[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M770PM6773MBMRNFVQJAE92K":3,"skill-same:01M770PM6773MBMRNFVQJAE92K":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M770PM6773MBMRNFVQJAE92K","web-subdomain-takeover",null,"Subdomain takeover via dangling DNS\u002FCNAME — GitHub Pages, Heroku, Azure, Fastly, Shopify, Netlify, Surge, Tumblr, Beanstalk, Zendesk, etc.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fweb-recon\u002Fsubdomain-takeover\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: web-subdomain-takeover\ndescription: \"Subdomain takeover via dangling DNS\u002FCNAME — GitHub Pages, Heroku, Azure, Fastly, Shopify, Netlify, Surge, Tumblr, Beanstalk, Zendesk, etc.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: reconnaissance\n  when_to_use: \"subdomain takeover, dangling CNAME, dangling DNS, NXDOMAIN provider, can-i-take-over-xyz, subjack, subzy, nuclei takeover, orphaned subdomain\"\n  tags: subdomain-takeover, dangling-dns, cname, recon, bug-bounty\n  mitre_attack: T1583.001\n---\n\n# Subdomain Takeover (Dangling DNS \u002F CNAME)\n\nA subdomain CNAMEs to a SaaS provider (GitHub Pages, Heroku, S3, etc.) but the underlying tenant has been deleted, expired, or never claimed. Whoever registers the orphaned tenant name controls a trusted `*.\u003CTARGET>` origin. Severity is almost always **High → Critical** because the attacker inherits the parent domain's cookie scope, CORS allowlist, OAuth `redirect_uri` whitelist, CSP `*.\u003CTARGET>` allowance, and reputation.\n\n## 1. Asset surface — enumerate every subdomain\n\n```bash\n# Passive (no traffic to target)\nsubfinder -d \u003CTARGET> -all -silent -o subs.txt\namass enum -passive -d \u003CTARGET> -o subs.amass.txt\nassetfinder --subs-only \u003CTARGET> >> subs.txt\nfindomain -t \u003CTARGET> -q >> subs.txt\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fcrt.sh\u002F?q=%25.\u003CTARGET>&output=json\" | jq -r '.[].name_value' | tr '\\n' '\\n' | sort -u >> subs.txt\nsort -u subs.txt -o subs.txt\n\n# Active resolution + CNAME extraction\ndnsx -l subs.txt -cname -resp -silent -o subs.cname.txt\n# subs.cname.txt format:  app.\u003CTARGET>  [cname.provider.net]\n```\n\n## 2. CNAME → provider fingerprints\n\nResolve each subdomain, capture the CNAME, and match against the dangling-provider table below.\n\n```bash\nwhile read sub; do\n  cname=$(dig +short CNAME \"$sub\" | head -n1)\n  [ -z \"$cname\" ] && continue\n  echo \"$sub -> $cname\"\ndone \u003C subs.txt | tee cname.map\n```\n\n| Provider | CNAME pattern | Vulnerable fingerprint in HTTP body |\n|---|---|---|\n| GitHub Pages | `*.github.io` | `There isn't a GitHub Pages site here.` |\n| Heroku | `*.herokuapp.com`, `*.herokussl.com` | `No such app` \u002F `herokucdn.com\u002Ferror-pages\u002Fno-such-app.html` |\n| AWS S3 | `*.s3*.amazonaws.com` | `NoSuchBucket` |\n| AWS Elastic Beanstalk | `*.elasticbeanstalk.com` | NXDOMAIN on CNAME target |\n| Azure CloudApp | `*.cloudapp.net`, `*.cloudapp.azure.com` | NXDOMAIN |\n| Azure Traffic Manager | `*.trafficmanager.net` | NXDOMAIN |\n| Azure Edge \u002F Front Door | `*.azureedge.net`, `*.azurefd.net` | NXDOMAIN |\n| Azure Websites | `*.azurewebsites.net` | `404 Web Site not found` |\n| Fastly | `*.fastly.net` | `Fastly error: unknown domain` |\n| Shopify | `shops.myshopify.com` | `Sorry, this shop is currently unavailable.` |\n| Netlify | `*.netlify.app`, `*.netlify.com` | `Not Found - Request ID` (and the site is unclaimed) |\n| Surge.sh | `*.surge.sh` | `project not found` |\n| Tumblr | `domains.tumblr.com` | `Whatever you were looking for doesn't currently exist at this address.` |\n| Read the Docs | `readthedocs.io` | `unknown to Read the Docs` |\n| Zendesk | `*.zendesk.com` | `Help Center Closed` |\n| Unbounce | `unbouncepages.com` | `The requested URL was not found on this server.` |\n| Pantheon | `*.pantheonsite.io` | `The gods are wise, but do not know of the site which you seek.` |\n| Help Scout | `*.helpscoutdocs.com` | `No settings were found for this company` |\n| Cargo | `cargocollective.com` | `404 Not Found` + Cargo branding |\n| Tilda | `*.tilda.ws` | `Please renew your subscription` |\n| Webflow | `proxy-ssl.webflow.com` | `The page you are looking for doesn't exist or has been moved.