[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M75PYW2FR9DYVFHFTQQWZHS8":3,"skill-same:01M75PYW2FR9DYVFHFTQQWZHS8":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M75PYW2FR9DYVFHFTQQWZHS8","volt-typhoon",null,"Adversary-emulation profile for Volt Typhoon (G1017), a PRC state-sponsored actor pre-positioning in US critical infrastructure via living-off-the-land TTPs.","Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","Iwakishirokoshu","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F194847626?v=4","01M75P4CVGA89TTCE8JGMNAQQ9","Around","01M75P4CWF85V6GVSEFKGGFZ03",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fvolt-typhoon\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: volt-typhoon\ndescription: \"Adversary-emulation profile for Volt Typhoon (G1017), a PRC state-sponsored actor pre-positioning in US critical infrastructure via living-off-the-land TTPs.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: adversary-emulation\n  when_to_use: \"volt typhoon, bronze silhouette, vanguard panda, insidious taurus, voltzite, dev-0391, unc3236, G1017, PRC critical infrastructure, living off the land, LOTL, LOLBins, SOHO router botnet, KV botnet, OT pre-positioning, China state-sponsored stealth espionage emulation\"\n  tags: adversary-emulation, china, prc, nation-state, critical-infrastructure, living-off-the-land, lotl, edge-devices, espionage, ot, stealth, G1017\n  mitre_attack: T1590, T1590.004, T1590.006, T1591, T1591.004, T1589, T1589.002, T1592, T1593, T1594, T1596.005, T1583.003, T1584.003, T1584.004, T1584.005, T1584.008, T1587.001, T1587.004, T1588.002, T1588.006, T1190, T1133, T1078, T1078.002, T1059.001, T1059.003, T1059.004, T1047, T1218, T1505.003, T1003.001, T1003.003, T1555, T1555.003, T1552, T1552.004, T1556, T1068, T1070.001, T1070.004, T1070.007, T1027.002, T1036.004, T1036.005, T1036.008, T1112, T1497.001, T1140, T1090, T1090.001, T1090.003, T1071.001, T1573.001, T1573.002, T1095, T1571, T1105, T1570, T1021.001, T1087.001, T1087.002, T1069.001, T1069.002, T1016, T1049, T1018, T1057, T1046, T1518.001, T1654, T1005, T1560.001, T1074.001, T1056.001, T1113\n---\n\n# Volt Typhoon (BRONZE SILHOUETTE, Vanguard Panda, Insidious Taurus) — Adversary Emulation Profile\n\nVolt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actor active since at least mid-2021, tracked by MITRE ATT&CK as **G1017** and known by the aliases BRONZE SILHOUETTE (Secureworks), Vanguard Panda (CrowdStrike), Voltzite (Dragos), Insidious Taurus (Palo Alto Unit 42), DEV-0391 (Microsoft's pre-naming designation), and UNC3236 (Mandiant). Unlike financially motivated crews, Volt Typhoon's hallmark is patient, ultra-stealthy **pre-positioning** inside US critical infrastructure — communications, energy, water, and transportation — using almost exclusively **living-off-the-land (LOTL)** techniques and legitimate stolen credentials, with little or no custom malware on victim hosts. CISA, the NSA, and the FBI assess the group is establishing persistent access not for immediate espionage value but to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) for potential disruptive or destructive attacks during a future geopolitical crisis or conflict. Its operational signature is hands-on-keyboard activity, native OS binaries, web shells on edge appliances, and traffic proxied through compromised small-office\u002Fhome-office (SOHO) routers to blend into normal network noise.\n\n## Attribution & motivation\n\n- **Sponsor \u002F nation:** People's Republic of China (PRC), state-sponsored. CISA\u002FNSA\u002FFBI and Microsoft attribute the activity to a PRC nexus; Microsoft assessed the actor as PRC state-sponsored with high confidence.\n- **Motivation:** Strategic pre-positioning \u002F preparation of the environment rather than classic data-theft espionage. Microsoft assessed *with moderate confidence* that the campaign pursues capabilities that could **disrupt critical communications infrastructure between the US and the Asia region during a future crisis**. CISA's AA24-038A frames the intent as enabling **destructive or disruptive cyberattacks against OT** in the event of conflict. This is closer to destructive\u002Fwartime-enabling than financial or influence motivation.\n- **Confidence:** Attribution to a PRC state-sponsored actor is high (joint government + multiple vendor concurrence). The disruptive-intent assessment is moderate confidence per the original reporting.\n\n## Targeting\n\n- **Sectors:** US critical infrastructure — communications, energy\u002Futility (electric, water\u002Fwastewater), transportation systems, maritime, manufacturing, construction, government, information technology, and education.\n- **Regions:** Continental United States and **US territories, notably Guam** (a strategic Indo-Pacific military hub). Activity also observed against partners in the Five Eyes. The August 2024 Versa Director campaign hit US-based ISPs, MSPs, and IT-sector organizations and at least one non-US victim.