[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7705WF7GR43ZYFTSMCTN2V1":3,"skill-same:01M7705WF7GR43ZYFTSMCTN2V1":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":31,"commitSha":32,"skillDirectory":33,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M7705WF7GR43ZYFTSMCTN2V1","kill-chain-analysis",null,"Kill chain analysis and attack path decision-making — findings analysis, attack vector selection, target prioritization, phase transitions.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fkill-chain-analysis\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: kill-chain-analysis\ndescription: \"Kill chain analysis and attack path decision-making — findings analysis, attack vector selection, target prioritization, phase transitions.\"\nallowed-tools: Read\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: orchestration\n  kind: analytic\n  when_to_use: \"analyze findings, select attack vector, prioritize targets, which technique, attack path, next attack, choose approach, alternative vector, blocked what next\"\n  tags: kill-chain, decision-making, attack-path, target-prioritization, technique-selection\n  upstream_ref: \"Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain + Decepticon attack-path planner — analytic decision support, no direct attack technique\"\n---\n\n# Kill Chain Analysis & Attack Path Decision-Making\n\n## Decision Framework\n\nWhen selecting the next action, evaluate in order:\n\n1. **What does the OPPLAN say?** — Prioritized objectives drive decisions\n2. **What do findings tell us?** — Previous phase results constrain options\n3. **What's the risk\u002Freward?** — Lower noise approaches first\n4. **What's the OPSEC impact?** — Consult `opsec` skill before noisy actions\n\n## Findings Analysis\n\n### After Recon Phase — Selecting Attack Vectors\n\nRead `recon\u002F` outputs and categorize:\n\n| Finding Type | Indicates | Next Action |\n|-------------|-----------|-------------|\n| Web apps with known CVEs | Web exploitation path | `exploit` → web techniques |\n| AD services (88\u002F389\u002F636) | AD attack surface | `exploit` → AD techniques (after initial access) |\n| Exposed credentials (OSINT) | Credential-based access | `exploit` → credential stuffing\u002Fspray |\n| Cloud misconfigs (S3\u002Fblob) | Cloud attack path | `exploit` → cloud-specific techniques |\n| VPN\u002Fremote access services | Network perimeter entry | `exploit` → VPN\u002FRDP exploitation |\n| Employee emails + breach data | Social engineering path | `exploit` → phishing (if in scope) |\n\n### Attack Vector Prioritization\n\nRank available vectors by:\n\n```\nScore = (Success Probability × Impact) \u002F Detection Risk\n\n1. Valid credentials from OSINT        → High prob, High impact, Low noise\n2. Known web CVE (public exploit)      → High prob, Med impact, Med noise\n3. AD misconfiguration (no patch)      → Med prob,  High impact, Med noise\n4. Password spray against O365         → Med prob,  High impact, High noise\n5. Zero-day or custom exploit          → Low prob,  High impact, Low noise\n```\n\nAlways prefer: **credentials > misconfigurations > known CVEs > brute force**\n\n### After Exploitation — Deciding Post-Exploit Strategy\n\nOnce a foothold is established, analyze:\n\n| Context | Decision |\n|---------|----------|\n| Low-privilege user on workstation | Prioritize: privesc → cred dump → lateral to server |\n| Service account on server | Prioritize: cred dump (may have cached admin creds) → lateral |\n| Domain user credentials | Prioritize: AD enumeration → Kerberoasting → DCSync path |\n| Local admin on single host | Prioritize: cred dump → check for cached domain creds → lateral |\n| Already domain admin | Prioritize: objective completion → evidence collection → reporting |\n\n## Handling Blocked Objectives\n\n### Failure Analysis Decision Tree\n\n```\nObjective BLOCKED\n│\n├── WHY did it fail?\n│   ├── Defense mechanism (WAF\u002FEDR\u002FIDS)\n│   │   → Consult defense-evasion skill → retry with evasion\n│   │\n│   ├── Missing prerequisite (need creds\u002Faccess\u002Finfo)\n│   │   → Identify which prior phase provides it → re-order objectives\n│   │\n│   ├── Target hardened \u002F not vulnerable\n│   │   → Check findings for alternative target → redirect attack\n│   │\n│   └── Tool failure \u002F environment issue\n│       → Retry with different tool or approach\n│\n├── Is there an ALTERNATIVE path?