` |\n| Smartling | `*.smartling.com` | `Domain is not configured` |\n| Worksites.net | `*.worksites.net` | `Hello! Sorry, but the website you're looking for doesn't exist.` |\n| Ghost | `*.ghost.io` | `Site unavailable \u002F The thing you were looking for is no longer here, or never was` |\n| LaunchRock | `*.launchrock.com` | `It looks like you may have taken a wrong turn somewhere.` |\n\nCanonical reference (updated by EdOverflow community): `can-i-take-over-xyz`.\n\n## 3. Detection — body fingerprint\n\n```bash\n# Single subdomain\ncurl -sk -H 'Host: app.\u003CTARGET>' \"https:\u002F\u002Fapp.\u003CTARGET>\u002F\" -o body.html -w '%{http_code}\\n'\ngrep -iEf \u003C(printf '%s\\n' \\\n  \"There isn't a GitHub Pages site here\" \\\n  \"no such app\" \"NoSuchBucket\" \"Fastly error: unknown domain\" \\\n  \"Sorry, this shop is currently unavailable\" \"project not found\" \\\n  \"Help Center Closed\" \"unknown to Read the Docs\" \\\n  \"The gods are wise\" \"Whatever you were looking for doesn't currently exist\" \\\n  ) body.html\n```\n\nNXDOMAIN cases (Azure, Beanstalk) are detected at DNS layer — no HTTP body:\n\n```bash\ncname=$(dig +short CNAME \"app.\u003CTARGET>\" | head -n1)\n[ -n \"$cname\" ] && dig +short \"$cname\" | grep -q . || echo \"DANGLING: $cname\"\n```\n\n## 4. Mass detection\n\n```bash\n# subjack — fingerprints + claim hints\nsubjack -w subs.txt -t 50 -timeout 30 -ssl -c ~\u002Fgo\u002Fpkg\u002Fmod\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhaccer\u002Fsubjack\u002Ffingerprints.json -v -o subjack.out\n\n# subzy — newer, maintained, more providers\nsubzy run --targets subs.txt --concurrency 50 --hide_fails --verify_ssl --output subzy.json\n\n# nuclei takeover templates — most up-to-date provider list\nnuclei -l subs.txt -t http\u002Ftakeovers\u002F -severity high,critical -o nuclei.takeover.out\n\n# Manual sanity check on hits\nfor s in $(awk '\u002FVULNERABLE\u002F{print $NF}' subjack.out); do\n  echo \"=== $s ===\"; curl -sk -m 10 \"https:\u002F\u002F$s\u002F\" | head -c 400; echo\ndone\n```\n\n## 5. Claim \u002F PoC\n\n`can-i-take-over-xyz` lists per-provider claim steps. General pattern: register an account on the provider, create the resource with the exact unclaimed name from the CNAME, deploy a marker page, and prove control.\n\n```bash\n# Marker page content — keep it boring, no defacement\ncat > index.html \u003C\u003CEOF\n\u003C!doctype html>\u003Chtml>\u003Cbody>\n\u003Ch1>Subdomain takeover PoC — authorized bug-bounty research\u003C\u002Fh1>\n\u003Cp>Subdomain: app.\u003CTARGET>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Reported by: \u003CRESEARCHER>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Date: $(date -u +%FT%TZ)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Contact: \u003CEMAIL>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003C\u002Fbody>\u003C\u002Fhtml>\nEOF\n# Deploy via the provider's normal flow (git push, heroku create, etc.)\n# Then prove:\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002Fapp.\u003CTARGET>\u002F\" | grep -i 'authorized bug-bounty research'\n```\n\nOPSEC: never collect cookies, never serve JavaScript, never accept POSTs. Marker file + screenshot + DNS chain in the report is sufficient.\n\n## 6. Chains — why this is rarely \"informational\"\n\n| Chain | How takeover unlocks it |\n|---|---|\n| Cookie theft | Cookies scoped to `.\u003CTARGET>` are sent to your subdomain → session hijack on the parent app. |\n| OAuth redirect_uri | Many IdPs allow any `*.\u003CTARGET>` as `redirect_uri`. Takeover → host the callback → exfil auth `code`. |\n| CSP bypass | If parent app uses `script-src *.\u003CTARGET>` or `connect-src *.\u003CTARGET>`, you host attacker JS that the parent CSP trusts. |\n| postMessage \u002F CORS | `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` reflecting `*.\u003CTARGET>` now trusts attacker JSON. |\n| SAML \u002F SSO | ACS URL allowlists by domain → forge assertions delivered to attacker subdomain. |\n| Service Worker | A SW served from `app.