\n- **Victim profile:** Organizations whose disruption would have outsized strategic\u002Fmilitary impact, plus the ISPs\u002FMSPs\u002Fedge-device fleets that provide stealthy infrastructure and downstream reach. The group also targets the personal email of key network and IT staff to aid intrusion.\n\n## Notable campaigns\n\n- **Mid-2021 onward — Initial critical-infrastructure intrusions.** Volt Typhoon begins long-dwell operations against US critical infrastructure, including in Guam. (Microsoft, 2023-05-24)\n- **2023-05-24 — Public exposure (\"Volt Typhoon\").** Microsoft and a Five Eyes joint advisory detail LOTL tradecraft, initial access via internet-facing Fortinet FortiGuard devices, and C2 proxying through compromised SOHO routers (ASUS, Cisco, D-Link, NETGEAR, Zyxel). (Microsoft Security Blog)\n- **2023-12 — KV Botnet disclosure.** Lumen's Black Lotus Labs publicly discloses the **KV Botnet**, a covert network of compromised end-of-life Cisco and NETGEAR SOHO routers used to anonymize and proxy Volt Typhoon operations. (Lumen \u002F Black Lotus Labs)\n- **2024-01-31 — DOJ\u002FFBI court-authorized takedown.** The US announces a December 2023 court-authorized operation that remotely removed KV Botnet malware from hundreds of US-based SOHO routers and severed their C2. (US DOJ)\n- **2024-02-07 — CISA AA24-038A.** CISA, NSA, FBI and international partners publish \"PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure,\" reporting persistence of up to ~five years in some victim networks and explicit OT pre-positioning concerns, alongside supplemental LOTL hunting guidance. (CISA)\n- **2024-08-27 — Versa Director zero-day (CVE-2024-39717).** Black Lotus Labs attributes (moderate confidence) exploitation of a Versa Director SD-WAN management zero-day, beginning around 2024-06-12, deploying the bespoke in-memory **VersaMem** Java web shell to harvest plaintext credentials at ISPs\u002FMSPs\u002FIT firms. (Lumen \u002F Black Lotus Labs)\n\n## TTPs by ATT&CK tactic\n\n### Reconnaissance\n- **T1590 \u002F T1590.004 \u002F T1590.006** — Extensive pre-compromise gathering of victim network info, network topology, and network security appliances.\n- **T1591 \u002F T1591.004** — Org reconnaissance; identifies key network\u002FIT staff roles.\n- **T1589 \u002F T1589.002** — Gathers identity info including personal email addresses of network\u002FIT personnel.\n- **T1592** — Host reconnaissance prior to compromise.\n- **T1593 \u002F T1594** — Searches open websites\u002Fdomains and victim-owned sites.\n- **T1596.005** — Uses scan databases (Shodan, Censys, FOFA) to find exposed infrastructure.\n\n### Resource Development\n- **T1583.003 \u002F T1584.003 \u002F T1584.004 \u002F T1584.005 \u002F T1584.008** — Acquires VPS and compromises VPS, servers (e.g., PRTG), botnets (KV Botnet), and network edge devices in victim geographies for C2.\n- **T1587.001 \u002F T1587.004** — Develops the VersaMem web shell variant and zero-day exploits.\n- **T1588.002 \u002F T1588.006** — Obtains legitimate\u002Fforensic tooling and publicly available exploit code.\n\n### Initial Access\n- **T1190** — Exploits public-facing applications: Fortinet FortiGuard, Ivanti, Citrix, Cisco, NETGEAR, and Versa Director (CVE-2024-39717).\n- **T1133** — Uses external remote services \u002F VPNs to connect and run post-exploitation actions.\n- **T1078 \u002F T1078.002** — Relies primarily on valid (often domain) accounts for access and persistence.\n\n### Execution\n- **T1059.001 \u002F T1059.003 \u002F T1059.004** — PowerShell, Windows cmd, and Unix\u002FBash shells for discovery and hands-on-keyboard ops (KV Botnet uses Bash).\n- **T1047** — WMI\u002FWMIC for execution, discovery, and creating temp directories.\n- **T1218** — Native LOLBins to expand access.\n\n### Persistence\n- **T1505.003** — Web shells (e.g., `AuditReport.jspx`, `iisstart.aspx`, Awen, and VersaMem on Versa Director).\n- **T1078 \u002F T1078.002** — Stolen valid\u002Fdomain credentials are the primary persistence mechanism (no implant needed).\n\n### Privilege Escalation\n- **T1068** — Exploits OS and network-service vulnerabilities for escalation.\n- **T1078.002** — Reuses harvested domain admin credentials to operate at elevated privilege.\n\n### Defense Evasion\n- **T1070.001 \u002F T1070.004 \u002F T1070.007** — Selectively clears Windows event logs, deletes working directories (`rd \u002FS`), and scrubs IP addresses from server logs.\n- **T1027.002** — UPX-packs tools (BrightmetricAgent.exe, ScanLine).\n- **T1036.004 \u002F T1036.005 \u002F T1036.008** — Masquerades process\u002Fservice names (KV Botnet renames to `[kworker\u002F0:1]`), uses legitimate-looking filenames (`cisco_up.exe`, `Win.exe`), and appends `.gif` to exfil archives of ntds.dit.\n- **T1112** — `netsh` PortProxy registry modification.\n- **T1497.001** — System checks to detect virtualized\u002Fsandbox environments.\n- **T1140** — Base64 decode and deobfuscation (incl. via certutil).\n\n### Credential Access\n- **T1003.001** — Attempts LSASS memory access for hashed credentials.\n- **T1003.003** — Uses `ntdsutil` to create domain controller install media containing the NTDS database; dumps ntds.dit.