[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M770N3G7EED20DRRA4X2329B":3,"skill-same:01M770N3G7EED20DRRA4X2329B":49},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M770N3G7EED20DRRA4X2329B","post-exploit-reporting",null,"Post-exploitation finding documentation — credential access, privilege escalation, lateral movement reports, detection gap analysis, attack path documentation, CVSS v4.0 scoring.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: post-exploit-reporting\ndescription: \"Post-exploitation finding documentation — credential access, privilege escalation, lateral movement reports, detection gap analysis, attack path documentation, CVSS v4.0 scoring.\"\nallowed-tools: Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: reporting\n  kind: reporting\n  when_to_use: \"write finding, document escalation, lateral movement report, credential found, detection gap, attack path, post-exploit report\"\n  tags: report, post-exploit, findings, privesc, lateral, creds, detection-gap, attack-path\n  mitre_attack:\n---\n\n# Post-Exploitation Reporting Knowledge Base\n\nPost-exploitation findings require richer documentation than reconnaissance findings because they demonstrate real-world impact, test Blue Team detection capabilities, and map the full kill chain traversal. This skill provides phase-specific templates and detection gap analysis guidance aligned with PTES, CREST, and TIBER-EU standards.\n\nAll agent-authored documents MUST be Markdown format (`.md`). Operational data files (`creds\u002F*.json`, `network_map.json`) are exceptions.\n\n## 1. Phase-Specific Finding Templates\n\nEach post-exploitation phase has a specialized template. All templates share the same YAML frontmatter schema but differ in body sections to capture phase-relevant details.\n\n### A. Credential Access Finding (TA0006)\n\n````markdown\n---\nid: FIND-007\nseverity: high\ncvss_score: 8.4\ncvss_vector: \"CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N\"\ncwe: CWE-522\nmitre: [T1003.001]\naffected_target: \"WEB01 (10.0.0.5)\"\naffected_component: \"LSASS process memory\"\nconfidence: verified\nobjective_id: OBJ-004\nphase: post-exploit\nagent: postexploit\ndetected: false\nremediation_priority: immediate\ndiscovered_at: \"2026-04-06T16:45:00Z\"\n---\n\n# [HIGH] LSASS Memory Dump on WEB01 exposes Domain Credentials\n\n## Description\n\nLSASS process memory was dumped on WEB01 (10.0.0.5) using nanodump, yielding NTLM hashes for 3 domain accounts including a service account with Domain Admin group membership.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. From SYSTEM shell on WEB01:\n   ```\n   nanodump --write C:\\Windows\\Temp\\debug.dmp --valid\n   ```\n2. Transfer dump to attack host:\n   ```\n   impacket-smbclient \u002F\u002F10.0.0.5\u002FC$ -k -no-pass\n   get Windows\u002FTemp\u002Fdebug.dmp\n   ```\n3. Extract credentials with pypykatz:\n   ```\n   pypykatz lsa minidump debug.dmp\n   ```\n\n## Credentials Obtained\n\n| Username | Type | Hash\u002FValue | Source Host | Domain | Privilege |\n|----------|------|-----------|-------------|--------|-----------|\n| svc_sql | NTLM | aad3b435...7cb | WEB01 | corp.local | Domain Admin |\n| jdoe | NTLM | e19ccf75...2a1 | WEB01 | corp.local | Domain User |\n| web_app | NTLM | 31d6cfe0...e0d | WEB01 | corp.local | Domain User |\n\n## Impact\n\nThe `svc_sql` account is a member of the Domain Admins group. With this NTLM hash, an attacker can perform Pass-the-Hash to gain full control over the Active Directory domain, including all domain-joined systems and data.\n\n## Evidence\n\n| Type | Path | Description |\n|------|------|-------------|\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-007_nanodump.txt | nanodump execution output |\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-007_pypykatz.txt | pypykatz credential extraction |\n\n## Detection Gap Analysis\n\n| Control | Fired? | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| EDR (CrowdStrike) | No | nanodump evaded userland hooks via direct syscalls |\n| SIEM | No | No alert for LSASS access or suspicious process creation |\n| Windows Event Log | Partial | Event 4663 logged but not forwarded to SIEM |\n| Network monitoring | No | SMB transfer blended with normal traffic |\n\nBlue team detection status: **Not detected**. LSASS access via direct syscalls bypassed EDR userland hooks entirely.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Enable Credential Guard to protect LSASS from memory dumps.\n2. Configure EDR to monitor kernel-level LSASS access (PPL enforcement).\n3. Forward Windows Security Event 4663 (object access) to SIEM with alerting.\n4. Review service accounts: `svc_sql` should NOT be Domain Admin — apply least privilege.\n\n## References\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK T1003.001: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1003\u002F001\u002F\n- Microsoft Credential Guard: https:\u002F\u002Flearn.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fwindows\u002Fsecurity\u002Fidentity-protection\u002Fcredential-guard\u002F\n- CWE-522: https:\u002F\u002Fcwe.mitre.org\u002Fdata\u002Fdefinitions\u002F522.html\n````\n\n### B. Privilege Escalation Finding (TA0004)\n\n````markdown\n---\nid: FIND-005\nseverity: high\ncvss_score: 8.5\ncvss_vector: \"CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N\"\ncwe: CWE-269\nmitre: [T1068]\naffected_target: \"WEB01 (10.0.0.5)\"\naffected_component: \"Windows Token Privileges\"\nconfidence: verified\nobjective_id: OBJ-003\nphase: post-exploit\nagent: postexploit\ndetected: false\nremediation_priority: short-term\ndiscovered_at: \"2026-04-06T16:20:00Z\"\n---\n\n# [HIGH] GodPotato on WEB01 — svc_web (IIS AppPool) to SYSTEM\n\n## Description\n\nThe IIS application pool identity `svc_web` holds SeImpersonatePrivilege, allowing token impersonation via GodPotato to escalate from service account to NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Confirm SeImpersonatePrivilege:\n   ```\n   whoami \u002Fpriv\n   ```\n2. Execute GodPotato:\n   ```\n   GodPotato.exe -cmd \"cmd \u002Fc whoami > C:\\Windows\\Temp\\whoami.txt\"\n   ```\n3. Verify SYSTEM access:\n   ```\n   type C:\\Windows\\Temp\\whoami.txt\n   # Output: nt authority\\system\n   ```\n\n## Privilege Chain\n\n| Step | From | To | Method | Tool |\n|------|------|----|--------|------|\n| 1 | svc_web (IIS AppPool) | NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM | Token Impersonation (SeImpersonatePrivilege) | GodPotato |\n\n## Impact\n\nSYSTEM-level access on WEB01 grants full control over the host, including credential extraction from LSASS, access to all local files, and ability to pivot to other network segments.