\u003CTARGET>` can intercept fetches inside its scope on that origin — full client-side compromise of any future user landing there. |\n| Phishing \u002F malware delivery | Trusted parent reputation + valid TLS → email filters and users trust the link. |\n| Mixed-content \u002F referrer leakage | Internal tools that whitelist `*.\u003CTARGET>` as image \u002F iframe source leak referrers and IDs to attacker. |\n\n## 7. Detection signatures (for defenders)\n\n| Signal | Source |\n|---|---|\n| CNAME RDATA pointing to provider where NXDOMAIN on the target | DNS audit |\n| Provider error body served from `*.\u003CTARGET>` | HTTP probe |\n| `subjack`\u002F`subzy`\u002F`nuclei` \"VULNERABLE\" line | Mass scan |\n| Provider tenant deleted but DNS not removed in IaC drift | Terraform \u002F Route53 audit |\n| Recently expired SaaS subscription + still-resolving CNAME | Procurement cross-check |\n\nRemediation: remove the dangling DNS record OR re-claim the resource. Treat CNAMEs to external providers as production assets in CI\u002FCD.\n\n## 8. Decision gate\n\n| Observation | Action |\n|---|---|\n| CNAME → provider on the table AND fingerprint body matches | Proceed to claim PoC → high\u002Fcritical report |\n| CNAME → provider AND NXDOMAIN at resolver | Same — claim PoC required, often even higher |\n| CNAME → provider but body shows a live tenant page | Out of scope, move on |\n| No CNAME, but A record to provider IP range with no app | Often false positive — verify provider docs before claiming |\n| Subdomain in scope but parent program forbids subdomain takeover testing | Stop — report dangling DNS without claiming |\n\n## Cross-references\n\n- OAuth chain: `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Foauth\u002FSKILL.md`\n- Open redirect \u002F cookie scoping: `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fopen-redirect\u002FSKILL.md`\n- WAF \u002F origin discovery (sister recon): `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fweb-recon\u002Fwaf-detection\u002FSKILL.md`\n- Upstream: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FEdOverflow\u002Fcan-i-take-over-xyz\n","# Subdomain Takeover (Dangling DNS \u002F CNAME)\n\nA subdomain CNAMEs to a SaaS provider (GitHub Pages, Heroku, S3, etc.) but the underlying tenant has been deleted, expired, or never claimed. Whoever registers the orphaned tenant name controls a trusted `*.\u003CTARGET>` origin. Severity is almost always **High → Critical** because the attacker inherits the parent domain's cookie scope, CORS allowlist, OAuth `redirect_uri` whitelist, CSP `*.\u003CTARGET>` allowance, and reputation.\n\n## 1. Asset surface — enumerate every subdomain\n\n```bash\n# Passive (no traffic to target)\nsubfinder -d \u003CTARGET> -all -silent -o subs.txt\namass enum -passive -d \u003CTARGET> -o subs.amass.txt\nassetfinder --subs-only \u003CTARGET> >> subs.txt\nfindomain -t \u003CTARGET> -q >> subs.txt\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fcrt.sh\u002F?q=%25.\u003CTARGET>&output=json\" | jq -r '.[].name_value' | tr '\\n' '\\n' | sort -u >> subs.txt\nsort -u subs.txt -o subs.txt\n\n# Active resolution + CNAME extraction\ndnsx -l subs.txt -cname -resp -silent -o subs.cname.txt\n# subs.cname.txt format:  app.\u003CTARGET>  [cname.provider.net]\n```\n\n## 2. CNAME → provider fingerprints\n\nResolve each subdomain, capture the CNAME, and match against the dangling-provider table below.\n\n```bash\nwhile read sub; do\n  cname=$(dig +short CNAME \"$sub\" | head -n1)\n  [ -z \"$cname\" ] && continue\n  echo \"$sub -> $cname\"\ndone \u003C subs.txt | tee cname.map\n```\n\n| Provider | CNAME pattern | Vulnerable fingerprint in HTTP body |\n|---|---|---|\n| GitHub Pages | `*.github.io` | `There isn't a GitHub Pages site here.