[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M770K7RATP9B5ZS9R4SC6M38":3,"skill-same:01M770K7RATP9B5ZS9R4SC6M38":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M770K7RATP9B5ZS9R4SC6M38","lure-deconfliction",null,"Mandatory out-of-band handshake with the blue-team contact BEFORE any phishing campaign sends. Skipping this is a critical RoE violation - the engagement has no legal coverage for unannounced phishing of real employees.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Flure-deconfliction\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: lure-deconfliction\ndescription: Mandatory out-of-band handshake with the blue-team contact BEFORE any phishing campaign sends. Skipping this is a critical RoE violation - the engagement has no legal coverage for unannounced phishing of real employees.\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: deconfliction\n  when_to_use: send phishing campaign, launch lure, evilginx2 lure activation, oauth device-code attack\n  tags: deconfliction, blue-team, opsec, legal\n  mitre_attack: T1566\n---\n\n# Lure Deconfliction\n\n> Before the first email leaves the wire, the customer's blue-team\n> contact MUST acknowledge the campaign metadata. This is the legal\n> coverage for the engagement - without it, you're a malicious\n> phisher.\n\n## Why this is mandatory\n\nA phishing campaign that surprises the blue team produces:\n\n- Helpdesk ticket volume (real users reporting suspicious mail).\n- Detection rules firing on lookalike domains, RoE-out-of-scope.\n- Escalation to leadership \u002F external counsel.\n- Potential SOC overtime that the engagement is supposed to test\n  *with awareness*, not *as a surprise*.\n\nIt also exposes the engagement to legal risk: phishing without\nwritten authorization is a crime in most jurisdictions. The RoE +\ndeconfliction ack is the documentation that protects the operator.\n\n## Inputs you need\n\nFrom `plan\u002Froe.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"escalation_contacts\": {\n    \"blue_team_contact\": {\n      \"name\": \"...\",\n      \"channel\": \"signal:@user \u002F email: addr \u002F phone: +...\",\n      \"available\": \"Mon-Fri 09:00-18:00 KST\",\n      \"ack_method\": \"signal_message | email_reply | voice_confirm\"\n    }\n  },\n  \"engagement_id\": \"RT-2026-0142\"\n}\n```\n\n## Handshake payload\n\nConstruct ONE message containing:\n\n```\nSubject: [DECEPTICON RT-2026-0142] Phishing campaign deconfliction\n\nEngagement: RT-2026-0142\nCampaign id: \u003Cgophish-campaign-id-or-evilginx-phishlet>\nSend window: 2026-05-27 14:00 - 16:00 KST\nTarget count: \u003CN> users\nTarget population: \u003Cdescription, e.g. \"all @engineering of acme.com\">\nPretext class: \u003Cinternal_it_password_reset | external_invoice | shared_doc | ...>\nLure URL: https:\u002F\u002Flogin.acme-portal.example\u002F\nLure domain registration: 2026-05-26 (lookalike of acme.com)\nOpt-out URL (in every lure): https:\u002F\u002Fdecepticon.example\u002Foptout\u002FRT-2026-0142\n\nREQUEST: confirm you've received this message before 13:30 KST.\nIf we have not received an ack by 13:45 KST, the campaign WILL NOT send\nand the objective will be marked BLOCKED.\n```\n\n## Send it via the configured channel\n\nThe `ack_method` in roe.json drives:\n\n- `signal_message`: `bash -c 'signal-cli -u \u003Coperator> send -m \"...\" \u003Ccontact>'`\n- `email_reply`: standard SMTP via the engagement's deconfliction\n  mailbox.\n- `voice_confirm`: log the planned call in `plan\u002Fphisher\u002Fdeconfliction-log.md`;\n  operator must complete the call out-of-band and update the log\n  before the campaign send-time.\n\n## Wait for ack\n\nPoll the channel until the ack arrives OR the deadline expires.\n\n```bash\nwhile true; do\n  if ack_received; then break; fi\n  if past_deadline; then\n    update_objective(status='blocked',\n      reason='blue-team contact unreachable for lure-deconfliction')\n    return\n  fi\n  sleep 60\ndone\n```\n\n## Record evidence\n\nAppend to `plan\u002Fphisher\u002Fdeconfliction-log.md`:\n\n```markdown\n## Campaign RT-2026-0142 \u002F gophish-id-12\n\n- Sent: 2026-05-27 12:31:04 UTC via signal_message\n- Recipient: \u003Ccontact>\n- Ack received: 2026-05-27 12:48:11 UTC\n- Ack message id: \u003Csignal-message-id>\n- Ack text: \"Acknowledged, send window 14:00-16:00 KST approved.\"\n```\n\nPersist as a Finding node in the knowledge graph with\n`finding_type: \"deconfliction_ack\"`, the ack message id, and the\ntimestamp. This is the audit trail for the engagement deliverable.\n\n## Failure modes\n\n- **Contact unreachable**: pause objective, ask operator via\n  `ask_user_question` for an alternate contact or a write-down.\n- **Contact denies the campaign**: the campaign DOES NOT send.\n  The objective is marked BLOCKED with the denial recorded. The\n  orchestrator may dispatch you against a different target user set,\n  or move to a different INITIAL_ACCESS technique.\n- **Contact requests modification** (e.g. \"not the CFO, but their\n  assistant is fine\"): update the target list and re-send the\n  handshake.