[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M770T50QEYKJE7PVG848VZ3M":3,"skill-same:01M770T50QEYKJE7PVG848VZ3M":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M770T50QEYKJE7PVG848VZ3M","lazarus",null,"Lazarus Group (Hidden Cobra, DPRK RGB) adversary-emulation playbook — financially-motivated crypto\u002FDeFi theft and supply-chain intrusion: fake-job social engineering, trojanized apps, wallet\u002Fkey theft, and on-chain DeFi\u002Fbridge exploitation (testnet\u002Ffork only). Use when emulating DPRK financial actors against a crypto\u002Fexchange\u002FDeFi target. Triggers on: 'emulate Lazarus', 'Hidden Cobra', 'DPRK crypto', 'AppleJeus', '3CX supply chain', 'DeFi bridge attack', 'crypto theft'.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Flazarus\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: lazarus\ndescription: \"Lazarus Group (Hidden Cobra, DPRK RGB) adversary-emulation playbook — financially-motivated crypto\u002FDeFi theft and supply-chain intrusion: fake-job social engineering, trojanized apps, wallet\u002Fkey theft, and on-chain DeFi\u002Fbridge exploitation (testnet\u002Ffork only). Use when emulating DPRK financial actors against a crypto\u002Fexchange\u002FDeFi target. Triggers on: 'emulate Lazarus', 'Hidden Cobra', 'DPRK crypto', 'AppleJeus', '3CX supply chain', 'DeFi bridge attack', 'crypto theft'.\"\nallowed-tools: Read Write Edit\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: planning\n  when_to_use: \"emulate Lazarus, Hidden Cobra, ZINC, Diamond Sleet, DPRK, cryptocurrency theft, DeFi protocol attack, bridge exploit, AppleJeus, 3CX supply chain, fake job social engineering, wallet key theft, exchange compromise\"\n  tags: adversary-emulation, lazarus, dprk, cryptocurrency, defi, supply-chain\n  mitre_attack: T1566.003, T1195.002, T1574.002, T1555, T1657, T1071.001\n---\n\n# Lazarus Group — Adversary Emulation Playbook\n\n> Tier-3 DPRK (RGB) actor whose modern mission is **revenue generation** — North Korea-linked\n> actors have stolen well over $3B in crypto. Two converging tracks: (a) enterprise intrusion\n> via fake-job social engineering, trojanized trading apps (AppleJeus), and software\n> supply-chain (3CX); (b) **on-chain DeFi\u002Fbridge exploitation** to drain protocols. Authorized\n> red-team emulation only; on-chain steps run on **testnet or a mainnet fork** — never real funds.\n\n## When to emulate Lazarus\n\n- Target is a cryptocurrency exchange, DeFi protocol, cross-chain bridge, wallet provider, or\n  a fintech\u002Fblockchain firm and the client wants the full DPRK money-theft kill chain tested.\n- The engagement spans both the **enterprise estate** (devs, build pipeline, cloud) and the\n  **smart-contract surface** — Decepticon's contract-audit lane is what makes this actor a\n  good fit (see `..\u002F..\u002Freferences\u002Fapt-groups.md`).\n\n## ThreatProfile seed (`plan\u002Fthreat-profile.json`)\n\n```json\n{\n  \"engagement_name\": \"\u003Cfill>\",\n  \"actor_name\": \"Lazarus-like (Hidden Cobra)\",\n  \"actor_aliases\": [\"Hidden Cobra\", \"ZINC\", \"Diamond Sleet\", \"Labyrinth Chollima\", \"NICKEL ACADEMY\"],\n  \"group_id\": \"G0032\",\n  \"tier\": \"tier-3\",\n  \"sophistication\": \"nation-state\",\n  \"motivation\": \"financial\",\n  \"initial_access\": [\"T1566.003\", \"T1195.002\", \"T1199\", \"T1204.002\"],\n  \"key_ttps\": [\"T1574.002\", \"T1027\", \"T1059.006\", \"T1555\", \"T1552.001\", \"T1657\", \"T1071.001\", \"T1567.002\"],\n  \"tools\": [\"Engagement-owned trojanized app + Sliver\", \"Foundry \u002F Anvil (forked mainnet PoC)\", \"canary wallets\", \"NetExec\"],\n  \"infrastructure\": [\"Fake-recruiter persona + lure docs\", \"Supply-chain build-step foothold\", \"Testnet\u002Ffork RPC endpoints\"],\n  \"recent_cti_delta\": \"$3B+ crypto stolen; targets entire blockchain ecosystems (cross-chain bridges, DeFi, identity providers); Operation Dream Job fake-job social engineering vs developers; 3CX double software supply chain; AppleJeus trojanized trading apps.