supplychain-overview
Supply-chain attack category — dependency confusion, typosquatting, package-registry abuse, build-pipeline poisoning, SBOM manipulation.
- License 许可
- MIT
- 最近更新
- 2026-06-15
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- supplychain-overview
- metadata
- { "tags": "supply-chain, dependency-confusion, typosquatting, ci-cd", "subdomain": "supply-chain", "when_to_use": "supply chain, dependency confusion, typosquat, package, npm, pypi, rubygems, cargo, maven, gradle, sbom, ci, github actions, build pipeline, registry, vendored", "mitre_attack": "T1195, T1195.001, T1195.002" }
- description
- Supply-chain attack category — dependency confusion, typosquatting, package-registry abuse, build-pipeline poisoning, SBOM manipulation.
- allowed-tools
- Bash Read Write
03 SKILL.md 正文
Supply-Chain Exploitation — Category Overview
This is a routing skill for supply-chain attack research. Sub-skills cover specific techniques against the dependency, build, and distribution layers.
Sub-Skills
| Sub-Skill | Covers | When to Load |
|---|---|---|
| dep-confusion | Public-registry impersonation of private package names, scoped-package abuse (@org/pkg), internal-name OSINT (lockfiles, GitHub Actions, Dockerfiles, error pages) |
Target uses private npm/PyPI/RubyGems/Cargo registries and you've discovered internal package names in public artifacts |
Surface Discovery
# Lockfiles often expose private package names that aren't on public registry
grep -hE '"name":|"@.+/' package-lock.json yarn.lock pnpm-lock.yaml | sort -u
# pip
grep -E '^[a-z0-9_-]+' requirements.txt
# go.mod
grep '^\s*[a-z0-9./_-]\+\s' go.mod
# Maven
grep -A1 '<artifactId>' pom.xml | grep -v '^--$'
Decision Notes
- Always confirm scope authorization in writing before publishing any package, even a benign one, to a public registry. Some bounty programs explicitly disallow public-registry submissions.
- Use a beacon-only payload (DNS callback, HTTPS GET) for confirmation; never ship code that mutates the target environment without an explicit follow-up authorization.
- Real damage from confusion attacks is usually post-install scripts (
postinstall,setup.py install) — focus PoCs on benign callbacks, not RCE. - For build-pipeline poisoning (workflow injection, branch protection bypass) see
/skills/standard/exploit/ad/SKILL.md(CI-as-AD-equivalent paths) and the broader threat-modeling under/skills/shared/opsec/SKILL.md.
04 同仓库更多 Skills
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WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K / pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.
wpa3-sae
WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.
wpa2-psk
WPA/WPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer/SMB encryption mode in 2026.
wpa-enterprise-eap
WPA/WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise (802.1X/EAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.
krack-fragattacks
KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation/aggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.
evil-twin-karma
Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA/Mana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK/open networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.