[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M74XDPS66ECHJ57H9ACVRV17":3,"skill-same:01M74XDPS66ECHJ57H9ACVRV17":90},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":36,"commitSha":37,"skillDirectory":5,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":38,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":39,"ownerBlogUrl":40,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":41,"install":42,"resources":55},"01M74XDPS66ECHJ57H9ACVRV17","detecting-process-hollowing-technique",null,"Detect process hollowing (T1055.012) by analyzing memory-mapped sections, hollowed process indicators, and parent-child process anomalies in EDR telemetry.","SamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection","SamuelChien","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F4652114?v=4","01M74KK34WVHA0P5ZYSJRDDFMG","Samuel Chien","01M74KK35FQN1N9VZ9EPTH3P2S",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-process-hollowing-technique\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-process-hollowing-technique\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: detecting-process-hollowing-technique\ndescription: Detect process hollowing (T1055.012) by analyzing memory-mapped sections, hollowed process indicators, and parent-child process anomalies in EDR telemetry.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags: [threat-hunting, mitre-attack, process-hollowing, process-injection, edr, t1055, proactive-detection]\nversion: \"1.0\"\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\n---\n\n# Detecting Process Hollowing Technique\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating suspected fileless malware or in-memory threats\n- After EDR alerts on process injection or suspicious memory operations\n- When hunting for defense evasion techniques in a compromised environment\n- When threat intel reports indicate process hollowing in active campaigns\n- During purple team exercises validating T1055.012 detection coverage\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- EDR with memory protection monitoring (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)\n- Sysmon with Event IDs 1 (Process Create), 8 (CreateRemoteThread), 25 (ProcessTampering)\n- Windows ETW providers for process hollowing (Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process)\n- Memory forensics capabilities (Volatility, WinDbg)\n- Process integrity monitoring tools\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Understand Hollowing Mechanics**: Process hollowing involves creating a legitimate process in suspended state, unmapping its memory, writing malicious code, then resuming execution.\n2. **Monitor Suspended Process Creation**: Hunt for processes created with CREATE_SUSPENDED flag followed by memory writes and thread resumption.\n3. **Detect Memory Section Anomalies**: Identify processes where the in-memory image differs from the on-disk binary (image mismatch).\n4. **Analyze Parent-Child Process Trees**: Flag processes whose behavior does not match their binary name (e.g., svchost.exe making unusual network connections).\n5. **Check Process Integrity**: Compare process memory sections against the legitimate binary on disk.\n6. **Correlate with Network Activity**: Hollowed processes often establish C2 connections - correlate suspicious process behavior with network logs.\n7. **Document and Contain**: Report findings, isolate affected endpoints, and update detection rules.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1055.012 | Process Injection: Process Hollowing |\n| T1055 | Process Injection (parent technique) |\n| T1055.001 | DLL Injection |\n| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |\n| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call |\n| CREATE_SUSPENDED | Windows flag to create a process in suspended state |\n| NtUnmapViewOfSection | API to unmap process memory sections |\n| WriteProcessMemory | API to write into another process's memory |\n| ResumeThread | API to resume a suspended thread |\n| Image Mismatch | Process memory content differs from on-disk binary |\n| Process Doppelganging | Related technique using NTFS transactions (T1055.013) |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | Memory protection and hollowing detection |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | ProcessTampering alerts |\n| Sysmon v13+ | Event ID 25 ProcessTampering detection |\n| Volatility | Memory forensics - malfind plugin |\n| pe-sieve | Process memory scanner for hollowed processes |\n| Hollows Hunter | Automated hollowed process detection |\n| Process Hacker | Live process memory inspection |\n| API Monitor | Monitor NtUnmapViewOfSection calls |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Svchost.exe Hollowing**: Malware creates svchost.exe suspended, hollows it, injects backdoor code - process appears legitimate but behaves maliciously.\n2. **Explorer.exe Hollowing**: Attacker hollows explorer.exe to inherit its network permissions and trusted process context.\n3. **Rundll32 Hollowing**: Malicious loader creates rundll32.exe, replaces its memory with implant code for C2 beaconing.\n4. **Multi-Stage Hollowing**: Loader uses process hollowing as first stage, then performs additional injection into services.