\n│   ├── YES → Craft new delegation with adjusted approach\n│   └── NO  → Mark BLOCKED, document reason, proceed to next objective\n│\n└── Should we REVISIT later?\n    ├── YES (new intel may help) → Keep status BLOCKED, note in lessons_learned.md\n    └── NO (dead end) → Mark BLOCKED permanently\n```\n\n### Common Pivots\n\n| Original Approach | Alternative When Blocked |\n|-------------------|-------------------------|\n| SQLi on web app | SSTI, deserialization, SSRF, or move to different web app |\n| Kerberoasting | AS-REP roasting, ADCS abuse, password spray |\n| LSASS dump blocked by EDR | nanodump, comsvcs.dll, MiniDumpWriteDump via syscall |\n| WinRM blocked | PsExec, WMI, DCOM, RDP, SMB exec |\n| Password spray lockout | Low-and-slow spray, single-password-multiple-users |\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Phase Mapping\n\nUse this to map OPPLAN objective phases to ATT&CK tactics:\n\n| OPPLAN Phase | ATT&CK Tactic | Sub-Agent |\n|-------------|---------------|-----------|\n| Recon | TA0043 Reconnaissance | `recon` |\n| Initial Access | TA0001 Initial Access | `exploit` |\n| Execution | TA0002 Execution | `exploit` |\n| Persistence | TA0003 Persistence | `postexploit` |\n| Privilege Escalation | TA0004 Privilege Escalation | `postexploit` |\n| Defense Evasion | TA0005 Defense Evasion | `exploit` \u002F `postexploit` |\n| Credential Access | TA0006 Credential Access | `postexploit` |\n| Discovery | TA0007 Discovery | `recon` \u002F `postexploit` |\n| Lateral Movement | TA0008 Lateral Movement | `postexploit` |\n| Collection | TA0009 Collection | `postexploit` |\n| Exfiltration | TA0010 Exfiltration | `postexploit` |\n\n## Target Prioritization\n\nWhen multiple targets are available, prioritize:\n\n1. **Crown jewels** — Targets explicitly named in OPPLAN objectives\n2. **Domain controllers** — Access = domain-wide compromise\n3. **File servers** — Likely contain sensitive data for objectives\n4. **Admin workstations** — Cached credentials for further access\n5. **Application servers** — May contain database credentials, API keys\n6. **Standard workstations** — Lower value, but may provide stepping stones\n","# Kill Chain Analysis & Attack Path Decision-Making\n\n## Decision Framework\n\nWhen selecting the next action, evaluate in order:\n\n1. **What does the OPPLAN say?** — Prioritized objectives drive decisions\n2. **What do findings tell us?** — Previous phase results constrain options\n3. **What's the risk\u002Freward?** — Lower noise approaches first\n4. **What's the OPSEC impact?** — Consult `opsec` skill before noisy actions\n\n## Findings Analysis\n\n### After Recon Phase — Selecting Attack Vectors\n\nRead `recon\u002F` outputs and categorize:\n\n| Finding Type | Indicates | Next Action |\n|-------------|-----------|-------------|\n| Web apps with known CVEs | Web exploitation path | `exploit` → web techniques |\n| AD services (88\u002F389\u002F636) | AD attack surface | `exploit` → AD techniques (after initial access) |\n| Exposed credentials (OSINT) | Credential-based access | `exploit` → credential stuffing\u002Fspray |\n| Cloud misconfigs (S3\u002Fblob) | Cloud attack path | `exploit` → cloud-specific techniques |\n| VPN\u002Fremote access services | Network perimeter entry | `exploit` → VPN\u002FRDP exploitation |\n| Employee emails + breach data | Social engineering path | `exploit` → phishing (if in scope) |\n\n### Attack Vector Prioritization\n\nRank available vectors by:\n\n```\nScore = (Success Probability × Impact) \u002F Detection Risk\n\n1. Valid credentials from OSINT        → High prob, High impact, Low noise\n2. Known web CVE (public exploit)      → High prob, Med impact, Med noise\n3. AD misconfiguration (no patch)      → Med prob,  High impact, Med noise\n4. Password spray against O365         → Med prob,  High impact, High noise\n5. Zero-day or custom exploit          → Low prob,  High impact, Low noise\n```\n\nAlways prefer: **credentials > misconfigurations > known CVEs > brute force**\n\n### After Exploitation — Deciding Post-Exploit Strategy\n\nOnce a foothold is established, analyze:\n\n| Context | Decision |\n|---------|----------|\n| Low-privilege user on workstation | Prioritize: privesc → cred dump → lateral to server |\n| Service account on server | Prioritize: cred dump (may have cached admin creds) → lateral |\n| Domain user credentials | Prioritize: AD enumeration → Kerberoasting → DCSync path |\n| Local admin on single host | Prioritize: cred dump → check for cached domain creds → lateral |\n| Already domain admin | Prioritize: objective completion → evidence collection → reporting |\n\n## Handling Blocked Objectives\n\n### Failure Analysis Decision Tree\n\n```\nObjective BLOCKED\n│\n├── WHY did it fail?