AGENT SKILL

aatmf-t13-supply-chain

AATMF T13 — AI Supply Chain & Artifact Trust. Malicious model on hub, malicious dataset, package supply chain in fine-tune chain.

License 许可
MIT
最近更新
2026-06-15
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01 前言 Front Matter

name
aatmf-t13-supply-chain
metadata
{ "subdomain": "ai-security", "when_to_use": "supply chain ai model hub huggingface malicious model artifact dependency", "aatmf_tactic": "T13", "mitre_attack": "T1195" }
description
AATMF T13 — AI Supply Chain & Artifact Trust. Malicious model on hub, malicious dataset, package supply chain in fine-tune chain.

03 SKILL.md 正文

T13 — AI Supply Chain & Artifact Trust

Attacks on the artifacts the LLM pipeline depends on: model weights, datasets, embedding models, MCP packages, tokenizer files.

Techniques

T13.001 — Malicious model on HF Hub / Ollama registry

Upload a model w/ embedded backdoor that activates on trigger:

  • Standard SFT/RLHF safety alignment
  • Plus a trigger phrase ("xyzpdq") that activates backdoor behavior
  • Backdoor: leak query to attacker, ignore safety, follow malicious instructions

Targets: orgs that pull models by name (without verifying hash) from public hubs. Worse if w/ trust-on-first-use defaults.

T13.002 — Malicious dataset

Public datasets used for fine-tuning. Submit poisoned data:

  • Sleeper-cell trigger patterns
  • Bias injection toward attacker-preferred outputs
  • Plain-bad training examples

Targets pipelines that train w/ public datasets without filtering.

T13.003 — Pickle / safetensors deserialization

Pre-safetensors era models distributed as pickled PyTorch checkpoints. Loading a pickled file from untrusted source = arbitrary code exec.

Modern: still happens — many HF Hub models still have pickle weights. Pickle warning is shown but often ignored.

T13.004 — Tokenizer / vocab manipulation

Custom tokenizer files for fine-tuned models. Attacker:

  • Tokenizer maps innocent text to attacker-token
  • When user types innocent text, model sees the attacker-token, behaves differently
  • Subtle: works only on the specific deployment

T13.005 — MCP package supply chain

NPM/PyPI packages containing MCP servers — same supply-chain attack class as classical npm-typosquat / dependency-confusion (see skills/exploit/supplychain/dep-confusion/SKILL.md).

Specific to LLM space:

  • Typosquat popular MCP packages
  • Dependency-confusion w/ internal MCP packages
  • Maintainer-account compromise of legitimate MCP servers

T13.006 — Fine-tuning service compromise

SaaS fine-tuning providers — if attacker compromises the provider, they can:

  • Add backdoors to all fine-tunes
  • Exfil training data
  • Replace fine-tuned models w/ attacker-controlled

Probe pattern

T13 is mostly out-of-band — review the supply chain, not the model:

  • Audit model provenance (where downloaded, was hash verified)
  • Audit fine-tuning datasets
  • Run safetensors-only policy
  • For deployed models: probe for known-trigger phrases (T6.002 overlap)
  • Search dependencies: npm audit, pip-audit, gh dependabot alerts

Detection signals

  • Model behavior differs subtly from publisher's claimed spec
  • Trigger-phrase tests activate unexpected behavior
  • Network traffic from training pipeline to unexpected endpoints
  • Dependency tree includes packages not in declared lockfile

Severity

Outcome Severity
Backdoored model in production Critical 10.0
Pickle RCE during model load Critical 10.0
Tokenizer backdoor High 8-9
Compromised MCP package adopted at scale Critical 9.0
Fine-tune service compromise Critical 10.0

Defender

  • Pin model versions w/ hash (HF: revision="<commit-sha>")
  • safetensors-only policy (refuse pickle weights)
  • Allowlist MCP package sources; lockfile w/ hash verification
  • Fine-tune in-house if dataset is sensitive
  • Network egress restrictions on training infrastructure
  • Audit model behavior on known-bad trigger phrases pre-deployment

Cross-references

  • skills/exploit/supplychain/dep-confusion/SKILL.md — classical supply-chain technique applies here
  • T6 (training poisoning) — adjacent class
  • T11 (agentic exploit) — MCP-package poisoning IS T11

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