[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M74F4KZMWTBCHMGA51D4QBW7":3,"skill-same:01M74F4KZMWTBCHMGA51D4QBW7":52},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":27,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":28,"ownerBlogUrl":29,"ownerDescription":30,"updatedAt":31,"install":32,"resources":45},"01M74F4KZMWTBCHMGA51D4QBW7","stripe-pci-scope-minimization",null,"Minimize PCI DSS scope when integrating Stripe -- token-only flows (Elements, Checkout, PaymentSheet), avoid raw PAN handling, audit-log discipline for cardholder-data adjacencies. References PCI DSS v4 Requirement 3 (Protect Stored Account Data) and Requirement 10 (Log and Monitor Access). Triggers on Stripe payment-intent \u002F charge \u002F customer code authoring. OWASP ASI03 (Identity & Privilege Abuse) defense for PCI-scoped credential handling.","MILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs","MILTONADINA","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F106546372?v=4","01M74F3R2PP4Z04DQMMBHSQAT1","Milton Adina","01M74F3R3CHTKPXJV4RP7RR3W8",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fstack-specific\u002Fstripe\u002Fpci-scope-minimization\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: stripe-pci-scope-minimization\ndescription: Minimize PCI DSS scope when integrating Stripe -- token-only flows (Elements, Checkout, PaymentSheet), avoid raw PAN handling, audit-log discipline for cardholder-data adjacencies. References PCI DSS v4 Requirement 3 (Protect Stored Account Data) and Requirement 10 (Log and Monitor Access). Triggers on Stripe payment-intent \u002F charge \u002F customer code authoring. OWASP ASI03 (Identity & Privilege Abuse) defense for PCI-scoped credential handling.\n---\n\n# Stripe PCI Scope Minimization\n\n> Defends against **OWASP ASI03 (Identity & Privilege Abuse)** in the\n> PCI-scoped credential dimension. PCI DSS classifies any system that\n> processes, stores, or transmits cardholder data as \"in scope\" for full\n> PCI compliance; \"in scope\" means a 12-requirement audit surface with\n> teeth. The patterns here keep the application OUT of scope wherever\n> possible -- token-only flows where Stripe-hosted UI handles raw card\n> data, and tight discipline on the few places card-related data crosses\n> the application boundary.\n\n**Tradeoff:** Token-only flows give up some UX flexibility (Stripe's\nElements \u002F Checkout \u002F PaymentSheet host the card-data UI on Stripe's\ndomain). The benefit: the bulk of PCI DSS v4 requirements don't apply\nto a SAQ-A integration where the app never sees a primary account number\n(PAN). Self-hosted card data collection means SAQ-D scope: 200+ pages of\naudit checklist.\n\n---\n\n## Why this matters\n\nPCI DSS v4.0 (released March 2022; v4.0.1 minor revision June 2024)\nhas several SAQs (Self-Assessment Questionnaires); the four that decide\nscope for a Stripe integration are:\n\n- **SAQ-A**: e-commerce merchants who fully outsource cardholder-data\n  handling to a PCI-DSS-validated third party. Smallest scope.\n- **SAQ-A-EP**: e-commerce where the merchant's site loads the\n  card-collection UI but doesn't see the card data itself.\n- **SAQ-D-Merchant**: merchants who handle PAN themselves.\n- **SAQ-D-Service-Provider**: for SaaS that processes card data on\n  behalf of others.\n\nStripe's hosted flows (Checkout, PaymentSheet, Payment Element with\nclient-side `stripe.confirmPayment`) keep most integrations in SAQ-A.\nThe moment the application reads, stores, or transmits raw card data\n-- even briefly, even in memory -- scope balloons.\n\n---\n\n## Pattern 1 -- Use Stripe's hosted card-collection UI\n\nThe card-data UI runs on Stripe's domain (via iframes or hosted-page\nredirects). The application receives back a tokenized identifier (a\n`PaymentMethod` id, format `pm_...`, or a `PaymentIntent` id `pi_...`)\nthat references the card on Stripe's side. The PAN never reaches the\napplication.\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F Server: create a PaymentIntent that the client will confirm.\nconst pi = await stripe.paymentIntents.create({\n  amount: 1999,\n  currency: 'usd',\n  customer: customerId,\n  automatic_payment_methods: { enabled: true },\n});\n\n\u002F\u002F Client: confirm using Stripe.js (loads from stripe.com -- iframed\n\u002F\u002F PCI-scoped UI on Stripe's domain). The page never touches raw PAN.\n\u002F\u002F `elements` was created with pi.client_secret and mounts the Payment Element.