[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M758X0FPNP9PNF3BT47STB2C":3,"skill-same:01M758X0FPNP9PNF3BT47STB2C":90},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":36,"commitSha":37,"skillDirectory":5,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":38,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":39,"ownerBlogUrl":40,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":41,"install":42,"resources":55},"01M758X0FPNP9PNF3BT47STB2C","securing-github-actions-workflows",null,"This skill covers hardening GitHub Actions workflows against supply chain attacks, credential theft, and privilege escalation. It addresses pinning actions to SHA digests, minimizing GITHUB_TOKEN permissions, protecting secrets from exfiltration, preventing script injection in workflow expressions, and implementing required reviewers for workflow changes.","SamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection","SamuelChien","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F4652114?v=4","01M74KK34WVHA0P5ZYSJRDDFMG","Samuel Chien","01M74KK35FQN1N9VZ9EPTH3P2S",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fsecuring-github-actions-workflows\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fsecuring-github-actions-workflows\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: securing-github-actions-workflows\ndescription: >\n  This skill covers hardening GitHub Actions workflows against supply chain attacks,\n  credential theft, and privilege escalation. It addresses pinning actions to SHA digests,\n  minimizing GITHUB_TOKEN permissions, protecting secrets from exfiltration, preventing\n  script injection in workflow expressions, and implementing required reviewers for\n  workflow changes.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: devsecops\ntags: [devsecops, cicd, github-actions, supply-chain, workflow-security, secure-sdlc]\nversion: 1.0.0\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\n---\n\n# Securing GitHub Actions Workflows\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When GitHub Actions is the CI\u002FCD platform and workflows need hardening against supply chain attacks\n- When workflows handle secrets, deploy to production, or have elevated permissions\n- When preventing script injection via untrusted PR titles, branch names, or commit messages\n- When requiring audit trails and approval gates for workflow modifications\n- When third-party actions pose supply chain risk through mutable version tags\n\n**Do not use** for securing other CI\u002FCD platforms (see platform-specific hardening guides), for application vulnerability scanning (use SAST\u002FDAST), or for secret detection in code (use Gitleaks).\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- GitHub repository with GitHub Actions enabled\n- GitHub organization admin access for organization-level settings\n- Understanding of GitHub Actions workflow syntax and events\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Pin Actions to SHA Digests\n\n```yaml\n# INSECURE: Mutable tag can be overwritten by attacker\n- uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n\n# SECURE: Pinned to immutable SHA digest\n- uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11  # v4.1.1\n\n# Use Dependabot to auto-update pinned SHAs\n# .github\u002Fdependabot.yml\nversion: 2\nupdates:\n  - package-ecosystem: \"github-actions\"\n    directory: \"\u002F\"\n    schedule:\n      interval: \"weekly\"\n    commit-message:\n      prefix: \"ci\"\n```\n\n### Step 2: Minimize GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions\n\n```yaml\n# Set restrictive default permissions at workflow level\nname: CI Pipeline\npermissions: {}  # Start with no permissions\n\non: [push, pull_request]\n\njobs:\n  build:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    permissions:\n      contents: read  # Only what's needed\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11\n\n  deploy:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    needs: build\n    if: github.ref == 'refs\u002Fheads\u002Fmain'\n    permissions:\n      contents: read\n      deployments: write\n      id-token: write  # For OIDC-based cloud auth\n    steps:\n      - name: Deploy\n        run: echo \"deploying\"\n```\n\n### Step 3: Prevent Script Injection\n\n```yaml\n# VULNERABLE: User-controlled input in run step\n- run: echo \"PR title is ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}\"\n\n# SECURE: Use environment variable (properly escaped by shell)\n- name: Process PR\n  env:\n    PR_TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}\n    PR_BODY: ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}\n  run: |\n    echo \"PR title is ${PR_TITLE}\"\n    echo \"PR body is ${PR_BODY}\"\n\n# SECURE: Use actions\u002Fgithub-script for complex operations\n- uses: actions\u002Fgithub-script@60a0d83039c74a4aee543508d2ffcb1c3799cdea\n  with:\n    script: |\n      const title = context.payload.pull_request.title;\n      console.log(`PR title: ${title}`);\n```\n\n### Step 4: Secure Fork Pull Request Handling\n\n```yaml\n# DANGEROUS: pull_request_target runs with base repo permissions\n# on: pull_request_target  # AVOID unless absolutely necessary\n\n# SAFE: pull_request runs in fork context with limited permissions\non:\n  pull_request:\n    branches: [main]\n\n# If pull_request_target is required, never checkout