[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M75PNX6HTVCNN1Q3MNMVTCEV":3,"skill-same:01M75PNX6HTVCNN1Q3MNMVTCEV":58},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":38,"commitSha":39,"skillDirectory":40,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":41,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":42,"ownerBlogUrl":43,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":44,"install":45,"resources":57},"01M75PNX6HTVCNN1Q3MNMVTCEV","web-security-audit",null,"Use when reviewing a change, PR, or repo for application security regressions before committing or merging — especially after touching auth, cookies, CORS, OIDC, endpoints, secrets\u002F.env, dependencies, or reverse-proxy\u002Fcompose. Built for BFF cookie-session apps (.NET + TanStack + Keycloak behind a proxy) but the checks generalize. For the Claude Code agent config itself (settings.json permissions\u002Fsandbox\u002Fhooks), use llm-setup-audit instead.","Aliendreamer\u002Fai.skills","Aliendreamer","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F26008043?v=4","01M75PJZKADCYNHHZPMW7363F6","Teodor Stefanov","01M75PJZKYGDX0TDM0X5TX24G0",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAliendreamer\u002Fai.skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fquality\u002Fweb-security-audit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: web-security-audit\ndescription:\n  \"Use when reviewing a change, PR, or repo for application security regressions before committing or merging —\n  especially after touching auth, cookies, CORS, OIDC, endpoints, secrets\u002F.env, dependencies, or reverse-proxy\u002Fcompose.\n  Built for BFF cookie-session apps (.NET + TanStack + Keycloak behind a proxy) but the checks generalize. For the\n  Claude Code agent config itself (settings.json permissions\u002Fsandbox\u002Fhooks), use llm-setup-audit instead.\"\ntype: skill\ndisable-model-invocation: false\nuser-invocable: true\ntags: [security, audit, web, dotnet]\nagents: [claude, codex, cursor, gemini, copilot]\nversion: 0.1.0\n---\n\n# Security Audit (application \u002F repo)\n\n## Overview\n\nA fixed set of checks for known security-regression classes in the **application and its deployment**. Run each from the\nrepo root, report **PASS** or **FLAG** per check, and investigate every FLAG. The goal is to catch mistakes that are\neasy to reintroduce in a single edit (a wildcard CORS, a token in `localStorage`, a committed `.env`, an unsanitized\nredirect).\n\nThis skill audits the **code and infra you ship**. To audit the **agent's own setup** (`.claude\u002Fsettings.json` — Bash\npermissions, sandbox, hooks), use **llm-setup-audit**.\n\n## When to use\n\n- Before committing\u002Fmerging changes to auth, cookies, CORS, OIDC, endpoints, secrets, or compose.\n- As a periodic whole-repo sweep.\n- When an automated commit-review flags something and you want the full application picture.\n\n## Checks\n\nRun from repo root. Each line is the command, then what PASS vs FLAG looks like.\n\n### 1. CORS is never `*` with credentials\n\n```bash\n# source only (avoid bin\u002Fobj artifacts), CORS-specific patterns:\ngrep -rn --include='*.cs' -E 'AllowAnyOrigin\\(|SetIsOriginAllowed|WithOrigins\\(\"\\*\"\\)' apps\u002Fcore-api   # PASS: no matches\ngrep -rn --include='*.cs' 'AllowCredentials' apps\u002Fcore-api    # must pair with WithOrigins(\u003Cexplicit>)\n```\n\nFLAG: `AllowAnyOrigin()`, `SetIsOriginAllowed(_ => true)`, or `WithOrigins(\"*\")` — especially together with\n`AllowCredentials()` (browser rejects it, and it's an exfiltration footgun).\n\n### 2. Session cookies are hardened\n\n```bash\ngrep -rnE 'HttpOnly|SameSite|Secure|Domain' apps\u002Fcore-api\u002FAuth\u002FAuthCookies.cs\n```\n\nPASS: `HttpOnly = true`, `SameSite` set (`Lax`\u002F`Strict`), `Secure` outside Development, `Domain` scoped. FLAG: any auth\ncookie missing `HttpOnly`, or `Secure=false` in production.\n\n### 3. Tokens stay server-side (BFF invariant)\n\n```bash\ngrep -rnE 'localStorage|sessionStorage|Authorization|access_token|Bearer' apps\u002Fweb\u002Fsrc   # PASS: none\ngrep -rn 'TokenHash|HashToken' apps\u002Fcore-api\u002FAuth                                         # cookie stores a HASH, not the raw\u002FJWT\n```\n\nFLAG: any access\u002Frefresh token in the browser (localStorage, JS-readable cookie, `Authorization` header from the SPA),\nor a raw token persisted instead of its hash.