\nconst result = await stripe.confirmPayment({\n  elements,  \u002F\u002F Stripe.js managed Payment Element, scoped to Stripe's domain\n  confirmParams: { return_url: 'https:\u002F\u002Fexample.test\u002Fcheckout\u002Fcomplete' },\n});\n```\n\nAfter confirmation, the application stores ONLY the `PaymentIntent.id`\nor `PaymentMethod.id`. These tokens are useless to an attacker who\nbreaches the application database; they only function with the Stripe\nsecret key.\n\n---\n\n## Pattern 2 -- Never log card data, ever\n\nPCI DSS v4 **Requirement 3 -- Protect Stored Account Data** restricts\nstorage of full PAN, sensitive authentication data (SAD: CVV, full\ntrack data, PIN blocks), and similar. **Sensitive authentication data\nSHALL NOT be stored after authorization, even if encrypted.**\n**Requirement 10 -- Log and Monitor All Access** also imposes\nrestrictions on what audit logs may contain about cardholder data.\n\nThe simplest interpretation: do not log card-related fields. If a\nlog line happens to contain a PaymentIntent object from a Stripe API\nresponse, redact the `payment_method` details before serializing.\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F Redact card-related fields before logging.\nfunction redactCardData\u003CT extends { payment_method?: unknown; charges?: unknown }>(obj: T): T {\n  const copy = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(obj)) as T;\n  if (copy.payment_method) {\n    copy.payment_method = '[REDACTED]' as never;\n  }\n  if (copy.charges && typeof copy.charges === 'object') {\n    \u002F\u002F ... recursively redact charge.payment_method_details ...\n  }\n  return copy;\n}\n\nconsole.log('payment intent processed', redactCardData(paymentIntent));\n```\n\nThis applies to error paths too -- a try \u002F catch that logs an Error\nwhose `.message` contains the raw API response leaks the card details\ninto log storage. Use Stripe error subtypes (`Stripe.errors.*`) and log\nonly `err.code` + `err.type`, never the full error object.\n\n---\n\n## Pattern 3 -- Restrict who has access to the Stripe secret key\n\nPCI DSS v4 **Requirement 7 -- Restrict Access to System Components**\napplies to systems that touch the cardholder-data environment (CDE);\nthe Stripe secret key is one such credential. Discipline:\n\n- The secret key lives in a vault (1Password, AWS Secrets Manager,\n  HashiCorp Vault, Doppler), never in `.env.local` committed to git\n  and never in a CI config file in plain text.\n- Production secret key is distinct from test secret key\n  (`sk_live_*` vs `sk_test_*`); the test key never grants access to\n  live cardholder data.\n- The set of engineers with production-secret-key access is auditable\n  per **Requirement 10**: when an engineer joins \u002F leaves a team with\n  CDE access, the access change is logged in an auditable system.\n- Server processes load the key at boot from the vault; no human reads\n  it in cleartext during normal operations.\n\n---\n\n## Anti-patterns\n\n### Anti-pattern 1 -- Accepting raw card data via the application's own API\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F WRONG\napp.post('\u002Fapi\u002Fcheckout', async (req, res) => {\n  const { cardNumber, cvv, expMonth, expYear } = req.body;\n  const charge = await stripe.charges.create({ source: { number: cardNumber, ... } });\n  \u002F\u002F ...\n});\n```\n\nThis single endpoint pulls the entire application into SAQ-D scope. The\napplication now processes, transmits, AND (depending on logging) stores\nPAN. Use the Stripe.js client-side tokenization (Pattern 1) instead --\nthe client sends a tokenized `PaymentMethod` id to the server, never the\nraw card.\n\n### Anti-pattern 2 -- Logging full Stripe API responses without redaction\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F WRONG\nconst charge = await stripe.charges.create({ ... });\nlogger.info('charge created', charge);  \u002F\u002F contains card.last4, card.brand, billing_details\n```\n\nEven partial card data (last4, brand) plus billing_details (name, address)\nin logs creates an audit problem -- log retention, access control, and\nbackup discipline all become CDE concerns per Requirement 3 + 10. Redact\nat the logging boundary (Pattern 2).\n\n### Anti-pattern 3 -- Sharing the secret key across environments\n\n```bash\n# WRONG: same key for staging and production\nexport STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_live_AbCdEf...