[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M757F3FAXF0EEGDVMRY7R1Z1":3,"skill-same:01M757F3FAXF0EEGDVMRY7R1Z1":55},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":27,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":28,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":29,"updatedAt":30,"install":31,"resources":44},"01M757F3FAXF0EEGDVMRY7R1Z1","acs-policy",null,"Generate Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security (ACS\u002FRHACS) SecurityPolicy Custom Resources as YAML. Use this skill whenever the user wants to create, write, or modify ACS security policies, StackRox policies, RHACS policy-as-code CRs, or asks about container security policies for OpenShift\u002FKubernetes clusters that should be enforced via ACS. Also use when the user mentions blocking images with CVEs, preventing privileged containers, enforcing runtime security, or writing admission control policies for ACS -- even if they don't explicitly say 'ACS' but describe something that clearly maps to an ACS policy.","lukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling","lukeelten","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F513392?v=4","01M757ET1X2A4R8NZGQW7T8M1H","Tobias Derksen","01M757ET33H503A8FHPK36TP9M",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Facs-policy\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: acs-policy\ndescription: \"Generate Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security (ACS\u002FRHACS) SecurityPolicy Custom Resources as YAML. Use this skill whenever the user wants to create, write, or modify ACS security policies, StackRox policies, RHACS policy-as-code CRs, or asks about container security policies for OpenShift\u002FKubernetes clusters that should be enforced via ACS. Also use when the user mentions blocking images with CVEs, preventing privileged containers, enforcing runtime security, or writing admission control policies for ACS -- even if they don't explicitly say 'ACS' but describe something that clearly maps to an ACS policy.\"\n---\n\n# Writing ACS SecurityPolicy Custom Resources\n\nThis skill generates Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security (ACS\u002FRHACS) SecurityPolicy Custom Resources in YAML format, following the `config.stackrox.io\u002Fv1alpha1` API. These CRs enable policy-as-code workflows where security policies are managed via GitOps and applied with `kubectl` or `oc`.\n\n## When the user asks for a policy\n\n1. Identify what security concern they want to address\n2. Determine the appropriate lifecycle stage(s) (BUILD, DEPLOY, RUNTIME)\n3. Select the right policy criteria fields\n4. Recommend severity and enforcement based on the context\n5. Output valid YAML that can be applied directly to the cluster\n\n## CR Structure\n\nEvery ACS SecurityPolicy CR follows this structure:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: config.stackrox.io\u002Fv1alpha1\nkind: SecurityPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: short-dns-name            # Kubernetes-valid name\n  namespace: stackrox             # Must match Central's namespace\nspec:\n  policyName: \"Human-Readable Name\"\n  description: \"What this policy detects\"\n  rationale: \"Why this matters from a security perspective\"\n  remediation: \"Steps to fix violations\"\n  disabled: false\n  severity: HIGH_SEVERITY         # LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH | CRITICAL\n  categories:\n    - \"Security Best Practices\"\n  lifecycleStages:\n    - DEPLOY\n  eventSource: NOT_APPLICABLE     # NOT_APPLICABLE | DEPLOYMENT_EVENT | AUDIT_LOG_EVENT\n  enforcementActions: []          # Empty = inform only\n  scope: []                       # Empty = applies everywhere\n  exclusions: []\n  policySections:\n    - sectionName: \"Rule description\"\n      policyGroups:\n        - fieldName: \"Privileged Container\"\n          booleanOperator: OR\n          values:\n            - value: \"true\"\n```\n\n## Key Fields Explained\n\n### severity\nReflects the risk level of what the policy detects:\n- `CRITICAL_SEVERITY` -- Immediate exploitable risk (host compromise, active attacks, known RCE)\n- `HIGH_SEVERITY` -- Significant misconfiguration or vulnerability (root containers, host namespaces, fixable critical CVEs)\n- `MEDIUM_SEVERITY` -- Weakened posture (no read-only rootfs, latest tag, missing probes)\n- `LOW_SEVERITY` -- Hygiene issues (missing labels, old images, no resource requests)\n\n### lifecycleStages\nDetermines when the policy is evaluated:\n- `BUILD` -- During CI\u002FCD image scanning. Only image-related criteria (CVEs, Dockerfile, registry).