[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M76ZKXF83SDCV89ZN997VNBA":3,"skill-same:01M76ZKXF83SDCV89ZN997VNBA":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":28,"commitSha":29,"skillDirectory":30,"forksCount":31,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":34,"ownerDescription":35,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M76ZKXF83SDCV89ZN997VNBA","game-theory",null,"Advanced game theory analysis for crypto protocols, DeFi mechanisms, governance systems, and strategic decision-making. Use when analyzing tokenomics, evaluating protocol incentives, predicting adversarial behavior, designing mechanisms, or understanding strategic interactions in web3.","javimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills","javimosch","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F12900508?v=4","01M6D3F2AS6PV75ET9PZ1QGP8J","Javier Leandro Arancibia","01M75B8NCTAJG9WH5YNZH7C3D8",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjavimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsp0oby\u002Fgame-theory\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: game-theory\ndescription: Advanced game theory analysis for crypto protocols, DeFi mechanisms, governance systems, and strategic decision-making. Use when analyzing tokenomics, evaluating protocol incentives, predicting adversarial behavior, designing mechanisms, or understanding strategic interactions in web3.\nmetadata: {\"clawdbot\":{\"emoji\":\"\",\"homepage\":\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftedkaczynski-the-bot\u002Fgame-theory\"}}\n---\n\n# Game Theory for Crypto\n\nStrategic analysis framework for understanding and designing incentive systems in web3.\n\n> \"Every protocol is a game. Every token is an incentive. Every user is a player. Understand the rules, or become the played.\"\n\n## When to Use This Skill\n\n- Analyzing tokenomics for exploits or misaligned incentives\n- Evaluating governance proposals and voting mechanisms\n- Understanding MEV and adversarial transaction ordering\n- Designing auction mechanisms (NFT drops, token sales, liquidations)\n- Predicting how rational actors will behave in a system\n- Identifying attack vectors in DeFi protocols\n- Modeling liquidity provision strategies\n- Assessing protocol sustainability\n\n## Core Framework\n\n### The Five Questions\n\nFor any protocol or mechanism, ask:\n\n1. **Who are the players?** (Users, LPs, validators, searchers, governance token holders)\n2. **What are their strategies?** (Actions available to each player)\n3. **What are the payoffs?** (How does each outcome affect each player?)\n4. **What information do they have?** (Complete, incomplete, asymmetric?)\n5. **What's the equilibrium?** (Where do rational actors end up?)\n\n### Analysis Template\n\n```markdown\n## Protocol: [Name]\n\n### Players\n- Player A: [Role, objectives, constraints]\n- Player B: [Role, objectives, constraints]\n- ...\n\n### Strategy Space\n- Player A can: [List possible actions]\n- Player B can: [List possible actions]\n\n### Payoff Structure\n- If (A does X, B does Y): A gets [payoff], B gets [payoff]\n- ...\n\n### Information Structure\n- Public information: [What everyone knows]\n- Private information: [What only some players know]\n- Observable actions: [What can be seen on-chain]\n\n### Equilibrium Analysis\n- Nash equilibrium: [Stable outcome where no player wants to deviate]\n- Dominant strategies: [Strategies that are always best regardless of others]\n- Potential exploits: [Deviations that benefit attackers]\n\n### Recommendations\n- [Design changes to improve incentive alignment]\n```\n\n## Reference Documents\n\n| Document | Use Case |\n|----------|----------|\n| [Nash Equilibrium](references\u002Fnash-equilibrium.md) | Finding stable outcomes in strategic interactions |\n| [Mechanism Design](references\u002Fmechanism-design.md) | Designing systems with desired equilibria |\n| [Auction Theory](references\u002Fauction-theory.md) | Token sales, NFT drops, liquidations |\n| [MEV Game Theory](references\u002Fmev-strategies.md) | Adversarial transaction ordering |\n| [Tokenomics Analysis](references\u002Ftokenomics-analysis.md) | Evaluating token incentive structures |\n| [Governance Attacks](references\u002Fgovernance-attacks.md) | Voting manipulation and capture |\n| [Liquidity Games](references\u002Fliquidity-games.md) | LP strategies and impermanent loss |\n| [Information Economics](references\u002Finformation-economics.md) | Asymmetric information and signaling |\n\n## Quick Concepts\n\n### Nash Equilibrium\nA state where no player can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing strategy. The \"stable\" outcome of a game.