\n```\n\nProduction and staging secret keys MUST be distinct. Sharing makes\nstaging access equivalent to production access for cardholder-data\npurposes; a staging-environment compromise becomes a production-scope\nincident. PCI DSS v4 Requirement 6 + 7 imply isolation between\nenvironments for CDE-adjacent credentials.\n\n---\n\n## ASI\u002FAST mapping\n\nThis skill addresses **canonical OWASP ASI03 (Identity & Privilege\nAbuse)** from `governance\u002Fowasp-asi-2026\u002Fthreats.md` in the\nPCI-credential dimension. The Stripe secret key is a high-privilege\ncredential whose misuse moves money and exposes cardholder data. The\npatterns here -- keep the credential out of the application's regular\nruntime surface, restrict the human + service identities that hold it,\naudit access -- are the ASI03 defense for this specific credential\nclass.\n\nThe Stripe webhook idempotency skill\n(`stack-specific\u002Fstripe\u002Fwebhook-idempotency`) is the ASI02 counterpart\nfor the same Stripe integration.\n\n---\n\n## PCI DSS v4 section references\n\nOperators implementing this skill SHALL verify the exact subsection\nnumbers against the current PCI DSS v4.0.1 standard text\n(https:\u002F\u002Fwww.pcisecuritystandards.org\u002F) -- subsection numbering has\nbeen stable across the v4.0 → v4.0.1 minor revision but a future v4.x\nrelease may renumber. The references in this skill are at the\nRequirement level (3, 6, 7, 10), which has been stable across the entire\nv4.x family:\n\n- **Requirement 3 -- Protect Stored Account Data**: drives Pattern 2\n  (no logging card data) and the no-PAN-storage default.\n- **Requirement 6 -- Develop and Maintain Secure Systems and Software**:\n  implies environment isolation (Anti-pattern 3).\n- **Requirement 7 -- Restrict Access to System Components and Cardholder\n  Data**: drives Pattern 3 (restrict secret-key access).\n- **Requirement 10 -- Log and Monitor All Access**: drives Pattern 2 +\n  Pattern 3 (auditable secret-key access).\n\n---\n\n## Testing\n\nConcrete checks an SAQ-A integration should pass:\n\n- `grep -rniwE 'card_?number|pan|cvc|cvv' src\u002F` returns no results (no\n  raw card fields in application source; `-w` stops `pan` matching\n  words such as `company` or `expand`).\n- Stripe API responses are redacted before reaching any log destination\n  -- check via a synthetic-event integration test.\n- Secret key is loaded from vault at boot, not from `.env` or repo\n  config.\n- Staging and production secret keys are distinct (compare `sk_live_*`\n  prefix presence between environments).\n\n---\n\n## See also\n\n- `governance\u002Fowasp-asi-2026\u002Fthreats.md` -- ASI03 full text\n- PCI DSS v4.0.1 standard:\n  https:\u002F\u002Fwww.pcisecuritystandards.org\u002Fdocument_library\u002F?category=pcidss\n- Stripe PCI guidance:\n  https:\u002F\u002Fstripe.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fsecurity\u002Fguide\n- `skills\u002Fstack-specific\u002Fstripe\u002Fwebhook-idempotency\u002FSKILL.md` -- the\n  ASI02 companion skill for the same Stripe integration\n","# Stripe PCI Scope Minimization\n\n> Defends against **OWASP ASI03 (Identity & Privilege Abuse)** in the\n> PCI-scoped credential dimension. PCI DSS classifies any system that\n> processes, stores, or transmits cardholder data as \"in scope\" for full\n> PCI compliance; \"in scope\" means a 12-requirement audit surface with\n> teeth. The patterns here keep the application OUT of scope wherever\n> possible -- token-only flows where Stripe-hosted UI handles raw card\n> data, and tight discipline on the few places card-related data crosses\n> the application boundary.\n\n**Tradeoff:** Token-only flows give up some UX flexibility (Stripe's\nElements \u002F Checkout \u002F PaymentSheet host the card-data UI on Stripe's\ndomain). The benefit: the bulk of PCI DSS v4 requirements don't apply\nto a SAQ-A integration where the app never sees a primary account number\n(PAN). Self-hosted card data collection means SAQ-D scope: 200+ pages of\naudit checklist.\n\n---\n\n## Why this matters\n\nPCI DSS v4.0 (released March 2022; v4.0.1 minor revision June 2024)\nhas several SAQs (Self-Assessment Questionnaires); the four that decide\nscope for a Stripe integration are:\n\n- **SAQ-A**: e-commerce merchants who fully outsource cardholder-data\n  handling to a PCI-DSS-validated third party. Smallest scope.\n- **SAQ-A-EP**: e-commerce where the merchant's site loads the\n  card-collection UI but doesn't see the card data itself.\n- **SAQ-D-Merchant**: merchants who handle PAN themselves.