\n- `DEPLOY` -- At deployment creation\u002Fupdate. Includes all BUILD criteria plus container config, volumes, networking.\n- `RUNTIME` -- On running workloads. Includes everything plus process activity and network flows.\n\nUse multiple stages when the same criteria applies at different points (e.g., CVE checks at both BUILD and DEPLOY).\n\n### eventSource\nRequired when `RUNTIME` is in lifecycleStages:\n- `DEPLOYMENT_EVENT` -- Process executions, network activity, pod exec\u002Fport-forward\n- `AUDIT_LOG_EVENT` -- Kubernetes audit log records (API access patterns)\n\nSet to `NOT_APPLICABLE` when RUNTIME is not used.\n\n### enforcementActions\nWhat happens when a violation is detected:\n\n| Action | Stage | Effect |\n|--------|-------|--------|\n| (empty list) | Any | Inform only -- creates alert |\n| `FAIL_BUILD_ENFORCEMENT` | BUILD | Fails CI\u002FCD pipeline |\n| `FAIL_DEPLOYMENT_CREATE_ENFORCEMENT` | DEPLOY | Blocks deployment via admission controller |\n| `FAIL_DEPLOYMENT_UPDATE_ENFORCEMENT` | DEPLOY | Blocks deployment updates |\n| `SCALE_TO_ZERO_ENFORCEMENT` | DEPLOY | Scales replicas to 0 (soft) |\n| `UNSATISFIABLE_NODE_CONSTRAINT_ENFORCEMENT` | DEPLOY | Adds impossible scheduling constraint (soft) |\n| `KILL_POD_ENFORCEMENT` | RUNTIME | Kills violating pods |\n| `FAIL_KUBE_REQUEST_ENFORCEMENT` | RUNTIME | Blocks exec\u002Fport-forward |\n\nStart with inform-only in production, then move to enforcement after reviewing violations and adding necessary exclusions.\n\n### scope\nRestricts where the policy applies. If empty, applies everywhere.\n\n```yaml\nscope:\n  - cluster: \"production\"\n    namespace: \"frontend\"        # Supports RE2 regex\n    label:\n      key: \"app\"\n      value: \"web\"\n```\n\n### exclusions\nExempts specific workloads from the policy:\n\n```yaml\nexclusions:\n  - name: \"System monitoring\"\n    deployment:\n      name: \"prometheus\"\n      scope:\n        namespace: \"monitoring\"\n  - name: \"Temporary exception\"\n    deployment:\n      scope:\n        namespace: \"legacy-app\"\n    expiration: \"2025-06-30T00:00:00Z\"\n```\n\nThe namespaces `stackrox`, `kube-system`, and `istio-system` are excluded from enforcement by default.\n\n### policySections\nThe rules that define what triggers the policy. This is where the actual detection logic lives.\n\n**Logic:**\n- Values within a `policyGroup` are combined with `booleanOperator` (OR or AND)\n- Groups within a `policySection` are ANDed together\n- Multiple `policySections` are ORed together (any section matching = violation)\n\n```yaml\npolicySections:\n  - sectionName: \"Critical CVEs that are fixable\"\n    policyGroups:\n      - fieldName: \"Severity\"\n        booleanOperator: OR\n        values:\n          - value: \">=CRITICAL\"\n      - fieldName: \"Fixable\"    # ANDed with Severity above\n        booleanOperator: OR\n        values:\n          - value: \"true\"\n```\n\nUse `negate: true` on a group to invert the match (e.g., \"registry is NOT in allowed list\").\n\nFor the full list of available `fieldName` values and their allowed inputs, read `references\u002Fcriteria.md`.\n\n## Best Practices for Policy Design\n\n### Enforcement rollout\nDeploy policies in phases:\n1. Start with `enforcementActions: []` (inform only) for 2-4 weeks\n2. Review violation alerts to find false positives\n3. Add exclusions for legitimate cases\n4. Enable enforcement once confidence is high\n\n### Severity alignment\nMatch severity to real-world impact:\n- Does this enable full host compromise? -> CRITICAL\n- Does this weaken isolation but require another vulnerability to exploit? -> HIGH\n- Is this a missing hardening measure? -> MEDIUM\n- Is this a hygiene\u002Fbest-practice violation? -> LOW\n\n### Scoping strategy\n- Production clusters: strictest enforcement\n- Staging: enforce with fewer exceptions (catch issues before prod)\n- Development: inform-only for most policies (don't block developer velocity)\n- System namespaces (kube-system, openshift-*): exclude unless you have specific system-level policies\n\n### Categories\nUse standard categories to organize policies in the RHACS dashboard:\n- `Vulnerability Management` -- CVE-related policies\n- `Security Best Practices` -- Container hardening (privileges, capabilities, filesystem)\n- `DevOps Best Practices` -- Image hygiene (tags, age, resource limits)\n- `Network` -- Network policy coverage, port exposure\n- `Supply Chain Security` -- Registry restrictions, image signing\n- `Anomalous Activity` -- Runtime behavioral detection\n- `Kubernetes` -- RBAC, service accounts, secrets handling\n- `Privileges` -- Privilege escalation, capabilities, host access\n\n### Kubernetes Pod Security Standards mapping\nIf implementing PSS Baseline or Restricted profiles via ACS:\n\n**Baseline** (prevent known privilege escalations):\n- No privileged containers\n- No hostNetwork\u002FhostPID\u002FhostIPC\n- No dangerous capabilities (SYS_ADMIN, NET_RAW if stricter)\n- No hostPath volumes\n\n**Restricted** (full hardening):\n- All of Baseline, plus:\n- Must run as non-root\n- All capabilities dropped\n- allowPrivilegeEscalation: false\n- Seccomp profile required (RuntimeDefault or Localhost)\n- Read-only root filesystem\n\n## Complete Examples\n\n### Block privileged containers in production\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: config.stackrox.io\u002Fv1alpha1\nkind: SecurityPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: no-privileged-containers\n  namespace: stackrox\nspec:\n  policyName: \"No Privileged Containers in Production\"\n  description: \"Prevents containers from running in privileged mode, which grants full host access\"\n  rationale: \"Privileged containers have unrestricted access to the host kernel and all devices, making container escape trivial\"\n  remediation: \"Remove securityContext.privileged or set it to false. If host access is genuinely needed, use specific capabilities instead.\"\n  disabled: false\n  severity: CRITICAL_SEVERITY\n  categories:\n    - \"Security Best Practices\"\n    - \"Privileges\"\n  lifecycleStages:\n    - DEPLOY\n  eventSource: NOT_APPLICABLE\n  enforcementActions:\n    - FAIL_DEPLOYMENT_CREATE_ENFORCEMENT\n  scope:\n    - label:\n        key: \"environment\"\n        value: \"production\"\n  exclusions:\n    - name: \"System components\"\n      deployment:\n        scope:\n          namespace: \"kube-system\"\n  policySections:\n    - sectionName: \"Privileged mode check\"\n      policyGroups:\n        - fieldName: \"Privileged Container\"\n          booleanOperator: OR\n          values:\n            - value: \"true\"\n```\n\n### Require images from trusted registries\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: config.stackrox.io\u002Fv1alpha1\nkind: SecurityPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: trusted-registries-only\n  namespace: stackrox\nspec:\n  policyName: \"Images Must Come From Trusted Registries\"\n  description: \"Only allows images pulled from approved container registries\"\n  rationale: \"Untrusted registries may host images with backdoors, malware, or unpatched vulnerabilities\"\n  remediation: \"Rebuild the image using a base from an approved registry (registry.redhat.io, quay.io\u002Fyour-org, or your internal registry)\"\n  disabled: false\n  severity: HIGH_SEVERITY\n  categories:\n    - \"Supply Chain Security\"\n  lifecycleStages:\n    - BUILD\n    - DEPLOY\n  eventSource: NOT_APPLICABLE\n  enforcementActions:\n    - FAIL_BUILD_ENFORCEMENT\n    - FAIL_DEPLOYMENT_CREATE_ENFORCEMENT\n  scope: []\n  exclusions:\n    - name: \"System namespaces\"\n      deployment:\n        scope:\n          namespace: \"^(kube-system|openshift-.*|stackrox)$\"\n  policySections:\n    - sectionName: \"Registry allowlist\"\n      policyGroups:\n        - fieldName: \"Image Registry\"\n          booleanOperator: OR\n          negate: true\n          values:\n            - value: \"registry.redhat.io\"\n            - value: \"quay.io\u002Fmyorg\"\n            - value: \"internal-registry.example.com\"\n```\n\n### Detect crypto mining at runtime\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: config.stackrox.io\u002Fv1alpha1\nkind: SecurityPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: detect-crypto-mining\n  namespace: stackrox\nspec:\n  policyName: \"Cryptocurrency Mining Process Detected\"\n  description: \"Detects execution of known cryptocurrency mining binaries\"\n  rationale: \"Crypto miners indicate a compromised workload -- an attacker is using your compute resources\"\n  remediation: \"Investigate the container for compromise. Check how the miner was deployed (supply chain attack, runtime exploit, or insider threat).