\n\n**Crypto application:** In a staking system, Nash equilibrium determines the stake distribution across validators.\n\n### Dominant Strategy\nA strategy that's optimal regardless of what others do.\n\n**Crypto application:** In a second-price auction, bidding your true value is dominant.\n\n### Pareto Efficiency\nAn outcome where no one can be made better off without making someone worse off.\n\n**Crypto application:** AMM fee structures try to be Pareto efficient for traders and LPs.\n\n### Mechanism Design\n\"Reverse game theory\" - designing rules to achieve desired outcomes.\n\n**Crypto application:** Designing token vesting schedules to align long-term incentives.\n\n### Schelling Point\nA solution people converge on without communication.\n\n**Crypto application:** Why certain price levels act as psychological support\u002Fresistance.\n\n### Incentive Compatibility\nWhen truthful behavior is optimal for participants.\n\n**Crypto application:** Oracle designs where honest reporting is the dominant strategy.\n\n### Common Knowledge\nEveryone knows X, everyone knows everyone knows X, infinitely recursive.\n\n**Crypto application:** Public blockchain state creates common knowledge of balances\u002Fpositions.\n\n## Analysis Patterns\n\n### Pattern 1: The Tragedy of the Commons\n\n**Structure:** Shared resource, individual incentive to overuse, collective harm.\n\n**Crypto examples:**\n- Gas price bidding during congestion\n- Governance token voting apathy\n- MEV extraction degrading UX\n\n**Solution approaches:**\n- Harberger taxes\n- Quadratic mechanisms\n- Commitment schemes\n\n### Pattern 2: The Prisoner's Dilemma\n\n**Structure:** Individual rationality leads to collective irrationality.\n\n**Crypto examples:**\n- Liquidity mining mercenaries (farm and dump)\n- Race-to-bottom validator fees\n- Bridge security (each chain wants others to secure)\n\n**Solution approaches:**\n- Repeated games (reputation)\n- Commitment mechanisms (staking\u002Fslashing)\n- Mechanism redesign\n\n### Pattern 3: The Coordination Game\n\n**Structure:** Multiple equilibria, players want to coordinate but may fail.\n\n**Crypto examples:**\n- Which L2 to use?\n- Token standard adoption\n- Hard fork coordination\n\n**Solution approaches:**\n- Focal points (Schelling points)\n- Sequential moves (first mover advantage)\n- Communication mechanisms\n\n### Pattern 4: The Principal-Agent Problem\n\n**Structure:** One party acts on behalf of another with misaligned incentives.\n\n**Crypto examples:**\n- Protocol team vs token holders\n- Delegates in governance\n- Fund managers\n\n**Solution approaches:**\n- Incentive alignment (token vesting)\n- Monitoring (transparency)\n- Bonding (skin in game)\n\n### Pattern 5: Adverse Selection\n\n**Structure:** Information asymmetry leads to market breakdown.\n\n**Crypto examples:**\n- Token launches (team knows more than buyers)\n- Insurance protocols (risky users more likely to buy)\n- Lending (borrowers know their risk better)\n\n**Solution approaches:**\n- Signaling (lock-ups, audits)\n- Screening (credit scores, history)\n- Pooling equilibria\n\n### Pattern 6: Moral Hazard\n\n**Structure:** Hidden action after agreement leads to risk-taking.\n\n**Crypto examples:**\n- Protocols with insurance may take more risk\n- Bailout expectations encourage leverage\n- Anonymous teams may rug\n\n**Solution approaches:**\n- Monitoring and transparency\n- Incentive alignment\n- Reputation systems\n\n## Common Crypto Games\n\n### The MEV Game\n\n**Players:** Users, searchers, builders, validators\n**Key insight:** Transaction ordering is a game; users are often the losers\n\nSee: [MEV Strategies](references\u002Fmev-strategies.md)\n\n### The Liquidity Game\n\n**Players:** LPs, traders, arbitrageurs\n**Key insight:** Impermanent loss is the cost of being adversely selected against\n\nSee: [Liquidity Games](references\u002Fliquidity-games.md)\n\n### The Governance Game\n\n**Players:** Token holders, delegates, protocol team\n**Key insight:** Rational apathy + concentrated interests = capture\n\nSee: [Governance Attacks](references\u002Fgovernance-attacks.md)\n\n### The Staking Game\n\n**Players:** Stakers, validators, delegators\n**Key insight:** Security budget must exceed attack profit\n\nSee: [Tokenomics Analysis](references\u002Ftokenomics-analysis.md)\n\n### The Oracle Game\n\n**Players:** Data providers, consumers, attackers\n**Key insight:** Profit from manipulation must be less than cost\n\nSee: [Mechanism Design](references\u002Fmechanism-design.md)\n\n## Red Flags in Protocol Design\n\n### Tokenomics Red