\n- **SAQ-D-Service-Provider**: for SaaS that processes card data on\n  behalf of others.\n\nStripe's hosted flows (Checkout, PaymentSheet, Payment Element with\nclient-side `stripe.confirmPayment`) keep most integrations in SAQ-A.\nThe moment the application reads, stores, or transmits raw card data\n-- even briefly, even in memory -- scope balloons.\n\n---\n\n## Pattern 1 -- Use Stripe's hosted card-collection UI\n\nThe card-data UI runs on Stripe's domain (via iframes or hosted-page\nredirects). The application receives back a tokenized identifier (a\n`PaymentMethod` id, format `pm_...`, or a `PaymentIntent` id `pi_...`)\nthat references the card on Stripe's side. The PAN never reaches the\napplication.\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F Server: create a PaymentIntent that the client will confirm.\nconst pi = await stripe.paymentIntents.create({\n  amount: 1999,\n  currency: 'usd',\n  customer: customerId,\n  automatic_payment_methods: { enabled: true },\n});\n\n\u002F\u002F Client: confirm using Stripe.js (loads from stripe.com -- iframed\n\u002F\u002F PCI-scoped UI on Stripe's domain). The page never touches raw PAN.\n\u002F\u002F `elements` was created with pi.client_secret and mounts the Payment Element.\nconst result = await stripe.confirmPayment({\n  elements,  \u002F\u002F Stripe.js managed Payment Element, scoped to Stripe's domain\n  confirmParams: { return_url: 'https:\u002F\u002Fexample.test\u002Fcheckout\u002Fcomplete' },\n});\n```\n\nAfter confirmation, the application stores ONLY the `PaymentIntent.id`\nor `PaymentMethod.id`. These tokens are useless to an attacker who\nbreaches the application database; they only function with the Stripe\nsecret key.\n\n---\n\n## Pattern 2 -- Never log card data, ever\n\nPCI DSS v4 **Requirement 3 -- Protect Stored Account Data** restricts\nstorage of full PAN, sensitive authentication data (SAD: CVV, full\ntrack data, PIN blocks), and similar. **Sensitive authentication data\nSHALL NOT be stored after authorization, even if encrypted.**\n**Requirement 10 -- Log and Monitor All Access** also imposes\nrestrictions on what audit logs may contain about cardholder data.\n\nThe simplest interpretation: do not log card-related fields. If a\nlog line happens to contain a PaymentIntent object from a Stripe API\nresponse, redact the `payment_method` details before serializing.\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F Redact card-related fields before logging.\nfunction redactCardData\u003CT extends { payment_method?: unknown; charges?: unknown }>(obj: T): T {\n  const copy = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(obj)) as T;\n  if (copy.payment_method) {\n    copy.payment_method = '[REDACTED]' as never;\n  }\n  if (copy.charges && typeof copy.charges === 'object') {\n    \u002F\u002F ... recursively redact charge.payment_method_details ...\n  }\n  return copy;\n}\n\nconsole.log('payment intent processed', redactCardData(paymentIntent));\n```\n\nThis applies to error paths too -- a try \u002F catch that logs an Error\nwhose `.message` contains the raw API response leaks the card details\ninto log storage. Use Stripe error subtypes (`Stripe.errors.*`) and log\nonly `err.code` + `err.type`, never the full error object.\n\n---\n\n## Pattern 3 -- Restrict who has access to the Stripe secret key\n\nPCI DSS v4 **Requirement 7 -- Restrict Access to System Components**\napplies to systems that touch the cardholder-data environment (CDE);\nthe Stripe secret key is one such credential. Discipline:\n\n- The secret key lives in a vault (1Password, AWS Secrets Manager,\n  HashiCorp Vault, Doppler), never in `.env.local` committed to git\n  and never in a CI config file in plain text.\n- Production secret key is distinct from test secret key\n  (`sk_live_*` vs `sk_test_*`); the test key never grants access to\n  live cardholder data.\n- The set of engineers with production-secret-key access is auditable\n  per **Requirement 10**: when an engineer joins \u002F leaves a team with\n  CDE access, the access change is logged in an auditable system.\n- Server processes load the key at boot from the vault; no human reads\n  it in cleartext during normal operations.\n\n---\n\n## Anti-patterns\n\n### Anti-pattern 1 -- Accepting raw card data via the application's own API\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F WRONG\napp.post('\u002Fapi\u002Fcheckout', async (req, res) => {\n  const { cardNumber, cvv, expMonth, expYear } = req.body;\n  const charge = await stripe.charges.create({ source: { number: cardNumber, ... } });\n  \u002F\u002F ...