[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7701ZVS5ZDQCDVBQ7EVRW4R":3,"skill-same:01M7701ZVS5ZDQCDVBQ7EVRW4R":52},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":32,"commitSha":33,"skillDirectory":34,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":35,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":36,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":37,"install":38,"resources":51},"01M7701ZVS5ZDQCDVBQ7EVRW4R","aws-iam-enum",null,"Enumerate AWS IAM policies, detect privilege escalation paths per Rhino Security Labs canonical 21 primitives.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Faws-iam-enum\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: aws-iam-enum\ndescription: Enumerate AWS IAM policies, detect privilege escalation paths per Rhino Security Labs canonical 21 primitives.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: cloud\n  when_to_use: \"aws iam enumeration privesc rhino security labs 21 primitives policy escalation\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1087.004\n    - T1069.003\n    - T1078.004\n    - T1098.003\n---\n\n# AWS IAM Enumeration + Privesc\n\n## 1. Identity check\n```bash\naws sts get-caller-identity\naws iam get-account-summary\n```\n\n## 2. Attached policies\n```bash\naws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name ME --output json > \u002Ftmp\u002Fattached.json\naws iam list-user-policies          --user-name ME --output json > \u002Ftmp\u002Finline.json\naws iam list-groups-for-user        --user-name ME --output json > \u002Ftmp\u002Fgroups.json\n```\nFor each attached policy ARN:\n```bash\naws iam get-policy --policy-arn ARN --query 'Policy.DefaultVersionId'\naws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn ARN --version-id VID > \u002Ftmp\u002Fpolicy.json\n```\nThen:\n```\niam_policy_audit(open(\"\u002Ftmp\u002Fpolicy.json\").read())\n```\n\n## 3. Check each privesc primitive\nRhino Security's canonical 21 paths — any `Allow` on these is a chain step:\n1. iam:CreateAccessKey (other user)\n2. iam:CreateLoginProfile\n3. iam:UpdateLoginProfile\n4. iam:AttachUserPolicy \u002F iam:AttachGroupPolicy \u002F iam:AttachRolePolicy\n5. iam:PutUserPolicy \u002F iam:PutGroupPolicy \u002F iam:PutRolePolicy\n6. iam:CreatePolicyVersion (if SetAsDefault=true)\n7. iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion\n8. iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction\n9. iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances\n10. iam:PassRole + ecs:RunTask \u002F UpdateService\n11. glue:CreateDevEndpoint \u002F UpdateDevEndpoint\n12. cloudformation:CreateStack with iam:PassRole\n13. datapipeline:CreatePipeline\n14. lambda:UpdateFunctionCode (existing function with priv role)\n15. iam:AddUserToGroup\n16. iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy\n17. iam:CreateRole + sts:AssumeRole\n18. codebuild:CreateProject with iam:PassRole\n19. sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob with iam:PassRole\n20. aws-marketplace:Subscribe (rare, but noted)\n21. sts:AssumeRole (direct)\n\n## 4. Graph promotion\n```\nkg_add_node(kind=\"vulnerability\", label=\"IAM:CreateAccessKey → account takeover\", props={\"severity\":\"critical\",\"source\":\"aws-iam\"})\nkg_add_node(kind=\"crown_jewel\", label=\"AWS Account 1234\")\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Cvuln>, dst=\u003Ccrown_jewel>, kind=\"grants\", weight=0.3)\n```\n\n## 5. Common chains\n- Dev user has `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction` + a Lambda role\n  with admin → create malicious Lambda → assume admin\n- `iam:UpdateLoginProfile` + `sts:GetFederationToken` → temporary\n  console access as another user\n","# AWS IAM Enumeration + Privesc\n\n## 1. Identity check\n```bash\naws sts get-caller-identity\naws iam get-account-summary\n```\n\n## 2. Attached policies\n```bash\naws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name ME --output json > \u002Ftmp\u002Fattached.json\naws iam list-user-policies          --user-name ME --output json > \u002Ftmp\u002Finline.json\naws iam list-groups-for-user        --user-name ME --output json > \u002Ftmp\u002Fgroups.json\n```\nFor each attached policy ARN:\n```bash\naws iam get-policy --policy-arn ARN --query 'Policy.DefaultVersionId'\naws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn ARN --version-id VID > \u002Ftmp\u002Fpolicy.json\n```\nThen:\n```\niam_policy_audit(open(\"\u002Ftmp\u002Fpolicy.json\").read())\n```\n\n## 3. Check each privesc primitive\nRhino Security's canonical 21 paths — any `Allow` on these is a chain step:\n1. iam:CreateAccessKey (other user)\n2. iam:CreateLoginProfile\n3. iam:UpdateLoginProfile\n4. iam:AttachUserPolicy \u002F iam:AttachGroupPolicy \u002F iam:AttachRolePolicy\n5. iam:PutUserPolicy \u002F iam:PutGroupPolicy \u002F iam:PutRolePolicy\n6. iam:CreatePolicyVersion (if SetAsDefault=true)\n7. iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion\n8. iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction\n9. iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances\n10. iam:PassRole + ecs:RunTask \u002F UpdateService\n11. glue:CreateDevEndpoint \u002F UpdateDevEndpoint\n12. cloudformation:CreateStack with iam:PassRole\n13. datapipeline:CreatePipeline\n14. lambda:UpdateFunctionCode (existing function with priv role)\n15. iam:AddUserToGroup\n16. iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy\n17. iam:CreateRole + sts:AssumeRole\n18. codebuild:CreateProject with iam:PassRole\n19. sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob with iam:PassRole\n20. aws-marketplace:Subscribe (rare, but noted)\n21. sts:AssumeRole (direct)\n\n## 4. Graph promotion\n```\nkg_add_node(kind=\"vulnerability\", label=\"IAM:CreateAccessKey → account takeover\", props={\"severity\":\"critical\",\"source\":\"aws-iam\"})\nkg_add_node(kind=\"crown_jewel\", label=\"AWS Account 1234\")\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Cvuln>, dst=\u003Ccrown_jewel>, kind=\"grants\", weight=0.3)\n```\n\n## 5. Common chains\n- Dev user has `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction` + a Lambda role\n  with admin → create malicious Lambda → assume admin\n- `iam:UpdateLoginProfile` + `sts:GetFederationToken` → temporary\n  console access as another user\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"cloud","aws iam enumeration privesc rhino security labs 21 primitives policy escalation",[28,29,30,31],"T1087.004","T1069.003","T1078.004","T1098.003","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Faws-iam-enum","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":39,"prompt":49,"zipAvailable":50},[40,43,46],{"tool":41,"command":42},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill aws-iam-enum",{"tool":44,"command":45},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill aws-iam-enum",{"tool":47,"command":48},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill aws-iam-enum","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Faws-iam-enum\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[53,60,67,74,81,88],{"skillNo":54,"name":55,"nameZh":6,"description":56,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":57,"categories":58,"keywords":59,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":71,"categories":72,"keywords":73,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":75,"name":76,"nameZh":6,"description":77,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":78,"categories":79,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":91,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":92,"categories":93,"keywords":94,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]