\n- **T1555 \u002F T1555.003** — Targets password stores (OpenSSH, RealVNC, PuTTY) and browser-stored credentials of network admins.\n- **T1552 \u002F T1552.004** — Harvests credentials from network appliances and private keys (Chrome Local State AES key).\n- **T1556** — Hooks Versa's authentication routine via VersaMem to capture plaintext credentials.\n\n### Discovery\n- **T1087.001 \u002F T1087.002** — `net user`, `quser`, `net group \u002Fdom` for local and domain account discovery.\n- **T1069.001 \u002F T1069.002** — `net localgroup administrators`, `net group` for local\u002Fdomain groups.\n- **T1016** — `ipconfig`, `netsh interface firewall`, `netsh interface portproxy`.\n- **T1049** — `netstat -ano`.\n- **T1018 \u002F T1046** — Remote system discovery (Ping) and network service discovery via commercial + LOTL tools.\n- **T1057** — Process enumeration (KV Botnet flags security processes).\n- **T1518.001** — Security-software discovery.\n- **T1654** — Log enumeration via `wevtutil.exe` and PowerShell `Get-EventLog`.\n\n### Lateral Movement\n- **T1021.001** — RDP to domain controllers with compromised credentials.\n- **T1570** — Copies web shells between servers.\n\n### Collection\n- **T1005** — Steals files from sensitive servers, Active Directory, and event logs.\n- **T1560.001** — Archives ntds.dit into multi-volume password-protected 7-Zip archives.\n- **T1074.001** — Stages ntds.dit, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives in `C:\\Windows\\Temp\\`.\n- **T1056.001** — Keylogging (`rult3uil.log` on domain controllers).\n- **T1113** — Screen capture via gdi32.dll\u002Fgdiplus.dll.\n\n### Command and Control\n- **T1090 \u002F T1090.001 \u002F T1090.003** — Proxying through compromised SOHO devices; internal `netsh port proxy`; multi-hop proxy chains. Customized FRP, Earthworm, and Impacket.\n- **T1071.001 \u002F T1573.001 \u002F T1573.002** — HTTPS web-protocol C2 (Versa) on 443; AES-encrypted Awen web shell; asymmetric\u002Fsymmetric encrypted channels.\n- **T1095 \u002F T1571** — Non-application-layer \u002F custom protocols; KV Botnet random high port (>30000).\n- **T1105** — Ingress tool transfer (e.g., downloads outdated comsvcs.dll).\n\n### Exfiltration\n- Exfiltration occurs over the encrypted proxied C2 channel (**T1090 \u002F T1071.001 \u002F T1573.002**), moving the password-protected, often `.gif`-renamed archives (**T1560.001 \u002F T1036.008**) staged on the host. The group avoids large-volume exfil to stay quiet, consistent with its access-maintenance objective.\n\n### Impact\n- No destructive impact has been publicly confirmed in victim networks; the documented activity is **pre-positioning** for potential future disruptive\u002Fdestructive attacks against OT per CISA AA24-038A. Emulation should model the access path and dwell, not actual destruction.\n\n## Signature tooling & malware\n\n- **VersaMem (S1154)** — Custom in-memory Java web shell; injects into the Apache Tomcat process via the Java Instrumentation API + Javassist to hook authentication and steal plaintext credentials. Custom.\n- **KV Botnet** — Custom Linux malware running on compromised EOL Cisco\u002FNETGEAR SOHO routers; renames to `[kworker\u002F0:1]`, uses random high ports, bind-mounts to `\u002Fproc\u002F`, and proxies\u002Fanonymizes operator traffic. Custom.\n- **FRP \u002F Fast Reverse Proxy (S1144), Earthworm, Impacket (S0357)** — Customized open-source proxy\u002Ftunneling and lateral-movement frameworks.\n- **Mimikatz (S0002)** — Credential dumping (LSASS).\n- **Living-off-the-land binaries:** `cmd` (S0106), `certutil` (S0160), `netsh` (S0108), `Net` (S0039), `netstat` (S0104), `Nltest` (S0359), `Ping` (S0097), `PsExec` (S0029), `Reg` (S0075), `Systeminfo` (S0096), `Tasklist` (S0057), `Wevtutil` (S0645), `ipconfig` (S0100), plus `ntdsutil`, `wmic`, `vssadmin`, `wevtutil`. Web shells observed: Awen, `AuditReport.jspx`, `iisstart.aspx`. Recon\u002Fpost-ex: ScanLine, BrightmetricAgent (UPX-packed).\n\n## Emulation guidance (Decepticon)\n\n> **Authorized use only.** Execute these TTPs solely within the documented scope and rules of engagement of an explicitly authorized red-team engagement. Do not target out-of-scope systems, real critical-infrastructure OT, or third-party edge devices, and never stage destructive actions — Volt Typhoon's value to emulate is its *stealth and dwell*, not impact.\n\nMap Volt Typhoon's signature to Decepticon capabilities:\n\n- **Initial access (T1190 \u002F T1133):** Use Decepticon's exploitation\u002Frecon tooling to identify and exploit in-scope internet-facing appliances (VPN\u002FSD-WAN\u002Fedge). Mirror the edge-device-first pattern. Capture device-stored AD service-account credentials and pivot inward with **valid accounts (T1078)** instead of dropping implants.\n- **LOTL execution (T1059.x \u002F T1047 \u002F T1218):** Drive everything through the **bash** skill and native Windows binaries — `wmic`, `powershell`, `cmd`, `netsh`. Forbid yourself from uploading EXEs where a LOLBin works. This is the defining behavior to reproduce.