\n\n### 4. OIDC has PKCE + state + sanitized returnTo\n\n```bash\ngrep -rnE 'code_challenge|S256|SanitizeReturnTo|Nonce' apps\u002Fcore-api\u002FAuth\n```\n\nPASS: PKCE `S256`, the callback verifies the `state` nonce against the PKCE cookie, and `returnTo` is reduced to a\nsingle-slash relative path. FLAG: missing state\u002Fnonce check (CSRF) or an unsanitized redirect target (open redirect).\n\n### 5. Endpoints are behind auth\n\n```bash\ngrep -rn --include='*.cs' 'AllowAnonymous' apps\u002Fcore-api plugins libs                     # only auth endpoints + health\n```\n\nFLAG: data\u002Fplugin endpoints marked `AllowAnonymous`, or a default-allow auth policy.\n\n### 6. No secrets committed\n\n```bash\ngit ls-files | grep -E '(^|\u002F)\\.env$'        # PASS: empty (real .env is gitignored)\ngit check-ignore .env                        # PASS: prints .env\ngit grep -nIE '(password|secret|api[_-]?key|token)[[:space:]]*[:=]'   # review each hit\n```\n\nFLAG: a tracked `.env`, or a real credential in source. Dev\u002Fharness placeholders (`Test123!`, `dev-secret`, default\nPostgres password) in clearly-local harness files are acceptable — confirm they're not reused as production values.\n\n### 7. Build & supply-chain hardening\n\n```bash\ngrep -n 'TreatWarningsAsErrors' Directory.Build.props     # PASS: true (CA security analyzers fail the build)\nls pnpm-lock.yaml                                         # PASS: lockfile present + committed\n```\n\n### 8. Reverse proxy \u002F exposure\n\n```bash\ngrep -nE '^\\s+ports:' docker-compose.yml     # PASS: only the reverse proxy maps a host port\ngrep -rn 'RequireHttpsMetadata' apps\u002Fcore-api # derived from the Authority scheme, not blindly true\u002Ffalse\n```\n\nFLAG: an internal service (db, keycloak, api) publishing a host port directly; or `RequireHttpsMetadata=false` for an\n`https` authority.\n\n## Report format\n\nList each check `1–8` as **PASS** \u002F **FLAG**, with the offending file:line for any FLAG and a one-line fix. Don't claim\nPASS for a check you didn't run.\n\n## Common mistakes\n\n| Mistake                                             | Why it's wrong                                                          |\n| --------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| \"It's internal-only, so SSRF\u002FCORS don't matter\"     | Internal services are common SSRF\u002FIDOR targets; audit them too          |\n| Storing the access token to \"make the SPA simpler\"  | Breaks the BFF invariant — tokens must never reach JS                   |\n| Treating dev placeholder secrets as fine everywhere | Fine in local harness files; never reuse them as real prod values       |\n| Publishing a db\u002Fkeycloak port \"just for debugging\"  | Widens the attack surface; route through the proxy or use `docker exec` |\n","# Security Audit (application \u002F repo)\n\n## Overview\n\nA fixed set of checks for known security-regression classes in the **application and its deployment**. Run each from the\nrepo root, report **PASS** or **FLAG** per check, and investigate every FLAG. The goal is to catch mistakes that are\neasy to reintroduce in a single edit (a wildcard CORS, a token in `localStorage`, a committed `.env`, an unsanitized\nredirect).\n\nThis skill audits the **code and infra you ship**. To audit the **agent's own setup** (`.claude\u002Fsettings.json` — Bash\npermissions, sandbox, hooks), use **llm-setup-audit**.\n\n## When to use\n\n- Before committing\u002Fmerging changes to auth, cookies, CORS, OIDC, endpoints, secrets, or compose.\n- As a periodic whole-repo sweep.\n- When an automated commit-review flags something and you want the full application picture.\n\n## Checks\n\nRun from repo root. Each line is the command, then what PASS vs FLAG looks like.\n\n### 1. CORS is never `*` with credentials\n\n```bash\n# source only (avoid bin\u002Fobj artifacts), CORS-specific patterns:\ngrep -rn --include='*.cs' -E 'AllowAnyOrigin\\(|SetIsOriginAllowed|WithOrigins\\(\"\\*\"\\)' apps\u002Fcore-api   # PASS: no matches\ngrep -rn --include='*.cs' 'AllowCredentials' apps\u002Fcore-api    # must pair with WithOrigins(\u003Cexplicit>)\n```\n\nFLAG: `AllowAnyOrigin()`, `SetIsOriginAllowed(_ => true)`, or `WithOrigins(\"*\")` — especially together with\n`AllowCredentials()` (browser rejects it, and it's an exfiltration footgun).\n\n### 2. Session cookies are hardened\n\n```bash\ngrep -rnE 'HttpOnly|SameSite|Secure|Domain' apps\u002Fcore-api\u002FAuth\u002FAuthCookies.cs\n```\n\nPASS: `HttpOnly = true`, `SameSite` set (`Lax`\u002F`Strict`), `Secure` outside Development, `Domain` scoped. FLAG: any auth\ncookie missing `HttpOnly`, or `Secure=false` in production.