Flags\n- Insiders can sell before others (vesting asymmetry)\n- Inflation benefits few, dilutes many\n- No sink mechanisms (perpetual selling pressure)\n- Rewards without risk (free money = someone else paying)\n\n### Governance Red Flags\n- Low quorum thresholds (minority capture)\n- No time delay (flash loan attacks)\n- Token voting only (plutocracy)\n- Delegates with no skin in game\n\n### Mechanism Red Flags\n- First-come-first-served (bot advantage)\n- Sealed bids without commitment (frontrunning)\n- Rebates\u002Frefunds (MEV extraction)\n- Complex formulas (hidden exploits)\n\n## Advanced Topics\n\n### Repeated Games and Reputation\nSingle-shot games often have bad equilibria. Repetition enables cooperation through:\n- Trigger strategies (cooperate until defection)\n- Reputation building (costly to destroy)\n- Future value (patient players cooperate more)\n\n**Crypto application:** Why anonymous actors behave worse than doxxed teams.\n\n### Evolutionary Game Theory\nStrategies that survive competitive selection. Relevant for:\n- Which protocols survive long-term\n- Memetic competition between narratives\n- Bot strategy evolution\n\n### Bayesian Games\nGames with incomplete information. Players have beliefs about others' types.\n\n**Crypto application:** Trading with unknown counterparties, evaluating anonymous teams.\n\n### Cooperative Game Theory\nWhen players can form binding coalitions.\n\n**Crypto application:** MEV extraction coalitions, validator cartels, governance blocs.\n\n### Algorithmic Game Theory\nComputational aspects of game theory.\n\n**Crypto application:** On-chain game computation limits, gas-efficient mechanism design.\n\n## Methodology\n\n### Step 1: Model the Game\n- Identify all players (including those not obvious)\n- Map complete strategy spaces\n- Define payoff functions precisely\n- Specify information structure\n\n### Step 2: Find Equilibria\n- Check for dominant strategies\n- Compute Nash equilibria\n- Identify Pareto improvements\n- Consider trembling-hand perfection\n\n### Step 3: Stress Test\n- What if players collude?\n- What if new players enter?\n- What if information leaks?\n- What if parameters change?\n\n### Step 4: Recommend\n- Mechanism changes to improve equilibrium\n- Monitoring to detect deviations\n- Parameter bounds to maintain stability\n\n## Resources\n\n### Foundational Texts\n- \"Theory of Games and Economic Behavior\" - von Neumann & Morgenstern\n- \"A Beautiful Mind\" (Nash's life, accessible intro)\n- \"The Strategy of Conflict\" - Schelling\n- \"Mechanism Design Theory\" - Myerson (Nobel lecture)\n\n### Crypto-Specific\n- \"Flash Boys 2.0\" - MEV paper\n- \"SoK: DeFi Attacks\" - Systemization of DeFi exploits\n- \"Clockwork Finance\" - MEV and mechanism design\n- Paradigm research blog\n\n### Tools\n- Nashpy (Python game theory library)\n- Gambit (game theory software)\n- Agent-based modeling frameworks\n","# Game Theory for Crypto\n\nStrategic analysis framework for understanding and designing incentive systems in web3.\n\n> \"Every protocol is a game. Every token is an incentive. Every user is a player. Understand the rules, or become the played.\"\n\n## When to Use This Skill\n\n- Analyzing tokenomics for exploits or misaligned incentives\n- Evaluating governance proposals and voting mechanisms\n- Understanding MEV and adversarial transaction ordering\n- Designing auction mechanisms (NFT drops, token sales, liquidations)\n- Predicting how rational actors will behave in a system\n- Identifying attack vectors in DeFi protocols\n- Modeling liquidity provision strategies\n- Assessing protocol sustainability\n\n## Core Framework\n\n### The Five Questions\n\nFor any protocol or mechanism, ask:\n\n1. **Who are the players?** (Users, LPs, validators, searchers, governance token holders)\n2. **What are their strategies?** (Actions available to each player)\n3. **What are the payoffs?** (How does each outcome affect each player?)\n4. **What information do they have?** (Complete, incomplete, asymmetric?)\n5. **What's the equilibrium?** (Where do rational actors end up?)\n\n### Analysis Template\n\n```markdown\n## Protocol: [Name]\n\n### Players\n- Player A: [Role, objectives, constraints]\n- Player B: [Role, objectives, constraints]\n- ...\n\n### Strategy Space\n- Player A can: [List possible actions]\n- Player B can: [List possible actions]\n\n### Payoff Structure\n- If (A does X, B does Y): A gets [payoff], B gets [payoff]\n- ...