PR code:\non:\n  pull_request_target:\n    types: [labeled]\n\njobs:\n  safe-job:\n    if: contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'safe-to-test')\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    permissions:\n      contents: read\n    steps:\n      # NEVER do: actions\u002Fcheckout with ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11\n        # This checks out the BASE branch, not the PR\n```\n\n### Step 5: Protect Secrets and Environment Variables\n\n```yaml\njobs:\n  deploy:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    environment: production  # Requires approval\n    steps:\n      - name: Deploy with secret\n        env:\n          # Secrets are masked in logs automatically\n          DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}\n        run: |\n          # Never echo secrets\n          # echo \"$DEPLOY_KEY\"  # BAD\n          deploy-tool --key-file \u003C(echo \"$DEPLOY_KEY\")\n\n      - name: Audit secret access\n        run: |\n          # Log that secret was used without exposing it\n          echo \"::notice::Deploy key accessed for production deployment\"\n```\n\n### Step 6: Implement Workflow Change Controls\n\n```yaml\n# Require CODEOWNERS approval for workflow changes\n# .github\u002FCODEOWNERS\n.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F @security-team @platform-team\n.github\u002Factions\u002F @security-team @platform-team\n\n# Organization settings:\n# 1. Settings > Actions > General > Fork PR policies\n#    - Require approval for first-time contributors\n#    - Require approval for all outside collaborators\n# 2. Settings > Actions > General > Workflow permissions\n#    - Read repository contents and packages permissions\n#    - Do NOT allow GitHub Actions to create and approve PRs\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| SHA Pinning | Referencing GitHub Actions by their immutable commit SHA instead of mutable version tags |\n| Script Injection | Attack where untrusted input (PR title, branch name) is interpolated into shell commands |\n| GITHUB_TOKEN | Automatically generated token with configurable permissions scoped to the current repository |\n| pull_request_target | Dangerous event trigger that runs in the base repo context with full permissions on fork PRs |\n| Environment Protection | GitHub feature requiring manual approval before jobs accessing an environment can run |\n| CODEOWNERS | File defining required reviewers for specific paths including workflow files |\n| OIDC Federation | Using GitHub's OIDC token to authenticate to cloud providers without storing long-lived credentials |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Dependabot**: Automated dependency updater that keeps pinned action SHAs current\n- **StepSecurity Harden Runner**: GitHub Action that monitors and restricts outbound network calls from workflows\n- **actionlint**: Linter for GitHub Actions workflow files that detects security issues\n- **allstar**: GitHub App by OpenSSF that enforces security policies on repositories\n- **scorecard**: OpenSSF tool that evaluates supply chain security practices including CI\u002FCD\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Preventing Supply Chain Attack via Compromised Third-Party Action\n\n**Context**: A widely-used GitHub Action is compromised and its v3 tag is updated to include credential-stealing code. Repositories using `@v3` automatically pull the malicious version.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Pin all actions to SHA digests immediately across all repositories\n2. Configure Dependabot for github-actions ecosystem to manage SHA updates\n3. Restrict GITHUB_TOKEN permissions so even compromised actions have minimal access\n4. Add StepSecurity harden-runner to detect anomalous outbound network calls\n5. Review all third-party actions and replace unnecessary ones with inline scripts\n6. Require CODEOWNERS approval for any changes to .github\u002Fworkflows\u002F\n\n**Pitfalls**: SHA pinning without Dependabot means missing legitimate security updates to actions. Overly restrictive permissions can break legitimate workflows. Using `pull_request_target` for label-based gating still exposes secrets if the workflow checks out PR code.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nGitHub Actions Security Audit\n================================\nRepository: org\u002Fweb-application\nDate: 2026-02-23\n\nWORKFLOW ANALYSIS:\n  Total workflows: 8\n  Total action references: 34\n\nSHA PINNING:\n  [FAIL] 12\u002F34 actions use mutable tags instead of SHA digests\n  - .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fci.yml: actions\u002Fsetup-node@v4\n  - .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fdeploy.yml: aws-actions\u002Fconfigure-aws-credentials@v4\n\nPERMISSIONS:\n  [FAIL] 3\u002F8 workflows have no explicit permissions (inherit default)\n  [WARN] 1\u002F8 workflows request write-all permissions\n\nSCRIPT INJECTION:\n  [FAIL] 2 workflow steps interpolate user input directly\n  - .