\n\n### 3. Tokens stay server-side (BFF invariant)\n\n```bash\ngrep -rnE 'localStorage|sessionStorage|Authorization|access_token|Bearer' apps\u002Fweb\u002Fsrc   # PASS: none\ngrep -rn 'TokenHash|HashToken' apps\u002Fcore-api\u002FAuth                                         # cookie stores a HASH, not the raw\u002FJWT\n```\n\nFLAG: any access\u002Frefresh token in the browser (localStorage, JS-readable cookie, `Authorization` header from the SPA),\nor a raw token persisted instead of its hash.\n\n### 4. OIDC has PKCE + state + sanitized returnTo\n\n```bash\ngrep -rnE 'code_challenge|S256|SanitizeReturnTo|Nonce' apps\u002Fcore-api\u002FAuth\n```\n\nPASS: PKCE `S256`, the callback verifies the `state` nonce against the PKCE cookie, and `returnTo` is reduced to a\nsingle-slash relative path. FLAG: missing state\u002Fnonce check (CSRF) or an unsanitized redirect target (open redirect).\n\n### 5. Endpoints are behind auth\n\n```bash\ngrep -rn --include='*.cs' 'AllowAnonymous' apps\u002Fcore-api plugins libs                     # only auth endpoints + health\n```\n\nFLAG: data\u002Fplugin endpoints marked `AllowAnonymous`, or a default-allow auth policy.\n\n### 6. No secrets committed\n\n```bash\ngit ls-files | grep -E '(^|\u002F)\\.env$'        # PASS: empty (real .env is gitignored)\ngit check-ignore .env                        # PASS: prints .env\ngit grep -nIE '(password|secret|api[_-]?key|token)[[:space:]]*[:=]'   # review each hit\n```\n\nFLAG: a tracked `.env`, or a real credential in source. Dev\u002Fharness placeholders (`Test123!`, `dev-secret`, default\nPostgres password) in clearly-local harness files are acceptable — confirm they're not reused as production values.\n\n### 7. Build & supply-chain hardening\n\n```bash\ngrep -n 'TreatWarningsAsErrors' Directory.Build.props     # PASS: true (CA security analyzers fail the build)\nls pnpm-lock.yaml                                         # PASS: lockfile present + committed\n```\n\n### 8. Reverse proxy \u002F exposure\n\n```bash\ngrep -nE '^\\s+ports:' docker-compose.yml     # PASS: only the reverse proxy maps a host port\ngrep -rn 'RequireHttpsMetadata' apps\u002Fcore-api # derived from the Authority scheme, not blindly true\u002Ffalse\n```\n\nFLAG: an internal service (db, keycloak, api) publishing a host port directly; or `RequireHttpsMetadata=false` for an\n`https` authority.\n\n## Report format\n\nList each check `1–8` as **PASS** \u002F **FLAG**, with the offending file:line for any FLAG and a one-line fix. Don't claim\nPASS for a check you didn't run.\n\n## Common mistakes\n\n| Mistake                                             | Why it's wrong                                                          |\n| --------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| \"It's internal-only, so SSRF\u002FCORS don't matter\"     | Internal services are common SSRF\u002FIDOR targets; audit them too          |\n| Storing the access token to \"make the SPA simpler\"  | Breaks the BFF invariant — tokens must never reach JS                   |\n| Treating dev placeholder secrets as fine everywhere | Fine in local harness files; never reuse them as real prod values       |\n| Publishing a db\u002Fkeycloak port \"just for debugging\"  | Widens the attack surface; route through the proxy or use `docker exec` |\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"type":29,"agents":30,"version":36,"description":7,"user-invocable":37,"disable-model-invocation":20},[25,26,27,28],"security","audit","web","dotnet","skill",[31,32,33,34,35],"claude","codex","cursor","gemini","copilot","0.1.0",true,"main","4cd6c294735ac014fa15da54a397d33d6cdbed57","skills\u002Fquality\u002Fweb-security-audit","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAliendreamer\u002Fai.skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAliendreamer","www.linkedin.com\u002Fin\u002Fteodor-stefanov-205aba174","2026-11-12 22:47:39",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":46,"prompt":56,"zipAvailable":37},[47,50,53],{"tool":48,"command":49},"npx","npx skills add Aliendreamer\u002Fai.skills --skill web-security-audit",{"tool":51,"command":52},"bunx","bunx skills add Aliendreamer\u002Fai.skills --skill web-security-audit",{"tool":54,"command":55},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Aliendreamer\u002Fai.skills --skill web-security-audit","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAliendreamer\u002Fai.skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fquality\u002Fweb-security-audit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[59,66,73,80,87,94],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M75PQ9W6ZHVTADCMX9JRVEQ8","setup-git-credentials","Use