\n\n### Information Structure\n- Public information: [What everyone knows]\n- Private information: [What only some players know]\n- Observable actions: [What can be seen on-chain]\n\n### Equilibrium Analysis\n- Nash equilibrium: [Stable outcome where no player wants to deviate]\n- Dominant strategies: [Strategies that are always best regardless of others]\n- Potential exploits: [Deviations that benefit attackers]\n\n### Recommendations\n- [Design changes to improve incentive alignment]\n```\n\n## Reference Documents\n\n| Document | Use Case |\n|----------|----------|\n| [Nash Equilibrium](references\u002Fnash-equilibrium.md) | Finding stable outcomes in strategic interactions |\n| [Mechanism Design](references\u002Fmechanism-design.md) | Designing systems with desired equilibria |\n| [Auction Theory](references\u002Fauction-theory.md) | Token sales, NFT drops, liquidations |\n| [MEV Game Theory](references\u002Fmev-strategies.md) | Adversarial transaction ordering |\n| [Tokenomics Analysis](references\u002Ftokenomics-analysis.md) | Evaluating token incentive structures |\n| [Governance Attacks](references\u002Fgovernance-attacks.md) | Voting manipulation and capture |\n| [Liquidity Games](references\u002Fliquidity-games.md) | LP strategies and impermanent loss |\n| [Information Economics](references\u002Finformation-economics.md) | Asymmetric information and signaling |\n\n## Quick Concepts\n\n### Nash Equilibrium\nA state where no player can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing strategy. The \"stable\" outcome of a game.\n\n**Crypto application:** In a staking system, Nash equilibrium determines the stake distribution across validators.\n\n### Dominant Strategy\nA strategy that's optimal regardless of what others do.\n\n**Crypto application:** In a second-price auction, bidding your true value is dominant.\n\n### Pareto Efficiency\nAn outcome where no one can be made better off without making someone worse off.\n\n**Crypto application:** AMM fee structures try to be Pareto efficient for traders and LPs.\n\n### Mechanism Design\n\"Reverse game theory\" - designing rules to achieve desired outcomes.\n\n**Crypto application:** Designing token vesting schedules to align long-term incentives.\n\n### Schelling Point\nA solution people converge on without communication.\n\n**Crypto application:** Why certain price levels act as psychological support\u002Fresistance.\n\n### Incentive Compatibility\nWhen truthful behavior is optimal for participants.\n\n**Crypto application:** Oracle designs where honest reporting is the dominant strategy.\n\n### Common Knowledge\nEveryone knows X, everyone knows everyone knows X, infinitely recursive.\n\n**Crypto application:** Public blockchain state creates common knowledge of balances\u002Fpositions.\n\n## Analysis Patterns\n\n### Pattern 1: The Tragedy of the Commons\n\n**Structure:** Shared resource, individual incentive to overuse, collective harm.\n\n**Crypto examples:**\n- Gas price bidding during congestion\n- Governance token voting apathy\n- MEV extraction degrading UX\n\n**Solution approaches:**\n- Harberger taxes\n- Quadratic mechanisms\n- Commitment schemes\n\n### Pattern 2: The Prisoner's Dilemma\n\n**Structure:** Individual rationality leads to collective irrationality.\n\n**Crypto examples:**\n- Liquidity mining mercenaries (farm and dump)\n- Race-to-bottom validator fees\n- Bridge security (each chain wants others to secure)\n\n**Solution approaches:**\n- Repeated games (reputation)\n- Commitment mechanisms (staking\u002Fslashing)\n- Mechanism redesign\n\n### Pattern 3: The Coordination Game\n\n**Structure:** Multiple equilibria, players want to coordinate but may fail.\n\n**Crypto examples:**\n- Which L2 to use?\n- Token standard adoption\n- Hard fork coordination\n\n**Solution approaches:**\n- Focal points (Schelling points)\n- Sequential moves (first mover advantage)\n- Communication mechanisms\n\n### Pattern 4: The Principal-Agent Problem\n\n**Structure:** One party acts on behalf of another with misaligned incentives.\n\n**Crypto examples:**\n- Protocol team vs token holders\n- Delegates in governance\n- Fund managers\n\n**Solution approaches:**\n- Incentive alignment (token vesting)\n- Monitoring (transparency)\n- Bonding (skin in game)\n\n### Pattern 5: Adverse Selection\n\n**Structure:** Information asymmetry leads to market breakdown.\n\n**Crypto examples:**\n- Token launches (team knows more than buyers)\n- Insurance protocols (risky users more likely to buy)\n- Lending (borrowers know their risk better)\n\n**Solution approaches:**\n- Signaling (lock-ups, audits)\n- Screening (credit scores, history)\n- Pooling equilibria\n\n### Pattern 6: Moral Hazard\n\n**Structure:** Hidden action after agreement leads to risk-taking.