[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73C7HA4NBDTHEBM90QPVDFD":3,"skill-same:01M73C7HA4NBDTHEBM90QPVDFD":112},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":54,"commitSha":55,"skillDirectory":56,"forksCount":57,"repositoryHtmlUrl":58,"repositoryHomepageUrl":59,"ownerHtmlUrl":60,"ownerBlogUrl":61,"ownerDescription":62,"updatedAt":63,"install":64,"resources":77},"01M73C7HA4NBDTHEBM90QPVDFD","hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions",null,"Hunt for adversary persistence through Windows Management Instrumentation event subscriptions by monitoring WMI consumer, filter, and binding creation events that execute malicious code triggered by system events.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\ndescription: Hunt for adversary persistence through Windows Management Instrumentation\n  event subscriptions by monitoring WMI consumer, filter, and binding creation events\n  that execute malicious code triggered by system events.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- wmi-persistence\n- mitre-t1546-003\n- event-subscription\n- windows\n- endpoint-detection\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Network Isolation\n- Network Traffic Analysis\n- Client-server Payload Profiling\n- Platform Monitoring\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1547\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\nsource_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d\n---\n\n# Hunting for Persistence via WMI Subscriptions\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When proactively searching for fileless persistence mechanisms in Windows environments\n- After threat intelligence reports indicate WMI-based persistence by APT groups (APT29, APT32, FIN8)\n- When investigating systems where malware persists across reboots despite cleanup attempts\n- During incident response when standard persistence locations (Run keys, scheduled tasks) are clean\n- When WmiPrvSe.exe is observed spawning unexpected child processes\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon Event ID 19, 20, 21 (WMI Event Filter\u002FConsumer\u002FBinding) enabled\n- Windows Event ID 5861 (WMI activity logging) from Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity\n- PowerShell logging enabled (Script Block Logging, Module Logging)\n- WMI repository access for enumeration\n- SIEM platform for event correlation\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Enumerate Existing WMI Subscriptions**: Query all permanent WMI event subscriptions on target systems. A clean system typically has very few or zero permanent subscriptions, making anomalies easy to spot.\n2. **Monitor WMI Event Creation (Sysmon 19\u002F20\u002F21)**: Sysmon Event 19 captures WmiEventFilter activity, Event 20 captures WmiEventConsumer activity, and Event 21 captures WmiEventConsumerToFilter binding.\n3. **Analyze Consumer Types**: Focus on ActiveScriptEventConsumer (runs VBScript\u002FJScript) and CommandLineEventConsumer (executes commands) -- these are the dangerous types used for persistence.\n4. **Check Event Filter Triggers**: Examine what triggers the subscription. Common malicious triggers include system startup (Win32_ProcessStartTrace), user logon, or timer-based execution intervals.\n5. **Investigate WmiPrvSe.exe Child Processes**: When a WMI subscription fires, the action is executed by WmiPrvSe.exe. Hunt for unusual child processes of WmiPrvSe.exe.\n6. **Correlate with MOF Compilation**: Detect `mofcomp.exe` usage which compiles MOF files to create WMI subscriptions programmatically.\n7. **Validate and Respond**: Confirm malicious subscriptions, remove them, and trace back to the initial infection vector.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1546.003 | Event Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription |\n| __EventFilter | WMI class defining the trigger condition |\n| __EventConsumer | WMI class defining the action to perform |\n| __FilterToConsumerBinding | Links a filter to a consumer |\n| ActiveScriptEventConsumer | Consumer that runs VBScript or JScript |\n| CommandLineEventConsumer | Consumer that executes command lines |\n| WmiPrvSe.exe | WMI Provider Host that executes subscription actions |\n| MOF File | Managed Object Format used to define WMI objects |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- WMI Subscription Creation via Sysmon\n```spl\nindex=sysmon (EventCode=19 OR EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21)\n| eval event_type=case(EventCode=19, \"EventFilter\", EventCode=20, \"EventConsumer\", EventCode=21, \"FilterToConsumerBinding\")\n| table _time Computer User event_type EventNamespace Name Query Destination Operation\n```\n\n### Splunk -- WMI Subscription via Windows Event 5861\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog source=\"Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity\u002FOperational\" EventCode=5861\n| table _time Computer NamespaceName Operation PossibleCause\n```\n\n### PowerShell -- Enumerate WMI Subscriptions\n```powershell\nGet-WmiObject -Namespace root\\subscription -Class __EventFilter\nGet-WmiObject -Namespace root\\subscription -Class __EventConsumer\nGet-WmiObject -Namespace root\\subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding\n```\n\n### KQL -- WmiPrvSe.exe Spawning Suspicious Children\n```kql\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"wmiprvse.exe\"\n| where FileName in~ (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule\n```yaml\ntitle: WMI Event Subscription Persistence\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: wmi_event\ndetection:\n    selection_consumer:\n        EventID: 20\n        Destination|contains:\n            - 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'\n            - 'CommandLineEventConsumer'\n    condition: selection_consumer\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.persistence\n    - attack.t1546.003\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **APT29 WMI Persistence**: Creates an ActiveScriptEventConsumer that executes a VBScript backdoor on system startup, surviving reboots and credential resets.\n2. **Turla WMI Backdoor**: Uses Win32_ProcessStartTrace filter combined with CommandLineEventConsumer for covert command execution.\n3. **FIN8 WMI Timer**: Interval-based __IntervalTimerEvent triggering encoded PowerShell downloads every 30 minutes.\n4. **MOF-Based Installation**: Adversary drops a .mof file and compiles it with `mofcomp.exe` to silently create persistent subscriptions.