secure-design-reviewer
Review secure-by-design decisions, least privilege, Zero Trust, tenant separation, secure defaults, and abuse scenarios.
- License 许可
- MIT
- 所属仓库
- domehahn/skcr
- 最近更新
- 2026-09-11
- Stars
- ★ 0
- Forks
- 0
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- secure-design-reviewer
- since
- 2026-06-17
- authors
- [ "platform-engineering" ]
- version
- 1.1.0
- replaces
- null
- changelog
- [ { "date": "2026-06-17", "change": "Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill", "version": "1.1.0" } ]
- stability
- stable
- supersedes
- []
- description
- Review secure-by-design decisions, least privilege, Zero Trust, tenant separation, secure defaults, and abuse scenarios.
- last_modified
- 2026-06-17
- deprecated_since
- null
- min_platform_version
- { "pi": "unknown", "bob": "unknown", "kimi": "unknown", "kiro": "unknown", "qwen": "unknown", "cline": "unknown", "codex": "unknown", "crush": "unknown", "iflow": "unknown", "junie": "unknown", "qoder": "unknown", "auggie": "unknown", "cursor": "unknown", "lingma": "unknown", "ollama": "unknown", "factory": "unknown", "amazon-q": "unknown", "continue": "unknown", "costrict": "unknown", "kilocode": "unknown", "opencode": "unknown", "roo-code": "unknown", "windsurf": "unknown", "codebuddy": "unknown", "forgecode": "unknown", "openhands": "unknown", "gemini-cli": "unknown", "gitlab-duo": "unknown", "antigravity": "unknown", "claude-code": "unknown", "github-copilot": "unknown" }
02 资源文件 6
- 参考文档CHANGELOG.md49 B
- 许可证LICENSE214 B
- 参考文档README.md484 B
- 参考文档skill.yaml459 B
- 参考文档tests/README.md98 B
- 其他VERSION6 B
03 SKILL.md 正文
Secure Design Reviewer
Purpose
Review secure-by-design decisions, least privilege, Zero Trust, tenant separation, secure defaults, and abuse scenarios. Treat regulatory, security, and operational references as review and evidence guidance, not legal advice.
When to use
- secure design decisions, controls, or operating practices need independent review.
- A change affects secure design artifacts such as design proposal, trust boundary, permission model, tenant model, default configuration, abuse case.
- The user needs evidence-oriented findings for risks such as overtrusted network, privilege creep, tenant data leak, insecure default, missing abuse case, weak isolation.
- Audit, security, operations, or platform stakeholders need a concise readiness position.
- Existing documentation, tickets, tests, or logs must be turned into actionable remediation items.
Operating model
- Identify the relevant secure design artifacts, owners, systems, environments, and review boundary.
- Compare the available artifacts against expected signals such as architecture diagram, threat model, access decision, configuration baseline, data-flow review, control rationale.
- Separate confirmed gaps from assumptions, missing evidence, and advisory improvement opportunities.
- Rate findings by operational, security, compliance, customer, and auditability impact.
- Recommend minimal remediation steps, validation evidence, owners, and review cadence.
Spec-Driven Change Context
- Treat repository specs, ADRs, runbooks, change proposals, design notes, and task files as durable context that outlives a chat session.
- For non-trivial changes, prefer a checked-in change artifact or equivalent proposal/design/tasks record before implementation begins.
- Capture requirement deltas explicitly: added, modified, removed, deprecated, or unchanged behavior.
- Keep implementation tasks traceable to acceptance criteria, affected specs, validation commands, and owners.
- During verification, compare the implementation against the proposal, design decisions, task checklist, and spec deltas.
- After completion, sync or archive completed change artifacts so the repository's source of truth reflects the final behavior.
- If the repository has no spec workflow yet, report the missing artifact and provide a minimal proposal/spec/tasks outline instead of relying on chat-only intent.
Skill-Specific Review Scope
- Primary artifacts: design proposal, trust boundary, permission model, tenant model, default configuration, abuse case.
- Risk themes: overtrusted network, privilege creep, tenant data leak, insecure default, missing abuse case, weak isolation.
- Evidence signals: architecture diagram, threat model, access decision, configuration baseline, data-flow review, control rationale.
- Ownership, approvals, review cadence, exception handling, and residual-risk decisions.
- Traceability from requirement or control intent to implementation, validation, and retained evidence.
Skill-Specific Checklist
- [ ] Confirm the review boundary covers the right secure design systems, teams, and environments.