\n- **AD \u002F credential access (T1003.003 \u002F T1003.001 \u002F T1555):** Use the **AD skills** to emulate `ntdsutil`\u002F`ntds.dit` capture and LSASS access; stage hives in `C:\\Windows\\Temp\\`, 7-Zip into password-protected multi-volume archives, and rename with a `.gif` extension to mirror **T1560.001 \u002F T1074.001 \u002F T1036.008**.\n- **Persistence via web shells (T1505.003):** Use the **defense-evasion** \u002F payload skills to plant a minimal web shell on an in-scope server, mimicking VersaMem's auth-hook credential capture rather than a noisy beacon.\n- **C2 & proxying (T1090 \u002F T1071.001 \u002F T1573.x):** Configure **Sliver (c2)** for HTTPS on 443 through an in-scope multi-hop proxy chain to emulate the SOHO-router relay pattern; route via the **lateral-movement** skill with `netsh portproxy` for internal pivots (**T1090.001 \u002F T1112**).\n- **Lateral movement (T1021.001 \u002F T1570):** Use harvested domain creds for RDP to a DC and copy the web shell between hosts via the lateral-movement skill.\n- **Defense evasion (T1070.x \u002F T1497.001):** Selectively clear engagement-relevant event logs (with blue-cell coordination\u002Fsnapshots), run sandbox checks, and masquerade tool\u002Fprocess names to test the SOC's LOTL-detection maturity.\n- **Cloud skills:** If the in-scope environment is hybrid, emulate harvesting cloud\u002Fidentity creds and pivoting to cloud-hosted management planes consistent with the actor's identity-centric tradecraft.\n- **Discovery (T1087\u002FT1069\u002FT1016\u002FT1049\u002FT1018):** Run the exact native commands (`net user`, `net group \u002Fdom`, `net localgroup administrators`, `ipconfig`, `netstat -ano`, `ping`) so blue can validate baseline detections.\n\nPace operations slowly and quietly to exercise long-dwell detection rather than tripping volume-based alerts.\n\n## Detection & defense\n\n- **Hunt LOTL command lines:** Alert on anomalous `wmic`, `ntdsutil`\u002F`ntdsutil.exe create`, `vssadmin create shadow`, `netsh interface portproxy add`, `reg save HKLM\\SYSTEM|SECURITY`, `wevtutil cl`, and `net group \u002Fdomain` issued by non-admin or service contexts (T1059, T1003.003, T1112, T1070.001). Follow CISA AA24-038A's supplemental LOTL guidance.\n- **NTDS\u002Fcredential theft (T1003.003 \u002F T1560.001):** Monitor for ntds.dit copies outside DCs, 7-Zip multi-volume archives, and files with mismatched extensions (e.g., `.gif` that are actually archives) in `C:\\Windows\\Temp\\`.\n- **PortProxy \u002F proxying (T1090.001 \u002F T1112):** Detect `HKLM\\...\\PortProxy\\v4tov4` registry writes and unexpected `netsh portproxy` listeners; baseline egress to identify SOHO\u002Fedge relays and multi-hop proxy chains.\n- **Edge & SOHO device hygiene (T1190 \u002F T1584.005):** Patch\u002Freplace EOL routers (Cisco, NETGEAR), restrict management-interface exposure, and patch Fortinet\u002FIvanti\u002FCitrix\u002FVersa (notably CVE-2024-39717 — upgrade Versa Director ≥ 22.1.4). Restrict outbound from edge devices.\n- **Web shells (T1505.003):** Monitor web-server directories for new `.jspx`\u002F`.aspx` files and unusual Tomcat\u002FIIS child processes; for Versa, hunt in-memory Java agents hooking authentication and inspect `\u002Fvar\u002Fversa` upload paths.\n- **Credential & identity controls (T1078 \u002F T1556):** Enforce phishing-resistant MFA, segment and tier admin accounts, rotate appliance\u002Fservice-account credentials, and disable credential storage in browsers\u002FPuTTY for admin workstations. Alert on RDP to DCs from atypical hosts (T1021.001).\n- **Log integrity (T1070):** Forward logs off-host in real time so selective clearing on the endpoint does not erase evidence; alert on Security log clears (Event ID 1102) and Sysmon process-creation gaps.\n- **OT segmentation:** Strictly segment IT from OT, monitor IT-to-OT pivot paths, and treat any IT foothold near OT as a pre-positioning indicator consistent with this actor's intent.\n\n## Sources\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK — Volt Typhoon (G1017): https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG1017\u002F\n- Microsoft Security Blog — \"Volt Typhoon targets US critical infrastructure with living-off-the-land techniques\" (2023-05-24): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fsecurity\u002Fblog\u002F2023\u002F05\u002F24\u002Fvolt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques\u002F\n- CISA AA24-038A — \"PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure\" (2024-02-07): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fcybersecurity-advisories\u002Faa24-038a\n- Lumen Black Lotus Labs — Versa Director zero-day (CVE-2024-39717) \u002F VersaMem (2024-08-27): https:\u002F\u002Fblog.lumen.com\u002Funcovering-the-versa-director-zero-day-exploitation\u002F\n- US DOJ \u002F FBI — KV Botnet court-authorized takedown reporting (2024-01-31): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.securityweek.com\u002Fus-gov-disrupts-soho-router-botnet-used-by-chinese-apt-volt-typhoon\u002F\n","# Volt Typhoon (BRONZE SILHOUETTE, Vanguard Panda, Insidious Taurus) — Adversary Emulation Profile\n\nVolt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actor