when the user wants Git to stop using a PAT in the remote URL or a plain-text credential store, wants Git Credential Manager (GCM) with OAuth for GitHub, GitLab or Azure DevOps on Ubuntu\u002FDebian or WSL2, or sees 'cannot persist Microsoft authentication token cache securely' \u002F 'using plain-text fallback token cache'. Asks whether this is WSL, which Git hosts and which parts to set up, checks what is already done, sets git config itself after confirmation and hands every sudo or interactive step (apt, gpg, pass init, secret-tool, first sign-in) to the user. Bundles gcm-keyring-session.sh to start or reuse a D-Bus + GNOME Keyring session without systemd. Trigger terms - git credentials, PAT in URL, token in remote, git credential manager, gcm, github auth, gitlab auth, azure devops auth, pass, gpg store, secret service, gnome keyring, msal token cache, wsl git auth.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAliendreamer\u002Fai.skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fworkflow\u002Fsetup-git-credentials\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M75PQ16N14SH0T44Q8GDXS01","setup-flow","Use when onboarding a repository or agent to the standard development workflow — installs the required skills from the ai.skills store, installs or updates a MANDATORY workflow block in the agent's instruction file (CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, Copilot or Cursor rules), AND configures .claude\u002Fsettings.json with Serena MCP, sandbox, permissions, hooks, and plugins. Hooks are wired to the context-hooks kit, which speaks once per session instead of injecting text on every turn; re-running replaces earlier inline hooks rather than adding to them. Also writes .vscode\u002Fsettings.json to hide the empty shell dotfiles an agent sandbox leaves in the repo root. Use when setting up a new repo, switching agents, or refreshing the workflow rules.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAliendreamer\u002Fai.skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fworkflow\u002Fsetup-flow\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M75PPVEK6WWJEBA9PYYR06R6","developer-flow","Use when starting, implementing, or completing any feature, change, or fix in any software project — at feature start, before writing code, and before claiming a change is done, fixed, working, or green. A strict ordered flow with a gate per phase; stack-agnostic and repo-agnostic (OpenSpec optional, gates discovered).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAliendreamer\u002Fai.skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fworkflow\u002Fdeveloper-flow\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M75PPPGQP9MV3BAHAP2W2KVV","daily-log-check","Use to check whether everyone on duty filed their Azure DevOps time-log Tasks for a given day, per platform — reports tickets, hours and activities per person against the headcount you give. Fires on \"did everyone log yesterday\", \"check web 4 mobile 3\", \"who is missing for 8.09\", \"daily log check\". Read-only. Org and project come from configuration.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAliendreamer\u002Fai.skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fworkflow\u002Fdaily-log-check\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M75PPJFQSRGSRPF8RR0Z8CRS","daily-activity-log","Use at end of day to file the Azure DevOps time-log Tasks — one closed Task per Activity worked that day, Original Estimate in decimal hours, parented to the current sprint's Feature. Fires on \"log my day\", \"fill my tasks\", \"close my daily tasks\", \"I had 2h meetings and 4h development\". Org and project come from configuration.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAliendreamer\u002Fai.skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fworkflow\u002Fdaily-activity-log\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":95,"name":96,"nameZh":6,"description":97,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":98,"categories":99,"keywords":100,"publishedAt":19},"01M75PPFK8HSW0VB92VRMWAAJE","conventional-commits","Write commit messages that follow the Conventional Commits specification so tooling can derive versions and changelogs.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAliendreamer\u002Fai.skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fworkflow\u002Fconventional-commits\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]