\n});\n```\n\nThis single endpoint pulls the entire application into SAQ-D scope. The\napplication now processes, transmits, AND (depending on logging) stores\nPAN. Use the Stripe.js client-side tokenization (Pattern 1) instead --\nthe client sends a tokenized `PaymentMethod` id to the server, never the\nraw card.\n\n### Anti-pattern 2 -- Logging full Stripe API responses without redaction\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F WRONG\nconst charge = await stripe.charges.create({ ... });\nlogger.info('charge created', charge);  \u002F\u002F contains card.last4, card.brand, billing_details\n```\n\nEven partial card data (last4, brand) plus billing_details (name, address)\nin logs creates an audit problem -- log retention, access control, and\nbackup discipline all become CDE concerns per Requirement 3 + 10. Redact\nat the logging boundary (Pattern 2).\n\n### Anti-pattern 3 -- Sharing the secret key across environments\n\n```bash\n# WRONG: same key for staging and production\nexport STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_live_AbCdEf...\n```\n\nProduction and staging secret keys MUST be distinct. Sharing makes\nstaging access equivalent to production access for cardholder-data\npurposes; a staging-environment compromise becomes a production-scope\nincident. PCI DSS v4 Requirement 6 + 7 imply isolation between\nenvironments for CDE-adjacent credentials.\n\n---\n\n## ASI\u002FAST mapping\n\nThis skill addresses **canonical OWASP ASI03 (Identity & Privilege\nAbuse)** from `governance\u002Fowasp-asi-2026\u002Fthreats.md` in the\nPCI-credential dimension. The Stripe secret key is a high-privilege\ncredential whose misuse moves money and exposes cardholder data. The\npatterns here -- keep the credential out of the application's regular\nruntime surface, restrict the human + service identities that hold it,\naudit access -- are the ASI03 defense for this specific credential\nclass.\n\nThe Stripe webhook idempotency skill\n(`stack-specific\u002Fstripe\u002Fwebhook-idempotency`) is the ASI02 counterpart\nfor the same Stripe integration.\n\n---\n\n## PCI DSS v4 section references\n\nOperators implementing this skill SHALL verify the exact subsection\nnumbers against the current PCI DSS v4.0.1 standard text\n(https:\u002F\u002Fwww.pcisecuritystandards.org\u002F) -- subsection numbering has\nbeen stable across the v4.0 → v4.0.1 minor revision but a future v4.x\nrelease may renumber. The references in this skill are at the\nRequirement level (3, 6, 7, 10), which has been stable across the entire\nv4.x family:\n\n- **Requirement 3 -- Protect Stored Account Data**: drives Pattern 2\n  (no logging card data) and the no-PAN-storage default.\n- **Requirement 6 -- Develop and Maintain Secure Systems and Software**:\n  implies environment isolation (Anti-pattern 3).\n- **Requirement 7 -- Restrict Access to System Components and Cardholder\n  Data**: drives Pattern 3 (restrict secret-key access).\n- **Requirement 10 -- Log and Monitor All Access**: drives Pattern 2 +\n  Pattern 3 (auditable secret-key access).\n\n---\n\n## Testing\n\nConcrete checks an SAQ-A integration should pass:\n\n- `grep -rniwE 'card_?number|pan|cvc|cvv' src\u002F` returns no results (no\n  raw card fields in application source; `-w` stops `pan` matching\n  words such as `company` or `expand`).\n- Stripe API responses are redacted before reaching any log destination\n  -- check via a synthetic-event integration test.\n- Secret key is loaded from vault at boot, not from `.env` or repo\n  config.\n- Staging and production secret keys are distinct (compare `sk_live_*`\n  prefix presence between environments).\n\n---\n\n## See also\n\n- `governance\u002Fowasp-asi-2026\u002Fthreats.md` -- ASI03 full text\n- PCI DSS v4.0.1 standard:\n  https:\u002F\u002Fwww.pcisecuritystandards.org\u002Fdocument_library\u002F?category=pcidss\n- Stripe PCI guidance:\n  https:\u002F\u002Fstripe.