\"\n  disabled: false\n  severity: CRITICAL_SEVERITY\n  categories:\n    - \"Anomalous Activity\"\n  lifecycleStages:\n    - RUNTIME\n  eventSource: DEPLOYMENT_EVENT\n  enforcementActions:\n    - KILL_POD_ENFORCEMENT\n  scope: []\n  exclusions: []\n  policySections:\n    - sectionName: \"Known mining processes\"\n      policyGroups:\n        - fieldName: \"Process Name\"\n          booleanOperator: OR\n          values:\n            - value: \"xmrig\"\n            - value: \"minerd\"\n            - value: \"cpuminer\"\n            - value: \"cgminer\"\n            - value: \"bfgminer\"\n            - value: \"ethminer\"\n            - value: \"nbminer\"\n```\n\n### Block critical fixable CVEs\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: config.stackrox.io\u002Fv1alpha1\nkind: SecurityPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: block-critical-fixable-cves\n  namespace: stackrox\nspec:\n  policyName: \"Block Critical Fixable CVEs\"\n  description: \"Prevents deployment of images containing critical-severity vulnerabilities that have a known fix\"\n  rationale: \"If a fix exists, there is no reason to deploy with a critical vulnerability\"\n  remediation: \"Update the affected package to the fixed version. Run the scanner locally to verify the fix.\"\n  disabled: false\n  severity: CRITICAL_SEVERITY\n  categories:\n    - \"Vulnerability Management\"\n  lifecycleStages:\n    - BUILD\n    - DEPLOY\n  eventSource: NOT_APPLICABLE\n  enforcementActions:\n    - FAIL_BUILD_ENFORCEMENT\n    - FAIL_DEPLOYMENT_CREATE_ENFORCEMENT\n  scope: []\n  exclusions: []\n  policySections:\n    - sectionName: \"Critical fixable vulnerabilities\"\n      policyGroups:\n        - fieldName: \"Severity\"\n          booleanOperator: OR\n          values:\n            - value: \">=CRITICAL\"\n        - fieldName: \"Fixable\"\n          booleanOperator: OR\n          values:\n            - value: \"true\"\n```\n\n## Applying Policies\n\n```bash\n# Apply to the cluster where RHACS Central runs\noc apply -f my-policy.yaml -n stackrox\n\n# Verify it appears in RHACS\n# Check the RHACS portal under Platform Configuration > Policy Management\n\n# For GitOps workflows, commit to a repo and sync via ArgoCD\n```\n\nThe CR must be applied to the namespace where Central is installed (typically `stackrox`). The `spec.policyName` must be unique across all policies in the RHACS instance.\n\n## Policy drift\n\nIf someone modifies the policy through the RHACS UI, the CR will be reconciled back to its declared state within 10 hours (or on the next reconciliation cycle). The CR is the source of truth -- treat the RHACS UI as read-only for policy-as-code managed policies.\n","# Writing ACS SecurityPolicy Custom Resources\n\nThis skill generates Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security (ACS\u002FRHACS) SecurityPolicy Custom Resources in YAML format, following the `config.stackrox.io\u002Fv1alpha1` API. These CRs enable policy-as-code workflows where security policies are managed via GitOps and applied with `kubectl` or `oc`.\n\n## When the user asks for a policy\n\n1. Identify what security concern they want to address\n2. Determine the appropriate lifecycle stage(s) (BUILD, DEPLOY, RUNTIME)\n3. Select the right policy criteria fields\n4. Recommend severity and enforcement based on the context\n5. Output valid YAML that can be applied directly to the cluster\n\n## CR Structure\n\nEvery ACS SecurityPolicy CR follows this structure:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: config.stackrox.io\u002Fv1alpha1\nkind: SecurityPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: short-dns-name            # Kubernetes-valid name\n  namespace: stackrox             # Must match Central's namespace\nspec:\n  policyName: \"Human-Readable Name\"\n  description: \"What this policy detects\"\n  rationale: \"Why this matters from a security perspective\"\n  remediation: \"Steps to fix violations\"\n  disabled: false\n  severity: HIGH_SEVERITY         # LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH | CRITICAL\n  categories:\n    - \"Security Best Practices\"\n  lifecycleStages:\n    - DEPLOY\n  eventSource: NOT_APPLICABLE     # NOT_APPLICABLE | DEPLOYMENT_EVENT | AUDIT_LOG_EVENT\n  enforcementActions: []          # Empty = inform only\n  scope: []                       # Empty = applies everywhere\n  exclusions: []\n  policySections:\n    - sectionName: \"Rule