\n\n**Crypto examples:**\n- Protocols with insurance may take more risk\n- Bailout expectations encourage leverage\n- Anonymous teams may rug\n\n**Solution approaches:**\n- Monitoring and transparency\n- Incentive alignment\n- Reputation systems\n\n## Common Crypto Games\n\n### The MEV Game\n\n**Players:** Users, searchers, builders, validators\n**Key insight:** Transaction ordering is a game; users are often the losers\n\nSee: [MEV Strategies](references\u002Fmev-strategies.md)\n\n### The Liquidity Game\n\n**Players:** LPs, traders, arbitrageurs\n**Key insight:** Impermanent loss is the cost of being adversely selected against\n\nSee: [Liquidity Games](references\u002Fliquidity-games.md)\n\n### The Governance Game\n\n**Players:** Token holders, delegates, protocol team\n**Key insight:** Rational apathy + concentrated interests = capture\n\nSee: [Governance Attacks](references\u002Fgovernance-attacks.md)\n\n### The Staking Game\n\n**Players:** Stakers, validators, delegators\n**Key insight:** Security budget must exceed attack profit\n\nSee: [Tokenomics Analysis](references\u002Ftokenomics-analysis.md)\n\n### The Oracle Game\n\n**Players:** Data providers, consumers, attackers\n**Key insight:** Profit from manipulation must be less than cost\n\nSee: [Mechanism Design](references\u002Fmechanism-design.md)\n\n## Red Flags in Protocol Design\n\n### Tokenomics Red Flags\n- Insiders can sell before others (vesting asymmetry)\n- Inflation benefits few, dilutes many\n- No sink mechanisms (perpetual selling pressure)\n- Rewards without risk (free money = someone else paying)\n\n### Governance Red Flags\n- Low quorum thresholds (minority capture)\n- No time delay (flash loan attacks)\n- Token voting only (plutocracy)\n- Delegates with no skin in game\n\n### Mechanism Red Flags\n- First-come-first-served (bot advantage)\n- Sealed bids without commitment (frontrunning)\n- Rebates\u002Frefunds (MEV extraction)\n- Complex formulas (hidden exploits)\n\n## Advanced Topics\n\n### Repeated Games and Reputation\nSingle-shot games often have bad equilibria. Repetition enables cooperation through:\n- Trigger strategies (cooperate until defection)\n- Reputation building (costly to destroy)\n- Future value (patient players cooperate more)\n\n**Crypto application:** Why anonymous actors behave worse than doxxed teams.\n\n### Evolutionary Game Theory\nStrategies that survive competitive selection. Relevant for:\n- Which protocols survive long-term\n- Memetic competition between narratives\n- Bot strategy evolution\n\n### Bayesian Games\nGames with incomplete information. Players have beliefs about others' types.\n\n**Crypto application:** Trading with unknown counterparties, evaluating anonymous teams.\n\n### Cooperative Game Theory\nWhen players can form binding coalitions.\n\n**Crypto application:** MEV extraction coalitions, validator cartels, governance blocs.\n\n### Algorithmic Game Theory\nComputational aspects of game theory.\n\n**Crypto application:** On-chain game computation limits, gas-efficient mechanism design.\n\n## Methodology\n\n### Step 1: Model the Game\n- Identify all players (including those not obvious)\n- Map complete strategy spaces\n- Define payoff functions precisely\n- Specify information structure\n\n### Step 2: Find Equilibria\n- Check for dominant strategies\n- Compute Nash equilibria\n- Identify Pareto improvements\n- Consider trembling-hand perfection\n\n### Step 3: Stress Test\n- What if players collude?\n- What if new players enter?\n- What if information leaks?\n- What if parameters change?\n\n### Step 4: Recommend\n- Mechanism changes to improve equilibrium\n- Monitoring to detect deviations\n- Parameter bounds to maintain stability\n\n## Resources\n\n### Foundational Texts\n- \"Theory of Games and Economic Behavior\" - von Neumann & Morgenstern\n- \"A Beautiful Mind\" (Nash's life, accessible intro)\n- \"The Strategy of Conflict\" - Schelling\n- \"Mechanism Design Theory\" - Myerson (Nobel lecture)\n\n### Crypto-Specific\n- \"Flash Boys 2.0\" - MEV paper\n- \"SoK: DeFi Attacks\" - Systemization of DeFi exploits\n- \"Clockwork Finance\" - MEV and mechanism design\n- Paradigm research blog\n\n### Tools\n- Nashpy (Python game theory library)\n- Gambit (game theory software)\n- Agent-based modeling frameworks\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"clawdbot":25},{"emoji":26,"homepage":27},"","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftedkaczynski-the-bot\u002Fgame-theory","main","f9d3fe7cf9ac8f1ea63a0d96e98e1f510a3814db","skills\u002Fsp0oby\u002Fgame-theory",1,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjavimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjavimosch","intrane.fr","Building