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-WMI-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nSubscription Name: [Filter\u002FConsumer name]\nFilter Query: [WQL trigger condition]\nConsumer Type: [ActiveScript\u002FCommandLine]\nConsumer Action: [Script content or command]\nBinding: [Filter-to-Consumer link]\nCreated: [Timestamp]\nUser Context: [SYSTEM\u002FUser]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n","# Hunting for Persistence via WMI Subscriptions\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When proactively searching for fileless persistence mechanisms in Windows environments\n- After threat intelligence reports indicate WMI-based persistence by APT groups (APT29, APT32, FIN8)\n- When investigating systems where malware persists across reboots despite cleanup attempts\n- During incident response when standard persistence locations (Run keys, scheduled tasks) are clean\n- When WmiPrvSe.exe is observed spawning unexpected child processes\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon Event ID 19, 20, 21 (WMI Event Filter\u002FConsumer\u002FBinding) enabled\n- Windows Event ID 5861 (WMI activity logging) from Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity\n- PowerShell logging enabled (Script Block Logging, Module Logging)\n- WMI repository access for enumeration\n- SIEM platform for event correlation\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Enumerate Existing WMI Subscriptions**: Query all permanent WMI event subscriptions on target systems. A clean system typically has very few or zero permanent subscriptions, making anomalies easy to spot.\n2. **Monitor WMI Event Creation (Sysmon 19\u002F20\u002F21)**: Sysmon Event 19 captures WmiEventFilter activity, Event 20 captures WmiEventConsumer activity, and Event 21 captures WmiEventConsumerToFilter binding.\n3. **Analyze Consumer Types**: Focus on ActiveScriptEventConsumer (runs VBScript\u002FJScript) and CommandLineEventConsumer (executes commands) -- these are the dangerous types used for persistence.\n4. **Check Event Filter Triggers**: Examine what triggers the subscription. Common malicious triggers include system startup (Win32_ProcessStartTrace), user logon, or timer-based execution intervals.\n5. **Investigate WmiPrvSe.exe Child Processes**: When a WMI subscription fires, the action is executed by WmiPrvSe.exe. Hunt for unusual child processes of WmiPrvSe.exe.\n6. **Correlate with MOF Compilation**: Detect `mofcomp.exe` usage which compiles MOF files to create WMI subscriptions programmatically.\n7. **Validate and Respond**: Confirm malicious subscriptions, remove them, and trace back to the initial infection vector.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1546.003 | Event Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription |\n| __EventFilter | WMI class defining the trigger condition |\n| __EventConsumer | WMI class defining the action to perform |\n| __FilterToConsumerBinding | Links a filter to a consumer |\n| ActiveScriptEventConsumer | Consumer that runs VBScript or JScript |\n| CommandLineEventConsumer | Consumer that executes command lines |\n| WmiPrvSe.exe | WMI Provider Host that executes subscription actions |\n| MOF File | Managed Object Format used to define WMI objects |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- WMI Subscription Creation via Sysmon\n```spl\nindex=sysmon (EventCode=19 OR EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21)\n| eval event_type=case(EventCode=19, \"EventFilter\", EventCode=20, \"EventConsumer\", EventCode=21, \"FilterToConsumerBinding\")\n| table _time Computer User event_type EventNamespace Name Query Destination Operation\n```\n\n### Splunk -- WMI Subscription via Windows Event 5861\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog source=\"Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity\u002FOperational\" EventCode=5861\n| table _time Computer NamespaceName Operation PossibleCause\n```\n\n### PowerShell -- Enumerate WMI Subscriptions\n```powershell\nGet-WmiObject -Namespace root\\subscription -Class __EventFilter\nGet-WmiObject -Namespace root\\subscription -Class __EventConsumer\nGet-WmiObject -Namespace root\\subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding\n```\n\n### KQL -- WmiPrvSe.exe Spawning Suspicious Children\n```kql\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"wmiprvse.exe\"\n| where FileName in~ (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule\n```yaml\ntitle: WMI Event Subscription Persistence\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: wmi_event\ndetection:\n    selection_consumer:\n        EventID: 20\n        Destination|contains:\n            - 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'\n            - 'CommandLineEventConsumer'\n    condition: selection_consumer\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.persistence\n    - attack.t1546.003\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **APT29 WMI Persistence**: Creates an ActiveScriptEventConsumer that executes a VBScript backdoor on system startup, surviving reboots and credential resets.\n2. **Turla WMI Backdoor**: Uses Win32_ProcessStartTrace filter combined with CommandLineEventConsumer for covert command execution.\n3. **FIN8 WMI Timer**: Interval-based __IntervalTimerEvent triggering encoded PowerShell downloads every 30 minutes.\n4. **MOF-Based Installation**: Adversary drops a .mof file and compiles it with `mofcomp.exe` to silently create persistent subscriptions.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-WMI-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nSubscription Name: [Filter\u002FConsumer name]\nFilter Query: [WQL trigger condition]\nConsumer Type: [ActiveScript\u002FCommandLine]\nConsumer Action: [Script content or command]\nBinding: [Filter-to-Consumer link]\nCreated: [Timestamp]\nUser Context: [SYSTEM\u002FUser]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":32,"domain":33,"source":34,"license":15,"version":35,"nist_csf":36,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":41,"source_commit":47,"d3fend_techniques":48},[26,27,28,29,30,31],"threat-hunting","wmi-persistence","mitre-t1546-003","event-subscription","windows","endpoint-detection","mahipal","cybersecurity","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","1.0",[37,38,39,40],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[42,43,44,45,46],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1547","04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d",[49,50,51,52,53],"Application Protocol Command Analysis","Network Isolation","Network Traffic Analysis","Client-server Payload Profiling","Platform 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