[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M770PCBDTF1BKDB1F5BA29A4":3,"skill-same:01M770PCBDTF1BKDB1F5BA29A4":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M770PCBDTF1BKDB1F5BA29A4","web-cookie-audit",null,"Cookie-conditional sink discovery — bisect required cookies per sink, session-write timeline for race-condition challenges.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fweb-recon\u002Fcookie-audit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: web-cookie-audit\ndescription: \"Cookie-conditional sink discovery — bisect required cookies per sink, session-write timeline for race-condition challenges.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: reconnaissance\n  when_to_use: \"cookie audit, session cookies, sink preconditions, gating cookies, session mutation, session-write timeline, race-condition recon, TOCTOU recon\"\n  tags: cookie-audit, session-mutation, gating\n  mitre_attack: T1539\n---\n\n# Cookie-Conditional Sink Discovery\n\nA \"sink\" (eval, deserialize, exec, template render) may behave differently — or not fire at all — depending on which session cookies are present. Recon MUST enumerate every cookie the app sets and re-test each candidate sink with and without each cookie before declaring the sink unreachable. Skipping this step is the most common cause of exploit handing back a false \"blind sink\" verdict.\n\n## Procedure\n\n1. Walk the app unauthenticated; record every `Set-Cookie` (name, attributes, source endpoint).\n2. Authenticate (every auth tier: anon, low-priv user, high-priv user) and record the full cookie jar after each.\n3. For each candidate sink (parameter, route, header, body field):\n   - Probe with NO cookies.\n   - Probe with FULL authenticated jar.\n   - Bisect: drop one cookie at a time and re-probe. The cookie whose removal silences the sink is the gating cookie.\n4. Document a \"Sink preconditions\" table in `recon_notes.md` and `SUMMARY.md`:\n\n| Sink | Endpoint | Method | Required cookies | Behavior w\u002Fo cookie | Behavior w\u002F cookie | Notes |\n|------|----------|--------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------|\n| `bookmark_data` (deser) | `\u002Fbookmarks\u002Fimport` | POST | `session=...; auth_tier=user` | 302 → \u002Flogin | 200 + processed | gated by auth_tier |\n\n4a. **Session mutation audit.** For every endpoint that READS session, trace which other endpoints WRITE to the SAME session key BEFORE the security verdict (login, password check, role lookup). This is the data race-condition exploit needs. Output a \"Session-write timeline\" table:\n\n| Endpoint | Reads session keys | Writes session keys (pre-verdict) | Slow ops (bcrypt\u002FDB\u002Fnetwork) | Race window (ms) |\n|----------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|\n| `POST \u002Flogin` | — | `user`, `auth_tier` (set BEFORE bcrypt) | bcrypt ~200ms | ~200 |\n| `GET \u002Fadmin_panel` | `user`, `auth_tier` | — | — | reads during the login bcrypt window |\n\nIf the challenge tag includes `race_condition`, `toctou`, `concurrent`, or `smuggling_desync` and recon hands off WITHOUT this table, exploit MUST flag the handoff back as \"recon incomplete: session-write timeline missing\".\n\n5. In the handoff to exploit\u002Fpostexploit, ALWAYS include a **Required session state** line:\n\n```\nRequired session state: cookies=[session, auth_tier=user]; obtained via POST \u002Flogin (creds: user@example.com \u002F hunter2)\n```\n\nIf recon hands off without this line, exploit is required to re-run cookie enumeration before concluding any sink is unreachable.\n","# Cookie-Conditional Sink Discovery\n\nA \"sink\" (eval, deserialize, exec, template render) may behave differently — or not fire at all — depending on which session cookies are present. Recon MUST enumerate every cookie the app sets and re-test each candidate sink with and without each cookie before declaring the sink unreachable. Skipping this step is the most common cause of exploit handing back a false \"blind sink\" verdict.\n\n## Procedure\n\n1. Walk the app unauthenticated; record every `Set-Cookie` (name, attributes, source endpoint).\n2. Authenticate (every auth tier: anon, low-priv user, high-priv user) and record the full cookie jar after each.\n3. For each candidate sink (parameter, route, header, body field):\n   - Probe with NO cookies.\n   - Probe with FULL authenticated jar.\n   - Bisect: drop one cookie at a time and re-probe. The cookie whose removal silences the sink is the gating cookie.\n4. Document a \"Sink preconditions\" table in `recon_notes.md` and `SUMMARY.md`:\n\n| Sink | Endpoint | Method | Required cookies | Behavior w\u002Fo cookie | Behavior w\u002F cookie | Notes |\n|------|----------|--------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------|\n| `bookmark_data` (deser) | `\u002Fbookmarks\u002Fimport` | POST | `session=...; auth_tier=user` | 302 → \u002Flogin | 200 + processed | gated by auth_tier |\n\n4a. **Session mutation audit.** For every endpoint that READS session, trace which other endpoints WRITE to the SAME session key BEFORE the security verdict (login, password check, role lookup). This is the data race-condition exploit needs. Output a \"Session-write timeline\" table:\n\n| Endpoint | Reads session keys | Writes session keys (pre-verdict) | Slow ops (bcrypt\u002FDB\u002Fnetwork) | Race window (ms) |\n|----------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|\n| `POST \u002Flogin` | — | `user`, `auth_tier` (set BEFORE bcrypt) | bcrypt ~200ms | ~200 |\n| `GET \u002Fadmin_panel` | `user`, `auth_tier` | — | — | reads during the login bcrypt window |\n\nIf the challenge tag includes `race_condition`, `toctou`, `concurrent`, or `smuggling_desync` and recon hands off WITHOUT this table, exploit MUST flag the handoff back as \"recon incomplete: session-write timeline missing\".\n\n5. In the handoff to exploit\u002Fpostexploit, ALWAYS include a **Required session state** line:\n\n```\nRequired session state: cookies=[session, auth_tier=user]; obtained via POST \u002Flogin (creds: user@example.com \u002F hunter2)\n```\n\nIf recon hands off without this line, exploit is required to re-run cookie enumeration before concluding any sink is unreachable.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"cookie-audit, session-mutation, gating","reconnaissance","cookie audit, session cookies, sink preconditions, gating cookies, session mutation, session-write timeline, race-condition recon, TOCTOU recon","T1539","Bash Read Write","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fweb-recon\u002Fcookie-audit","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill web-cookie-audit",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill web-cookie-audit",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill web-cookie-audit","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fweb-recon\u002Fcookie-audit\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]