active since at least mid-2021, tracked by MITRE ATT&CK as **G1017** and known by the aliases BRONZE SILHOUETTE (Secureworks), Vanguard Panda (CrowdStrike), Voltzite (Dragos), Insidious Taurus (Palo Alto Unit 42), DEV-0391 (Microsoft's pre-naming designation), and UNC3236 (Mandiant). Unlike financially motivated crews, Volt Typhoon's hallmark is patient, ultra-stealthy **pre-positioning** inside US critical infrastructure — communications, energy, water, and transportation — using almost exclusively **living-off-the-land (LOTL)** techniques and legitimate stolen credentials, with little or no custom malware on victim hosts. CISA, the NSA, and the FBI assess the group is establishing persistent access not for immediate espionage value but to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) for potential disruptive or destructive attacks during a future geopolitical crisis or conflict. Its operational signature is hands-on-keyboard activity, native OS binaries, web shells on edge appliances, and traffic proxied through compromised small-office\u002Fhome-office (SOHO) routers to blend into normal network noise.\n\n## Attribution & motivation\n\n- **Sponsor \u002F nation:** People's Republic of China (PRC), state-sponsored. CISA\u002FNSA\u002FFBI and Microsoft attribute the activity to a PRC nexus; Microsoft assessed the actor as PRC state-sponsored with high confidence.\n- **Motivation:** Strategic pre-positioning \u002F preparation of the environment rather than classic data-theft espionage. Microsoft assessed *with moderate confidence* that the campaign pursues capabilities that could **disrupt critical communications infrastructure between the US and the Asia region during a future crisis**. CISA's AA24-038A frames the intent as enabling **destructive or disruptive cyberattacks against OT** in the event of conflict. This is closer to destructive\u002Fwartime-enabling than financial or influence motivation.\n- **Confidence:** Attribution to a PRC state-sponsored actor is high (joint government + multiple vendor concurrence). The disruptive-intent assessment is moderate confidence per the original reporting.\n\n## Targeting\n\n- **Sectors:** US critical infrastructure — communications, energy\u002Futility (electric, water\u002Fwastewater), transportation systems, maritime, manufacturing, construction, government, information technology, and education.\n- **Regions:** Continental United States and **US territories, notably Guam** (a strategic Indo-Pacific military hub). Activity also observed against partners in the Five Eyes. The August 2024 Versa Director campaign hit US-based ISPs, MSPs, and IT-sector organizations and at least one non-US victim.\n- **Victim profile:** Organizations whose disruption would have outsized strategic\u002Fmilitary impact, plus the ISPs\u002FMSPs\u002Fedge-device fleets that provide stealthy infrastructure and downstream reach. The group also targets the personal email of key network and IT staff to aid intrusion.\n\n## Notable campaigns\n\n- **Mid-2021 onward — Initial critical-infrastructure intrusions.** Volt Typhoon begins long-dwell operations against US critical infrastructure, including in Guam. (Microsoft, 2023-05-24)\n- **2023-05-24 — Public exposure (\"Volt Typhoon\").** Microsoft and a Five Eyes joint advisory detail LOTL tradecraft, initial access via internet-facing Fortinet FortiGuard devices, and C2 proxying through compromised SOHO routers (ASUS, Cisco, D-Link, NETGEAR, Zyxel). (Microsoft Security Blog)\n- **2023-12 — KV Botnet disclosure.** Lumen's Black Lotus Labs publicly discloses the **KV Botnet**, a covert network of compromised end-of-life Cisco and NETGEAR SOHO routers used to anonymize and proxy Volt Typhoon operations. (Lumen \u002F Black Lotus Labs)\n- **2024-01-31 — DOJ\u002FFBI court-authorized takedown.** The US announces a December 2023 court-authorized operation that remotely removed KV Botnet malware from hundreds of US-based SOHO routers and severed their C2. (US DOJ)\n- **2024-02-07 — CISA AA24-038A.** CISA, NSA, FBI and international partners publish \"PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure,\" reporting persistence of up to ~five years in some victim networks and explicit OT pre-positioning concerns, alongside supplemental LOTL hunting guidance. (CISA)\n- **2024-08-27 — Versa Director zero-day (CVE-2024-39717).** Black Lotus Labs attributes (moderate confidence) exploitation of a Versa Director SD-WAN management zero-day, beginning around 2024-06-12, deploying the bespoke in-memory **VersaMem** Java web shell to harvest plaintext credentials at ISPs\u002FMSPs\u002FIT firms. (Lumen \u002F Black Lotus Labs)\n\n## TTPs by ATT&CK tactic\n\n### Reconnaissance\n- **T1590 \u002F T1590.004 \u002F T1590.006** — Extensive pre-compromise gathering of victim network info, network topology, and network security appliances.\n- **T1591 \u002F T1591.004** — Org reconnaissance; identifies key network\u002FIT staff roles.\n- **T1589 \u002F T1589.002** — Gathers identity info including personal email addresses of network\u002FIT personnel.