ssiag
暂无简介
- License 许可
- AGPL-3.0
- 所属仓库
- QuanuX/Symphony
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-14
- Stars
- ★ 2
- Forks
- 0
02 资源文件 42
- 参考文档INTENT.md4.9 KB
- 参考文档MANIFEST.md4.7 KB
- 参考文档PROVIDER-LIFECYCLE.md14.1 KB
- 参考文档PROVIDER-READINESS.md7.3 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/authorization-decision.schema.json2.3 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/authorization-policy.schema.json1.2 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/authorization-request.schema.json1.0 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/capability.schema.json2.2 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/foundation-audit-request.schema.json3.4 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/foundation-audit-response.schema.json909 B
- 参考文档schemas/v1/lifecycle-grant-plan.schema.json7.5 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/macos-signing-policy.schema.json486 B
- 参考文档schemas/v1/MANIFEST.md8.9 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/policy-apply-request.schema.json407 B
- 参考文档schemas/v1/policy-attempt.schema.json1.2 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/policy-proposal-request.schema.json1.5 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/policy-proposal.schema.json1.9 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/policy-recovery-request.schema.json916 B
- 参考文档schemas/v1/policy-result.schema.json1.3 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/policy-state.schema.json1.0 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-binding-apply-request.schema.json601 B
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-binding-attempt.schema.json4.4 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-binding-plan-request.schema.json840 B
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-binding-plan.schema.json3.6 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-binding-recovery-request.schema.json658 B
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-binding-result.schema.json3.6 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-binding-state.schema.json2.8 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-binding-status.schema.json4.1 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-control-request.schema.json2.7 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-control-response.schema.json3.7 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-executable-trust.schema.json3.3 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-handshake.schema.json4.4 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-installation-inventory.schema.json3.4 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-one-shot-channel.schema.json2.4 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-readiness-observation-request.schema.json767 B
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-readiness-observation.schema.json3.5 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-readiness-result.schema.json2.5 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-trust-result.schema.json5.6 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/provider-trust-verification-request.schema.json758 B
- 参考文档schemas/v1/transport-profile-audit-request.schema.json1.9 KB
- 参考文档schemas/v1/transport-profile-audit-response.schema.json540 B
- 参考文档SPEC.md39.3 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Symphony Secure Identity and Access Governance Skill
Purpose
Guide every authorized caller in safely reading, reviewing, configuring, and implementing SSIAG contracts.
Required Reading Order
knowledge/ssiag/INTENT.mdknowledge/ssiag/MANIFEST.mdknowledge/ssiag/SPEC.mdknowledge/ssiag/PROVIDER-LIFECYCLE.mdbefore changing provider inventory or binding behaviorknowledge/ssiag/PROVIDER-READINESS.mdbefore changing signing, bundle, session, or operational-eligibility behaviormodules/secure-identity-access-governance/REQUIREMENTS.md- the selected provider module contracts
knowledge/stav/SPEC.mdbefore changing audit output
Caller Authority
Caller type is not an authorization input. A caller may inspect canonical contracts, query safe SSIAG metadata, propose administrative changes, or use a future apply operation only to the extent permitted by the target host and its caller-neutral safeguards. No supported operation may request, print, persist, or infer excluded credential values; bypass effective permission; edit operational STAV ledgers; invent fallback providers; or promote a draft relationship or schema without permission-backed ratification.
Change Procedure
- Identify the affected canonical relationship and requirement IDs.
- Keep immutable IDs separate from display names.
- update canonical contracts before or atomically with implementations;
- keep foundation changes Go-only and cgo-free;
- keep native platform code in an independent adapter;
- verify safe-output and fail-closed tests;
- update SKVI relationships;
- create SCLV evidence only after the real review and merge facts exist.
Ratified Implementation Sequence
- Maintain the implemented build-tagged local peer-credential authentication, exact UID/GID mapping, and endpoint trust.
- Maintain the implemented foundational bootstrap supervision without granting the supervisor policy authority.
- Maintain the implemented dedicated per-TOPS STAV append authority integration.
- Maintain the implemented exact-grant deny-by-default authorization decision and non-transferable capability surface.
- Maintain qxctl/coordinator authenticated-session use without converting decision evidence into bearer or canonical apply authority.
- Preserve the implemented local policy proposal/apply/recovery circuit: kernel-derived authority, CAS, idempotent STAV-before-commit, protected attempt/state files, and noncanonical result binding.
- Maintain the implemented exact provider mutual-executable-trust and metadata-control runtime without widening its v1 surface or enabling the synthetic secret channel.
- Preserve the exact provider installation/binding lifecycle: bounded inventory, no newest-version selection, distinct command/backend identities, exact plan and state digests, durable initiating audit identity, state-before-committed ordering,
prepared -> candidate_verified -> audited -> committedrecovery, and committed distinct STAV evidence. - Preserve the implemented Phase 10B complete-bundle receipt/staging and three-layer readiness circuit. Native structural success and policy match remain non-operational evidence; qxctl must validate the closed result without accepting signing or path authority.
- Enable per-user macOS Keychain operations only after the separate Phase 10C gate, beginning with non-exportable capability where suitable.
Stop Conditions
Stop and obtain permission-backed owner approval before choosing an unrecorded namespace, enabling remote access, enabling canonical apply, weakening peer authentication, exporting a non-exportable credential, adding a provider fallback, changing the provider IPC major version, auto-selecting an installed provider version, widening provider binding into provider execution, publishing an API, or weakening safe metadata exclusions. Do not mark a ratified capability operational until its exact contract and tests pass.