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fpr-check.yml:23: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}\n\nSECRETS:\n  [PASS] No secrets exposed in workflow logs\n  [PASS] All production deployments use environment protection\n\nSCORE: 6\u002F10 (Remediate 5 HIGH findings)\n```\n","# Securing GitHub Actions Workflows\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When GitHub Actions is the CI\u002FCD platform and workflows need hardening against supply chain attacks\n- When workflows handle secrets, deploy to production, or have elevated permissions\n- When preventing script injection via untrusted PR titles, branch names, or commit messages\n- When requiring audit trails and approval gates for workflow modifications\n- When third-party actions pose supply chain risk through mutable version tags\n\n**Do not use** for securing other CI\u002FCD platforms (see platform-specific hardening guides), for application vulnerability scanning (use SAST\u002FDAST), or for secret detection in code (use Gitleaks).\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- GitHub repository with GitHub Actions enabled\n- GitHub organization admin access for organization-level settings\n- Understanding of GitHub Actions workflow syntax and events\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Pin Actions to SHA Digests\n\n```yaml\n# INSECURE: Mutable tag can be overwritten by attacker\n- uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n\n# SECURE: Pinned to immutable SHA digest\n- uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11  # v4.1.1\n\n# Use Dependabot to auto-update pinned SHAs\n# .github\u002Fdependabot.yml\nversion: 2\nupdates:\n  - package-ecosystem: \"github-actions\"\n    directory: \"\u002F\"\n    schedule:\n      interval: \"weekly\"\n    commit-message:\n      prefix: \"ci\"\n```\n\n### Step 2: Minimize GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions\n\n```yaml\n# Set restrictive default permissions at workflow level\nname: CI Pipeline\npermissions: {}  # Start with no permissions\n\non: [push, pull_request]\n\njobs:\n  build:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    permissions:\n      contents: read  # Only what's needed\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11\n\n  deploy:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    needs: build\n    if: github.ref == 'refs\u002Fheads\u002Fmain'\n    permissions:\n      contents: read\n      deployments: write\n      id-token: write  # For OIDC-based cloud auth\n    steps:\n      - name: Deploy\n        run: echo \"deploying\"\n```\n\n### Step 3: Prevent Script Injection\n\n```yaml\n# VULNERABLE: User-controlled input in run step\n- run: echo \"PR title is ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}\"\n\n# SECURE: Use environment variable (properly escaped by shell)\n- name: Process PR\n  env:\n    PR_TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}\n    PR_BODY: ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}\n  run: |\n    echo \"PR title is ${PR_TITLE}\"\n    echo \"PR body is ${PR_BODY}\"\n\n# SECURE: Use actions\u002Fgithub-script for complex operations\n- uses: actions\u002Fgithub-script@60a0d83039c74a4aee543508d2ffcb1c3799cdea\n  with:\n    script: |\n      const title = context.payload.pull_request.title;\n      console.log(`PR title: ${title}`);\n```\n\n### Step 4: Secure Fork Pull Request Handling\n\n```yaml\n# DANGEROUS: pull_request_target runs with base repo permissions\n# on: pull_request_target  # AVOID unless absolutely necessary\n\n# SAFE: pull_request runs in fork context with limited permissions\non:\n  pull_request:\n    branches: [main]\n\n# If pull_request_target is required, never checkout PR code:\non:\n  pull_request_target:\n    types: [labeled]\n\njobs:\n  safe-job:\n    if: contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'safe-to-test')\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    permissions:\n      contents: read\n    steps:\n      # NEVER do: actions\u002Fcheckout with ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11\n        # This checks out the BASE branch, not the PR\n```\n\n### Step 5: Protect Secrets and Environment Variables\n\n```yaml\njobs:\n  deploy:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    environment: production  # Requires approval\n    steps:\n      - name: Deploy with secret\n        env:\n          # Secrets are masked in logs automatically\n          DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}\n        run: |\n          # Never echo secrets\n          # echo \"$DEPLOY_KEY\"  # BAD\n          deploy-tool --key-file \u003C(echo \"$DEPLOY_KEY\")\n\n      - name: Audit secret access\n        run: |\n          # Log that secret was used without exposing it\n          echo \"::notice::Deploy key accessed for production deployment\"\n```\n\n### Step 6: Implement Workflow Change Controls\n\n```yaml\n# Require CODEOWNERS approval for workflow changes\n# .github\u002FCODEOWNERS\n.