[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73C5W7JGCNNDQJS9J2KSC3S":3,"skill-same:01M73C5W7JGCNNDQJS9J2KSC3S":96},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":56,"commitSha":57,"skillDirectory":58,"forksCount":59,"repositoryHtmlUrl":60,"repositoryHomepageUrl":61,"ownerHtmlUrl":62,"ownerBlogUrl":63,"ownerDescription":64,"updatedAt":65,"install":66,"resources":79},"01M73C5W7JGCNNDQJS9J2KSC3S","hunting-for-dcsync-attacks",null,"Detect DCSync attacks by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 for unauthorized DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests from non-domain-controller accounts.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-dcsync-attacks\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-dcsync-attacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: hunting-for-dcsync-attacks\ndescription: Detect DCSync attacks by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 for unauthorized\n  DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests from non-domain-controller accounts.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- dcsync\n- active-directory\n- credential-access\n- t1003.006\n- mimikatz\n- windows\n- dfir\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Network Isolation\n- Network Traffic Analysis\n- Client-server Payload Profiling\n- Platform Monitoring\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1003\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\nsource_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d\n---\n\n# Hunting for DCSync Attacks\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for DCSync credential theft (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006)\n- After detecting Mimikatz or similar tools in the environment\n- During incident response involving Active Directory compromise\n- When monitoring for unauthorized domain replication requests\n- During purple team exercises testing AD attack detection\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled (Event ID 4662)\n- Audit Directory Service Access enabled via Group Policy\n- Domain Computers SACL configured on Domain Object for machine account detection\n- SIEM with Windows event data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)\n- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller accounts and replication partners\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Enable Auditing**: Ensure Audit Directory Service Access is enabled on domain controllers.\n2. **Collect Events**: Gather Windows Event ID 4662 with AccessMask 0x100 (Control Access).\n3. **Filter Replication GUIDs**: Search for DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All.\n4. **Identify Non-DC Sources**: Flag events where SubjectUserName is not a domain controller machine account.\n5. **Correlate with Network**: Cross-reference source IPs against known DC addresses.\n6. **Validate Findings**: Exclude legitimate replication tools (Azure AD Connect, SCCM).\n7. **Respond**: Disable compromised accounts, reset krbtgt, investigate lateral movement.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| DCSync | Technique abusing AD replication protocol to extract password hashes |\n| Event ID 4662 | Directory Service Access audit event |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | GUID 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | GUID 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 |\n| AccessMask 0x100 | Control Access right indicating extended rights verification |\n| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Windows Event Viewer | Direct event log analysis |\n| Splunk | SIEM correlation of Event 4662 |\n| Elastic Security | Detection rules for DCSync patterns |\n| Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync | Attack tool used to perform DCSync |\n| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |\n| BloodHound | Identify accounts with replication rights |\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1003.006\nDomain Controller: [DC hostname]\nSubject Account: [Account performing replication]\nSource IP: [Non-DC IP address]\nGUID Accessed: [Replication GUID]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nRecommended Action: [Disable account, reset krbtgt, investigate]\n```\n","# Hunting for DCSync Attacks\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for DCSync credential theft (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006)\n- After detecting Mimikatz or similar tools in the environment\n- During incident response involving Active Directory compromise\n- When monitoring for unauthorized domain replication requests\n- During purple team exercises testing AD attack detection\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled (Event ID 4662)\n- Audit Directory Service Access enabled via Group Policy\n- Domain Computers SACL configured on Domain Object for machine account detection\n- SIEM with Windows event data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)\n- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller accounts and replication partners\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Enable Auditing**: Ensure Audit Directory Service Access is enabled on domain controllers.\n2. **Collect Events**: Gather Windows Event ID 4662 with AccessMask 0x100 (Control Access).\n3. **Filter Replication GUIDs**: Search for DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All.\n4. **Identify Non-DC Sources**: Flag events where SubjectUserName is not a domain controller machine account.\n5. **Correlate with Network**: Cross-reference source IPs against known DC addresses.\n6. **Validate Findings**: Exclude legitimate replication tools (Azure AD Connect, SCCM).\n7. **Respond**: Disable compromised accounts, reset krbtgt, investigate lateral movement.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| DCSync | Technique abusing AD replication protocol to extract password hashes |\n| Event ID 4662 | Directory Service Access audit event |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | GUID 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | GUID 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 |\n| AccessMask 0x100 | Control Access right indicating extended rights verification |\n| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Windows Event Viewer | Direct event log analysis |\n| Splunk | SIEM correlation of Event 4662 |\n| Elastic Security | Detection rules for DCSync patterns |\n| Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync | Attack tool used to perform DCSync |\n| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |\n| BloodHound | Identify accounts with replication rights |\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1003.006\nDomain Controller: [DC hostname]\nSubject Account: [Account performing replication]\nSource IP: [Non-DC IP address]\nGUID Accessed: [Replication GUID]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nRecommended Action: [Disable account, reset krbtgt, investigate]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":34,"domain":35,"source":36,"license":15,"version":37,"nist_csf":38,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":43,"source_commit":49,"d3fend_techniques":50},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33],"threat-hunting","dcsync","active-directory","credential-access","t1003.006","mimikatz","windows","dfir","mahipal","cybersecurity","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","1.0",[39,40,41,42],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[44,45,46,47,48],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1003","04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d",[51,52,53,54,55],"Application Protocol Command Analysis","Network Isolation","Network Traffic Analysis","Client-server Payload Profiling","Platform 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when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":106,"name":107,"nameZh":6,"description":108,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":109,"categories":110,"keywords":111,"publishedAt":20},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":113,"name":114,"nameZh":6,"description":115,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":116,"sourceHtmlUrl":117,"categories":118,"keywords":119,"publishedAt":20},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":121,"name":122,"nameZh":6,"description":123,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":124,"sourceHtmlUrl":125,"categories":126,"keywords":127,"publishedAt":20},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":129,"name":130,"nameZh":6,"description":131,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":132,"sourceHtmlUrl":133,"categories":134,"keywords":135,"publishedAt":20},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":137,"name":138,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":139,"categories":140,"keywords":141,"publishedAt":20},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]