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-HOLLOW-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1055.012\nHollowed Process: [Process name and PID]\nOriginal Binary: [Expected on-disk path]\nParent Process: [Parent name and PID]\nMemory Mismatch: [Yes\u002FNo]\nSuspicious APIs: [NtUnmapViewOfSection, WriteProcessMemory, etc.]\nNetwork Activity: [C2 connections if any]\nHost: [Hostname]\nUser: [Account context]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n","# Detecting Process Hollowing Technique\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating suspected fileless malware or in-memory threats\n- After EDR alerts on process injection or suspicious memory operations\n- When hunting for defense evasion techniques in a compromised environment\n- When threat intel reports indicate process hollowing in active campaigns\n- During purple team exercises validating T1055.012 detection coverage\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- EDR with memory protection monitoring (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)\n- Sysmon with Event IDs 1 (Process Create), 8 (CreateRemoteThread), 25 (ProcessTampering)\n- Windows ETW providers for process hollowing (Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process)\n- Memory forensics capabilities (Volatility, WinDbg)\n- Process integrity monitoring tools\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Understand Hollowing Mechanics**: Process hollowing involves creating a legitimate process in suspended state, unmapping its memory, writing malicious code, then resuming execution.\n2. **Monitor Suspended Process Creation**: Hunt for processes created with CREATE_SUSPENDED flag followed by memory writes and thread resumption.\n3. **Detect Memory Section Anomalies**: Identify processes where the in-memory image differs from the on-disk binary (image mismatch).\n4. **Analyze Parent-Child Process Trees**: Flag processes whose behavior does not match their binary name (e.g., svchost.exe making unusual network connections).\n5. **Check Process Integrity**: Compare process memory sections against the legitimate binary on disk.\n6. **Correlate with Network Activity**: Hollowed processes often establish C2 connections - correlate suspicious process behavior with network logs.\n7. **Document and Contain**: Report findings, isolate affected endpoints, and update detection rules.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1055.012 | Process Injection: Process Hollowing |\n| T1055 | Process Injection (parent technique) |\n| T1055.001 | DLL Injection |\n| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |\n| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call |\n| CREATE_SUSPENDED | Windows flag to create a process in suspended state |\n| NtUnmapViewOfSection | API to unmap process memory sections |\n| WriteProcessMemory | API to write into another process's memory |\n| ResumeThread | API to resume a suspended thread |\n| Image Mismatch | Process memory content differs from on-disk binary |\n| Process Doppelganging | Related technique using NTFS transactions (T1055.013) |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | Memory protection and hollowing detection |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | ProcessTampering alerts |\n| Sysmon v13+ | Event ID 25 ProcessTampering detection |\n| Volatility | Memory forensics - malfind plugin |\n| pe-sieve | Process memory scanner for hollowed processes |\n| Hollows Hunter | Automated hollowed process detection |\n| Process Hacker | Live process memory inspection |\n| API Monitor | Monitor NtUnmapViewOfSection calls |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Svchost.exe Hollowing**: Malware creates svchost.exe suspended, hollows it, injects backdoor code - process appears legitimate but behaves maliciously.\n2. **Explorer.exe Hollowing**: Attacker hollows explorer.exe to inherit its network permissions and trusted process context.\n3. **Rundll32 Hollowing**: Malicious loader creates rundll32.exe, replaces its memory with implant code for C2 beaconing.\n4. **Multi-Stage Hollowing**: Loader uses process hollowing as first stage, then performs additional injection into services.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-HOLLOW-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1055.012\nHollowed Process: [Process name and PID]\nOriginal Binary: [Expected on-disk path]\nParent Process: [Parent name and PID]\nMemory Mismatch: [Yes\u002FNo]\nSuspicious APIs: [NtUnmapViewOfSection, WriteProcessMemory, etc.]\nNetwork Activity: [C2 connections if any]\nHost: [Hostname]\nUser: [Account context]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":33,"domain":34,"license":15,"version":35,"subdomain":26,"description":7},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32],"threat-hunting","mitre-attack","process-hollowing","process-injection","edr","t1055","proactive-detection","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0","main","c2b1fdccc779e99ac814e55fb69ca8d71215dd0f","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien","http:\u002F\u002Fsamuelchien.com\u002F","2026-05-26 08:27:14",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":43,"prompt":53,"zipAvailable":54},[44,47,50],{"tool":45,"command":46},"npx","npx skills add SamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection --skill detecting-process-hollowing-technique",{"tool":48,"command":49},"bunx","bunx