description\"\n      policyGroups:\n        - fieldName: \"Privileged Container\"\n          booleanOperator: OR\n          values:\n            - value: \"true\"\n```\n\n## Key Fields Explained\n\n### severity\nReflects the risk level of what the policy detects:\n- `CRITICAL_SEVERITY` -- Immediate exploitable risk (host compromise, active attacks, known RCE)\n- `HIGH_SEVERITY` -- Significant misconfiguration or vulnerability (root containers, host namespaces, fixable critical CVEs)\n- `MEDIUM_SEVERITY` -- Weakened posture (no read-only rootfs, latest tag, missing probes)\n- `LOW_SEVERITY` -- Hygiene issues (missing labels, old images, no resource requests)\n\n### lifecycleStages\nDetermines when the policy is evaluated:\n- `BUILD` -- During CI\u002FCD image scanning. Only image-related criteria (CVEs, Dockerfile, registry).\n- `DEPLOY` -- At deployment creation\u002Fupdate. Includes all BUILD criteria plus container config, volumes, networking.\n- `RUNTIME` -- On running workloads. Includes everything plus process activity and network flows.\n\nUse multiple stages when the same criteria applies at different points (e.g., CVE checks at both BUILD and DEPLOY).\n\n### eventSource\nRequired when `RUNTIME` is in lifecycleStages:\n- `DEPLOYMENT_EVENT` -- Process executions, network activity, pod exec\u002Fport-forward\n- `AUDIT_LOG_EVENT` -- Kubernetes audit log records (API access patterns)\n\nSet to `NOT_APPLICABLE` when RUNTIME is not used.\n\n### enforcementActions\nWhat happens when a violation is detected:\n\n| Action | Stage | Effect |\n|--------|-------|--------|\n| (empty list) | Any | Inform only -- creates alert |\n| `FAIL_BUILD_ENFORCEMENT` | BUILD | Fails CI\u002FCD pipeline |\n| `FAIL_DEPLOYMENT_CREATE_ENFORCEMENT` | DEPLOY | Blocks deployment via admission controller |\n| `FAIL_DEPLOYMENT_UPDATE_ENFORCEMENT` | DEPLOY | Blocks deployment updates |\n| `SCALE_TO_ZERO_ENFORCEMENT` | DEPLOY | Scales replicas to 0 (soft) |\n| `UNSATISFIABLE_NODE_CONSTRAINT_ENFORCEMENT` | DEPLOY | Adds impossible scheduling constraint (soft) |\n| `KILL_POD_ENFORCEMENT` | RUNTIME | Kills violating pods |\n| `FAIL_KUBE_REQUEST_ENFORCEMENT` | RUNTIME | Blocks exec\u002Fport-forward |\n\nStart with inform-only in production, then move to enforcement after reviewing violations and adding necessary exclusions.\n\n### scope\nRestricts where the policy applies. If empty, applies everywhere.\n\n```yaml\nscope:\n  - cluster: \"production\"\n    namespace: \"frontend\"        # Supports RE2 regex\n    label:\n      key: \"app\"\n      value: \"web\"\n```\n\n### exclusions\nExempts specific workloads from the policy:\n\n```yaml\nexclusions:\n  - name: \"System monitoring\"\n    deployment:\n      name: \"prometheus\"\n      scope:\n        namespace: \"monitoring\"\n  - name: \"Temporary exception\"\n    deployment:\n      scope:\n        namespace: \"legacy-app\"\n    expiration: \"2025-06-30T00:00:00Z\"\n```\n\nThe namespaces `stackrox`, `kube-system`, and `istio-system` are excluded from enforcement by default.\n\n### policySections\nThe rules that define what triggers the policy. This is where the actual detection logic lives.\n\n**Logic:**\n- Values within a `policyGroup` are combined with `booleanOperator` (OR or AND)\n- Groups within a `policySection` are ANDed together\n- Multiple `policySections` are ORed together (any section matching = violation)\n\n```yaml\npolicySections:\n  - sectionName: \"Critical CVEs that are fixable\"\n    policyGroups:\n      - fieldName: \"Severity\"\n        booleanOperator: OR\n        values:\n          - value: \">=CRITICAL\"\n      - fieldName: \"Fixable\"    # ANDed with Severity above\n        booleanOperator: OR\n        values:\n          - value: \"true\"\n```\n\nUse `negate: true` on a group to invert the match (e.g., \"registry is NOT in allowed list\").\n\nFor the full list of available `fieldName` values and their allowed inputs, read `references\u002Fcriteria.md`.