AGENT SKILL

hunting-for-dcsync-attacks

Detect DCSync attacks by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 for unauthorized DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests from non-domain-controller accounts.

License 许可
Apache-2.0
最近更新
2026-11-14
Stars
★ 13
Forks
2

01 前言 Front Matter

name
hunting-for-dcsync-attacks
tags
[ "threat-hunting", "dcsync", "active-directory", "credential-access", "t1003.006", "mimikatz", "windows", "dfir" ]
author
mahipal
domain
cybersecurity
source
https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
license
Apache-2.0
version
1.0
nist_csf
[ "DE.CM-01", "DE.AE-02", "DE.AE-07", "ID.RA-05" ]
subdomain
threat-hunting
description
Detect DCSync attacks by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 for unauthorized DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests from non-domain-controller accounts.
mitre_attack
[ "T1046", "T1057", "T1082", "T1083", "T1003" ]
source_commit
04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d
d3fend_techniques
[ "Application Protocol Command Analysis", "Network Isolation", "Network Traffic Analysis", "Client-server Payload Profiling", "Platform Monitoring" ]

02 资源文件 3

03 SKILL.md 正文

Hunting for DCSync Attacks

When to Use

  • When hunting for DCSync credential theft (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006)
  • After detecting Mimikatz or similar tools in the environment
  • During incident response involving Active Directory compromise
  • When monitoring for unauthorized domain replication requests
  • During purple team exercises testing AD attack detection

Prerequisites

  • Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled (Event ID 4662)
  • Audit Directory Service Access enabled via Group Policy
  • Domain Computers SACL configured on Domain Object for machine account detection
  • SIEM with Windows event data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
  • Knowledge of legitimate domain controller accounts and replication partners

Workflow

  1. Enable Auditing: Ensure Audit Directory Service Access is enabled on domain controllers.
  2. Collect Events: Gather Windows Event ID 4662 with AccessMask 0x100 (Control Access).
  3. Filter Replication GUIDs: Search for DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All.
  4. Identify Non-DC Sources: Flag events where SubjectUserName is not a domain controller machine account.
  5. Correlate with Network: Cross-reference source IPs against known DC addresses.
  6. Validate Findings: Exclude legitimate replication tools (Azure AD Connect, SCCM).
  7. Respond: Disable compromised accounts, reset krbtgt, investigate lateral movement.

Key Concepts

Concept Description
DCSync Technique abusing AD replication protocol to extract password hashes
Event ID 4662 Directory Service Access audit event
DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUID 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All GUID 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2
AccessMask 0x100 Control Access right indicating extended rights verification
T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync

Tools & Systems

Tool Purpose
Windows Event Viewer Direct event log analysis
Splunk SIEM correlation of Event 4662
Elastic Security Detection rules for DCSync patterns
Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync Attack tool used to perform DCSync
Impacket secretsdump.py Python-based DCSync implementation
BloodHound Identify accounts with replication rights

Output Format

Hunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1003.006
Domain Controller: [DC hostname]
Subject Account: [Account performing replication]
Source IP: [Non-DC IP address]
GUID Accessed: [Replication GUID]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Disable account, reset krbtgt, investigate]

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