skills add SamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection --skill detecting-process-hollowing-technique",{"tool":51,"command":52},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add SamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection --skill detecting-process-hollowing-technique","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-process-hollowing-technique\u002FSKILL.md",true,[56,62,66,72,76,80,86],{"path":57,"resourceType":58,"resourceTypeDesc":59,"sizeBytes":60,"sourceHtmlUrl":61},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",972,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-process-hollowing-technique\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":63,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":65,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":67,"resourceType":68,"resourceTypeDesc":69,"sizeBytes":70,"sourceHtmlUrl":71},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",1162,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-process-hollowing-technique\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":73,"resourceType":68,"resourceTypeDesc":69,"sizeBytes":74,"sourceHtmlUrl":75},"references\u002Fstandards.md",3127,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-process-hollowing-technique\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":77,"resourceType":68,"resourceTypeDesc":69,"sizeBytes":78,"sourceHtmlUrl":79},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",3819,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-process-hollowing-technique\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",{"path":81,"resourceType":82,"resourceTypeDesc":83,"sizeBytes":84,"sourceHtmlUrl":85},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",4564,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-process-hollowing-technique\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":87,"resourceType":82,"resourceTypeDesc":83,"sizeBytes":88,"sourceHtmlUrl":89},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py",12220,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-process-hollowing-technique\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[91,99,106,113,120,127],{"skillNo":92,"name":93,"nameZh":6,"description":94,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":95,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":96,"categories":97,"keywords":98,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R4WZQZAXGGXMQCA0FZ716","zustand-store-ts","Create Zustand stores with TypeScript, subscribeWithSelector middleware, and proper state\u002Faction separation. Use when building React state management, creating global stores, or implementing reactive state patterns with Zustand.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzustand-store-ts\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":100,"name":101,"nameZh":6,"description":102,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":95,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":103,"categories":104,"keywords":105,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R4T9KENDH7FENGZQHBW4G","zustand-store-creator","Zustand Store Creator - Auto-activating skill for Frontend Development.\nTriggers on: zustand store creator, zustand store creator\nPart of the Frontend Development skill category.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzustand-store-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":107,"name":108,"nameZh":6,"description":109,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":95,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":110,"categories":111,"keywords":112,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R3YWN84B7SANJ52X799ZE","zero-trust-config-helper","Zero Trust Config Helper - Auto-activating skill for Security Advanced.\nTriggers on: zero trust config helper, zero trust config helper\nPart of the Security Advanced skill category.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzero-trust-config-helper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":114,"name":115,"nameZh":6,"description":116,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":95,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":117,"categories":118,"keywords":119,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R3HNSV2AEYSKHM915GJ58","zapier-integration-helper","Zapier Integration Helper - Auto-activating skill for Business Automation.\nTriggers on: zapier integration helper, zapier integration helper\nPart of the Business Automation skill category.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzapier-integration-helper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":121,"name":122,"nameZh":6,"description":123,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":124,"categories":125,"keywords":126,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R3DJSKAT4FA7DV4BF3GCE","zai-cli","Execute z.AI CLI providing vision, search, reader, and GitHub exploration via CLI and MCP.\nUse when user needs image\u002Fvideo analysis, OCR, UI-to-code conversion, error diagnosis,\nreal-time web search, web page to markdown extraction, or GitHub code exploration.\nTrigger with phrases like \"analyze this image\", \"search the web for\", \"read this page\",\n\"explore this repo\", or \"use zai\". 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