\n\n## Best Practices for Policy Design\n\n### Enforcement rollout\nDeploy policies in phases:\n1. Start with `enforcementActions: []` (inform only) for 2-4 weeks\n2. Review violation alerts to find false positives\n3. Add exclusions for legitimate cases\n4. Enable enforcement once confidence is high\n\n### Severity alignment\nMatch severity to real-world impact:\n- Does this enable full host compromise? -> CRITICAL\n- Does this weaken isolation but require another vulnerability to exploit? -> HIGH\n- Is this a missing hardening measure? -> MEDIUM\n- Is this a hygiene\u002Fbest-practice violation? -> LOW\n\n### Scoping strategy\n- Production clusters: strictest enforcement\n- Staging: enforce with fewer exceptions (catch issues before prod)\n- Development: inform-only for most policies (don't block developer velocity)\n- System namespaces (kube-system, openshift-*): exclude unless you have specific system-level policies\n\n### Categories\nUse standard categories to organize policies in the RHACS dashboard:\n- `Vulnerability Management` -- CVE-related policies\n- `Security Best Practices` -- Container hardening (privileges, capabilities, filesystem)\n- `DevOps Best Practices` -- Image hygiene (tags, age, resource limits)\n- `Network` -- Network policy coverage, port exposure\n- `Supply Chain Security` -- Registry restrictions, image signing\n- `Anomalous Activity` -- Runtime behavioral detection\n- `Kubernetes` -- RBAC, service accounts, secrets handling\n- `Privileges` -- Privilege escalation, capabilities, host access\n\n### Kubernetes Pod Security Standards mapping\nIf implementing PSS Baseline or Restricted profiles via ACS:\n\n**Baseline** (prevent known privilege escalations):\n- No privileged containers\n- No hostNetwork\u002FhostPID\u002FhostIPC\n- No dangerous capabilities (SYS_ADMIN, NET_RAW if stricter)\n- No hostPath volumes\n\n**Restricted** (full hardening):\n- All of Baseline, plus:\n- Must run as non-root\n- All capabilities dropped\n- allowPrivilegeEscalation: false\n- Seccomp profile required (RuntimeDefault or Localhost)\n- Read-only root filesystem\n\n## Complete Examples\n\n### Block privileged containers in production\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: config.stackrox.io\u002Fv1alpha1\nkind: SecurityPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: no-privileged-containers\n  namespace: stackrox\nspec:\n  policyName: \"No Privileged Containers in Production\"\n  description: \"Prevents containers from running in privileged mode, which grants full host access\"\n  rationale: \"Privileged containers have unrestricted access to the host kernel and all devices, making container escape trivial\"\n  remediation: \"Remove securityContext.privileged or set it to false. If host access is genuinely needed, use specific capabilities instead.\"\n  disabled: false\n  severity: CRITICAL_SEVERITY\n  categories:\n    - \"Security Best Practices\"\n    - \"Privileges\"\n  lifecycleStages:\n    - DEPLOY\n  eventSource: NOT_APPLICABLE\n  enforcementActions:\n    - FAIL_DEPLOYMENT_CREATE_ENFORCEMENT\n  scope:\n    - label:\n        key: \"environment\"\n        value: \"production\"\n  exclusions:\n    - name: \"System components\"\n      deployment:\n        scope:\n          namespace: \"kube-system\"\n  policySections:\n    - sectionName: \"Privileged mode check\"\n      policyGroups:\n        - fieldName: \"Privileged Container\"\n          booleanOperator: OR\n          values:\n            - value: \"true\"\n```\n\n### Require images from trusted registries\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: config.stackrox.io\u002Fv1alpha1\nkind: SecurityPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: trusted-registries-only\n  namespace: stackrox\nspec:\n  policyName: \"Images Must Come From Trusted Registries\"\n  description: \"Only allows images pulled from approved container registries\"\n  rationale: \"Untrusted registries may host images with backdoors, malware, or unpatched vulnerabilities\"\n  remediation: \"Rebuild the image using a base from an approved registry (registry.redhat.io, quay.io\u002Fyour-org, or your internal registry)\"\n  disabled: false\n  severity: HIGH_SEVERITY\n  categories:\n    - \"Supply Chain Security\"\n  lifecycleStages:\n    - BUILD\n    - DEPLOY\n  eventSource: NOT_APPLICABLE\n  enforcementActions:\n    - FAIL_BUILD_ENFORCEMENT\n    - FAIL_DEPLOYMENT_CREATE_ENFORCEMENT\n  scope: []\n  exclusions:\n    - name: \"System namespaces\"\n      deployment:\n        scope:\n          namespace: \"^(kube-system|openshift-.