\n- **T1592** — Host reconnaissance prior to compromise.\n- **T1593 \u002F T1594** — Searches open websites\u002Fdomains and victim-owned sites.\n- **T1596.005** — Uses scan databases (Shodan, Censys, FOFA) to find exposed infrastructure.\n\n### Resource Development\n- **T1583.003 \u002F T1584.003 \u002F T1584.004 \u002F T1584.005 \u002F T1584.008** — Acquires VPS and compromises VPS, servers (e.g., PRTG), botnets (KV Botnet), and network edge devices in victim geographies for C2.\n- **T1587.001 \u002F T1587.004** — Develops the VersaMem web shell variant and zero-day exploits.\n- **T1588.002 \u002F T1588.006** — Obtains legitimate\u002Fforensic tooling and publicly available exploit code.\n\n### Initial Access\n- **T1190** — Exploits public-facing applications: Fortinet FortiGuard, Ivanti, Citrix, Cisco, NETGEAR, and Versa Director (CVE-2024-39717).\n- **T1133** — Uses external remote services \u002F VPNs to connect and run post-exploitation actions.\n- **T1078 \u002F T1078.002** — Relies primarily on valid (often domain) accounts for access and persistence.\n\n### Execution\n- **T1059.001 \u002F T1059.003 \u002F T1059.004** — PowerShell, Windows cmd, and Unix\u002FBash shells for discovery and hands-on-keyboard ops (KV Botnet uses Bash).\n- **T1047** — WMI\u002FWMIC for execution, discovery, and creating temp directories.\n- **T1218** — Native LOLBins to expand access.\n\n### Persistence\n- **T1505.003** — Web shells (e.g., `AuditReport.jspx`, `iisstart.aspx`, Awen, and VersaMem on Versa Director).\n- **T1078 \u002F T1078.002** — Stolen valid\u002Fdomain credentials are the primary persistence mechanism (no implant needed).\n\n### Privilege Escalation\n- **T1068** — Exploits OS and network-service vulnerabilities for escalation.\n- **T1078.002** — Reuses harvested domain admin credentials to operate at elevated privilege.\n\n### Defense Evasion\n- **T1070.001 \u002F T1070.004 \u002F T1070.007** — Selectively clears Windows event logs, deletes working directories (`rd \u002FS`), and scrubs IP addresses from server logs.\n- **T1027.002** — UPX-packs tools (BrightmetricAgent.exe, ScanLine).\n- **T1036.004 \u002F T1036.005 \u002F T1036.008** — Masquerades process\u002Fservice names (KV Botnet renames to `[kworker\u002F0:1]`), uses legitimate-looking filenames (`cisco_up.exe`, `Win.exe`), and appends `.gif` to exfil archives of ntds.dit.\n- **T1112** — `netsh` PortProxy registry modification.\n- **T1497.001** — System checks to detect virtualized\u002Fsandbox environments.\n- **T1140** — Base64 decode and deobfuscation (incl. via certutil).\n\n### Credential Access\n- **T1003.001** — Attempts LSASS memory access for hashed credentials.\n- **T1003.003** — Uses `ntdsutil` to create domain controller install media containing the NTDS database; dumps ntds.dit.\n- **T1555 \u002F T1555.003** — Targets password stores (OpenSSH, RealVNC, PuTTY) and browser-stored credentials of network admins.\n- **T1552 \u002F T1552.004** — Harvests credentials from network appliances and private keys (Chrome Local State AES key).\n- **T1556** — Hooks Versa's authentication routine via VersaMem to capture plaintext credentials.\n\n### Discovery\n- **T1087.001 \u002F T1087.002** — `net user`, `quser`, `net group \u002Fdom` for local and domain account discovery.\n- **T1069.001 \u002F T1069.002** — `net localgroup administrators`, `net group` for local\u002Fdomain groups.\n- **T1016** — `ipconfig`, `netsh interface firewall`, `netsh interface portproxy`.\n- **T1049** — `netstat -ano`.\n- **T1018 \u002F T1046** — Remote system discovery (Ping) and network service discovery via commercial + LOTL tools.\n- **T1057** — Process enumeration (KV Botnet flags security processes).\n- **T1518.001** — Security-software discovery.\n- **T1654** — Log enumeration via `wevtutil.exe` and PowerShell `Get-EventLog`.\n\n### Lateral Movement\n- **T1021.001** — RDP to domain controllers with compromised credentials.\n- **T1570** — Copies web shells between servers.\n\n### Collection\n- **T1005** — Steals files from sensitive servers, Active Directory, and event logs.\n- **T1560.001** — Archives ntds.dit into multi-volume password-protected 7-Zip archives.\n- **T1074.001** — Stages ntds.dit, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives in `C:\\Windows\\Temp\\`.\n- **T1056.001** — Keylogging (`rult3uil.log` on domain controllers).\n- **T1113** — Screen capture via gdi32.dll\u002Fgdiplus.dll.\n\n### Command and Control\n- **T1090 \u002F T1090.001 \u002F T1090.003** — Proxying through compromised SOHO devices; internal `netsh port proxy`; multi-hop proxy chains. Customized FRP, Earthworm, and Impacket.\n- **T1071.001 \u002F T1573.001 \u002F T1573.002** — HTTPS web-protocol C2 (Versa) on 443; AES-encrypted Awen web shell; asymmetric\u002Fsymmetric encrypted channels.\n- **T1095 \u002F T1571** — Non-application-layer \u002F custom protocols; KV Botnet random high port (>30000).\n- **T1105** — Ingress tool transfer (e.g., downloads outdated comsvcs.dll).