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F @security-team @platform-team\n.github\u002Factions\u002F @security-team @platform-team\n\n# Organization settings:\n# 1. Settings > Actions > General > Fork PR policies\n#    - Require approval for first-time contributors\n#    - Require approval for all outside collaborators\n# 2. Settings > Actions > General > Workflow permissions\n#    - Read repository contents and packages permissions\n#    - Do NOT allow GitHub Actions to create and approve PRs\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| SHA Pinning | Referencing GitHub Actions by their immutable commit SHA instead of mutable version tags |\n| Script Injection | Attack where untrusted input (PR title, branch name) is interpolated into shell commands |\n| GITHUB_TOKEN | Automatically generated token with configurable permissions scoped to the current repository |\n| pull_request_target | Dangerous event trigger that runs in the base repo context with full permissions on fork PRs |\n| Environment Protection | GitHub feature requiring manual approval before jobs accessing an environment can run |\n| CODEOWNERS | File defining required reviewers for specific paths including workflow files |\n| OIDC Federation | Using GitHub's OIDC token to authenticate to cloud providers without storing long-lived credentials |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Dependabot**: Automated dependency updater that keeps pinned action SHAs current\n- **StepSecurity Harden Runner**: GitHub Action that monitors and restricts outbound network calls from workflows\n- **actionlint**: Linter for GitHub Actions workflow files that detects security issues\n- **allstar**: GitHub App by OpenSSF that enforces security policies on repositories\n- **scorecard**: OpenSSF tool that evaluates supply chain security practices including CI\u002FCD\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Preventing Supply Chain Attack via Compromised Third-Party Action\n\n**Context**: A widely-used GitHub Action is compromised and its v3 tag is updated to include credential-stealing code. Repositories using `@v3` automatically pull the malicious version.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Pin all actions to SHA digests immediately across all repositories\n2. Configure Dependabot for github-actions ecosystem to manage SHA updates\n3. Restrict GITHUB_TOKEN permissions so even compromised actions have minimal access\n4. Add StepSecurity harden-runner to detect anomalous outbound network calls\n5. Review all third-party actions and replace unnecessary ones with inline scripts\n6. Require CODEOWNERS approval for any changes to .github\u002Fworkflows\u002F\n\n**Pitfalls**: SHA pinning without Dependabot means missing legitimate security updates to actions. Overly restrictive permissions can break legitimate workflows. Using `pull_request_target` for label-based gating still exposes secrets if the workflow checks out PR code.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nGitHub Actions Security Audit\n================================\nRepository: org\u002Fweb-application\nDate: 2026-02-23\n\nWORKFLOW ANALYSIS:\n  Total workflows: 8\n  Total action references: 34\n\nSHA PINNING:\n  [FAIL] 12\u002F34 actions use mutable tags instead of SHA digests\n  - .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fci.yml: actions\u002Fsetup-node@v4\n  - .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fdeploy.yml: aws-actions\u002Fconfigure-aws-credentials@v4\n\nPERMISSIONS:\n  [FAIL] 3\u002F8 workflows have no explicit permissions (inherit default)\n  [WARN] 1\u002F8 workflows request write-all permissions\n\nSCRIPT INJECTION:\n  [FAIL] 2 workflow steps interpolate user input directly\n  - .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fpr-check.yml:23: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}\n\nSECRETS:\n  [PASS] No secrets exposed in workflow logs\n  [PASS] All production deployments use environment protection\n\nSCORE: 6\u002F10 (Remediate 5 HIGH findings)\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":32,"domain":33,"license":15,"version":34,"subdomain":26,"description":35},[26,27,28,29,30,31],"devsecops","cicd","github-actions","supply-chain","workflow-security","secure-sdlc","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0.0","This skill covers hardening GitHub Actions workflows against supply chain attacks, credential theft, and privilege escalation. It addresses pinning actions to SHA digests, minimizing GITHUB_TOKEN permissions, protecting secrets from exfiltration, preventing script injection in workflow expressions, and implementing required reviewers for workflow changes.\n","main","c2b1fdccc779e99ac814e55fb69ca8d71215dd0f","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien","http:\u002F\u002Fsamuelchien.com\u002F","2026-05-26 08:27:14",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":43,"prompt":53,"zipAvailable":54},[44,47,50],{"tool":45,"command":46},"npx","npx skills add SamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection --skill securing-github-actions-workflows",{"tool":48,"command":49},"bunx","bunx skills add SamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection --skill securing-github-actions-workflows",{"tool":51,"command":52},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add SamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection --skill