is `p=none` with no `rua`, so\nthere is no reporting vendor to pivot to. Dead end on the mail side.\n\nHistorical WHOIS is the break: a snapshot from two months after registration,\npre-privacy-service, carries a Gmail address and a name. Reverse WHOIS on that\naddress returns six more domains, four sharing the same `dana`\u002F`rex` pair — and\nCloudflare assigns that pair per account, so this is one operator, not chance.\n\nGrade: registrant identity **probable** (one snapshot, corroborated by the\nnameserver cluster, not yet by a filing). Seven-domain cluster **confirmed** as\none operator.\n\n## Pivots\n\n| New selector | Goes to |\n|---|---|\n| Subdomains, siblings on shared certs | `find-hidden-subdomains` |\n| IPs, netblocks, ASNs | `find-exposed-servers` |\n| Registrant email, mail vendor, forwarding address | `what-an-email-reveals` |\n| Registrant org, privacy-service jurisdiction | `who-really-owns-it`, `x-ray-a-company` |\n| Registrant phone from a pre-redaction snapshot | `whose-number-is-this` |\n| Historical content at recovered IPs and hostnames | `read-deleted-pages` |\n| Indexed files on discovered hostnames | `google-like-a-spy` |\n| A cluster of domains, IPs and registrants to lay out | `graph-the-network` |\n\n## Legal and ToS notes\n\nBulk WHOIS access is contractually restricted: registries and registrars forbid\nusing it for marketing or for building redistributable databases, and enforce\nwith rate limits and blocks. RDAP supports differentiated access, where a vetted\nauthenticated requester sees more than an anonymous one — that vetting exists\nprecisely so personal data cannot be bulk-collected anonymously. Pre-redaction\nregistrant data pulled from a historical database is still personal data under\nGDPR: you need a lawful basis, and the minimization rules in\n[..\u002F..\u002FETHICS.md](..\u002F..\u002FETHICS.md) apply. AXFR without written authorization can\nconstitute unauthorized access.\n",{"description":7},"main","58843b159d7a4050d6b785a98b908cce505c0b92","agent\u002Fskills\u002Fwho-owns-this-domain",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6","reihsns.web.id","2026-08-19 20:08:18",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":33,"prompt":43,"zipAvailable":44},[34,37,40],{"tool":35,"command":36},"npx","npx skills add Reihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent --skill who-owns-this-domain",{"tool":38,"command":39},"bunx","bunx skills add Reihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent --skill who-owns-this-domain",{"tool":41,"command":42},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Reihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent --skill who-owns-this-domain","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fwho-owns-this-domain\u002FSKILL.md",true,[46,52],{"path":47,"resourceType":48,"resourceTypeDesc":49,"sizeBytes":50,"sourceHtmlUrl":51},"reference\u002Fdns-record-types.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",7383,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fwho-owns-this-domain\u002Freference\u002Fdns-record-types.md",{"path":53,"resourceType":48,"resourceTypeDesc":49,"sizeBytes":54,"sourceHtmlUrl":55},"reference\u002Fvendor-fingerprints.md",10497,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fwho-owns-this-domain\u002Freference\u002Fvendor-fingerprints.md",[57,64,71,78,85,92],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M77XDCYZ407XYMF2T4P6F7VT","youtube-transcript","Extract transcripts from YouTube videos. Use when the user asks for a transcript, subtitles, or captions of a YouTube video and provides a YouTube URL (youtube.com\u002Fwatch?v=, youtu.be\u002F, or similar). Supports output with or without timestamps.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fyoutube-transcript\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M77XD7PBC98J6MXGJJ2TJ8DX","youtube-thumbnail-design","YouTube thumbnail design with specific dimensions, contrast rules, and mobile preview optimization. Covers safe zones, text placement, face expression psychology, and A\u002FB testing. Use for: YouTube thumbnails, video cover images, click-through optimization. Triggers: youtube thumbnail, thumbnail design, video thumbnail, click through rate, ctr optimization, youtube cover, video cover image, thumbnail maker, thumbnail tips, youtube design, video preview image","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fyoutube-thumbnail-design\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M77XD2541C8HXJ6RHYZP4NGJ","youtube-short-maker","Make YouTube Shorts that hold attention with Pexo — vertical 9:16, fast-paced, hook in the first 3 seconds. Describe your topic and Pexo writes the script, generates the shots, picks the models, and assembles a finished Short with music and captions. Use for YouTube Shorts: \"youtube short\", \"make a youtube short\", \"shorts video\", \"short-form video\". NOT for long-form or landscape video.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fyoutube-short-maker\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M77XCXKVSYK7KTZ3PQBVVGFD","xcode-project-setup","Safely modifies Xcode projects (.pbxproj) to add Swift Packages and link files. Use this skill whenever an iOS project needs dependencies installed (e.g. Firebase, Alamofire).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fxcode-project-setup\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M77XCR1DV8ZQK2NHWKVY4EWX","x402","Set up Browser Use Cloud payments with x402 — pay per request from a crypto wallet (USDC on Base mainnet), no signup or API key. Two setups it works out up front — \"just use it\" (set up a wallet so you or Claude Code can run cloud browser tasks paid from the wallet — Claude writes and runs throwaway scripts, nothing touches your codebase) or \"build it in\" (install the SDK and write the key + code into your project). Walks through wallet setup, funding, .env, and a ~$1 test run. Use when the user asks about x402, pay-per-use, USDC payments, or wants Browser Use Cloud without an API key. For the free-tier signup (reverse-CAPTCHA → API key), use `browser-use cloud signup` or the `cloud` skill instead.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fx402\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":93,"name":94,"nameZh":6,"description":95,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":96,"categories":97,"keywords":98,"publishedAt":19},"01M77XCMD3R3ZBZQQSW6E0793B","x-twitter-scraper","Build GitHub Copilot workflows with Xquik X API SDKs, REST endpoints, hosted Apify Actor runs, MCP tools, TweetClaw OpenClaw plugin installs, signed webhooks, tweet search, user lookup, follower exports, media actions, and agent automation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fx-twitter-scraper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]