\n│   ├── Defense mechanism (WAF\u002FEDR\u002FIDS)\n│   │   → Consult defense-evasion skill → retry with evasion\n│   │\n│   ├── Missing prerequisite (need creds\u002Faccess\u002Finfo)\n│   │   → Identify which prior phase provides it → re-order objectives\n│   │\n│   ├── Target hardened \u002F not vulnerable\n│   │   → Check findings for alternative target → redirect attack\n│   │\n│   └── Tool failure \u002F environment issue\n│       → Retry with different tool or approach\n│\n├── Is there an ALTERNATIVE path?\n│   ├── YES → Craft new delegation with adjusted approach\n│   └── NO  → Mark BLOCKED, document reason, proceed to next objective\n│\n└── Should we REVISIT later?\n    ├── YES (new intel may help) → Keep status BLOCKED, note in lessons_learned.md\n    └── NO (dead end) → Mark BLOCKED permanently\n```\n\n### Common Pivots\n\n| Original Approach | Alternative When Blocked |\n|-------------------|-------------------------|\n| SQLi on web app | SSTI, deserialization, SSRF, or move to different web app |\n| Kerberoasting | AS-REP roasting, ADCS abuse, password spray |\n| LSASS dump blocked by EDR | nanodump, comsvcs.dll, MiniDumpWriteDump via syscall |\n| WinRM blocked | PsExec, WMI, DCOM, RDP, SMB exec |\n| Password spray lockout | Low-and-slow spray, single-password-multiple-users |\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Phase Mapping\n\nUse this to map OPPLAN objective phases to ATT&CK tactics:\n\n| OPPLAN Phase | ATT&CK Tactic | Sub-Agent |\n|-------------|---------------|-----------|\n| Recon | TA0043 Reconnaissance | `recon` |\n| Initial Access | TA0001 Initial Access | `exploit` |\n| Execution | TA0002 Execution | `exploit` |\n| Persistence | TA0003 Persistence | `postexploit` |\n| Privilege Escalation | TA0004 Privilege Escalation | `postexploit` |\n| Defense Evasion | TA0005 Defense Evasion | `exploit` \u002F `postexploit` |\n| Credential Access | TA0006 Credential Access | `postexploit` |\n| Discovery | TA0007 Discovery | `recon` \u002F `postexploit` |\n| Lateral Movement | TA0008 Lateral Movement | `postexploit` |\n| Collection | TA0009 Collection | `postexploit` |\n| Exfiltration | TA0010 Exfiltration | `postexploit` |\n\n## Target Prioritization\n\nWhen multiple targets are available, prioritize:\n\n1. **Crown jewels** — Targets explicitly named in OPPLAN objectives\n2. **Domain controllers** — Access = domain-wide compromise\n3. **File servers** — Likely contain sensitive data for objectives\n4. **Admin workstations** — Cached credentials for further access\n5. **Application servers** — May contain database credentials, API keys\n6. **Standard workstations** — Lower value, but may provide stepping stones\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":30},{"kind":25,"tags":26,"subdomain":27,"when_to_use":28,"upstream_ref":29},"analytic","kill-chain, decision-making, attack-path, target-prioritization, technique-selection","orchestration","analyze findings, select attack vector, prioritize targets, which technique, attack path, next attack, choose approach, alternative vector, blocked what next","Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain + Decepticon attack-path planner — analytic decision support, no direct attack technique","Read","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fkill-chain-analysis","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill kill-chain-analysis",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill kill-chain-analysis",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill kill-chain-analysis","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fkill-chain-analysis\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]