hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows
Systematically hunt for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows endpoints including registry, services, startup folders, and WMI subscriptions.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-14
- Stars
- ★ 13
- Forks
- 2
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows
- tags
- [ "threat-hunting", "mitre-attack", "persistence", "windows", "registry", "siem", "proactive-detection" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- source
- https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0
- nist_csf
- [ "DE.CM-01", "DE.AE-02", "DE.AE-07", "ID.RA-05" ]
- subdomain
- threat-hunting
- description
- Systematically hunt for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows endpoints including registry, services, startup folders, and WMI subscriptions.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1046", "T1057", "T1082", "T1083", "T1547" ]
- source_commit
- 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d
- d3fend_techniques
- [ "Executable Denylisting", "Execution Isolation", "File Metadata Consistency Validation", "Content Format Conversion", "File Content Analysis" ]
02 资源文件 7
- 资产文件assets/template.md2.0 KB
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md2.0 KB
- 参考文档references/standards.md4.3 KB
- 参考文档references/workflows.md3.3 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py6.2 KB
- 脚本scripts/process.py14.0 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Hunting for Persistence Mechanisms in Windows
When to Use
- During periodic proactive threat hunts for dormant backdoors
- After an incident to identify all persistence mechanisms an attacker planted
- When investigating unusual services, scheduled tasks, or startup entries
- When threat intel reports describe new persistence techniques in the wild
- During security posture assessments to identify unauthorized persistent software
Prerequisites
- Sysmon deployed with Event IDs 12/13/14 (Registry), 19/20/21 (WMI), 1 (Process Creation)
- Windows Security Event forwarding for 4697 (Service Install), 4698 (Scheduled Task)
- EDR with registry and file monitoring capabilities
- PowerShell script block logging enabled (Event ID 4104)
- Autoruns or equivalent baseline of legitimate persistent entries
Workflow
- Enumerate Known Persistence Locations: Build a comprehensive list of Windows persistence points (Run keys, services, scheduled tasks, WMI, startup folder, DLL search order, COM hijacks, AppInit DLLs, Image File Execution Options).
- Collect Endpoint Data: Use EDR, Sysmon, or Velociraptor to collect current persistence artifacts from endpoints across the environment.
- Baseline Legitimate Persistence: Compare collected data against known-good baselines (Autoruns snapshots, GPO-deployed entries, SCCM configurations).
- Identify Anomalies: Flag new, unsigned, or unknown entries in persistence locations that deviate from the baseline.
- Investigate Suspicious Entries: For each anomaly, examine the binary it points to, its digital signature, file hash, and creation timestamp.
- Correlate with Process Activity: Link persistence entries to process execution, network activity, and user login events.
- Document and Remediate: Record findings, remove malicious persistence, and update detection rules.
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
| T1543.003 | Windows Service (Create or Modify) |
| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task |
| T1546.003 | WMI Event Subscription |
| T1546.015 | Component Object Model (COM) Hijacking |
| T1546.012 | Image File Execution Options Injection |
| T1546.010 | AppInit DLLs |
| T1547.004 | Winlogon Helper DLL |
| T1547.005 | Security Support Provider |
| T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking |
| TA0003 | Persistence Tactic |
| Autoruns | Sysinternals tool showing persistent entries |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Sysinternals Autoruns | Comprehensive persistence enumeration |
| Velociraptor | Endpoint-wide persistence artifact collection |
| CrowdStrike Falcon | Real-time persistence monitoring |
| Sysmon | Registry and WMI event monitoring |
| OSQuery | SQL-based persistence queries |
| RECmd | Registry Explorer for forensic analysis |
| Splunk | SIEM correlation of persistence events |
Common Scenarios
- Registry Run Key Backdoor: Malware adds
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Runentry pointing to payload in%APPDATA%. - WMI Event Subscription: Adversary creates WMI consumer/filter pair that executes PowerShell on system boot.
- Malicious Service: Attacker creates Windows service with
sc createpointing to a backdoor binary. - COM Object Hijack: Legitimate COM CLSID InprocServer32 path replaced with malicious DLL.
- IFEO Debugger Injection: Image File Execution Options key set with debugger pointing to implant for common utilities.
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-PERSIST-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Persistence Type: [Registry/Service/Task/WMI/COM/Other]
MITRE Technique: T1547.xxx / T1543.xxx / T1053.xxx
Location: [Full registry key / service name / task path]
Value: [Binary path / command line]
Host(s): [Affected endpoints]
Signed: [Yes/No]
Hash: [SHA256]
Creation Time: [Timestamp]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Verdict: [Malicious/Suspicious/Benign]
04 同仓库更多 Skills
openai--sentry--sentry
Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.
ito-basket-compare
Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.
implementing-network-traffic-baselining
Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow/IPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly/daily traffic pattern profiling
detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs
Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.
implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore
Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.
ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns
暂无简介