\n\n## Evidence\n\n| Type | Path | Description |\n|------|------|-------------|\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-005_godpotato.txt | GodPotato execution and whoami output |\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-005_privs.txt | whoami \u002Fpriv output showing SeImpersonatePrivilege |\n\n## Detection Gap Analysis\n\n| Control | Fired? | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| EDR | No | GodPotato not in signature database |\n| SIEM | No | No correlation rule for token impersonation |\n| Windows Event Log | Yes | Event 4672 (special privileges) logged but not alerted |\n\nBlue team detection status: **Not detected**. Event 4672 was logged but no alert was configured.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Remove SeImpersonatePrivilege from IIS application pool accounts where not required.\n2. Configure EDR to alert on potato-family privilege escalation patterns.\n3. Create SIEM rule for Event 4672 from non-SYSTEM service accounts.\n````\n\n### C. Lateral Movement Finding (TA0008)\n\n````markdown\n---\nid: FIND-008\nseverity: critical\ncvss_score: 9.3\ncvss_vector: \"CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:H\u002FSA:H\"\ncwe: CWE-287\nmitre: [T1550.002]\naffected_target: \"DC01 (10.0.0.1)\"\naffected_component: \"Kerberos \u002F SMB\"\nconfidence: verified\nobjective_id: OBJ-005\nphase: post-exploit\nagent: postexploit\ndetected: false\nremediation_priority: immediate\ndiscovered_at: \"2026-04-06T17:10:00Z\"\n---\n\n# [CRITICAL] Lateral Movement via Pass-the-Hash — WEB01 to DC01 (Domain Admin)\n\n## Description\n\nUsing the svc_sql NTLM hash obtained from FIND-007, Pass-the-Hash via Impacket's psexec achieved SYSTEM-level access on DC01 (Domain Controller).\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. From attack host, use svc_sql NTLM hash:\n   ```\n   impacket-psexec -hashes :aad3b435...7cb svc_sql@10.0.0.1\n   ```\n2. Verify domain controller access:\n   ```\n   whoami\n   # Output: nt authority\\system\n   hostname\n   # Output: DC01\n   ```\n\n## Movement Details\n\n| Source Host | Target Host | Method | Credentials Used | Access Level |\n|------------|-------------|--------|------------------|-------------|\n| WEB01 (10.0.0.5) | DC01 (10.0.0.1) | Pass-the-Hash (psexec) | svc_sql NTLM hash | SYSTEM |\n\n## Impact\n\nFull domain compromise. SYSTEM access on the domain controller allows: DCSync for all domain credentials, Group Policy modification, creation of persistence mechanisms (Golden Ticket), and access to all domain-joined systems and data.\n\n## Evidence\n\n| Type | Path | Description |\n|------|------|-------------|\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-008_psexec.txt | psexec session and whoami output |\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-008_domain_info.txt | Domain info confirming DC role |\n\n## Detection Gap Analysis\n\n| Control | Fired? | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| Network IDS | No | SMB\u002Fpsexec traffic not flagged |\n| EDR on DC01 | Partial | Service creation logged but not correlated with lateral movement |\n| SIEM | No | No rule for PtH detection via service creation patterns |\n| AD monitoring | No | No alert for svc_sql authenticating to DC01 |\n\nBlue team detection status: **Not detected**. PsExec service creation was logged but not correlated as lateral movement.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Remove svc_sql from Domain Admins group immediately — apply least privilege.\n2. Deploy Windows Defender Credential Guard on all domain controllers.\n3. Enable Advanced Audit Policy for logon events (4624 type 3) with source IP correlation.\n4. Implement network segmentation: restrict SMB access to DC from non-admin subnets.\n5. Deploy Microsoft ATA\u002FDefender for Identity for PtH detection.\n\n## References\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK T1550.002: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1550\u002F002\u002F\n- Microsoft PtH Mitigation: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fdownload\u002Fdetails.aspx?id=36036\n````\n\n### D. Data Collection \u002F Exfiltration Finding (TA0009\u002FTA0010)\n\n````markdown\n---\nid: FIND-010\nseverity: high\ncvss_score: 8.7\ncvss_vector: \"CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N\"\ncwe: CWE-200\nmitre: [T1005, T1560.001]\naffected_target: \"FILESVR01 (10.0.0.20)\"\naffected_component: \"HR file share (\\\\FILESVR01\\HR$)\"\nconfidence: verified\nobjective_id: OBJ-006\nphase: exfiltration\nagent: postexploit\ndetected: true\nremediation_priority: immediate\ndiscovered_at: \"2026-04-06T17:45:00Z\"\n---\n\n# [HIGH] Sensitive HR Data accessed on FILESVR01 File Share\n\n## Description\n\nUsing domain admin credentials, the HR$ administrative share on FILESVR01 was accessed. The share contains personally identifiable information (PII) including employee SSNs, salary data, and performance reviews for approximately 2,000 employees.