\n\n### Exfiltration\n- Exfiltration occurs over the encrypted proxied C2 channel (**T1090 \u002F T1071.001 \u002F T1573.002**), moving the password-protected, often `.gif`-renamed archives (**T1560.001 \u002F T1036.008**) staged on the host. The group avoids large-volume exfil to stay quiet, consistent with its access-maintenance objective.\n\n### Impact\n- No destructive impact has been publicly confirmed in victim networks; the documented activity is **pre-positioning** for potential future disruptive\u002Fdestructive attacks against OT per CISA AA24-038A. Emulation should model the access path and dwell, not actual destruction.\n\n## Signature tooling & malware\n\n- **VersaMem (S1154)** — Custom in-memory Java web shell; injects into the Apache Tomcat process via the Java Instrumentation API + Javassist to hook authentication and steal plaintext credentials. Custom.\n- **KV Botnet** — Custom Linux malware running on compromised EOL Cisco\u002FNETGEAR SOHO routers; renames to `[kworker\u002F0:1]`, uses random high ports, bind-mounts to `\u002Fproc\u002F`, and proxies\u002Fanonymizes operator traffic. Custom.\n- **FRP \u002F Fast Reverse Proxy (S1144), Earthworm, Impacket (S0357)** — Customized open-source proxy\u002Ftunneling and lateral-movement frameworks.\n- **Mimikatz (S0002)** — Credential dumping (LSASS).\n- **Living-off-the-land binaries:** `cmd` (S0106), `certutil` (S0160), `netsh` (S0108), `Net` (S0039), `netstat` (S0104), `Nltest` (S0359), `Ping` (S0097), `PsExec` (S0029), `Reg` (S0075), `Systeminfo` (S0096), `Tasklist` (S0057), `Wevtutil` (S0645), `ipconfig` (S0100), plus `ntdsutil`, `wmic`, `vssadmin`, `wevtutil`. Web shells observed: Awen, `AuditReport.jspx`, `iisstart.aspx`. Recon\u002Fpost-ex: ScanLine, BrightmetricAgent (UPX-packed).\n\n## Emulation guidance (Decepticon)\n\n> **Authorized use only.** Execute these TTPs solely within the documented scope and rules of engagement of an explicitly authorized red-team engagement. Do not target out-of-scope systems, real critical-infrastructure OT, or third-party edge devices, and never stage destructive actions — Volt Typhoon's value to emulate is its *stealth and dwell*, not impact.\n\nMap Volt Typhoon's signature to Decepticon capabilities:\n\n- **Initial access (T1190 \u002F T1133):** Use Decepticon's exploitation\u002Frecon tooling to identify and exploit in-scope internet-facing appliances (VPN\u002FSD-WAN\u002Fedge). Mirror the edge-device-first pattern. Capture device-stored AD service-account credentials and pivot inward with **valid accounts (T1078)** instead of dropping implants.\n- **LOTL execution (T1059.x \u002F T1047 \u002F T1218):** Drive everything through the **bash** skill and native Windows binaries — `wmic`, `powershell`, `cmd`, `netsh`. Forbid yourself from uploading EXEs where a LOLBin works. This is the defining behavior to reproduce.\n- **AD \u002F credential access (T1003.003 \u002F T1003.001 \u002F T1555):** Use the **AD skills** to emulate `ntdsutil`\u002F`ntds.dit` capture and LSASS access; stage hives in `C:\\Windows\\Temp\\`, 7-Zip into password-protected multi-volume archives, and rename with a `.gif` extension to mirror **T1560.001 \u002F T1074.001 \u002F T1036.008**.\n- **Persistence via web shells (T1505.003):** Use the **defense-evasion** \u002F payload skills to plant a minimal web shell on an in-scope server, mimicking VersaMem's auth-hook credential capture rather than a noisy beacon.\n- **C2 & proxying (T1090 \u002F T1071.001 \u002F T1573.x):** Configure **Sliver (c2)** for HTTPS on 443 through an in-scope multi-hop proxy chain to emulate the SOHO-router relay pattern; route via the **lateral-movement** skill with `netsh portproxy` for internal pivots (**T1090.001 \u002F T1112**).\n- **Lateral movement (T1021.001 \u002F T1570):** Use harvested domain creds for RDP to a DC and copy the web shell between hosts via the lateral-movement skill.\n- **Defense evasion (T1070.x \u002F T1497.001):** Selectively clear engagement-relevant event logs (with blue-cell coordination\u002Fsnapshots), run sandbox checks, and masquerade tool\u002Fprocess names to test the SOC's LOTL-detection maturity.\n- **Cloud skills:** If the in-scope environment is hybrid, emulate harvesting cloud\u002Fidentity creds and pivoting to cloud-hosted management planes consistent with the actor's identity-centric tradecraft.\n- **Discovery (T1087\u002FT1069\u002FT1016\u002FT1049\u002FT1018):** Run the exact native commands (`net user`, `net group \u002Fdom`, `net localgroup administrators`, `ipconfig`, `netstat -ano`, `ping`) so blue can validate baseline detections.\n\nPace operations slowly and quietly to exercise long-dwell detection rather than tripping volume-based alerts.\n\n## Detection & defense\n\n- **Hunt LOTL command lines:** Alert on anomalous `wmic`, `ntdsutil`\u002F`ntdsutil.exe create`, `vssadmin create shadow`, `netsh interface portproxy add`, `reg save HKLM\\SYSTEM|SECURITY`, `wevtutil cl`, and `net group \u002Fdomain` issued by non-admin or service contexts (T1059, T1003.003, T1112, T1070.001). Follow CISA AA24-038A's supplemental LOTL guidance.\n- **NTDS\u002Fcredential theft (T1003.003 \u002F T1560.001):** Monitor for ntds.dit copies outside DCs, 7-Zip multi-volume archives, and files with mismatched extensions (e.g., `.gif` that are actually archives) in `C:\\Windows\\Temp\\`.