- [ ] Inventory and inspect the current design proposal.
- [ ] Check whether trust boundary is current, approved, versioned, and owned.
- [ ] Verify that permission model has test, ticket, log, or approval support.
- [ ] Look for overtrusted network and record concrete repository or process evidence.
- [ ] Look for privilege creep and identify affected assets, services, or stakeholders.
- [ ] Look for tenant data leak and classify the operational or audit impact.
- [ ] Use architecture diagram to validate that the control or practice is operating.
- [ ] Use threat model to confirm ownership, timing, and reproducibility.
- [ ] Check exception, risk-acceptance, and expiry handling for secure design.
- [ ] Confirm remediation items have owners, due dates, validation steps, and evidence expectations.
- [ ] Identify missing artifacts separately from weak artifacts so the next action is unambiguous.
- [ ] Review whether logging, reporting, or retained evidence exposes sensitive data unnecessarily.
Decision Rules
- If design proposal is missing for a critical service, raise at least a high-severity readiness gap.
- If threat model cannot be tied to an owner and approval, treat the outcome as unauditable until corrected.
- If tenant model is present but expired or untested, require validation before accepting residual risk.
- If the only support is verbal or chat-only context, request durable ticket, document, log, or test evidence.
- If remediation would require a process or architecture decision, assign a decision owner instead of prescribing legal conclusions.
- If compensating measures reduce likelihood but not impact, keep the residual-risk statement explicit.
Finding Categories
- Missing or stale secure design artifact.
- Unclear ownership, approval, review cadence, or accountability.
- Insufficient validation, test proof, logs, ticket trail, or retained audit material.
- Unreviewed exception, residual risk, expiry, or compensating measure.
- Policy, architecture, operational, or platform implementation drift.
- Sensitive-data exposure in logs, reports, prompts, artifacts, or evidence packages.
Severity Guidance
- Critical: a gap in secure design creates immediate outage, data-loss, privilege, regulatory-reporting, or irreversible business risk.
- High: design proposal is missing, unowned, untested, or unauditable for a critical service or material change.
- Medium: trust boundary exists but is stale, incomplete, inconsistently enforced, or weakly evidenced.
- Low: wording, metadata, formatting, link freshness, or minor traceability improvements are needed.
DevSecOps Guardrails
- Do not read secrets,
.envfiles, private keys, production credentials, masked CI/CD variables, database dumps, or sensitive logs unless explicitly required. - Do not push, deploy, publish, merge, or create releases unless explicitly asked.
- Prefer merge requests, reviewable diffs, and auditable validation evidence.
- Prefer least privilege, minimal changes, and explicit rollback notes.
- Do not fabricate test results, repository state, commands, security findings, or validation outcomes.
- Report assumptions, uncertainty, residual risk, and validation gaps clearly.
Output Requirements
- Findings ordered by severity with affected secure design artifacts and evidence references.
- Coverage note for reviewed artifacts: design proposal, trust boundary, permission model, tenant model, default configuration, abuse case.
- Risk note covering relevant themes: overtrusted network, privilege creep, tenant data leak, insecure default, missing abuse case, weak isolation.
- Evidence request list using expected signals: architecture diagram, threat model, access decision, configuration baseline, data-flow review, control rationale.
- Deliverables or updates needed: secure design review, abuse-case findings, least-privilege recommendations, tenant-isolation notes, secure-default backlog.
- Residual-risk, assumptions, missing-context, and validation-gap summary.
Acceptance Criteria
- Relevant secure design artifacts are identified, current, owned, and versioned where applicable.
- Each high-impact finding includes evidence, impact, likelihood, owner, and remediation guidance.
- Missing evidence is separated from failed controls or weak implementation.
- Exceptions and risk acceptances include owner, rationale, expiry, and compensating measures.
- Recommendations are review-oriented and avoid presenting regulatory interpretation as legal advice.
- Final output states pass, conditional pass, or blocked readiness with validation gaps.
Anti-Patterns
- Treating a policy title or control name as proof that the practice operates effectively.
- Collapsing missing evidence and failed implementation into one vague finding.
- Accepting open-ended exceptions without owner, expiry, impact, likelihood, and compensating measures.
- Making legal, regulatory, or audit conclusions beyond the available evidence and review scope.
- Recommending broad process rewrites when a targeted owner, test, ticket, or evidence fix is enough.
- Copying sensitive production data into examples, evidence packages, prompts, or reports.
Changelog
1.1.0 - 2026-06-17
- Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill.
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