*|stackrox)$\"\n  policySections:\n    - sectionName: \"Registry allowlist\"\n      policyGroups:\n        - fieldName: \"Image Registry\"\n          booleanOperator: OR\n          negate: true\n          values:\n            - value: \"registry.redhat.io\"\n            - value: \"quay.io\u002Fmyorg\"\n            - value: \"internal-registry.example.com\"\n```\n\n### Detect crypto mining at runtime\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: config.stackrox.io\u002Fv1alpha1\nkind: SecurityPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: detect-crypto-mining\n  namespace: stackrox\nspec:\n  policyName: \"Cryptocurrency Mining Process Detected\"\n  description: \"Detects execution of known cryptocurrency mining binaries\"\n  rationale: \"Crypto miners indicate a compromised workload -- an attacker is using your compute resources\"\n  remediation: \"Investigate the container for compromise. Check how the miner was deployed (supply chain attack, runtime exploit, or insider threat).\"\n  disabled: false\n  severity: CRITICAL_SEVERITY\n  categories:\n    - \"Anomalous Activity\"\n  lifecycleStages:\n    - RUNTIME\n  eventSource: DEPLOYMENT_EVENT\n  enforcementActions:\n    - KILL_POD_ENFORCEMENT\n  scope: []\n  exclusions: []\n  policySections:\n    - sectionName: \"Known mining processes\"\n      policyGroups:\n        - fieldName: \"Process Name\"\n          booleanOperator: OR\n          values:\n            - value: \"xmrig\"\n            - value: \"minerd\"\n            - value: \"cpuminer\"\n            - value: \"cgminer\"\n            - value: \"bfgminer\"\n            - value: \"ethminer\"\n            - value: \"nbminer\"\n```\n\n### Block critical fixable CVEs\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: config.stackrox.io\u002Fv1alpha1\nkind: SecurityPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: block-critical-fixable-cves\n  namespace: stackrox\nspec:\n  policyName: \"Block Critical Fixable CVEs\"\n  description: \"Prevents deployment of images containing critical-severity vulnerabilities that have a known fix\"\n  rationale: \"If a fix exists, there is no reason to deploy with a critical vulnerability\"\n  remediation: \"Update the affected package to the fixed version. Run the scanner locally to verify the fix.\"\n  disabled: false\n  severity: CRITICAL_SEVERITY\n  categories:\n    - \"Vulnerability Management\"\n  lifecycleStages:\n    - BUILD\n    - DEPLOY\n  eventSource: NOT_APPLICABLE\n  enforcementActions:\n    - FAIL_BUILD_ENFORCEMENT\n    - FAIL_DEPLOYMENT_CREATE_ENFORCEMENT\n  scope: []\n  exclusions: []\n  policySections:\n    - sectionName: \"Critical fixable vulnerabilities\"\n      policyGroups:\n        - fieldName: \"Severity\"\n          booleanOperator: OR\n          values:\n            - value: \">=CRITICAL\"\n        - fieldName: \"Fixable\"\n          booleanOperator: OR\n          values:\n            - value: \"true\"\n```\n\n## Applying Policies\n\n```bash\n# Apply to the cluster where RHACS Central runs\noc apply -f my-policy.yaml -n stackrox\n\n# Verify it appears in RHACS\n# Check the RHACS portal under Platform Configuration > Policy Management\n\n# For GitOps workflows, commit to a repo and sync via ArgoCD\n```\n\nThe CR must be applied to the namespace where Central is installed (typically `stackrox`). The `spec.policyName` must be unique across all policies in the RHACS instance.\n\n## Policy drift\n\nIf someone modifies the policy through the RHACS UI, the CR will be reconciled back to its declared state within 10 hours (or on the next reconciliation cycle). The CR is the source of truth -- treat the RHACS UI as read-only for policy-as-code managed policies.\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","0ddd1b9ee84c0b89891b798126de64062c989ab5","skills\u002Facs-policy","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten","OpenShift Expert","2026-10-15 15:28:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":32,"prompt":42,"zipAvailable":43},[33,36,39],{"tool":34,"command":35},"npx","npx skills add lukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling --skill acs-policy",{"tool":37,"command":38},"bunx","bunx skills add lukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling --skill acs-policy",{"tool":40,"command":41},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling --skill acs-policy","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Facs-policy\u002FSKILL.md",true,[45,51],{"path":46,"resourceType":47,"resourceTypeDesc":48,"sizeBytes":49,"sourceHtmlUrl":50},"README.