\",\n  \"confidence\": \"probable\"\n}\n```\n\n## Kill-chain emulation\n\n| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |\n|---|-------|-------|-----------------|-------------------------|\n| 1 | Recon | T1591 \u002F T1589 | Profile devs, the DeFi protocol, and the bridge\u002Fcontract surface | recon → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fosint\u002FSKILL.md`, `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fosint\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 2 | Initial Access | T1566.003 | Fake-job \u002F DeFi-collab social engineering with a lure doc | phisher → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 3 | Initial Access (alt) | T1195.002 \u002F T1199 | Trojanized dependency or build-step (3CX pattern) | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fsupplychain\u002Fdep-confusion\u002FSKILL.md`; `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsupply-chain\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 4 | Execution | T1204.002 \u002F T1574.002 | Trojanized app + DLL side-load into a trusted process | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fc2-sliver\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 5 | Credential \u002F Key theft | T1555 \u002F T1552.001 | Steal wallet keys, seed phrases, cloud creds, signing keys | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fcredential-access\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 6 | Web\u002FAPI (exchange) | T1190 | Exchange web\u002FAPI abuse (authz, IDOR, JWT) | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002FSKILL.md` (route to `idor` \u002F `jwt` \u002F `api`) |\n| 7 | On-chain (bridge) | — (DeFi) | Drain a cross-chain bridge via logic\u002Fvalidator flaw (fork) | contracts → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fbridge-exploit\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 8 | On-chain (sig) | — (DeFi) | Signature replay \u002F ecrecover abuse on the protocol (fork) | contracts → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fsignature-replay\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 9 | On-chain (authz) | — (DeFi) | Missing-modifier \u002F wrong-owner privileged call (fork) | contracts → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Faccess-control\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 10 | C2 | T1071.001 | Sliver HTTPS beacon for the enterprise foothold | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fc2-sliver\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 11 | Exfil \u002F Theft | T1657 \u002F T1567.002 | Simulated fund movement to a canary address (testnet\u002Ffork) | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md` |\n\n## CONOPS kill_chain (copy into `conops.json`)\n\n1. `recon` — devs + protocol + bridge\u002Fcontract surface (1).\n2. `initial-access` — fake-job social engineering \u002F trojanized supply chain (2-3).\n3. `post-exploit` — trojan execution, wallet-key\u002Fcred theft, exchange web\u002FAPI abuse, **on-chain DeFi exploitation on a fork** (4-9).\n4. `c2` — Sliver (10).\n5. `exfiltration` — simulated theft to canary address on testnet\u002Ffork (11).\n\n## OPSEC & signature fidelity\n\n- **Patient grooming.** Operation Dream Job runs for weeks — the social-engineering relationship\n  is built slowly with benign files first.\n- **Obfuscated, side-loaded execution** into trusted processes (mirror the DLL side-load chain).\n- **On-chain moves are irreversible on mainnet** — fidelity comes from a *working PoC on a\n  forked mainnet*, not from touching production funds.\n\n## RoE \u002F safety gates\n\n- **On-chain exploitation MUST run on testnet or a forked-mainnet (Anvil) RPC.** Never sign a\n  real mainnet transaction. Add an `EMERGENCY` abort: *\"a transaction signed against a\n  production\u002Fmainnet RPC or a real wallet key used.\"*\n- Developer-targeted social engineering requires authorization + lure-deconfliction\n  (`\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Flure-deconfliction\u002FSKILL.md`).\n- Key\u002Fseed theft is simulated against **canary wallets** seeded for the exercise.\n\n## Deconfliction\n\n- Record fork\u002Ftestnet RPC URLs, canary wallet addresses, and the trojanized-app hash in\n  `deconfliction.json` + `cleanup.json`.\n- Mark the recruiter persona and lure documents so they can be distinguished from a real\n  Dream Job approach.