\n\n## Data Classification\n\n| Data Type | Volume | Classification | Regulatory |\n|-----------|--------|---------------|------------|\n| Employee SSNs | ~2,000 records | PII \u002F Restricted | GDPR, CCPA |\n| Salary records | ~2,000 records | Confidential | Internal policy |\n| Performance reviews | ~500 documents | Confidential | Internal policy |\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Mount HR share with domain admin credentials:\n   ```\n   net use \\\\FILESVR01\\HR$ \u002Fuser:corp\\svc_sql\n   ```\n2. List contents:\n   ```\n   dir \\\\FILESVR01\\HR$\\\n   ```\n3. Verify PII presence (do NOT exfiltrate real data):\n   ```\n   type \\\\FILESVR01\\HR$\\employees\\sample.csv | head -5\n   ```\n\n## Impact\n\nFull access to HR data containing PII for ~2,000 employees. In a real attack, this data could be exfiltrated for identity theft, extortion, or sold on dark web markets. Regulatory exposure under GDPR\u002FCCPA.\n\n## Evidence\n\n| Type | Path | Description |\n|------|------|-------------|\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-010_share_listing.txt | Directory listing (filenames only, no PII) |\n\n**Note**: No actual PII was exfiltrated per RoE constraints. Evidence contains directory listings and file metadata only.\n\n## Detection Gap Analysis\n\n| Control | Fired? | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| DLP | No | No DLP agent on file server |\n| SIEM | Yes | Alert triggered for admin share access from non-admin workstation |\n| File audit | Yes | Windows file access audit logged the access |\n\nBlue team detection status: **Detected** (partial). SIEM alerted on admin share access but response was not within SLA.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Restrict HR$ share access to named HR admin accounts only (remove Domain Admins).\n2. Deploy DLP agent on file servers containing PII.\n3. Implement SIEM playbook for admin share access with 15-minute response SLA.\n4. Encrypt PII data at rest.\n````\n\n## 2. Detection Gap Analysis\n\nDetection gap analysis is the KEY differentiator of red team reporting versus standard penetration testing. For every finding, document whether Blue Team controls detected the activity.\n\n### Per-Finding Detection Table\n\nEvery finding MUST include a Detection Gap Analysis section:\n\n```markdown\n## Detection Gap Analysis\n\n| Control | Fired? | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| EDR | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Specific observation |\n| SIEM | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Alert name or absence |\n| IDS\u002FIPS | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Signature match or miss |\n| Network monitoring | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Traffic analysis observation |\n| AD monitoring | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Identity-based detection |\n| DLP | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Data loss prevention observation |\n| Windows Event Log | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Event IDs logged\u002Fmissed |\n\nBlue team detection status: **Detected** \u002F **Partially detected** \u002F **Not detected**.\nTime to detect: N\u002FA or X minutes\u002Fhours.\n```\n\n### Detection Gap Summary (Cross-Finding)\n\nAfter all findings are recorded, include a detection gap summary in the final report or a dedicated `findings\u002FFIND-{NNN}.md` when it represents a verified finding. Do not create a legacy `findings.md` summary file:\n\n```markdown\n## Detection Gap Summary\n\n| Finding | Phase | ATT&CK | Detected | Primary Control | Gap |\n|---------|-------|--------|----------|----------------|-----|\n| FIND-005 | post-exploit | T1068 | No | EDR | Potato not in signatures |\n| FIND-007 | post-exploit | T1003.001 | No | EDR | Direct syscalls bypass hooks |\n| FIND-008 | post-exploit | T1550.002 | No | SIEM | No PtH correlation rule |\n| FIND-010 | exfiltration | T1005 | Partial | SIEM | Alert fired, slow response |\n\n**Overall Detection Rate**: 1\u002F4 (25%) — partial detection only\n**Blind Spots**: Credential access and lateral movement entirely undetected\n**Recommendation**: Deploy Credential Guard, implement PtH detection rules, tune EDR for kernel-level monitoring\n```\n\n## 3. Attack Path Documentation\n\nAttack paths connect individual findings into kill chain narratives. Save to `findings\u002Fattack-paths\u002FPATH-{NNN}.md`. Individual findings use `findings\u002FFIND-{NNN}.md` filenames.\n\n### Attack Path Template\n\n````markdown\n---\nid: PATH-001\nname: \"External Web App to Domain Admin via Token Impersonation and Credential Theft\"\ncombined_severity: critical\nfinding_ids: [FIND-003, FIND-005, FIND-007, FIND-008]\n---\n\n# PATH-001: External Web App to Domain Admin\n\n## Narrative\n\nStarting from an SQL injection vulnerability in the public-facing web application (FIND-003), the attacker gained code execution as the IIS application pool identity. Using GodPotato (FIND-005), privileges were escalated to SYSTEM on the web server. LSASS memory was dumped (FIND-007) revealing the svc_sql Domain Admin NTLM hash. Pass-the-Hash with this hash (FIND-008) yielded SYSTEM access on the domain controller, achieving full domain compromise.\n\n## Attack Path\n\n| Step | Phase | Technique | MITRE | Source | Target | Tool | Detected | Finding |\n|------|-------|-----------|-------|--------|--------|------|----------|---------|\n| 1 | initial-access | SQL Injection | T1190 | Internet | WEB01:443 | sqlmap | No | FIND-003 |\n| 2 | post-exploit | Token Impersonation | T1068 | svc_web | SYSTEM@WEB01 | GodPotato | No | FIND-005 |\n| 3 | post-exploit | LSASS Dump | T1003.001 | SYSTEM@WEB01 | LSASS | nanodump | No | FIND-007 |\n| 4 | post-exploit | Pass-the-Hash | T1550.002 | WEB01 | DC01 | psexec | No | FIND-008 |\n\n## Chain Severity Assessment\n\nIndividual findings range from HIGH to CRITICAL, but the chain achieves full domain compromise from an external position with zero detection — **combined severity: CRITICAL**.