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",5497,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Facs-policy\u002FREADME.md",{"path":52,"resourceType":47,"resourceTypeDesc":48,"sizeBytes":53,"sourceHtmlUrl":54},"references\u002Fcriteria.md",13201,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Facs-policy\u002Freferences\u002Fcriteria.md",[56,63,70,79,86,93],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":19},"01M757GJ0MVQXVMR6WY3VYAAM6","version-push","Increase (bump) the version of an existing Helm chart, then commit and push the change to origin. Use this skill whenever the user wants to release a new chart version, bump\u002Fincrement\u002Fraise a Chart.yaml version, cut a monthly chart release, or says things like \"bump the keycloak chart patch version\", \"bump the month version for the chart and push it\", \"release v24.6.0\", or \"increment the chart version and commit\" — even if they don't say the word \"Helm\". The user must specify the bump type as either **patch** (bug-fix increment: vYY.M.Z → vYY.M.Z+1) or **month** (new monthly CalVer release: → vYY.M.0); ask if not provided. This handles the full release motion: editing the top-level `version:` field, a Conventional Commit, and a push to the current branch. It is NOT for scaffolding new charts (use helm-expert for that).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fversion-push\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M757GG10TC4ZAZ981WMA5XT5","to-spec","Turn the current conversation into a spec and publish it to the project issue tracker: no interview, just synthesis of what you've already discussed.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fto-spec\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":74,"licenseFileUrl":75,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M757GB143YHBC0MGBE46MTKK","skill-creator","Create new skills, modify and improve existing skills, and measure skill performance. Use when users want to create a skill from scratch, edit, or optimize an existing skill, run evals to test a skill, benchmark skill performance with variance analysis, or optimize a skill's description for better triggering accuracy.","Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fskill-creator\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fskill-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":74,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M757G1ZCMBCMQ2Z9Y55KYDNE","impeccable","Use when the user wants to design, redesign, shape, critique, audit, polish, clarify, distill, harden, optimize, adapt, animate, colorize, extract, or otherwise improve a frontend interface. Covers websites, landing pages, dashboards, product UI, app shells, components, forms, settings, onboarding, and empty states. Handles UX review, visual hierarchy, information architecture, cognitive load, accessibility, performance, responsive behavior, theming, anti-patterns, typography, fonts, spacing, layout, alignment, color, motion, micro-interactions, UX copy, error states, edge cases, i18n, and reusable design systems or tokens. Also use for bland designs that need to become bolder or more delightful, loud designs that should become quieter, live browser iteration on UI elements, or ambitious visual effects that should feel technically extraordinary. Not for backend-only or non-UI tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimpeccable\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M757FWRNAWB49ACFX8Q7GW7F","helm-expert","Generate production-ready Helm charts with hardened security by default. Use this skill whenever the user needs to create or scaffold a Helm chart, whether they mention it explicitly or are describing Kubernetes deployments that need packaging. The skill ensures security best practices including non-root users, read-only filesystems, network policies, RBAC, Pod Security Standards, and resource limits are all built in from the start. Even if the user just says \"I need to deploy X to Kubernetes\", use this skill to generate a proper Helm chart with hardened defaults.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhelm-expert\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":94,"name":95,"nameZh":6,"description":96,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":97,"categories":98,"keywords":99,"publishedAt":19},"01M757FTCR15N3CEV9TEY1R4TG","handoff","Compact the current conversation into a handoff document for another agent to pick up.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flukeelten\u002Fpersonal-ai-tooling\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhandoff\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]