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fsecurity\u002Fguide\n- `skills\u002Fstack-specific\u002Fstripe\u002Fwebhook-idempotency\u002FSKILL.md` -- the\n  ASI02 companion skill for the same Stripe integration\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","5a590e92c8f62b54c96a6928215ac2145b671e03","skills\u002Fstack-specific\u002Fstripe\u002Fpci-scope-minimization","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMILTONADINA","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.linkedin.com\u002Fin\u002Fmiltonadina","CS\u002FCybersecurity SWE & former Epidemiologist. Building secure, test-driven full-stack & mobile apps (TS\u002FReact\u002FNode, Java\u002FSpring, Flutter).","2026-11-14 20:03:36",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":33,"prompt":43,"zipAvailable":44},[34,37,40],{"tool":35,"command":36},"npx","npx skills add MILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs --skill stripe-pci-scope-minimization",{"tool":38,"command":39},"bunx","bunx skills add MILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs --skill stripe-pci-scope-minimization",{"tool":41,"command":42},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add MILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs --skill stripe-pci-scope-minimization","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fstack-specific\u002Fstripe\u002Fpci-scope-minimization\u002FSKILL.md",true,[46],{"path":47,"resourceType":48,"resourceTypeDesc":49,"sizeBytes":50,"sourceHtmlUrl":51},"SKILL.md.bundle","OTHER","其他",9703,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fstack-specific\u002Fstripe\u002Fpci-scope-minimization\u002FSKILL.md.bundle",[53,60,67,74,79,86],{"skillNo":54,"name":55,"nameZh":6,"description":56,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":57,"categories":58,"keywords":59,"publishedAt":19},"01M74F7F3HN6J7CSFHBVQAE9S5","karpathy-guidelines","Behavioral guidelines that reduce common LLM coding mistakes. Apply whenever writing, modifying, or reviewing code. Don't assume requirements, don't overcomplicate, don't refactor unrelated code, and define success criteria before implementing. Use this skill on every non-trivial coding task to avoid bloat, silent assumptions, and completion-bias.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftests\u002Ffixtures\u002Fsecurity\u002Fmodified-skill\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":19},"01M74F7D60N9FRWWWHCGZMMB41","unsigned-missing-sig-fixture","Test fixture (F.09) — SKILL.md without an accompanying .sig file. Default install rejects with exit 2; --allow-unsigned --rationale=\"...\" proceeds.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftests\u002Ffixtures\u002Finstall\u002Fsource-skills\u002Funsigned-missing-sig\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":71,"categories":72,"keywords":73,"publishedAt":19},"01M74F7BKGX67Q606QPKZV7TQV","unsigned-mismatched-sig-fixture","Test fixture (F.09) — SKILL.md whose accompanying .sig signs different content. NFR-F3 hash check catches this even with --allow-unsigned.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftests\u002Ffixtures\u002Finstall\u002Fsource-skills\u002Funsigned-mismatched-sig\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":75,"name":55,"nameZh":6,"description":56,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M74F793BYMX98EQC5XP4CDZK","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Ftests\u002Ffixtures\u002Finstall\u002Fsource-skills\u002Fsigned\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M74F7481EBD7G5471ZC4S9YB","webhook-idempotency","Defend against double-processing of webhook events across every provider (Stripe, GitHub, Slack, Twilio, SendGrid). Idempotency-key pattern + replay-window enforcement + dedupe-storage strategy. Triggers on any webhook handler authoring (route matching \u002Fwebhook(s)?\u002F, Stripe-Signature \u002F X-Hub-Signature-256 header references). Defense against OWASP ASI02 (Tool Misuse) -- a replayed webhook that re-triggers a destructive tool is the canonical control-flow-level replay attack. Universal across providers; stack-specific signature verification lives in stack-specific skills.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Funiversal\u002Fsecurity\u002Fwebhook-idempotency\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M74F71Q6JKRFJ66G5T98KE8H","semgrep-scan","Run Semgrep static analysis to detect insecure code patterns - SQL injection, XSS, path traversal, weak crypto, broken auth, OWASP Top 10 issues. Use on every file change touching security-sensitive code and as part of the tiered security gate. Complements gitleaks (which catches secrets) by catching insecure logic.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMILTONADINA\u002FDevOPs\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Funiversal\u002Fsecurity\u002Fsemgrep-scan\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]