\n\n## Detection Summary\n\n0 of 4 steps detected by Blue Team. The entire kill chain from initial access to domain compromise executed without triggering any actionable alert.\n\n## Visual Path\n\n```\nInternet ──[SQLi]──> WEB01:443 (svc_web)\n                         │\n                    [GodPotato]\n                         │\n                    WEB01 (SYSTEM)\n                         │\n                    [LSASS dump → svc_sql hash]\n                         │\n                    [Pass-the-Hash]\n                         │\n                    DC01 (SYSTEM) ── DOMAIN COMPROMISED\n```\n````\n\n### Chain Severity Escalation Rules\n\nWhen individual findings chain together, combined severity often exceeds individual scores:\n\n| Chain Pattern | Individual Severities | Combined | Reason |\n|--------------|----------------------|----------|--------|\n| Info Disclosure + Credential Access | Medium + High | CRITICAL | Credentials enable full access |\n| PrivEsc + Lateral Movement | High + High | CRITICAL | Domain-wide impact |\n| Web Vuln + PrivEsc + Cred Dump + Lateral | High + High + High + High | CRITICAL | Full kill chain, external to DA |\n| Weak Config + Info Disclosure | Low + Medium | MEDIUM | Limited blast radius |\n\n## 4. Common Post-Exploit CVSS v4.0 Scores\n\n| Finding Type | CVSS 4.0 | Vector |\n|-------------|----------|--------|\n| LSASS dump \u002F credential theft | 8.4 | AV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n| PrivEsc to SYSTEM (token impersonation) | 8.5 | AV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n| PrivEsc to SYSTEM (kernel exploit) | 8.5 | AV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n| Lateral movement to DC (PtH) | 9.3 | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:H\u002FSA:H |\n| Kerberoastable SPN (crackable) | 7.7 | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n| AS-REP roasting | 7.7 | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n| DCSync | 9.3 | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:H\u002FSA:H |\n| Unrestricted file share access (PII) | 8.7 | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n| Weak AD config (no LAPS) | 6.9 | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n\n## 5. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping — Post-Exploitation\n\n### Credential Access (TA0006)\n| ID | Technique | Common Tools |\n|----|-----------|-------------|\n| T1003.001 | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory | nanodump, Mimikatz, pypykatz |\n| T1003.002 | OS Credential Dumping: SAM | secretsdump, reg save |\n| T1003.003 | OS Credential Dumping: NTDS | secretsdump (DCSync) |\n| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync | Mimikatz, Impacket |\n| T1558.003 | Kerberoasting | Rubeus, Impacket |\n| T1558.004 | AS-REP Roasting | Rubeus, Impacket |\n| T1552.001 | Credentials in Files | manual search, Snaffler |\n| T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | Mimikatz (DPAPI) |\n\n### Privilege Escalation (TA0004)\n| ID | Technique | Common Tools |\n|----|-----------|-------------|\n| T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | GodPotato, PrintSpoofer, JuicyPotato |\n| T1134.001 | Token Impersonation | Incognito, SweetPotato |\n| T1548.002 | UAC Bypass | UACME, fodhelper |\n| T1078.002 | Valid Accounts: Domain | Cached credentials |\n\n### Lateral Movement (TA0008)\n| ID | Technique | Common Tools |\n|----|-----------|-------------|\n| T1550.002 | Pass-the-Hash | psexec, wmiexec, smbexec |\n| T1550.003 | Pass-the-Ticket | Rubeus, Mimikatz |\n| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | xfreerdp, rdesktop |\n| T1021.002 | SMB\u002FWindows Admin Shares | CrackMapExec, NetExec |\n| T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management | Evil-WinRM |\n| T1047 | WMI | wmiexec, CrackMapExec |\n\n## 6. Evidence Collection Checklist\n\nBefore completing a post-exploitation objective, verify:\n\n- [ ] All credentials saved to `post-exploit\u002Fcreds\u002F` AND corresponding `findings\u002FFIND-{NNN}.md` finding created\n- [ ] Each privilege escalation step documented with before\u002Fafter whoami output\n- [ ] Each lateral movement hop has terminal log evidence\n- [ ] Detection Gap Analysis completed for every finding\n- [ ] Evidence files saved to `findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-{NNN}_{description}.txt`\n- [ ] Each finding saved as its own `findings\u002FFIND-{NNN}.md` document\n- [ ] Timeline entries appended to `timeline.jsonl`\n- [ ] Attack path documented in `findings\u002Fattack-paths\u002FPATH-{NNN}.md` if multi-step chain\n- [ ] OPPLAN objective status updated via `update_objective`\n\n## 7. File Organization\n\n```\nfindings\u002F\n├── FIND-005.md              # Finding documents — stable FIND-NNN key (id in frontmatter)\n├── FIND-007.md\n├── FIND-008.md\n├── FIND-010.md\n├── attack-paths\u002F\n│   └── PATH-001.md          # Full kill chain narrative\n└── evidence\u002F\n    ├── FIND-005_godpotato.txt      # Evidence keyed by finding ID\n    ├── FIND-005_privs.txt\n    ├── FIND-007_nanodump.txt\n    ├── FIND-007_pypykatz.txt\n    ├── FIND-008_psexec.txt\n    ├── FIND-008_domain_info.txt\n    └── FIND-010_share_listing.txt\n\npost-exploit\u002F\n├── creds\u002F\n│   ├── ntlm_hashes.txt      # Operational credential store\n│   └── kerberos_tickets\u002F\n├── privesc\u002F\n│   └── escalation_log.json   # Operational log\n├── lateral\u002F\n│   └── movement_log.json     # Operational log\n└── network_map.json          # Operational data\n```\n\nThe `findings\u002F` directory contains deliverable documents (Markdown). The `post-exploit\u002F` directory contains operational data files (JSON\u002Ftext) used during the engagement.