robust, open-source infrastructure for the commons. AI-leveraged, self-hosted, built to last.","2026-06-07 03:34:58",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add javimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills --skill game-theory",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add javimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills --skill game-theory",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add javimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills --skill game-theory","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjavimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsp0oby\u002Fgame-theory\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,60,67,74,81,88],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":59},"01M778GGXG2VQ0YF31W2MKGMQZ","crowd-prompting","A marketplace where AI agents improve prompts, system instructions, tool descriptions, and other text-based content with domain expertise from real-world operations — and earn tokens for valuable contributions.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjavimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzzadrian\u002Fcrowd-prompting\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":59},"01M778G7BH8SBJ9FJ6C3G7CB1K","ceaser","Interact with the Ceaser privacy protocol on Base L2 using the ceaser-mcp MCP tools. This skill uses the ceaser-mcp npm package for ALL operations -- shield, unshield, note management, and protocol queries. All ceaser tool calls use CLI subcommands (npx -y ceaser-mcp \u003Csubcommand>). Ceaser is a privacy-preserving ETH wrapper using Noir\u002FUltraHonk zero-knowledge proofs on Base L2 (chain ID 8453).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjavimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzyra-v21\u002Fceaser\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":71,"categories":72,"keywords":73,"publishedAt":59},"01M778FYCJQZWFKKX5FYMK3S47","ceaser-send","Fully automated private ETH transfer via Ceaser Protocol on Base L2 using the ceaser-mcp MCP tools. This skill uses the ceaser-mcp npm package for ALL operations -- all ceaser tool calls use CLI subcommands (npx -y ceaser-mcp \u003Csubcommand>). WARNING -- creates observable on-chain links between user wallet and hot wallet (see Privacy Warning). Generates an ephemeral hot wallet with BIP-39 mnemonic recovery, user funds it, agent signs and broadcasts the Shield TX automatically. Exactly one manual step required (funding the hot wallet with ETH). Uses Noir\u002FUltraHonk zero-knowledge proofs.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjavimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzyra-v21\u002Fceaser-send\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":75,"name":76,"nameZh":6,"description":77,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":78,"categories":79,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":59},"01M778FQQNSEYA3HJKZBPQ4M9Z","dilemm-ai","Compete in DilemmAI, the prisoner's dilemma AI arena at dilemm.ai. Use when an OpenClaw agent wants to create an account, design and submit strategy prompts for their bot, enter matchmaking, analyze historical matches and leaderboards, and iterate on bot strategy. Requires headless browser automation (no API available yet).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjavimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzyori\u002Fdilemm-ai\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":59},"01M778FGVZX7QA2TF9BFMM37FY","moldium","Post and manage content on the Moldium blog platform. Triggered by \"post to Moldium\", \"write a blog post\", \"publish an article\", etc.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjavimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzyom45\u002Fmoldium\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":91,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":92,"categories":93,"keywords":94,"publishedAt":59},"01M778F88D8PQ9MQ0KNW2TJ8ZH","arxiv-paper-reviews","Interact with arXiv Crawler API to fetch papers, read reviews, submit comments, search papers, and import papers. Use when working with arXiv papers, fetching paper lists by date\u002Fcategory\u002Finterest, viewing paper details with comments, submitting paper reviews, searching papers by title, or importing papers from arXiv URLs via API at http:\u002F\u002Fweakaccept.top:8000\u002F.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjavimosch\u002Fopen-claw-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzxrys\u002Farxiv-paper-reviews\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]