AGENT SKILL

detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods

Detect and prevent privilege escalation in Kubernetes pods by monitoring security contexts, capabilities, and syscall patterns with Falco and OPA policies.

License 许可
Apache-2.0
最近更新
2026-05-26
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01 前言 Front Matter

name
detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods
tags
[ "kubernetes", "privilege-escalation", "security-context", "capabilities", "detection", "pod-security" ]
author
mahipal
domain
cybersecurity
license
Apache-2.0
version
1.0
subdomain
container-security
description
Detect and prevent privilege escalation in Kubernetes pods by monitoring security contexts, capabilities, and syscall patterns with Falco and OPA policies.

02 资源文件 7

03 SKILL.md 正文

Detecting Privilege Escalation in Kubernetes Pods

Overview

Privilege escalation in Kubernetes occurs when a pod or container gains elevated permissions beyond its intended scope. This includes running as root, using privileged mode, mounting host filesystems, enabling dangerous Linux capabilities, or exploiting kernel vulnerabilities. Detection combines admission control (prevention), runtime monitoring (detection), and audit logging (investigation).

When to Use

  • When investigating security incidents that require detecting privilege escalation in kubernetes pods
  • When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
  • When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
  • When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Prerequisites

  • Kubernetes cluster v1.25+ (Pod Security Admission support)
  • kubectl with cluster-admin access
  • Falco or similar runtime security tool
  • OPA Gatekeeper or Kyverno for admission policies

Privilege Escalation Vectors in Kubernetes

Vector Risk Detection Method
privileged: true Full host access Admission control + audit
hostPID: true Access host processes Admission control
hostNetwork: true Access host network stack Admission control
hostPath volumes Read/write host filesystem Admission control
SYS_ADMIN capability Near-privileged access Admission + runtime
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true setuid/setgid exploitation Admission control
runAsUser: 0 Container root Admission control
automountServiceAccountToken Token theft for API access Admission control
Writable /proc or /sys Kernel parameter manipulation Runtime monitoring

Detection with Admission Control

Pod Security Admission (Built-in)

# Enforce restricted policy on namespace
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  name: production
  labels:
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version: latest
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted

OPA Gatekeeper Policies

# Block dangerous capabilities
apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1
kind: ConstraintTemplate
metadata:
  name: k8sdangerouspriv
spec:
  crd:
    spec:
      names:
        kind: K8sDangerousPriv
  targets:
    - target: admission.k8s.gatekeeper.sh
      rego: |
        package k8sdangerouspriv

        dangerous_caps := {"SYS_ADMIN", "SYS_PTRACE", "SYS_MODULE", "DAC_OVERRIDE", "NET_ADMIN", "NET_RAW"}

        violation[{"msg": msg}] {
          container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
          cap := container.securityContext.capabilities.add[_]
          dangerous_caps[cap]
          msg := sprintf("Container %v adds dangerous capability: %v", [container.name, cap])
        }

        violation[{"msg": msg}] {
          container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
          container.securityContext.privileged == true
          msg := sprintf("Container %v runs in privileged mode", [container.name])
        }

        violation[{"msg": msg}] {
          container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]
          container.securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation == true
          msg := sprintf("Container %v allows privilege escalation", [container.name])
        }

        violation[{"msg": msg}] {
          input.review.object.spec.hostPID == true
          msg := "Pod uses host PID namespace"
        }

        violation[{"msg": msg}] {
          input.review.object.spec.hostNetwork == true
          msg := "Pod uses host network"
        }

Runtime Detection with Falco

# /etc/falco/rules.d/privesc-detection.yaml
- rule: Setuid Binary Execution in Container
  desc: Detect execution of setuid/setgid binaries in a container
  condition: >
    spawned_process and container and
    (proc.name in (su, sudo, newgrp, chsh, passwd) or
     proc.is_exe_upper_layer=true)
  output: >
    Setuid/setgid binary executed in container
    (user=%user.name container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
     command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1548]

- rule: Capability Gained in Container
  desc: Detect when a process gains elevated capabilities
  condition: >
    evt.type = capset and container and
    evt.arg.cap != ""
  output: >
    Process gained capabilities in container
    (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
     capabilities=%evt.arg.cap command=%proc.cmdline)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1548.001]

- rule: Container with Dangerous Capabilities Started
  desc: Detect container launched with dangerous capabilities
  condition: >
    container_started and container and
    (container.image.repository != "registry.k8s.io/pause") and
    (container.cap_effective contains SYS_ADMIN or
     container.cap_effective contains SYS_PTRACE or
     container.cap_effective contains SYS_MODULE)
  output: >
    Container with dangerous capabilities
    (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
     caps=%container.cap_effective)
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1068]

- rule: Write to /etc/passwd in Container
  desc: Detect writes to /etc/passwd inside container
  condition: >
    open_write and container and fd.name = /etc/passwd
  output: >
    Write to /etc/passwd in container
    (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository
     command=%proc.cmdline user=%user.name)
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1136]

Kubernetes Audit Log Detection

# audit-policy.yaml - Capture privilege escalation events
apiVersion: audit.k8s.io/v1
kind: Policy
rules:
  # Log pod creation with security context details
  - level: RequestResponse
    resources:
      - group: ""
        resources: ["pods"]
    verbs: ["create", "update", "patch"]

  # Log privilege escalation attempts
  - level: RequestResponse
    resources:
      - group: "rbac.authorization.k8s.io"
        resources: ["clusterroles", "clusterrolebindings", "roles", "rolebindings"]
    verbs: ["create", "update", "patch", "bind", "escalate"]

  # Log service account token requests
  - level: Metadata
    resources:
      - group: ""
        resources: ["serviceaccounts/token"]
    verbs: ["create"]

Query Audit Logs for Privilege Escalation

# Find pods created with privileged security context
kubectl logs -n kube-system kube-apiserver-* | \
  jq 'select(.verb == "create" and .objectRef.resource == "pods") |
  select(.requestObject.spec.containers[].securityContext.privileged == true)'

# Find RBAC escalation attempts
kubectl logs -n kube-system kube-apiserver-* | \
  jq 'select(.objectRef.resource == "clusterrolebindings" and .verb == "create")'

Investigation Playbook

# Check pod security context
kubectl get pod <pod-name> -n <ns> -o jsonpath='{.spec.containers[*].securityContext}'

# Check effective capabilities
kubectl exec <pod-name> -n <ns> -- cat /proc/1/status | grep -i cap

# List pods running as root
kubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | \
  jq '.items[] | select(.spec.containers[].securityContext.runAsUser == 0 or .spec.containers[].securityContext.privileged == true) | {name: .metadata.name, ns: .metadata.namespace}'

# Check for hostPath volumes
kubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | \
  jq '.items[] | select(.spec.volumes[]?.hostPath != null) | {name: .metadata.name, ns: .metadata.namespace, paths: [.spec.volumes[].hostPath.path]}'

Best Practices

  1. Enable Pod Security Admission at restricted level for production namespaces
  2. Drop ALL capabilities and add back only what is needed
  3. Set allowPrivilegeEscalation: false on all containers
  4. Run as non-root (runAsNonRoot: true, runAsUser > 0)
  5. Disable automountServiceAccountToken unless API access is needed
  6. Monitor with Falco for runtime privilege escalation attempts
  7. Audit RBAC changes with Kubernetes audit logging
  8. Use seccomp profiles to restrict syscalls

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