\n","# Post-Exploitation Reporting Knowledge Base\n\nPost-exploitation findings require richer documentation than reconnaissance findings because they demonstrate real-world impact, test Blue Team detection capabilities, and map the full kill chain traversal. This skill provides phase-specific templates and detection gap analysis guidance aligned with PTES, CREST, and TIBER-EU standards.\n\nAll agent-authored documents MUST be Markdown format (`.md`). Operational data files (`creds\u002F*.json`, `network_map.json`) are exceptions.\n\n## 1. Phase-Specific Finding Templates\n\nEach post-exploitation phase has a specialized template. All templates share the same YAML frontmatter schema but differ in body sections to capture phase-relevant details.\n\n### A. Credential Access Finding (TA0006)\n\n````markdown\n---\nid: FIND-007\nseverity: high\ncvss_score: 8.4\ncvss_vector: \"CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N\"\ncwe: CWE-522\nmitre: [T1003.001]\naffected_target: \"WEB01 (10.0.0.5)\"\naffected_component: \"LSASS process memory\"\nconfidence: verified\nobjective_id: OBJ-004\nphase: post-exploit\nagent: postexploit\ndetected: false\nremediation_priority: immediate\ndiscovered_at: \"2026-04-06T16:45:00Z\"\n---\n\n# [HIGH] LSASS Memory Dump on WEB01 exposes Domain Credentials\n\n## Description\n\nLSASS process memory was dumped on WEB01 (10.0.0.5) using nanodump, yielding NTLM hashes for 3 domain accounts including a service account with Domain Admin group membership.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. From SYSTEM shell on WEB01:\n   ```\n   nanodump --write C:\\Windows\\Temp\\debug.dmp --valid\n   ```\n2. Transfer dump to attack host:\n   ```\n   impacket-smbclient \u002F\u002F10.0.0.5\u002FC$ -k -no-pass\n   get Windows\u002FTemp\u002Fdebug.dmp\n   ```\n3. Extract credentials with pypykatz:\n   ```\n   pypykatz lsa minidump debug.dmp\n   ```\n\n## Credentials Obtained\n\n| Username | Type | Hash\u002FValue | Source Host | Domain | Privilege |\n|----------|------|-----------|-------------|--------|-----------|\n| svc_sql | NTLM | aad3b435...7cb | WEB01 | corp.local | Domain Admin |\n| jdoe | NTLM | e19ccf75...2a1 | WEB01 | corp.local | Domain User |\n| web_app | NTLM | 31d6cfe0...e0d | WEB01 | corp.local | Domain User |\n\n## Impact\n\nThe `svc_sql` account is a member of the Domain Admins group. With this NTLM hash, an attacker can perform Pass-the-Hash to gain full control over the Active Directory domain, including all domain-joined systems and data.\n\n## Evidence\n\n| Type | Path | Description |\n|------|------|-------------|\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-007_nanodump.txt | nanodump execution output |\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-007_pypykatz.txt | pypykatz credential extraction |\n\n## Detection Gap Analysis\n\n| Control | Fired? | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| EDR (CrowdStrike) | No | nanodump evaded userland hooks via direct syscalls |\n| SIEM | No | No alert for LSASS access or suspicious process creation |\n| Windows Event Log | Partial | Event 4663 logged but not forwarded to SIEM |\n| Network monitoring | No | SMB transfer blended with normal traffic |\n\nBlue team detection status: **Not detected**. LSASS access via direct syscalls bypassed EDR userland hooks entirely.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Enable Credential Guard to protect LSASS from memory dumps.\n2. Configure EDR to monitor kernel-level LSASS access (PPL enforcement).\n3. Forward Windows Security Event 4663 (object access) to SIEM with alerting.\n4. Review service accounts: `svc_sql` should NOT be Domain Admin — apply least privilege.\n\n## References\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK T1003.001: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1003\u002F001\u002F\n- Microsoft Credential Guard: https:\u002F\u002Flearn.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fwindows\u002Fsecurity\u002Fidentity-protection\u002Fcredential-guard\u002F\n- CWE-522: https:\u002F\u002Fcwe.mitre.org\u002Fdata\u002Fdefinitions\u002F522.html\n````\n\n### B. Privilege Escalation Finding (TA0004)\n\n````markdown\n---\nid: FIND-005\nseverity: high\ncvss_score: 8.5\ncvss_vector: \"CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N\"\ncwe: CWE-269\nmitre: [T1068]\naffected_target: \"WEB01 (10.0.0.5)\"\naffected_component: \"Windows Token Privileges\"\nconfidence: verified\nobjective_id: OBJ-003\nphase: post-exploit\nagent: postexploit\ndetected: false\nremediation_priority: short-term\ndiscovered_at: \"2026-04-06T16:20:00Z\"\n---\n\n# [HIGH] GodPotato on WEB01 — svc_web (IIS AppPool) to SYSTEM\n\n## Description\n\nThe IIS application pool identity `svc_web` holds SeImpersonatePrivilege, allowing token impersonation via GodPotato to escalate from service account to NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Confirm SeImpersonatePrivilege:\n   ```\n   whoami \u002Fpriv\n   ```\n2. Execute GodPotato:\n   ```\n   GodPotato.exe -cmd \"cmd \u002Fc whoami > C:\\Windows\\Temp\\whoami.txt\"\n   ```\n3. Verify SYSTEM access:\n   ```\n   type C:\\Windows\\Temp\\whoami.txt\n   # Output: nt authority\\system\n   ```\n\n## Privilege Chain\n\n| Step | From | To | Method | Tool |\n|------|------|----|--------|------|\n| 1 | svc_web (IIS AppPool) | NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM | Token Impersonation (SeImpersonatePrivilege) | GodPotato |\n\n## Impact\n\nSYSTEM-level access on WEB01 grants full control over the host, including credential extraction from LSASS, access to all local files, and ability to pivot to other network segments.