securing-github-actions-workflows","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fsecuring-github-actions-workflows\u002FSKILL.md",true,[56,62,66,72,76,80,86],{"path":57,"resourceType":58,"resourceTypeDesc":59,"sizeBytes":60,"sourceHtmlUrl":61},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",1016,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fsecuring-github-actions-workflows\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":63,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":65,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":67,"resourceType":68,"resourceTypeDesc":69,"sizeBytes":70,"sourceHtmlUrl":71},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",1844,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fsecuring-github-actions-workflows\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":73,"resourceType":68,"resourceTypeDesc":69,"sizeBytes":74,"sourceHtmlUrl":75},"references\u002Fstandards.md",1152,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fsecuring-github-actions-workflows\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":77,"resourceType":68,"resourceTypeDesc":69,"sizeBytes":78,"sourceHtmlUrl":79},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",1192,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fsecuring-github-actions-workflows\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",{"path":81,"resourceType":82,"resourceTypeDesc":83,"sizeBytes":84,"sourceHtmlUrl":85},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",8248,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fsecuring-github-actions-workflows\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":87,"resourceType":82,"resourceTypeDesc":83,"sizeBytes":88,"sourceHtmlUrl":89},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py",7533,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fsecuring-github-actions-workflows\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[91,99,106,113,120,127],{"skillNo":92,"name":93,"nameZh":6,"description":94,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":95,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":96,"categories":97,"keywords":98,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R4WZQZAXGGXMQCA0FZ716","zustand-store-ts","Create Zustand stores with TypeScript, subscribeWithSelector middleware, and proper state\u002Faction separation. Use when building React state management, creating global stores, or implementing reactive state patterns with Zustand.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzustand-store-ts\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":100,"name":101,"nameZh":6,"description":102,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":95,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":103,"categories":104,"keywords":105,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R4T9KENDH7FENGZQHBW4G","zustand-store-creator","Zustand Store Creator - Auto-activating skill for Frontend Development.\nTriggers on: zustand store creator, zustand store creator\nPart of the Frontend Development skill category.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzustand-store-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":107,"name":108,"nameZh":6,"description":109,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":95,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":110,"categories":111,"keywords":112,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R3YWN84B7SANJ52X799ZE","zero-trust-config-helper","Zero Trust Config Helper - Auto-activating skill for Security Advanced.\nTriggers on: zero trust config helper, zero trust config helper\nPart of the Security Advanced skill category.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzero-trust-config-helper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":114,"name":115,"nameZh":6,"description":116,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":95,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":117,"categories":118,"keywords":119,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R3HNSV2AEYSKHM915GJ58","zapier-integration-helper","Zapier Integration Helper - Auto-activating skill for Business Automation.\nTriggers on: zapier integration helper, zapier integration helper\nPart of the Business Automation skill category.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzapier-integration-helper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":121,"name":122,"nameZh":6,"description":123,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":124,"categories":125,"keywords":126,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R3DJSKAT4FA7DV4BF3GCE","zai-cli","Execute z.AI CLI providing vision, search, reader, and GitHub exploration via CLI and MCP.\nUse when user needs image\u002Fvideo analysis, OCR, UI-to-code conversion, error diagnosis,\nreal-time web search, web page to markdown extraction, or GitHub code exploration.\nTrigger with phrases like \"analyze this image\", \"search the web for\", \"read this page\",\n\"explore this repo\", or \"use zai\". Requires Z_AI_API_KEY.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzai-cli\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":128,"name":129,"nameZh":6,"description":130,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":95,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":131,"categories":132,"keywords":133,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R2KAM699XE9AJVAWE4H2E","yt-research","Research competitor YouTube channels, niches, and trending topics for your content strategy.\nUse this skill whenever the user says \"research channels\", \"analyze competitors\", \"find trending topics\",\n\"niche analysis\", \"competitive research\", \"what are other creators doing\", \"scrape YouTube channels\",\nor wants to understand the competitive landscape for a specific tool or topic area. Use when working with yt research. Trigger with 'yt', 'research'.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fyt-research\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]