\n\n## ZFP\n\nTwo-method evidence for the ack:\n\n1. The actual ack message from the channel.\n2. The Finding node with the message id in Neo4j.\n\nBoth must exist before the campaign send-step proceeds.\n","# Lure Deconfliction\n\n> Before the first email leaves the wire, the customer's blue-team\n> contact MUST acknowledge the campaign metadata. This is the legal\n> coverage for the engagement - without it, you're a malicious\n> phisher.\n\n## Why this is mandatory\n\nA phishing campaign that surprises the blue team produces:\n\n- Helpdesk ticket volume (real users reporting suspicious mail).\n- Detection rules firing on lookalike domains, RoE-out-of-scope.\n- Escalation to leadership \u002F external counsel.\n- Potential SOC overtime that the engagement is supposed to test\n  *with awareness*, not *as a surprise*.\n\nIt also exposes the engagement to legal risk: phishing without\nwritten authorization is a crime in most jurisdictions. The RoE +\ndeconfliction ack is the documentation that protects the operator.\n\n## Inputs you need\n\nFrom `plan\u002Froe.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"escalation_contacts\": {\n    \"blue_team_contact\": {\n      \"name\": \"...\",\n      \"channel\": \"signal:@user \u002F email: addr \u002F phone: +...\",\n      \"available\": \"Mon-Fri 09:00-18:00 KST\",\n      \"ack_method\": \"signal_message | email_reply | voice_confirm\"\n    }\n  },\n  \"engagement_id\": \"RT-2026-0142\"\n}\n```\n\n## Handshake payload\n\nConstruct ONE message containing:\n\n```\nSubject: [DECEPTICON RT-2026-0142] Phishing campaign deconfliction\n\nEngagement: RT-2026-0142\nCampaign id: \u003Cgophish-campaign-id-or-evilginx-phishlet>\nSend window: 2026-05-27 14:00 - 16:00 KST\nTarget count: \u003CN> users\nTarget population: \u003Cdescription, e.g. \"all @engineering of acme.com\">\nPretext class: \u003Cinternal_it_password_reset | external_invoice | shared_doc | ...>\nLure URL: https:\u002F\u002Flogin.acme-portal.example\u002F\nLure domain registration: 2026-05-26 (lookalike of acme.com)\nOpt-out URL (in every lure): https:\u002F\u002Fdecepticon.example\u002Foptout\u002FRT-2026-0142\n\nREQUEST: confirm you've received this message before 13:30 KST.\nIf we have not received an ack by 13:45 KST, the campaign WILL NOT send\nand the objective will be marked BLOCKED.\n```\n\n## Send it via the configured channel\n\nThe `ack_method` in roe.json drives:\n\n- `signal_message`: `bash -c 'signal-cli -u \u003Coperator> send -m \"...\" \u003Ccontact>'`\n- `email_reply`: standard SMTP via the engagement's deconfliction\n  mailbox.\n- `voice_confirm`: log the planned call in `plan\u002Fphisher\u002Fdeconfliction-log.md`;\n  operator must complete the call out-of-band and update the log\n  before the campaign send-time.\n\n## Wait for ack\n\nPoll the channel until the ack arrives OR the deadline expires.\n\n```bash\nwhile true; do\n  if ack_received; then break; fi\n  if past_deadline; then\n    update_objective(status='blocked',\n      reason='blue-team contact unreachable for lure-deconfliction')\n    return\n  fi\n  sleep 60\ndone\n```\n\n## Record evidence\n\nAppend to `plan\u002Fphisher\u002Fdeconfliction-log.md`:\n\n```markdown\n## Campaign RT-2026-0142 \u002F gophish-id-12\n\n- Sent: 2026-05-27 12:31:04 UTC via signal_message\n- Recipient: \u003Ccontact>\n- Ack received: 2026-05-27 12:48:11 UTC\n- Ack message id: \u003Csignal-message-id>\n- Ack text: \"Acknowledged, send window 14:00-16:00 KST approved.\"\n```\n\nPersist as a Finding node in the knowledge graph with\n`finding_type: \"deconfliction_ack\"`, the ack message id, and the\ntimestamp. This is the audit trail for the engagement deliverable.\n\n## Failure modes\n\n- **Contact unreachable**: pause objective, ask operator via\n  `ask_user_question` for an alternate contact or a write-down.\n- **Contact denies the campaign**: the campaign DOES NOT send.\n  The objective is marked BLOCKED with the denial recorded. The\n  orchestrator may dispatch you against a different target user set,\n  or move to a different INITIAL_ACCESS technique.\n- **Contact requests modification** (e.g. \"not the CFO, but their\n  assistant is fine\"): update the target list and re-send the\n  handshake.\n\n## ZFP\n\nTwo-method evidence for the ack:\n\n1. The actual ack message from the channel.\n2. The Finding node with the message id in Neo4j.\n\nBoth must exist before the campaign send-step proceeds.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"deconfliction, blue-team, opsec, legal","deconfliction","send phishing campaign, launch lure, evilginx2 lure activation, oauth device-code attack","T1566","Bash Read Write","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Flure-deconfliction","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill lure-deconfliction",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill lure-deconfliction",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill lure-deconfliction","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Flure-deconfliction\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]