\n\n## Evidence\n\n| Type | Path | Description |\n|------|------|-------------|\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-005_godpotato.txt | GodPotato execution and whoami output |\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-005_privs.txt | whoami \u002Fpriv output showing SeImpersonatePrivilege |\n\n## Detection Gap Analysis\n\n| Control | Fired? | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| EDR | No | GodPotato not in signature database |\n| SIEM | No | No correlation rule for token impersonation |\n| Windows Event Log | Yes | Event 4672 (special privileges) logged but not alerted |\n\nBlue team detection status: **Not detected**. Event 4672 was logged but no alert was configured.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Remove SeImpersonatePrivilege from IIS application pool accounts where not required.\n2. Configure EDR to alert on potato-family privilege escalation patterns.\n3. Create SIEM rule for Event 4672 from non-SYSTEM service accounts.\n````\n\n### C. Lateral Movement Finding (TA0008)\n\n````markdown\n---\nid: FIND-008\nseverity: critical\ncvss_score: 9.3\ncvss_vector: \"CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:H\u002FSA:H\"\ncwe: CWE-287\nmitre: [T1550.002]\naffected_target: \"DC01 (10.0.0.1)\"\naffected_component: \"Kerberos \u002F SMB\"\nconfidence: verified\nobjective_id: OBJ-005\nphase: post-exploit\nagent: postexploit\ndetected: false\nremediation_priority: immediate\ndiscovered_at: \"2026-04-06T17:10:00Z\"\n---\n\n# [CRITICAL] Lateral Movement via Pass-the-Hash — WEB01 to DC01 (Domain Admin)\n\n## Description\n\nUsing the svc_sql NTLM hash obtained from FIND-007, Pass-the-Hash via Impacket's psexec achieved SYSTEM-level access on DC01 (Domain Controller).\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. From attack host, use svc_sql NTLM hash:\n   ```\n   impacket-psexec -hashes :aad3b435...7cb svc_sql@10.0.0.1\n   ```\n2. Verify domain controller access:\n   ```\n   whoami\n   # Output: nt authority\\system\n   hostname\n   # Output: DC01\n   ```\n\n## Movement Details\n\n| Source Host | Target Host | Method | Credentials Used | Access Level |\n|------------|-------------|--------|------------------|-------------|\n| WEB01 (10.0.0.5) | DC01 (10.0.0.1) | Pass-the-Hash (psexec) | svc_sql NTLM hash | SYSTEM |\n\n## Impact\n\nFull domain compromise. SYSTEM access on the domain controller allows: DCSync for all domain credentials, Group Policy modification, creation of persistence mechanisms (Golden Ticket), and access to all domain-joined systems and data.\n\n## Evidence\n\n| Type | Path | Description |\n|------|------|-------------|\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-008_psexec.txt | psexec session and whoami output |\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-008_domain_info.txt | Domain info confirming DC role |\n\n## Detection Gap Analysis\n\n| Control | Fired? | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| Network IDS | No | SMB\u002Fpsexec traffic not flagged |\n| EDR on DC01 | Partial | Service creation logged but not correlated with lateral movement |\n| SIEM | No | No rule for PtH detection via service creation patterns |\n| AD monitoring | No | No alert for svc_sql authenticating to DC01 |\n\nBlue team detection status: **Not detected**. PsExec service creation was logged but not correlated as lateral movement.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Remove svc_sql from Domain Admins group immediately — apply least privilege.\n2. Deploy Windows Defender Credential Guard on all domain controllers.\n3. Enable Advanced Audit Policy for logon events (4624 type 3) with source IP correlation.\n4. Implement network segmentation: restrict SMB access to DC from non-admin subnets.\n5. Deploy Microsoft ATA\u002FDefender for Identity for PtH detection.\n\n## References\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK T1550.002: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1550\u002F002\u002F\n- Microsoft PtH Mitigation: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fdownload\u002Fdetails.aspx?id=36036\n````\n\n### D. Data Collection \u002F Exfiltration Finding (TA0009\u002FTA0010)\n\n````markdown\n---\nid: FIND-010\nseverity: high\ncvss_score: 8.7\ncvss_vector: \"CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N\"\ncwe: CWE-200\nmitre: [T1005, T1560.001]\naffected_target: \"FILESVR01 (10.0.0.20)\"\naffected_component: \"HR file share (\\\\FILESVR01\\HR$)\"\nconfidence: verified\nobjective_id: OBJ-006\nphase: exfiltration\nagent: postexploit\ndetected: true\nremediation_priority: immediate\ndiscovered_at: \"2026-04-06T17:45:00Z\"\n---\n\n# [HIGH] Sensitive HR Data accessed on FILESVR01 File Share\n\n## Description\n\nUsing domain admin credentials, the HR$ administrative share on FILESVR01 was accessed. The share contains personally identifiable information (PII) including employee SSNs, salary data, and performance reviews for approximately 2,000 employees.\n\n## Data Classification\n\n| Data Type | Volume | Classification | Regulatory |\n|-----------|--------|---------------|------------|\n| Employee SSNs | ~2,000 records | PII \u002F Restricted | GDPR, CCPA |\n| Salary records | ~2,000 records | Confidential | Internal policy |\n| Performance reviews | ~500 documents | Confidential | Internal policy |\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Mount HR share with domain admin credentials:\n   ```\n   net use \\\\FILESVR01\\HR$ \u002Fuser:corp\\svc_sql\n   ```\n2. List contents:\n   ```\n   dir \\\\FILESVR01\\HR$\\\n   ```\n3. Verify PII presence (do NOT exfiltrate real data):\n   ```\n   type \\\\FILESVR01\\HR$\\employees\\sample.csv | head -5\n   ```\n\n## Impact\n\nFull access to HR data containing PII for ~2,000 employees. In a real attack, this data could be exfiltrated for identity theft, extortion, or sold on dark web markets. Regulatory exposure under GDPR\u002FCCPA.