\n\n## Fidelity notes (deviations)\n\n- **No real AppleJeus\u002F3CX samples** — emulate the trojanized-app + supply-chain *delivery\n  pattern* with an engagement-owned dropper + Sliver.\n- DeFi exploitation reproduces the real bug classes (bridge validator bypass, signature\n  replay, access-control) with Foundry PoCs on a fork; the proof is a drained canary balance\n  on the fork, never a real protocol.\n- Theft is demonstrated as a fund move to a canary address on testnet\u002Ffork; the deliverable\n  distinguishes \"drained on fork\" from \"production funds\" (never the latter).\n","# Lazarus Group — Adversary Emulation Playbook\n\n> Tier-3 DPRK (RGB) actor whose modern mission is **revenue generation** — North Korea-linked\n> actors have stolen well over $3B in crypto. Two converging tracks: (a) enterprise intrusion\n> via fake-job social engineering, trojanized trading apps (AppleJeus), and software\n> supply-chain (3CX); (b) **on-chain DeFi\u002Fbridge exploitation** to drain protocols. Authorized\n> red-team emulation only; on-chain steps run on **testnet or a mainnet fork** — never real funds.\n\n## When to emulate Lazarus\n\n- Target is a cryptocurrency exchange, DeFi protocol, cross-chain bridge, wallet provider, or\n  a fintech\u002Fblockchain firm and the client wants the full DPRK money-theft kill chain tested.\n- The engagement spans both the **enterprise estate** (devs, build pipeline, cloud) and the\n  **smart-contract surface** — Decepticon's contract-audit lane is what makes this actor a\n  good fit (see `..\u002F..\u002Freferences\u002Fapt-groups.md`).\n\n## ThreatProfile seed (`plan\u002Fthreat-profile.json`)\n\n```json\n{\n  \"engagement_name\": \"\u003Cfill>\",\n  \"actor_name\": \"Lazarus-like (Hidden Cobra)\",\n  \"actor_aliases\": [\"Hidden Cobra\", \"ZINC\", \"Diamond Sleet\", \"Labyrinth Chollima\", \"NICKEL ACADEMY\"],\n  \"group_id\": \"G0032\",\n  \"tier\": \"tier-3\",\n  \"sophistication\": \"nation-state\",\n  \"motivation\": \"financial\",\n  \"initial_access\": [\"T1566.003\", \"T1195.002\", \"T1199\", \"T1204.002\"],\n  \"key_ttps\": [\"T1574.002\", \"T1027\", \"T1059.006\", \"T1555\", \"T1552.001\", \"T1657\", \"T1071.001\", \"T1567.002\"],\n  \"tools\": [\"Engagement-owned trojanized app + Sliver\", \"Foundry \u002F Anvil (forked mainnet PoC)\", \"canary wallets\", \"NetExec\"],\n  \"infrastructure\": [\"Fake-recruiter persona + lure docs\", \"Supply-chain build-step foothold\", \"Testnet\u002Ffork RPC endpoints\"],\n  \"recent_cti_delta\": \"$3B+ crypto stolen; targets entire blockchain ecosystems (cross-chain bridges, DeFi, identity providers); Operation Dream Job fake-job social engineering vs developers; 3CX double software supply chain; AppleJeus trojanized trading apps.\",\n  \"confidence\": \"probable\"\n}\n```\n\n## Kill-chain emulation\n\n| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |\n|---|-------|-------|-----------------|-------------------------|\n| 1 | Recon | T1591 \u002F T1589 | Profile devs, the DeFi protocol, and the bridge\u002Fcontract surface | recon → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fosint\u002FSKILL.md`, `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fosint\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 2 | Initial Access | T1566.003 | Fake-job \u002F DeFi-collab social engineering with a lure doc | phisher → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 3 | Initial Access (alt) | T1195.002 \u002F T1199 | Trojanized dependency or build-step (3CX pattern) | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fsupplychain\u002Fdep-confusion\u002FSKILL.md`; `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsupply-chain\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 4 | Execution | T1204.002 \u002F T1574.002 | Trojanized app + DLL side-load into a trusted process | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fc2-sliver\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 5 | Credential \u002F Key theft | T1555 \u002F T1552.001 | Steal wallet keys, seed phrases, cloud creds, signing keys | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fcredential-access\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 6 | Web\u002FAPI (exchange) | T1190 | Exchange web\u002FAPI abuse (authz, IDOR, JWT) | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002FSKILL.md` (route to `idor` \u002F `jwt` \u002F `api`) |\n| 7 | On-chain (bridge) | — (DeFi) | Drain a cross-chain bridge via logic\u002Fvalidator flaw (fork) | contracts → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fbridge-exploit\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 8 | On-chain (sig) | — (DeFi) | Signature replay \u002F ecrecover abuse on the protocol (fork) | contracts → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fsignature-replay\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 9 | On-chain (authz) | — (DeFi) | Missing-modifier \u002F wrong-owner privileged call (fork) | contracts → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Faccess-control\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 10 | C2 | T1071.001 | Sliver HTTPS beacon for the enterprise foothold | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fc2-sliver\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 11 | Exfil \u002F Theft | T1657 \u002F T1567.002 | Simulated fund movement to a canary address (testnet\u002Ffork) | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md` |\n\n## CONOPS kill_chain (copy into `conops.json`)\n\n1. `recon` — devs + protocol + bridge\u002Fcontract surface (1).\n2. `initial-access` — fake-job social engineering \u002F trojanized supply chain (2-3).\n3. `post-exploit` — trojan execution, wallet-key\u002Fcred theft, exchange web\u002FAPI abuse, **on-chain DeFi exploitation on a fork** (4-9).\n4. `c2` — Sliver (10).\n5. `exfiltration` — simulated theft to canary address on testnet\u002Ffork (11).\n\n## OPSEC & signature fidelity\n\n- **Patient grooming.** Operation Dream Job runs for weeks — the social-engineering relationship\n  is built slowly with benign files first.\n- **Obfuscated, side-loaded execution** into trusted processes (mirror the DLL side-load chain).\n- **On-chain moves are irreversible on mainnet** — fidelity comes from a *working PoC on a\n  forked mainnet*, not from touching production funds.\n\n## RoE \u002F safety gates\n\n- **On-chain exploitation MUST run on testnet or a forked-mainnet (Anvil) RPC.** Never sign a\n  real mainnet transaction. Add an `EMERGENCY` abort: *\"a transaction signed against a\n  production\u002Fmainnet RPC or a real wallet key used.\"*\n- Developer-targeted social engineering requires authorization + lure-deconfliction\n  (`\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Flure-deconfliction\u002FSKILL.md`).\n- Key\u002Fseed theft is simulated against **canary wallets** seeded for the exercise.\n\n## Deconfliction\n\n- Record fork\u002Ftestnet RPC URLs, canary wallet addresses, and the trojanized-app hash in\n  `deconfliction.json` + `cleanup.json`.\n- Mark the recruiter persona and lure documents so they can be distinguished from a real\n  Dream Job approach.\n\n## Fidelity notes (deviations)\n\n- **No real AppleJeus\u002F3CX samples** — emulate the trojanized-app + supply-chain *delivery\n  pattern* with an engagement-owned dropper + Sliver.\n- DeFi exploitation reproduces the real bug classes (bridge validator bypass, signature\n  replay, access-control) with Foundry PoCs on a fork; the proof is a drained canary balance\n  on the fork, never a real protocol.\n- Theft is demonstrated as a fund move to a canary address on testnet\u002Ffork; the deliverable\n  distinguishes \"drained on fork\" from \"production funds\" (never the latter).\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"adversary-emulation, lazarus, dprk, cryptocurrency, defi, supply-chain","planning","emulate Lazarus, Hidden Cobra, ZINC, Diamond Sleet, DPRK, cryptocurrency theft, DeFi protocol attack, bridge exploit, AppleJeus, 3CX supply chain, fake job social engineering, wallet key theft, exchange compromise","T1566.003, T1195.002, T1574.002, T1555, T1657, T1071.001","Read Write Edit","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Flazarus","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill lazarus",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill lazarus",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill lazarus","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Flazarus\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]