aws-iam-enum
Enumerate AWS IAM policies, detect privilege escalation paths per Rhino Security Labs canonical 21 primitives.
- License 许可
- MIT
- 最近更新
- 2026-06-15
- Stars
- ★ 0
- Forks
- 0
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- aws-iam-enum
- metadata
- { "subdomain": "cloud", "when_to_use": "aws iam enumeration privesc rhino security labs 21 primitives policy escalation", "mitre_attack": [ "T1087.004", "T1069.003", "T1078.004", "T1098.003" ] }
- description
- Enumerate AWS IAM policies, detect privilege escalation paths per Rhino Security Labs canonical 21 primitives.
03 SKILL.md 正文
AWS IAM Enumeration + Privesc
1. Identity check
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws iam get-account-summary
2. Attached policies
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name ME --output json > /tmp/attached.json
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name ME --output json > /tmp/inline.json
aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name ME --output json > /tmp/groups.json
For each attached policy ARN:
aws iam get-policy --policy-arn ARN --query 'Policy.DefaultVersionId'
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn ARN --version-id VID > /tmp/policy.json
Then:
iam_policy_audit(open("/tmp/policy.json").read())
3. Check each privesc primitive
Rhino Security's canonical 21 paths — any Allow on these is a chain step:
- iam:CreateAccessKey (other user)
- iam:CreateLoginProfile
- iam:UpdateLoginProfile
- iam:AttachUserPolicy / iam:AttachGroupPolicy / iam:AttachRolePolicy
- iam:PutUserPolicy / iam:PutGroupPolicy / iam:PutRolePolicy
- iam:CreatePolicyVersion (if SetAsDefault=true)
- iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion
- iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction
- iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances
- iam:PassRole + ecs:RunTask / UpdateService
- glue:CreateDevEndpoint / UpdateDevEndpoint
- cloudformation:CreateStack with iam:PassRole
- datapipeline:CreatePipeline
- lambda:UpdateFunctionCode (existing function with priv role)
- iam:AddUserToGroup
- iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
- iam:CreateRole + sts:AssumeRole
- codebuild:CreateProject with iam:PassRole
- sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob with iam:PassRole
- aws-marketplace:Subscribe (rare, but noted)
- sts:AssumeRole (direct)
4. Graph promotion
kg_add_node(kind="vulnerability", label="IAM:CreateAccessKey → account takeover", props={"severity":"critical","source":"aws-iam"})
kg_add_node(kind="crown_jewel", label="AWS Account 1234")
kg_add_edge(src=<vuln>, dst=<crown_jewel>, kind="grants", weight=0.3)
5. Common chains
- Dev user has
iam:PassRole+lambda:CreateFunction+ a Lambda role with admin → create malicious Lambda → assume admin iam:UpdateLoginProfile+sts:GetFederationToken→ temporary console access as another user
04 同仓库更多 Skills
wps-pixie-dust
WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K / pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.
wpa3-sae
WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.
wpa2-psk
WPA/WPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer/SMB encryption mode in 2026.
wpa-enterprise-eap
WPA/WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise (802.1X/EAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.
krack-fragattacks
KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation/aggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.
evil-twin-karma
Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA/Mana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK/open networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.