\n\n## Evidence\n\n| Type | Path | Description |\n|------|------|-------------|\n| terminal-log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-010_share_listing.txt | Directory listing (filenames only, no PII) |\n\n**Note**: No actual PII was exfiltrated per RoE constraints. Evidence contains directory listings and file metadata only.\n\n## Detection Gap Analysis\n\n| Control | Fired? | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| DLP | No | No DLP agent on file server |\n| SIEM | Yes | Alert triggered for admin share access from non-admin workstation |\n| File audit | Yes | Windows file access audit logged the access |\n\nBlue team detection status: **Detected** (partial). SIEM alerted on admin share access but response was not within SLA.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Restrict HR$ share access to named HR admin accounts only (remove Domain Admins).\n2. Deploy DLP agent on file servers containing PII.\n3. Implement SIEM playbook for admin share access with 15-minute response SLA.\n4. Encrypt PII data at rest.\n````\n\n## 2. Detection Gap Analysis\n\nDetection gap analysis is the KEY differentiator of red team reporting versus standard penetration testing. For every finding, document whether Blue Team controls detected the activity.\n\n### Per-Finding Detection Table\n\nEvery finding MUST include a Detection Gap Analysis section:\n\n```markdown\n## Detection Gap Analysis\n\n| Control | Fired? | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| EDR | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Specific observation |\n| SIEM | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Alert name or absence |\n| IDS\u002FIPS | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Signature match or miss |\n| Network monitoring | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Traffic analysis observation |\n| AD monitoring | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Identity-based detection |\n| DLP | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Data loss prevention observation |\n| Windows Event Log | Yes\u002FNo\u002FPartial\u002FN\u002FA | Event IDs logged\u002Fmissed |\n\nBlue team detection status: **Detected** \u002F **Partially detected** \u002F **Not detected**.\nTime to detect: N\u002FA or X minutes\u002Fhours.\n```\n\n### Detection Gap Summary (Cross-Finding)\n\nAfter all findings are recorded, include a detection gap summary in the final report or a dedicated `findings\u002FFIND-{NNN}.md` when it represents a verified finding. Do not create a legacy `findings.md` summary file:\n\n```markdown\n## Detection Gap Summary\n\n| Finding | Phase | ATT&CK | Detected | Primary Control | Gap |\n|---------|-------|--------|----------|----------------|-----|\n| FIND-005 | post-exploit | T1068 | No | EDR | Potato not in signatures |\n| FIND-007 | post-exploit | T1003.001 | No | EDR | Direct syscalls bypass hooks |\n| FIND-008 | post-exploit | T1550.002 | No | SIEM | No PtH correlation rule |\n| FIND-010 | exfiltration | T1005 | Partial | SIEM | Alert fired, slow response |\n\n**Overall Detection Rate**: 1\u002F4 (25%) — partial detection only\n**Blind Spots**: Credential access and lateral movement entirely undetected\n**Recommendation**: Deploy Credential Guard, implement PtH detection rules, tune EDR for kernel-level monitoring\n```\n\n## 3. Attack Path Documentation\n\nAttack paths connect individual findings into kill chain narratives. Save to `findings\u002Fattack-paths\u002FPATH-{NNN}.md`. Individual findings use `findings\u002FFIND-{NNN}.md` filenames.\n\n### Attack Path Template\n\n````markdown\n---\nid: PATH-001\nname: \"External Web App to Domain Admin via Token Impersonation and Credential Theft\"\ncombined_severity: critical\nfinding_ids: [FIND-003, FIND-005, FIND-007, FIND-008]\n---\n\n# PATH-001: External Web App to Domain Admin\n\n## Narrative\n\nStarting from an SQL injection vulnerability in the public-facing web application (FIND-003), the attacker gained code execution as the IIS application pool identity. Using GodPotato (FIND-005), privileges were escalated to SYSTEM on the web server. LSASS memory was dumped (FIND-007) revealing the svc_sql Domain Admin NTLM hash. Pass-the-Hash with this hash (FIND-008) yielded SYSTEM access on the domain controller, achieving full domain compromise.\n\n## Attack Path\n\n| Step | Phase | Technique | MITRE | Source | Target | Tool | Detected | Finding |\n|------|-------|-----------|-------|--------|--------|------|----------|---------|\n| 1 | initial-access | SQL Injection | T1190 | Internet | WEB01:443 | sqlmap | No | FIND-003 |\n| 2 | post-exploit | Token Impersonation | T1068 | svc_web | SYSTEM@WEB01 | GodPotato | No | FIND-005 |\n| 3 | post-exploit | LSASS Dump | T1003.001 | SYSTEM@WEB01 | LSASS | nanodump | No | FIND-007 |\n| 4 | post-exploit | Pass-the-Hash | T1550.002 | WEB01 | DC01 | psexec | No | FIND-008 |\n\n## Chain Severity Assessment\n\nIndividual findings range from HIGH to CRITICAL, but the chain achieves full domain compromise from an external position with zero detection — **combined severity: CRITICAL**.\n\n## Detection Summary\n\n0 of 4 steps detected by Blue Team. The entire kill chain from initial access to domain compromise executed without triggering any actionable alert.