` |\n| Heroku | `*.herokuapp.com`, `*.herokussl.com` | `No such app` \u002F `herokucdn.com\u002Ferror-pages\u002Fno-such-app.html` |\n| AWS S3 | `*.s3*.amazonaws.com` | `NoSuchBucket` |\n| AWS Elastic Beanstalk | `*.elasticbeanstalk.com` | NXDOMAIN on CNAME target |\n| Azure CloudApp | `*.cloudapp.net`, `*.cloudapp.azure.com` | NXDOMAIN |\n| Azure Traffic Manager | `*.trafficmanager.net` | NXDOMAIN |\n| Azure Edge \u002F Front Door | `*.azureedge.net`, `*.azurefd.net` | NXDOMAIN |\n| Azure Websites | `*.azurewebsites.net` | `404 Web Site not found` |\n| Fastly | `*.fastly.net` | `Fastly error: unknown domain` |\n| Shopify | `shops.myshopify.com` | `Sorry, this shop is currently unavailable.` |\n| Netlify | `*.netlify.app`, `*.netlify.com` | `Not Found - Request ID` (and the site is unclaimed) |\n| Surge.sh | `*.surge.sh` | `project not found` |\n| Tumblr | `domains.tumblr.com` | `Whatever you were looking for doesn't currently exist at this address.` |\n| Read the Docs | `readthedocs.io` | `unknown to Read the Docs` |\n| Zendesk | `*.zendesk.com` | `Help Center Closed` |\n| Unbounce | `unbouncepages.com` | `The requested URL was not found on this server.` |\n| Pantheon | `*.pantheonsite.io` | `The gods are wise, but do not know of the site which you seek.` |\n| Help Scout | `*.helpscoutdocs.com` | `No settings were found for this company` |\n| Cargo | `cargocollective.com` | `404 Not Found` + Cargo branding |\n| Tilda | `*.tilda.ws` | `Please renew your subscription` |\n| Webflow | `proxy-ssl.webflow.com` | `The page you are looking for doesn't exist or has been moved.` |\n| Smartling | `*.smartling.com` | `Domain is not configured` |\n| Worksites.net | `*.worksites.net` | `Hello! Sorry, but the website you're looking for doesn't exist.` |\n| Ghost | `*.ghost.io` | `Site unavailable \u002F The thing you were looking for is no longer here, or never was` |\n| LaunchRock | `*.launchrock.com` | `It looks like you may have taken a wrong turn somewhere.` |\n\nCanonical reference (updated by EdOverflow community): `can-i-take-over-xyz`.\n\n## 3. Detection — body fingerprint\n\n```bash\n# Single subdomain\ncurl -sk -H 'Host: app.\u003CTARGET>' \"https:\u002F\u002Fapp.\u003CTARGET>\u002F\" -o body.html -w '%{http_code}\\n'\ngrep -iEf \u003C(printf '%s\\n' \\\n  \"There isn't a GitHub Pages site here\" \\\n  \"no such app\" \"NoSuchBucket\" \"Fastly error: unknown domain\" \\\n  \"Sorry, this shop is currently unavailable\" \"project not found\" \\\n  \"Help Center Closed\" \"unknown to Read the Docs\" \\\n  \"The gods are wise\" \"Whatever you were looking for doesn't currently exist\" \\\n  ) body.html\n```\n\nNXDOMAIN cases (Azure, Beanstalk) are detected at DNS layer — no HTTP body:\n\n```bash\ncname=$(dig +short CNAME \"app.\u003CTARGET>\" | head -n1)\n[ -n \"$cname\" ] && dig +short \"$cname\" | grep -q . || echo \"DANGLING: $cname\"\n```\n\n## 4. Mass detection\n\n```bash\n# subjack — fingerprints + claim hints\nsubjack -w subs.txt -t 50 -timeout 30 -ssl -c ~\u002Fgo\u002Fpkg\u002Fmod\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhaccer\u002Fsubjack\u002Ffingerprints.json -v -o subjack.out\n\n# subzy — newer, maintained, more providers\nsubzy run --targets subs.txt --concurrency 50 --hide_fails --verify_ssl --output subzy.json\n\n# nuclei takeover templates — most up-to-date provider list\nnuclei -l subs.txt -t http\u002Ftakeovers\u002F -severity high,critical -o nuclei.takeover.out\n\n# Manual sanity check on hits\nfor s in $(awk '\u002FVULNERABLE\u002F{print $NF}' subjack.out); do\n  echo \"=== $s ===\"; curl -sk -m 10 \"https:\u002F\u002F$s\u002F\" | head -c 400; echo\ndone\n```\n\n## 5. Claim \u002F PoC\n\n`can-i-take-over-xyz` lists per-provider claim steps. General pattern: register an account on the provider, create the resource with the exact unclaimed name from the CNAME, deploy a marker page, and prove control.\n\n```bash\n# Marker page content — keep it boring, no defacement\ncat > index.html \u003C\u003CEOF\n\u003C!doctype html>\u003Chtml>\u003Cbody>\n\u003Ch1>Subdomain takeover PoC — authorized bug-bounty research\u003C\u002Fh1>\n\u003Cp>Subdomain: app.\u003CTARGET>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Reported by: \u003CRESEARCHER>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Date: $(date -u +%FT%TZ)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Contact: \u003CEMAIL>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003C\u002Fbody>\u003C\u002Fhtml>\nEOF\n# Deploy via the provider's normal flow (git push, heroku create, etc.)