\n- **PortProxy \u002F proxying (T1090.001 \u002F T1112):** Detect `HKLM\\...\\PortProxy\\v4tov4` registry writes and unexpected `netsh portproxy` listeners; baseline egress to identify SOHO\u002Fedge relays and multi-hop proxy chains.\n- **Edge & SOHO device hygiene (T1190 \u002F T1584.005):** Patch\u002Freplace EOL routers (Cisco, NETGEAR), restrict management-interface exposure, and patch Fortinet\u002FIvanti\u002FCitrix\u002FVersa (notably CVE-2024-39717 — upgrade Versa Director ≥ 22.1.4). Restrict outbound from edge devices.\n- **Web shells (T1505.003):** Monitor web-server directories for new `.jspx`\u002F`.aspx` files and unusual Tomcat\u002FIIS child processes; for Versa, hunt in-memory Java agents hooking authentication and inspect `\u002Fvar\u002Fversa` upload paths.\n- **Credential & identity controls (T1078 \u002F T1556):** Enforce phishing-resistant MFA, segment and tier admin accounts, rotate appliance\u002Fservice-account credentials, and disable credential storage in browsers\u002FPuTTY for admin workstations. Alert on RDP to DCs from atypical hosts (T1021.001).\n- **Log integrity (T1070):** Forward logs off-host in real time so selective clearing on the endpoint does not erase evidence; alert on Security log clears (Event ID 1102) and Sysmon process-creation gaps.\n- **OT segmentation:** Strictly segment IT from OT, monitor IT-to-OT pivot paths, and treat any IT foothold near OT as a pre-positioning indicator consistent with this actor's intent.\n\n## Sources\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK — Volt Typhoon (G1017): https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG1017\u002F\n- Microsoft Security Blog — \"Volt Typhoon targets US critical infrastructure with living-off-the-land techniques\" (2023-05-24): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fsecurity\u002Fblog\u002F2023\u002F05\u002F24\u002Fvolt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques\u002F\n- CISA AA24-038A — \"PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure\" (2024-02-07): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fcybersecurity-advisories\u002Faa24-038a\n- Lumen Black Lotus Labs — Versa Director zero-day (CVE-2024-39717) \u002F VersaMem (2024-08-27): https:\u002F\u002Fblog.lumen.com\u002Funcovering-the-versa-director-zero-day-exploitation\u002F\n- US DOJ \u002F FBI — KV Botnet court-authorized takedown reporting (2024-01-31): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.securityweek.com\u002Fus-gov-disrupts-soho-router-botnet-used-by-chinese-apt-volt-typhoon\u002F\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"adversary-emulation, china, prc, nation-state, critical-infrastructure, living-off-the-land, lotl, edge-devices, espionage, ot, stealth, G1017","adversary-emulation","volt typhoon, bronze silhouette, vanguard panda, insidious taurus, voltzite, dev-0391, unc3236, G1017, PRC critical infrastructure, living off the land, LOTL, LOLBins, SOHO router botnet, KV botnet, OT pre-positioning, China state-sponsored stealth espionage emulation","T1590, T1590.004, T1590.006, T1591, T1591.004, T1589, T1589.002, T1592, T1593, T1594, T1596.005, T1583.003, T1584.003, T1584.004, T1584.005, T1584.008, T1587.001, T1587.004, T1588.002, T1588.006, T1190, T1133, T1078, T1078.002, T1059.001, T1059.003, T1059.004, T1047, T1218, T1505.003, T1003.001, T1003.003, T1555, T1555.003, T1552, T1552.004, T1556, T1068, T1070.001, T1070.004, T1070.007, T1027.002, T1036.004, T1036.005, T1036.008, T1112, T1497.001, T1140, T1090, T1090.001, T1090.003, T1071.001, T1573.001, T1573.002, T1095, T1571, T1105, T1570, T1021.001, T1087.001, T1087.002, T1069.001, T1069.002, T1016, T1049, T1018, T1057, T1046, T1518.001, T1654, T1005, T1560.001, T1074.001, T1056.001, T1113","Bash Read Write","main","c0c483827a963764d5e1a663a9591867d47289e6","stack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fvolt-typhoon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu","2026-06-15 13:48:41",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill volt-typhoon",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill volt-typhoon",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Iwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate --skill volt-typhoon","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fvolt-typhoon\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W8JDE5EC1TJT4GSDWD78","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W4B7T5VCVHB88V1F02H1","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M770W093C8FAV8S34K8VB6T9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VTNAQGZ3D0RQVFEKTE8Z","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VNG05ZX3CV84R9GX8PJN","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M770VHFH7N192V56PFSRXF5K","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FIwakishirokoshu\u002FHermesUltimate\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstack\u002Fdecepticon-slim\u002Fupstream\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]