\n\n## Visual Path\n\n```\nInternet ──[SQLi]──> WEB01:443 (svc_web)\n                         │\n                    [GodPotato]\n                         │\n                    WEB01 (SYSTEM)\n                         │\n                    [LSASS dump → svc_sql hash]\n                         │\n                    [Pass-the-Hash]\n                         │\n                    DC01 (SYSTEM) ── DOMAIN COMPROMISED\n```\n````\n\n### Chain Severity Escalation Rules\n\nWhen individual findings chain together, combined severity often exceeds individual scores:\n\n| Chain Pattern | Individual Severities | Combined | Reason |\n|--------------|----------------------|----------|--------|\n| Info Disclosure + Credential Access | Medium + High | CRITICAL | Credentials enable full access |\n| PrivEsc + Lateral Movement | High + High | CRITICAL | Domain-wide impact |\n| Web Vuln + PrivEsc + Cred Dump + Lateral | High + High + High + High | CRITICAL | Full kill chain, external to DA |\n| Weak Config + Info Disclosure | Low + Medium | MEDIUM | Limited blast radius |\n\n## 4. Common Post-Exploit CVSS v4.0 Scores\n\n| Finding Type | CVSS 4.0 | Vector |\n|-------------|----------|--------|\n| LSASS dump \u002F credential theft | 8.4 | AV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n| PrivEsc to SYSTEM (token impersonation) | 8.5 | AV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n| PrivEsc to SYSTEM (kernel exploit) | 8.5 | AV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n| Lateral movement to DC (PtH) | 9.3 | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:H\u002FSA:H |\n| Kerberoastable SPN (crackable) | 7.7 | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n| AS-REP roasting | 7.7 | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n| DCSync | 9.3 | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:H\u002FSA:H |\n| Unrestricted file share access (PII) | 8.7 | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n| Weak AD config (no LAPS) | 6.9 | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N |\n\n## 5. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping — Post-Exploitation\n\n### Credential Access (TA0006)\n| ID | Technique | Common Tools |\n|----|-----------|-------------|\n| T1003.001 | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory | nanodump, Mimikatz, pypykatz |\n| T1003.002 | OS Credential Dumping: SAM | secretsdump, reg save |\n| T1003.003 | OS Credential Dumping: NTDS | secretsdump (DCSync) |\n| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync | Mimikatz, Impacket |\n| T1558.003 | Kerberoasting | Rubeus, Impacket |\n| T1558.004 | AS-REP Roasting | Rubeus, Impacket |\n| T1552.001 | Credentials in Files | manual search, Snaffler |\n| T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | Mimikatz (DPAPI) |\n\n### Privilege Escalation (TA0004)\n| ID | Technique | Common Tools |\n|----|-----------|-------------|\n| T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | GodPotato, PrintSpoofer, JuicyPotato |\n| T1134.001 | Token Impersonation | Incognito, SweetPotato |\n| T1548.002 | UAC Bypass | UACME, fodhelper |\n| T1078.002 | Valid Accounts: Domain | Cached credentials |\n\n### Lateral Movement (TA0008)\n| ID | Technique | Common Tools |\n|----|-----------|-------------|\n| T1550.002 | Pass-the-Hash | psexec, wmiexec, smbexec |\n| T1550.003 | Pass-the-Ticket | Rubeus, Mimikatz |\n| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | xfreerdp, rdesktop |\n| T1021.002 | SMB\u002FWindows Admin Shares | CrackMapExec, NetExec |\n| T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management | Evil-WinRM |\n| T1047 | WMI | wmiexec, CrackMapExec |\n\n## 6. Evidence Collection Checklist\n\nBefore completing a post-exploitation objective, verify:\n\n- [ ] All credentials saved to `post-exploit\u002Fcreds\u002F` AND corresponding `findings\u002FFIND-{NNN}.md` finding created\n- [ ] Each privilege escalation step documented with before\u002Fafter whoami output\n- [ ] Each lateral movement hop has terminal log evidence\n- [ ] Detection Gap Analysis completed for every finding\n- [ ] Evidence files saved to `findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-{NNN}_{description}.txt`\n- [ ] Each finding saved as its own `findings\u002FFIND-{NNN}.md` document\n- [ ] Timeline entries appended to `timeline.jsonl`\n- [ ] Attack path documented in `findings\u002Fattack-paths\u002FPATH-{NNN}.md` if multi-step chain\n- [ ] OPPLAN objective status updated via `update_objective`\n\n## 7. File Organization\n\n```\nfindings\u002F\n├── FIND-005.md              # Finding documents — stable FIND-NNN key (id in frontmatter)\n├── FIND-007.md\n├── FIND-008.md\n├── FIND-010.md\n├── attack-paths\u002F\n│   └── PATH-001.md          # Full kill chain narrative\n└── evidence\u002F\n    ├── FIND-005_godpotato.txt      # Evidence keyed by finding ID\n    ├── FIND-005_privs.txt\n    ├── FIND-007_nanodump.txt\n    ├── FIND-007_pypykatz.txt\n    ├── FIND-008_psexec.txt\n    ├── FIND-008_domain_info.txt\n    └── FIND-010_share_listing.txt\n\npost-exploit\u002F\n├── creds\u002F\n│   ├── ntlm_hashes.txt      # Operational credential store\n│   └── kerberos_tickets\u002F\n├── privesc\u002F\n│   └── escalation_log.json   # Operational log\n├── lateral\u002F\n│   └── movement_log.json     # Operational log\n└── network_map.json          # Operational data\n```\n\nThe `findings\u002F` directory contains deliverable documents (Markdown). The `post-exploit\u002F` directory contains operational data files (JSON\u002Ftext) used during the engagement.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":28},{"kind":25,"tags":26,"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":6},"reporting","report, post-exploit, findings, privesc, lateral, creds, detection-gap, attack-path","write finding, document escalation, lateral movement report, credential found, detection gap, attack path, post-exploit report","Read Write","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill post-exploit-reporting",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill post-exploit-reporting",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill post-exploit-reporting","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[50,57,64,71,78,85],{"skillNo":51,"name":52,"nameZh":6,"description":53,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]