\n# Then prove:\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002Fapp.\u003CTARGET>\u002F\" | grep -i 'authorized bug-bounty research'\n```\n\nOPSEC: never collect cookies, never serve JavaScript, never accept POSTs. Marker file + screenshot + DNS chain in the report is sufficient.\n\n## 6. Chains — why this is rarely \"informational\"\n\n| Chain | How takeover unlocks it |\n|---|---|\n| Cookie theft | Cookies scoped to `.\u003CTARGET>` are sent to your subdomain → session hijack on the parent app. |\n| OAuth redirect_uri | Many IdPs allow any `*.\u003CTARGET>` as `redirect_uri`. Takeover → host the callback → exfil auth `code`. |\n| CSP bypass | If parent app uses `script-src *.\u003CTARGET>` or `connect-src *.\u003CTARGET>`, you host attacker JS that the parent CSP trusts. |\n| postMessage \u002F CORS | `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` reflecting `*.\u003CTARGET>` now trusts attacker JSON. |\n| SAML \u002F SSO | ACS URL allowlists by domain → forge assertions delivered to attacker subdomain. |\n| Service Worker | A SW served from `app.\u003CTARGET>` can intercept fetches inside its scope on that origin — full client-side compromise of any future user landing there. |\n| Phishing \u002F malware delivery | Trusted parent reputation + valid TLS → email filters and users trust the link. |\n| Mixed-content \u002F referrer leakage | Internal tools that whitelist `*.\u003CTARGET>` as image \u002F iframe source leak referrers and IDs to attacker. |\n\n## 7. Detection signatures (for defenders)\n\n| Signal | Source |\n|---|---|\n| CNAME RDATA pointing to provider where NXDOMAIN on the target | DNS audit |\n| Provider error body served from `*.\u003CTARGET>` | HTTP probe |\n| `subjack`\u002F`subzy`\u002F`nuclei` \"VULNERABLE\" line | Mass scan |\n| Provider tenant deleted but DNS not removed in IaC drift | Terraform \u002F Route53 audit |\n| Recently expired SaaS subscription + still-resolving CNAME | Procurement cross-check |\n\nRemediation: remove the dangling DNS record OR re-claim the resource. Treat CNAMEs to external providers as production assets in CI\u002FCD.\n\n## 8. Decision gate\n\n| Observation | Action |\n|---|---|\n| CNAME → provider on the table AND fingerprint body matches | Proceed to claim PoC → high\u002Fcritical report |\n| CNAME → provider AND NXDOMAIN at resolver | Same — claim PoC required, often even higher |\n| CNAME → provider but body shows a live tenant page | Out of scope, move on |\n| No CNAME, but A record to provider IP range with no app | Often false positive — verify provider docs before claiming |\n| Subdomain in scope but parent program forbids subdomain takeover testing | Stop — report dangling DNS without claiming |\n\n## Cross-references\n\n- OAuth chain: `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Foauth\u002FSKILL.md`\n- Open redirect \u002F cookie scoping: `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fopen-redirect\u002FSKILL.md`\n- WAF \u002F origin discovery (sister recon): `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fweb-recon\u002Fwaf-detection\u002FSKILL.md`\n- Upstream: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FEdOverflow\u002Fcan-i-take-over-xyz\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"subdomain-takeover, dangling-dns, cname, recon, bug-bounty","reconnaissance","subdomain takeover, dangling CNAME, dangling DNS, NXDOMAIN provider, can-i-take-over-xyz, subjack, subzy, nuclei takeover, orphaned subdomain","T1583.001","Bash Read Write","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fweb-recon\u002Fsubdomain-takeover","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill web-subdomain-takeover",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill web-subdomain-takeover",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill web-subdomain-takeover","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fweb-recon\u002Fsubdomain-takeover\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]