lure-deconfliction
Mandatory out-of-band handshake with the blue-team contact BEFORE any phishing campaign sends. Skipping this is a critical RoE violation - the engagement has no legal coverage for unannounced phishing of real employees.
- License 许可
- MIT
- 最近更新
- 2026-06-15
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- lure-deconfliction
- metadata
- { "tags": "deconfliction, blue-team, opsec, legal", "subdomain": "deconfliction", "when_to_use": "send phishing campaign, launch lure, evilginx2 lure activation, oauth device-code attack", "mitre_attack": "T1566" }
- description
- Mandatory out-of-band handshake with the blue-team contact BEFORE any phishing campaign sends. Skipping this is a critical RoE violation - the engagement has no legal coverage for unannounced phishing of real employees.
- allowed-tools
- Bash Read Write
03 SKILL.md 正文
Lure Deconfliction
Before the first email leaves the wire, the customer's blue-team contact MUST acknowledge the campaign metadata. This is the legal coverage for the engagement - without it, you're a malicious phisher.
Why this is mandatory
A phishing campaign that surprises the blue team produces:
- Helpdesk ticket volume (real users reporting suspicious mail).
- Detection rules firing on lookalike domains, RoE-out-of-scope.
- Escalation to leadership / external counsel.
- Potential SOC overtime that the engagement is supposed to test with awareness, not as a surprise.
It also exposes the engagement to legal risk: phishing without written authorization is a crime in most jurisdictions. The RoE + deconfliction ack is the documentation that protects the operator.
Inputs you need
From plan/roe.json:
{
"escalation_contacts": {
"blue_team_contact": {
"name": "...",
"channel": "signal:@user / email: addr / phone: +...",
"available": "Mon-Fri 09:00-18:00 KST",
"ack_method": "signal_message | email_reply | voice_confirm"
}
},
"engagement_id": "RT-2026-0142"
}
Handshake payload
Construct ONE message containing:
Subject: [DECEPTICON RT-2026-0142] Phishing campaign deconfliction
Engagement: RT-2026-0142
Campaign id: <gophish-campaign-id-or-evilginx-phishlet>
Send window: 2026-05-27 14:00 - 16:00 KST
Target count: <N> users
Target population: <description, e.g. "all @engineering of acme.com">
Pretext class: <internal_it_password_reset | external_invoice | shared_doc | ...>
Lure URL: https://login.acme-portal.example/
Lure domain registration: 2026-05-26 (lookalike of acme.com)
Opt-out URL (in every lure): https://decepticon.example/optout/RT-2026-0142
REQUEST: confirm you've received this message before 13:30 KST.
If we have not received an ack by 13:45 KST, the campaign WILL NOT send
and the objective will be marked BLOCKED.
Send it via the configured channel
The ack_method in roe.json drives:
signal_message:bash -c 'signal-cli -u <operator> send -m "..." <contact>'email_reply: standard SMTP via the engagement's deconfliction mailbox.voice_confirm: log the planned call inplan/phisher/deconfliction-log.md; operator must complete the call out-of-band and update the log before the campaign send-time.
Wait for ack
Poll the channel until the ack arrives OR the deadline expires.
while true; do
if ack_received; then break; fi
if past_deadline; then
update_objective(status='blocked',
reason='blue-team contact unreachable for lure-deconfliction')
return
fi
sleep 60
done
Record evidence
Append to plan/phisher/deconfliction-log.md:
## Campaign RT-2026-0142 / gophish-id-12
- Sent: 2026-05-27 12:31:04 UTC via signal_message
- Recipient: <contact>
- Ack received: 2026-05-27 12:48:11 UTC
- Ack message id: <signal-message-id>
- Ack text: "Acknowledged, send window 14:00-16:00 KST approved."
Persist as a Finding node in the knowledge graph with
finding_type: "deconfliction_ack", the ack message id, and the
timestamp. This is the audit trail for the engagement deliverable.
Failure modes
- Contact unreachable: pause objective, ask operator via
ask_user_questionfor an alternate contact or a write-down. - Contact denies the campaign: the campaign DOES NOT send. The objective is marked BLOCKED with the denial recorded. The orchestrator may dispatch you against a different target user set, or move to a different INITIAL_ACCESS technique.
- Contact requests modification (e.g. "not the CFO, but their assistant is fine"): update the target list and re-send the handshake.
ZFP
Two-method evidence for the ack:
- The actual ack message from the channel.
- The Finding node with the message id in Neo4j.
Both must exist before the campaign send-step proceeds.
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